

Some remarks on illocutionary force and evidentiality

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This paper examines Faller's (2019) proposal to account for discourse commitments and reportative evidentiality in declarative clauses based on (i) the illocutionary force of presentation and (ii) the Collaborative Principle (Walker 1996). Key for (i) are a principal and an animator (Goffman 1974). The latter presents a proposition but need not be committed to its truth; the commitment lies in the principal—this characterizes reportative evidentials. In their absence (i.e., the default case), however, the animator and the principal are the same individual; assertion follows from this. As for (ii), the absence of overt disagreement towards the at-issue proposition means that the animator intends to resolve the question under discussion with it. Based on evidence from the reportative *dizque* in American Spanish and the direct $-\emptyset$ in Southern Aymara, I propose that the only thing that presentation does is to put an issue on the table, making it the most basic illocutionary force there is (i.e., commitments to the at-issue proposition by a principal are not a necessary component of presentation). I further revise the Collaborative Principle where crucially the commitment to the truth of the at-issue proposition by discourse participants is assumed in general. I further discuss cases where the speaker has no intention of resolving the question under discussion. Assertion arises as a result of presentation and pragmatic strengthening.