Inequalities, deprivation, absence, misery-of-position and well-being. "Now't the'er": distinction, credentialisation, valuation, competence and trauma.

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Abstract:
I want to look at the relation between realised differences, closures and the conditions of possibility that govern the ascription of competencies. I want to consider relational aspects that subtend access to experiences whose objectivisation constitute some as functional and objectified, whilst others undergo a de-realisation that violates them. Why are labour market criteria as they are: what is their social logic? What are the conditions the devalued face and why are these conditions so ontologically terminal?

Keywords: Absence, actualisation, competence, competition, credentials, deprivation, distinction, labour-market, mental-health, negation, ostracism, possibility, trauma, value.

Introduction

Any consideration of austerity in Britain has to consider how contemporary conditions produce behaviours whose sense are impossible to trace without an understanding of the mediations constitutive of how individuals experience being-realised-in-relation-to actualities devoid of possibility. As one older worker narrated:

Ah left school in nineteen sixty five an’ then yer could do owt yer wanted, yer could do any trade, get a job, thi’d train yer, yer could gu to college an’ du any trade yer wanted, Ah left school Friday, started w’k Monday after. Then Thatcher cem in, [moves hands and fans fingers outward pushing hands away from the centre of the stomach] voom, it all went, thi’ wo’ now’t the’er fo’ young ‘uns, an’ it’s bin same ever since, it’ll never bi same age’an nahr.

What is interesting is how the very possibility of positing “the notion of the possible” (Bourdieu 1979: 16) now seems miraculous because of the poverty of possibilities available in an economy in which excessive labour market competition erodes the capacity of individuals to sustain any contact with conditions conducive to the maintenance of their own dispositional capacities. The absence of possibility is captured via the notion of emptiness that arises as an effect of the negations tacitly constituted in a labour market in which access to possibilities is excessively institutionally mediated so that the most devalued face chronic insecurity and non-possibility:

Now’t’s secure. Everythin’s bin shit since Thatcher. Wiy us wi’ could get apprenticeships, yer din’t earn a lot but yer ‘ad a future, yer learned yer trade. Instead’r w’kin’ fo’ someb’dy yer’ve...agency to pay, it’s a lot a fuckin’ messin’ abaha ‘cos they fuck up all the...time so yer ‘avin’ to ring ‘em up when yer get in from work ‘cos thi’ never get yer pay right, so, yer’ve no security. It’s all casual. It’s no different nahr to ahr it was all through history it’s just w’se nahr than when Ah wo’ young. Ah feel sorry fo’ young ‘uns, yer can’t blame ‘em fo’ bein’ like thi’ ahr. Thi’s now’t the’er fo’ ‘em an’ what’s the’er is ohnny the’er to exploit ‘em. Ah see it in’ grandkids when thi’ dun’t want to work or learn, thi’ want everythin’ nahr, so thi’ tek owt thi’ can when thi’ can, thi’ll not invest in future like we did, but we could, yer see, because wi’ knew thi’ wo’ someaht the’er, we could learn any trade
an’ work an’ earn enough to feed an fetch a family up, nahr it’s all fucked. Ah pity young people, Ah do, yer can’t blame ‘em fo’ bein’ ahr thi’ ahr.

This person describes the temporal immanentalism arising from economic dislocation, and the powerlessness arising from it, "Th’is now’t the’er fo’ ‘em an’ what’s the’er is ohnny the’er to exploit ‘em. Ah see it in’ grandkids when thi’ dun’t want to work or learn, thi’ want everythin’ nahr", as Bourdieu puts it: "convinced that he has no means of acting effectively on his future...the peasant feels himself responsible only for the act" (Bourdieu 1979: 26). This reduction is an effect of the absence of mediations that connect individuals to possibilities that inhere in meanings that originate in a world whose source requires relational constitution. What is articulated with a sense of the historical tragedy manifest in the different dispositions arising from changes in the mediations that constitute economic structures, perceived via the sense inscribed as an effect of the conditions depicted, is akin to what Bourdieu describes:

To tear oneself from the world in order to confront or master it is to tear oneself from the immediate present and the imminent “forthcoming”, an urgency and threat with which the present is fraught. The sub-proletarian, locked in the present, knows only the free-floating indefinite future of his daydreams. Because the field of possibles has the same limits as the field of objective possibilities, the individual project and the revolutionary consciousness are closely allied. Before individual practices -- not least, economic acts -- can be organized in accordance with a life-plan and before a systematic, rational awareness of the economic system as a system can be formed, there has to be some relaxation in the pressure of the economic necessity which forbids that suspension of fascinated adherence to the present "given" without which no "lateral possible" can be posited. It follows that to the different stages of the process leading from existence abandoned to chance to economic conduct regulated by calculation, correspond different forms of awareness of unemployment... (Bourdieu 1979: 50)

What is interesting is how a world of possibilities, "we could learn any trade": because it offered actualisation, was perceived as founding membership of a world whose erosion has profoundly affected the dispositions of later generations who face a world that is, not merely, chronically limited in its horizons but highly exploitative, "what’s the’er is ohnny the’er to exploit ‘em", manifesting an understanding of the structuring efficacy of the institutional mediations constitutive of the possibilities available to the young. How people insert themselves into non-organized, non-institutionalised activities in order to earn a living and why people “develop alternatives in matters of production and organization” (Max-Neef 1991: 69) in the invisible sectors of the contemporary market, adopting survival trades in relation to the need to generate income emerges in the following:

Ah forgot mi pass [for pool] today, Ah an’t got money to pay till next week. Ah an’t got any new w’k on. Ah need to get some new jobs. Ah packed that job in ‘cos shi wun’t pay mi ‘olid’y money an’ wun’t gi’ mi a pound a week pay-rise. Every body else would pay mi the extra one-pound but ‘er. Shi spends twelve pahnd a week on lottery an’ wain’t pay mi an extra quid-a-week. Shi sent mi a card when Ah wo’ off badly, an’ rung mi ‘up sayin’ “oh Ah an’t got nobody to do mi cleanin’” an’ yer think, "well pay mi, mi extra quid an Ah’ll do it". Ah’m livin’ on seventy-seven quid a week: it’s a good job mi mortgage is paid fo’ or Ah’d bi on street corners: Ahr much can yer get fo’ sex these days?

S: What will yer do abaht yer swim? Ah can lend yer some till yer get paid if yer want?
Ah shall not gu. Ah shan’t bi doin’ owt. Ah shall just ‘ave to stay in. Ah can’t affo’ord petrol fo’ car so Ah shall ohnny use car fo’ mi jobs what Ah need t’ get paid. So Ah shall bi in on mi own till
Sunday then Monday Ah’ll bi back fo’ a swim.

In the words of someone else:

Mi’ Father’s bin on that thing where yer get old an’ gu on sick on dole, Ah’ve bin on an’ off job centre fo’ years. Ah w’k wi’ mi da’ at weekends, Ah ohnny w’k weekends, on cars, not enough w’k, no money abaat, so wi’ just do what wi’ can, when wi’ can. Mi Da’ teaches mi ahr t’ w’k on cars ‘cos he trained fo’ that befo’re hi lost his job. Ah’m on benefits, now’t t’ bi ashamed’r. Don’t really matter…I an’t got no career, no future or nothin’, Ah just do mi cars to mek a few bob when Ah can.

I just same as you bro in twenny or thi’ty y’rs time, Ah an’t got no things, din’t gu to school much, din’t do no exams or nothin’, Ah’ve not worked…just forget things…Ah like to do mi cars, Ah do them fo’ nothin’, bin ova drawn two times this week to pay fo’ bills fo’ mi ‘ouse. I dun’t like greedy people, Ah know we need money to live but Ah dun’t like greedy.

As someone else articulated:

Ah cun’t afo’ord eight quid t’ train last week. Did tha’ watch that programme last week abaht them in prison in America? …Ah watched it an’ thought, “what nice folks”, thi’ wo’ like us weren’t thi’? …That’s ahr it gets yer, like mi’, Ah’d bi better off in prison. Ah can’t afo’ord t’ put ‘eatin’ on. Ah an’t ‘ad a bath fo’ a week ‘cos Ah can’t afo’ord to ‘eat water up. Ah mean, if someb’d’y cem t’ mi an’ asked mi “can yer look after these drugs fo’ two grahnd”, Ah cun’t turn ‘em dahn. Ah can’t afo’ord food, rait, it’s just tranna eke aht stale bread wi’ a tin’r beens.

The reality of the destruction of the dispositions required to function in the contemporary economy is captured by a younger worker:

Yer can’t tek piss aht’r kids ‘cos thi’ dun’t wanna du owt an’ thi’ full’r attitude ‘cos that’s come dahn from owder generation who’ve past it dahn ‘cos they wo’ shat on, wi’ YTS, all these employment an’ trainin’ schemes that wo’ just slave labour. It’s not any different nahr to ahr it wo’ fo’ me, no jobs, shit trainin’ schemes, crap courses at college, it’s not changed just it’s got w’se.

The words of one college lecturer sum up the protracted, attenuated, educational process that fills the void of opportunities with preparation for notional pseudo-trades that increase the rate of exploitation as individuals attempt to finance an educational process that replaces their benefits with debt under the notion of a self-development whose impossibility is experienced via the frustration of an unrealisation that is an effect of incapacities arising from a dislocation that the education perpetuates as it becomes the mechanism for obscuring the high levels of unemployment required to sustain labor market flexibility and low-wages and ensure the invisibility of the structural condition that neoliberalism presumes:

There is no labour market, I feel miserable with the whole business of perpetuating this, I feel like I am selling timeshares and not worrying about the consequences of selling the hope. My only real conceleation is that I dont earn as much as some who promote this whole unethical process…I don’t really understand why we need these qualifications, after all there is no viable career to pursue with them unless you stay in education and research, or you are in science and the research is of relevance. Most jobs that we now produce in this country the average person with good A levels could undertake. I ask you why would you need Masters to teach in FE. And would what you learn in it be any use anyway, that is why I never wished to enter into the whole process its shyte…I don’t think the kids care anymore, they have no career plan and realise that there is little for them in the death valley…The fact is there is a queue who will do these jobs so supply forces down the value even further. Most students go and do worthless jobs and they are the lucky ones. They are affected the hoplessness manifests itself in the fact they dont care…The kids I deal with are in education because they have no idea about a focussed career path. School ill prepares these…people and primarily concentrates on statistical league tables, easy GCSE’s and irrelevant
subjects...Many disengage altogether...These students that stay in education have little idea of a
direction and a formalised desire to obtain awards at little physical cost to themselves. They have
little desire to learn...and accept...that they are not destined to achieve much...the colleges are
culturally, economically and strategically distanced from the very sector that they theoretically are
there to support. They realised a long time ago they entertain young people who work hard at
school and who have no pathway but have to be in education to the age of 18 as said by
government. Forty years ago when I left there were apprenticeships but now nothing. Let’s chase
the money and get students to come to our college. Do a course then sod em. The courses are so
bad that employers have no idea but in their rush to appease share holders will spend no money on
training. In education last year there were no books or computers for students they had to buy
there own if parents could afford them. This is where nationalised companies are better as they
don’t have this problem. Thatcher stopped all that. Hence no industry, low skilled jobs and focus on
lowering employment by creating an economy that relies on foreign investment. RCAT do furniture
making...who the hell makes furniture by hand? Wrong century. Ninety per cent of people finishing
that won’t get a job needing those skills the other one per cent will get a job in an organisation
selling furniture like IKEA if they lucky. They...teach courses but then ditch the students on
completion...there is never access to impartial and supportive advice...because courses are funded
on student numbers so staff sold the courses to potential students to ensure they had a job...Staff
do everything to keep em and virtually do the work as it’s all based on course work so no one fails
to ensure retention and achievement is at national benchmark or above. Lower than that means
that when Offsted look at the figures it impacts on the college grade. Most people in FE worry
more about Offsted than the Shyte students were being peddled and they were glad to be rid as
long as retention and completion figures were above national benchmark figures...What they
should say is if a course has high achievement it is worthless and if it’s humanities with that type of
profile it’s even worse than that. Employers now know this and ignore humanities subjects unless
key subjects from red brick universities. Doncaster like Rotherham (old Doncaster gate hospital site)
are validated by uni’s who fight each other to get the money from validation. FE is all it is and its not
even A level as the work is low and the students struggle but it penalises those that are bright as
they work and end up with the same worthless qual. Science don’t have that profile it’s too hard to
fiddle the results and that’s why it’s not in FE colleges as it knackers their inspection profile. They
get paid on retention and achievement not on whether the students have anything that gets them a
job. Now colleges are full of ex-students who teach because they have a degree but cant get a job.
Now the government say colleges are there to prepare the young for employment, but look at it.
Offsted assess and give grades, staff teach and students go through a vacuous process that is a
process of destroying their personal confidence. The irony is all the parties involved have never
worked in commerce, industry or anything other than education. The only courses worth following
are construction and engineering but the staff don’t last because they realize how corrupt the
process is and go back to industry because it’s more rewarding than watching kids get sold down
the river by a process of little benefit to them. I taught kids and I do not want to see them
enjoyin’ the pool and then sayin’, "right, get out’r this pool, we’ve taught you to swim but you can’t do it again" because that is ahr it is wi’ these
subjects, yer can study them, but thi’s now’t else yer can du wi’y ‘em. I lost hope years ago.

We see that education arises from divisions that affect its form. What you have are
attempts to produce the appearance of auxiliary positions in the labour market,
under the guise of education and training, whose relationships of involvement are
not analogous to those characteristic of the labour market function, even in relation
to what people are supposed to be training in, and, thereby, consequentially,
people’s labour is not recognised and their labour power is undermined by its
constitutive conditions, which is, practically, why credentials are not validated and
pathways lead nowhere but to the perpetuation of a condition relating to the private
sphere of capital, the original position, which is transfigured into new ways of being-
perceived that legitimate discrimination via these modes of reproduction that favour
societies with a pressing need to obscure functional structural unemployment. Because of the closures constitutive of the objectifications that determine access, there are only really transferable skills for those in employment, those who purchase devalued credentials find their credentials unrecognised and are forced to function as consumers of further credentials which are then degraded by the structural relationships that subtend valuation, recognition and objectification. As another lecturer describes:

> Our higher education section, we call it, “theatre ‘r dreams”, tekin’ piss, wi’ ‘ad this one kid, thi’ took ‘im on level 1, then thi’ ‘ad ‘im on HNC, lookin’ to pass ‘im on to ‘Allam, end’r day hi’s twenty-five nahr, Ah saw ‘im a few week back, ‘is back on benefits. It’s just movin’ people aboht, gettin’ ’em off benefits an’ into co’ourses. Ah’ve got a dog, it’s a bit’r a bastard, an’ Ah ‘ad this guy come aht, an’ hi’ ses to mi’ “whe’er’d yer w’k?” Ah ses, “Donny college”, hi ses “ohr Ah used to w’k the’er, is it still same shit ‘ole?” Ah ses, [looks down] “ye’, ye, it is”. He used to teach Sociology and Criminology an’ hi ses “get aht’r it mate while yer still can, befo’ore yer too old t’ escape”. Hi ses to me, “Ah’ll tell yer what ‘appens in the’er, if yer good at yer job, yer stay whe’er yer ahr an’ if yer a useless lazy cunt, thi’ promote yer, an’ all them what can get aht, get aht, an’ all that’s left is them who can’t do fuck all else”. An’ hi’s rait. Ah wo’ like a lot’r kids rahnd ‘ere, interested in sport, yer think yer might like to work in a gym or someaht, Ah ‘ad one today ring up, “Ah want to w’k in a gym, Ah’ve been told Ah need t’ do a course at college, Ah’ve yer got ‘owt?” an’ yer s’posed to sell ‘em a route that spins money aht, but Ah ses “try an’ get a job if yer can, otherwise yer can do level 1 sport science”. Thing is, like wi’ me, yer do so much thi’ mek it sound natural t’ just do another year an’ another year an’ then do the degree, when yer come aht, yer strugglin’ an’ yer end up in teachin’ ‘cos PGCE is all yer can do an’ yer not wantin’ t’ just gu back on benefits. So yer end up in teachin’, debted up to eyeballs an’ w’kin’ in a place like Donny college to pay it off.

Talking to another academic, he said the following:

> I’ve been teaching at Huddersfield, not sure I’ll last much longer, I am looking for a way out of it, what we teach is all out of date compared to industry and I tend to spend a lot of time arguing with other members of staff who want to carry on teaching stuff that’s well out of date. (S: Do you find industry more rewarding?) Ye’, it’s more cutting edge because it’s up-to-date and has to be or it won’t be competitive so I’d rather go back before I get stuck and my skills are out-of-date because I’m in education.

The latter testimony manifests the problems arising via this structural support for practices whose viability depends upon the artificial support the contrivance of educational processes provides to those whose practice is itself displaced via the distance between fields which makes it difficult to introduce students to the responsively acquired non-inferential forms arising from experiences of being embedded in a context whose disclosure constitutes the forms incorporated via such a positioning so that these forms simultaneously constitute the ability, its sense and the forms of value arising from being involved in such conditions of existence. The relations constitutive of the space in which institutions are located effects the nature of the process that students undergo. The institutional apparatus supposed to address the absence of possibilities merely transposes a lack of opportunity into an unrealisation that leads to the incorporation of the sense of an absence that is the physiognomically materialised trace of inabilities that are effects of such conditions. The institutional apparatus supposed to address the effects of a decontextualisation that is itself an effect of the negation of aggregates constituted via such objectivising
processes merely perpetuates a sense of incapacity that is an effect of a negation that comes to life via the stigma immanent to having access to nothing, that is, to experiencing nothing as a constitutive aspect of one's public objectivity. Products of such conditions enter university with CVs already stigmatized, usually pursuing educational pathways that only compound deficits as their insignificance elicits the neglect constitutive of the absence of anything characteristic of their experience of university. The process individuals underwent is well captured in the following:

Yer wo talked onto a course that bore no resemblance to ahr it wo’ described to yer...an’ thi then betray yer by not even bein’ able to teach yer prop’ly, so when yer get the’er yer thinkin’ “well what’s ‘appennin’ ‘ere, thi’ can’t fuckin’ teach mi, what, the’ere not doin’ anythin’ thi’ said thi’ would do...to fuckin’ support mi or gi mi what it is that Ah needed”, so instead’r you walkin’ away wi’ this qualification thinkin’ “that wo’ a load’r shite”...what yer’ve got to do to keep yer fuckin’ sanity is...they use that by saying “Ohr yer just needed to do this, or yer just needed to tidy that up or yer just need this extra course to mek what yer’ave done mean someaht extra”, so yer thinkin’ “fuckin’ ‘ell...it’s never endin’”, but eventually thi’ give it yer an’ yer think “fuckin’ ‘ell Ah’ve got it”, do yer know what Ah mean, “at least Ah’ve got it nahr”...yer get a feelin’ ‘r euphoria wi’ that, so yer walk away wi’ this feelin’ ‘r euphoria an’ that’s the con...thi’ve fuckin’ conned yer, ‘cos thi’ve let yer dahn fuckin’ dreadfully but thi’ve done it such a way that meks yer walk away thinkin’ “fuckin’ ‘ell Ah’ve got it nahr, Ah’ve got someaht what the fuck does this mean, is it gunna mek a fuckin’ difference”, ‘cos yer’ve b’in so fuckin’ desperate to struggle through all these hoops, yer think “fuck, it must mean someaht”, an yer re-energised to gu on to next stage an’ then yer walk in an’ who the fucks the’er but that fuckin’ twat who cun’t teach yer rait last fuckin’ time, but yer stuck by then, ‘cos yer on that fuckin’ treadmill...It’s all abaat, it’s all abaat education’s got to promote education, education in real terms is nothin’ to do wi’gettin’...anywher’...Education is just another institution that has to fuckin’ promote itself...What makes people sick, what I have done is, at uni’, I should have left in first couple’re months, I should’ve said I can’t do this, in sense ‘r Ah can’t make this, it’s not suitin’ me, I can’t do anythin’, it’s not gunna me anywhere, then we have to tek piss aht of it to protect ourselves...because the people who’re teachin’ are lookin’ at the people who the’re helping, sayin’ “Why would anyone not want this great gift wi’ want to give them?”...what makes yer sick...is thi’ don’t want to go on but thi’ can’t stop because thi’ve already med everyone around them suffer...yer’ve yer family involved, yer’ve got to try and get somethin’ out of it...I actually failed a dozen fuckin’ people as well, I have to live wi’ that now fo’ the rest of mi life ‘cos there’s nothin’ Ah can do abaat it.

Whilst academics realise themselves via interpersonal aspects that constitute intersubjective donations of significance that constitute their experience of being capable of manifesting properties whose sense they experience via the relational basis of such modalities, students exist as the foil, the medium, via which such aspects are extorted and they exist outside of the relational conditions that embed such constitutive aspects, they exist outside of the interpersonal grounds of the cultural forms they attempt to acquire, alone, and so, they experience a caesura arising from the absence of such embedding, they experience "this great gift" as useless and their attempts to project as absurd. This raises a question. Why do academics want others, and believe it is beneficial for others, to undergo a process that consists of so little? Moreover, clearly whilst the need to institute the appearance of 'access' is a fundamental aspect of the production of the public legitimacy of state-financed institutions, clearly their infiltration by particular sectional interests, exploits this need via interpersonally exploitative expressive transactions which, whilst they realise some in relation to an experience of commitment, are experienced as vacuous, and bankrupt, by the supposed
beneficiaries of the process, who experience merely the absurdity of cultural forms whose grounds of sense remain unavailable. What is only too clear is the paralysis arising from educational processes that consist of the production of a syllabus derived from fragments of disciplines that cannot offer a pathway or direct embedding because the capital derived from the educational process is as autonomous as the educational process is dislocated. Whilst educationalists can derive sources of value that further their own employment and economic interests, students, clearly, experience the condition as merely another form of what its mediations mirror: unemployment. What is illuminated by the testimony is an incommensurability rooted in distances, how can those who want people to embrace education experience it as a great gift when it is, clearly, a source of misery for the supposed beneficiaries? And, how can academics who actually offer so little mistake the poverty of what they offer for a "great gift"? One can appreciate why Bourdieu says:

> Capital in its various forms is a set of pre-emptive rights over the future; it guarantees some people the monopoly of some possibles although they are officially guaranteed to all (such as the right to education). The exclusive rights consecrated by law are only the visible, explicitly guaranteed form of this set of appropriated chances and pre-empted possibles, which are thereby converted, for others, into *de jure* exclusions or *de facto* impossibilities, through which present power relations are projected into the future, orienting present dispositions in return. (Bourdieu 2000: 225)

People are future-faked to extort an investment, condescended to in order to get them to remain on-track, and then, finally, humiliated, publicly, by the poverty of the significance arising from the absence of anything involving or embedding that characterises the education available to them. Money spun out of institutional hocus-pocus leaves the exploited confused and disoriented by a malaise that emerges from a dislocation the processes merely perpetuate. The disillusionment is manifest in other sites which mediate social presence:

> ...Ah w’k at benefits on security, it’s horrendous, attitude, aggression, yap, that [opens and closes right hand to immitate a mouth speaking], thi’ think thi’ve a right to everythin’: "whe’er’s mi money", one come in wantin’ travel money t’ gu to see ‘er fAther in Africa, thi’ stuck ‘er wi’ me an’ thi’ said, “we ‘ave to giy everyone the chance to apply”. It’s a system that’s frustratin’ em an’ all the aggression comes from the frustration, it’s a system wi’ now’t the’er an us on do’ors are front line between them an’ what they see as’ system.

**Difference, valuation, manner and destiny**

What I want to consider are the forms that are constitutive of the reality whose sense individuals bear as part of the shapes that render this reality recognisable via the constitution of forms that individuals perceive as immanent aspects of the conditions that sediment sensible properties which are consequential because these grounds are materialised in order to realise particular distinctions which are incorporated via instantiated patterns that are physiognomically materialised aspects of experiences of being subject to the reality of such differences. The way things make sense, arises from subjection to instantiated patterns that radiate significance via tacit aspects of manner that realise individuals so that they incorporate a sense conveyed via expressivity, or manner, that affects the
orientation of interaction, thereby being consequential and destining. Differences constitute a fabric whose interpersonal disclosure realise individuals in relation to forms that affect the intentional impetus experienced via existing in relation to such processes. Intentional aspects are realised via the interpersonal disclosure of the forms constitutive of this fabric. Via immersion in a form of life whose tangibility arises from the way individuals are touched and affected by the sense of forms incorporated via osmosis and manifest via the way presence bears the sense of mimetically acquired shapes that allude, via the nature of such processes, to aggregative differences that constitute the world arising from a point within a continuum constituted via difference, we are oriented via forms that affect the life available to us. The sociocultural grounds via which we acquire our objectivity arise as aspects of the reality of the social world. Individuals exist via the functional shapes they experience being realised in relation to so that presence is a conveyor of sense which is unthought and non-representational: presence is infused with intentional radiances arising from their incorporation in the grounds of instantiated patterns. These radiating configurations are self-evolving materialisations that constitute the irreducible contextualisation that generates what presence implies. Intentionality emerges as a phenomena of assimilation in relation to incorporations whose realised forms are tangible aspects emerging via actualisation in relation to configurations which are enacted, public, sense-relational forms that are aspectually constituted, disclosed, so that individuals’ dispositions emerge via processes of recognition that are part of their incorporation, manifesting how individuals are touched by the sense of environments. In other words, presence bears the sense of realisations that are part of the emergence of relationally disclosed objectivities incorporated as aspects which tacitly refer to shapes constitutive of the sense that reality emerges via so that all cultural forms are positioned in relation to this background. One must understand the sense that has evolved historically via circumscriptions that render determinate forms whose sense individuals bear which are constitutive of how they experience being. Layers of social sense arise via constitutive forms that emerge as forms of existence that are sense-relationally constituted effects of the ways individuals experience being as a result of surreptitiously incorporated aspects arising from the circulation of significances rooted in impersonal, anonymous, interactions that constitute the public world. The non-discursive configurations of sense realized as objective forms via constitutive aspects of the exchange of significances that arise via the pre-reflective mimesis that is an effect of our ability to incorporate forms via our experience of being realised in relation to them, when we are absorbed in moments whose disclosure, constitute such aspects, ensure that existence emerges via a process of constant permutation in which historically sedimented dispositions arise as relational actualities, sensible to those who share the grounds inscribed in the configurations arising via such attunement. Restricted realms of possibility mediate forms of unrealisation that constitute a quasi-normative aura embedded in a visceral sensitivity that induces certain configurational forms without their grounds being visible. Behaviour absorbs an order via the sense of distances so that sense constitutes patterns which are practically incarnated so that they need never require the conflict immanent to the valuations which circumscribe the lives of the devalued. These forms of unrealisation lead to the pervasive silence of a form of life whose constitutive
moments, inhering in nonrepresentational aspects of intentionality, are beyond textual representation. The way individuals experience being is ineffably manifest in radiated aspects arising via the unrealisation characteristic of the poor. The ineffable is an effect of the conditions that presence manifests because of the tenacious friction that exposure to conditions of incorporative realisation exert on the forms of sense individuals experience being in relation to. This fabric is a constitutive, non-representational, medium that affects the sense individuals bear as a consequence of possibilities they experience being via. As one lecturer described the sense of young people, “These fuckers ‘ave got nothing, thi’ve got no drive at all, yer se’ to ‘em, “what du yer want to do?” “I don’t know”, “What yer gunna do? “I don’t know”, if Ah se’ to ‘em “do some research on yer own” thi’ gu “fuck that, can’t you tell us a web page?” Thi’ just ‘ave no idea an’ no drive, no ambition, thi’ dun’t wanna work at all”. As someone else described:

Nahr, the stuff we do nahr wi’ school leavers it’s just so basic yer wonder what the point of even doin’ it is, it’s a way’r mekin’ it look like thi’ doin’ someaht in college an’ that’s abaht it. Thi’ just settin’ kids up to fail, thi’ gi’d nothin’ that is gunna count anywhere, the kids know straight away, but thi’ gu along wi’y it ‘cos it’s all thi’ can really do, what thi’ gunna do? Gu’ dahn job centre, which is an awful fuckin’ place, so thi’ gu along wi’ college, but what’s it offer? Thi’ know thi’ gunna fuckin’ fail, an’ ‘you know it, but thi’ gu along wi’y it, an’ we gu along it ‘cos it’s what yer ‘ave to do. Thi’ ohnny fuckin’ comin’ t’ colleges just fo’ fuckin’ warm an’ get ‘em aht’r ‘ouse. So, Ah think thi’ know, an’ a lot’r the kids ahr get, although wi’ get ‘em aht’r level one, level two, level three, thi’ wain’t gu fuckin’ anywhere, mate, thi’ end up guin’ to do mo’ore same at ‘allam but it’s just drawin’ it aht. Kids’r fucked off, who can blame ‘em? Ma students can see ahr bad it is, it’s why thi’ wain’t fuckin’ w’k. Other day Ah ses to ‘em, rait wi’ll do some basketball, then thi’ ses, “can’t we gu to library an’ du research?” Ah ses “yer allous guin’ an abaht none’r it’s practical an’ so Ah do some practical an’ yer wan’t t’ gu to library!”’ but all it is, is, thi’ want t’ gu to library so thi’ can toss it off, an’ this is on foundation level sport science. So, ye’ thi’ know ahr bad it is, thi’ just dun’t see point in w’kin’, that’s ahr Ah see it an’ what we do wi’y ‘em, it meks it look like thi’ duin’ someaht but really, what skills thi’ gunna ‘ave, spend a lot’r years studyin’ t’ write aht a trainin’ sheet fo’ a gym?

Bourdieu suggests that the basis of our experience of temporality is our subjective expectations and objective chances, and suggests that it is the volume of capital possessed, the individual’s value, that determines their capacity to accede to modalities born of possibility, he speaks of:

The extreme dispossession of the subproletarian—whether of working age or still in that ill-defined zone between schooling and unemployment or underemployment in which many working-class adolescents are kept, often for a rather long time—brings to light the self-evidence of the relationship between time and power, by showing that the practical relation to the forthcoming, in which the experience of time is generated, depends on power and the objective chances it opens. (Bourdieu 2000: 223)

Clearly, with such conditions constitutive of the lives of those in this ill-defined zone between schooling and unemployment, it is clear that people do not accede to an experience, born of absorption in interpersonally engaging mediations, of "time as something so self-evident as to pass unnoticed" (Bourdieu 2000: 223), involvement in a sphere of engagement constitutes modalities arising from acceding to a sense of purpose that transforms cognition. Significance, meaning, are emergent aspects of involvement in spheres of practical absorption that constitute capacities arising from being subject to such modalities:
The “for-the-sake-of-which” signifies an "in-order-to"; this in turn, a "towards-this"; the latter, an "in-which" of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the "with-which" of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial whole; they are what they are as this signifying in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational whole of this signifying we call "significance". This is what makes up the structure of the world—the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is. (Heidegger 1962: 120)

The reclassified unemployed intuit the reality via the absence of fundamental modalities constitutive of competence: "thi’ know ahr bad it is, thi’ just dun’t see point in w’kin’, that’s ahr Ah see it an’ what we do wi’y ‘em, it meks it look like thi’ duin’ someaht but really, what skills thi’ gunna ‘ave". Individuals experience the sense emerging via aspects rooted in an absence of contextualisation that is not addressable because of the overall structure of valuations immanent to the forms available to those at the bottom who will undergo educational processes that are distant from any contextualisation that might render what they are attempting to appropriate meaningful: this lack of contextualisation is an essential effect of economic distances which take the form of refracted traces of inabilities for institutions to contextualise students and actually realise them in relation to aspects which intersubjectively donate the forms which render the practice sensible, resulting in students who are not motivated because they experience no reason for doing what they are required to do because of their inability to make choices that deliver them into meaningful contexts as an effect of a fundamental condition whose sense is reproduced via what is available to them. Disillusionment is an effect of unrealisation and non-contextualisation so that individuals don’t experience the intersubjective donations of significance constitutive of the ability-to-believe in what they do because they don’t experience realisation in relation to a form of existence in which they incorporate a sense of bearing a competence as an effect of a contextualisation that is constitutive of their experience of being. One academic spoke of people “whose lives have been institutionally arranged such that they are "destined for failure" because they function as justifications for these institutions to be there in the first place”. One of the major differences in the social hierarchy is contextualisation and an ability to make choices in relation to forms of education that actually realise one in relation to objectified forms that have consequence in relation to labour market practices: much of the education that the poor get is merely manifestation of forms whose sense they incorporate via mediations of difference so that their fundamental position is simply rearticulated. Valuations take the form of realised differences in time as the poor waste time subject to an enforced idleness that corrodes the basis of any belief in what they are attempting to learn outside of access to the forms of realisation constitutive of the form of the competence recognised in the labour market. The decomposition involved in excessive labour market segregation is a really endured personal process of incorporating significances via unrealisations that incapacitate those least resourced. When people say “thi’s now’t the’er”, what they refer to are mediations of nothingness that constitute the absence of possibility for co-presence and realisation in relation to aspects that are consequential to becoming configured via consequential significances that have an economic and labour market function. “Now’t the’er” relates to the absence of the conditions which satisfy intentional
states that inhere in belonging and involvement: in collective forms of intentionality. “Now’t the’er” refers to the absence of a ‘there’ to experience developmental and realising mediations via. It alludes to the constitutive absence of mediations that constitute a context, a ‘there’, to experience developmental mediations in relation to. Given that individuals experience being via ‘the there’ from which they experience being arising, the absence of mediation constitutes an absence of possibility that impoverishes being, curtailing the individual’s actualisation so that they experience the limits inherent to an absence that forecloses upon possibilities. Involvement in disclosures which constitute circumstantial aspects via which individuals experience an appropriation arising from absorption in the sense they experience being physiognomically materialised via such mediations constitutes capacities that inhere in the recognitions which disclose such modalities. Without mediation, without involvement, there is an absence of realisation, an absence of absorptions that engage faculties that require such actualisation. This is why education bereft of opportunities, or contextualisation, merely reproduces the same modalities arising from unemployment, heightening the experience of the absence of mediation by constituting needs that the educational process cannot satisfy. The working class intuit real existential distinctions that relate to the personalised forms that labour market competition produces as an effect of the excessive mediation of differences that attenuate access via institutions whose quality are manifest in the properties individuals embody as an effect of exposure to the grounds via which they incorporate configurations of sense, properties, whose meaning arise as an effect of being attuned via processes that are instantiated on a terrain of distance that transfigure this into the sense of forms whose disclosure are effects of mobilisations that locate individuals, selectively, on a terrain of competence: the middle classes experience being socially realised, via disclosures which constitute resources appropriated as the sense they experience being physiognomically materialised via recognitions that constitute an interpersonally materialised fabric relating to ways of being-there that responsively constitute capacities that inhere in a horizon disclosed via such processes. Because of these materialised divisions which are transmuted into sense-relational aspects, individuals intuitively classify other existential perspectives, necessarily, in relation to the capacity to associate in relation to compatibilities rooted in positions that are constituted via the function of public institutions to realise certain individuals on a terrain of social competence while de-realising others who undergo the progressive disintegration of their physiognomic materiality. This is why one of the key mediations of poverty is unrealisation so that the poor manifest absences arising via the sense-relational constitution of a divide that takes place on the essential ground of being itself so that the poor cannot possess what is unavailable to them: they cannot accede to a command of properties whose sense arise via synchronising configurations exchanged publicly when they face existing outside of any sphere of realisation. The poor experience absences born of a negation which precludes their appropriation of the resources of sense required to constitute themselves socially. There is a real destruction of possibility that the grounds of their experience constitutes that is an experience of an absence of the grounds required to instantiate forms which are an appropriation of possibilities immanent to meanings disclosed which materialise aspects constitutive of being so that de-realisation is a real experience of the absence of
competences which have interpersonal conditions. The 'nothing' that is perceived to exist arises via a way of existing in which absences of sense are inter-relationally constituted by tacit reference to manifestations of what the poor are perceived to lack for them to appear socially viable. The nothingness that is experienced is a real effect of an experience of absence that arises from a lack of the means to show-up as a worthy interlocutor so that space is encountered via an absence of possibilities arising from the sense arising from subjection to the experiential effects of being subject to such modalities. Indeed, the effects of these conditions affect position in the labour market and life-chances. One gets a strong sense of the nature of relative deprivation in the following:

The thing abaat deprived children, yer can’t ‘ave a deprived area wiyahd deprived people, an’ deprived people have deprived children. Yer know, yer know, it’s two and two in’t it? Yer know, it’s there. The’re is a standard, the’re is a standard…

S: What do yer think is the most noticeable thing wi’ deprived children?
Clothes, ahr they look, thi’s a sense of desperateness, or uncontrollableness abaht them…[Pause]…it’s like nothin’s holdin’ ‘em, yer get a sense of fear, comes aht as uncontrolled behaviour, really, they aren’t held by anything wiyahd a community rahnd them fo’ a future, fo’ things thi’ can hope to do, yer know?

For the deprived, the world is shorn of possibilities so that there is an absence of the substrate which constitutes capacities that inhere in the appropriation of forms via experiences of realisation that physiognomically materialise the meaning of being-there such that one experiences capabilities as available, sensible, modalities of a horizon whose disclosure materialises such possibilities. The message conveyed via expressivity, or manner, arises from the lived actuality of existence as it arises from the sense that inheres in its form, its shape, as an aspect of a reality in which individuals, especially poor ones, do not exercise control over how they experience being realised in the world. We glimpse how the absence of possibilities affects individuals who lack access to realisations whose sense arise from intersubjective donations rooted in disclosures which constitute a viability that characterises an experience of being assured of existing consequentially, publicly, so that individuals are assured of capacities arising from an appropriation arising via being-realised in relation to such objectivities. Assurance is rooted in the realisations born of recognitions which disclose such possibilities as actual aspects of public identities whose grounds are constituted via a public sphere whose signifying aura arises via circumscriptions that surreptitiously disclose such modalities as aspects of persons whilst the interpersonal conditions constitutive of such processes are invisible, or visible only via their individuated effects. We can appreciate the way sense pervades the living actuality of embodiment because structural conditions are transubstantiated, via relationships, into incorporated aspects arising from experiencing being subject to such modalities. We can sense the extent to which the world is a signifying aspect expressed in immanent forms, echoes existence manifests, of ways of being affected by conditions that inflect the sense expressed via ways of being realised in relation to it. We see the elemental manner of givenness characteristic of presence relative to the conditions from which its sense arises so that we can intuit the social logic arising from the grounds of subjection to a world constituted via the absence of necessary forms, the forms that human civility requires, to constitute meaningful associational patterns from which capacities can
emerge as aspects of the ways individuals experience being realised. We can appreciate the way the behavioural actuality constitutive of presence emerges from ways of being realised so that aspects become transubstantiated as sense-bearing elements of existential physiognomy that tacitly refer to aspects arising from ways of being-realised, the draughts of circumstance, that flare in expressivities rooted in ways of being affected by the objectivity of such forms as mediators of structural aspects of being. Elements that constitute the behavioural actuality whose sense presence manifests arise from ways of being-realised so that individuals' relationship to the world affects behavioural fluency because individuals need to accede to a coherence that can only be an effect of immersion, involvement and realisation. Such processes constitute a compelling component of the way individuals appear. Conditions accede to a tangibility arising from their effects on expressivity: expressivity arises from experiences of being enveloped by the sense of forms whose disclosure realise us so that sense becomes sedimented as an effect of this pre-objective contact between person and the world. We get a sense of the way an environment becomes ontically involved with its inhabiting subjectivities via the effects of exposure to the interpersonal processes whereby presence becomes infused with the incorporated effects of a context in which individuals exist and what is described is a way of being arising from the way subjectivity is affected by ways of being-there, subject to a sensible context of life as opposed to appropriated by knowing that world representationally. We see how the subjective is affected by the nature of being-in-a-world and how ways of being-affected constitute the terrain of being, "yer get a sense of fear, comes aht as uncontrolled behaviour". We get a sense of the way our vulnerability to the world affects meanings experienced via being exposed to sociocultural forms rooted in the materiality of this subjection, leading individuals to concede something of their own sovereignty because of the way individuals endure informal sanctions that shape their conditions of existence (Marcoulatos 2001). The following articulates how conditions affect the sense that presence manifests:

Most’r schools ave got a proliferation of humanities teachers they are all short of maths and science teachers because they gu to private schools because they get better pay, better students, bright kids, yer gu in schools Ah gu in, thi like bastard Neanderthals, thi' like human garbage, it's not their fault, yer look at kids at eight and nine years old, thi’s nothin' there, the’r horrible, Ah now yer shun't se’ that abaht young kids but the fuck’n horrible, thi nasty bastards, thi look horrible, nasty, thi gunna end up at her majesty's pleasure, thi’ no difference to eighteenth century, just the dregs, thi's nothin' the'er fo' 'em an' it shows in ahr thi' ahr. I looked at some children and they were well behaved but you could see in their eyes the feeling of hopelessness and you could see it in the eyes of some of the staff. It wo’ just as if thi guin under the waves, yer look in the’r eyes, yer want to se, "yer need to get aht’r ’ere", but thi’s now’t the'er, what is the fo’ 'em? Ah could see in the’r eyes thi’ guin' under humanly, like the drownin’ ’cos thi’s now’t t’ the’er fo’ 'em. All these educationalists who think education's a route, what's the point in getting an education to work in a call centre, what are jobs that ahr the'er, thi' not the’er so’ education fills the void, it’s a created industry that creates wealth for an elite. It is a job creation fo' the middle classes but it dun’t du ow’t fo’ majority, just produces debt that keeps the elite aht’r now't but ahr difficult it is to get a job.

The absence of a constitutive medium that is part of a fabric that institutions arise from is alluded to in the expression, "the drownin' 'cos thi’s now’t t’ the’er fo' 'em", the absence of anything that education can relate to reconstitutes the same malaise
that education is supposed to address. The present is experienced as a void, constituted via the absence of the mediations required to accede to intentional forms whose possibility are unavailable via ways of being born of an inexistence arising from the sedimentation of the meaning of being disclosed via such conditions. So that individuals inscribe the sense of what constitutes them publicly. It is because being is appropriated via realisations which constitute the sense of forms which physiognomically materialise a substrate of responsively constituted aspects which inform cognition that the absence of such contextualising mediations constitutes a sense of absence that haunts the expressivity of those who have an impoverished relationship to being because they experience a curtailment arising from their involvement in the world. The interpersonal disclosure of forms in relation to recognitions which constitute ways of being-there-with others materialises a fabric appropriated via the sense of forms which constitute capacities that inhere in accession to modalities whose experience integrate cognitive functions via a coherence arising from absorption in such forms that anchor being in the world. Recognition constitutes circumstantial aspects that engage us in their disclosure so that we experience being absorbed in forms that realise us so that our faculties are mobilised, via the sense we experience being physiognomically materialised via this experience of being-there. Recognition discloses aspects that absorb us in the realisation of such forms and this engagement in sense is a substrate of meanings that engage our faculties so that, via the physiognomic materialisation of such forms, we experience being able to intuit aspects appropriated via such modalities so that we develop through the absorption arising from the realisation of forms which constitute the sense appropriated via experiencing being subject to such mediations. When we are recognised, we are assured of the meaning-of-our-being because others realise us in relation to interpersonal forms that are the basis of capacities that require access to a fabric whose disclosure materialise the sense inscribed via relationships that constitute modalities of engagement that mobilise our faculties so that we are attuned via the sense inscribed in forms appropriated via their physiognomic materialisation. The engagement of our faculties has interpersonal conditions that constitute possibilities to experience intentional aspects that inhere in realisations that inhere in experiencing being via such modalities. In this sense cognitive functions are affected by forms that subtend meanings inscribed via being subject to particular conditions. The developmental conditions required to accede to intentional states requires access to conditions which constitute such possibilities. Individuals need to experience the disclosure of a 'there' whose circumstantial aspects elicit a way of being arising from experiences of realisation that physiognomically materialise such aspects of a world that is constituted via such processes. The aspects experienced via the world, thereby inhere in interpersonal disclosures which constitute meanings experienced via being inscribed in 'the there' being is realised via so that forms of involvement constitute the sense of shapes that arise via subjection to ways of being-there arising from subjection to such processes. Existing, individuals are subject to a world whose sanctions become protensions toward the world they experience being realised in relation to so that realisations constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to such processes so that conditions of existence leave traces via forms, inscribed, that echo, as the sense physiognomy expresses. Without
access to recognition, the devalued face a reduction, interpersonally, that robs them of the circumstantial aspects that constitute a world of possibilities and they experience an impoverishment whose sense they bear because its truth is inscribed via the absence of conditions that constitute intentional states born of realisation. Aspects that inhere in being-in-a-world whose circumstantial forms arise as meanings inscribed via being subject to such possibilities are absent and the devalued are world-impoverished. Without a world, a fundamental relational condition of being is missing and that is what is manifest as the absence, the sense of a less varied cognitive-affective spectrum, manifest in an inexpressivity that is the physiognomic materialisation of an unrealisation born of an insignificance that is transfigured into the sense of absences of expressivity that manifest an impoverishment born of such modalities. But, such incapacities are born of the meaning of being such forms and can be countered by access to enriching experiences, by the creation of human scales that engage and elicit qualities born of humanising influences, but can such possibilities be financed when they exist only to the extent that they can function as a resource? Without access to realisations behavioural fluency is affected and development doesn't occur because a fundamental constitutive aspect of the development of capacities, access to a field of reflexively sensed possibilities, is missing. We absorb capacities via realisations of form which constitute the capacity to intuit their sense. Behavioural fluency is ingrained via realisations that disclose the sense of capacities appropriated via an absorption arising via such modalities. This is why absence of opportunity constitutes a sense of absence that inheres in the expressivity of those whose relation to involving mediations that constitute the basis of consequential forms, justifications for existing, reasons for being, is weak. The devalued manifest incapacities that appear essential attributes of their person and they are really the transubstantiated effects of barriers whose sense they incorporate via being exposed to absences which constitute the meaning-of-being-there, publicly, whenever they attempt to contest resources on public markets. How can individuals bear the sense of an absence? What is being articulated in, "thi like bastard Neanderthals, thi' like human garbage, it's not their fault, yer look at kids at eight and nine years old, thi's nothin' there, the'r horrible, Ah now yer shun't se' that abaht young kids but the fuck'n horrible...just the dregs, thi's nothin' the'er fo’ 'em an’ it shows in ahr thi' ahr'? How can the absence of access to involvement in realising forms mark presence with a sense of the absence of a constitutive relation to a world unless being requires developmental conditions arising relationally that constitute capacities that are behaviourally-manifest-effects of being realised? It is because neurophysiological mechanisms are constituted via responses to disclosures that absorb individuals in forms whose realisation absorb us in possibilities which constitute capacities arising via such modalities so that capacities arise from forms of actualisation that constitute the sense of forms sedimented via their incorporation as ways of being. The absence of possibilities constitutes a sense of incapacities that are effects of the absence of developmental mediations that become manifest via the way presence bears the sense of a way of being devoid of significant aspects, modalities of realisation, whose conditions are not satisfied. Without access to spheres of actualisation, even the cognitive development that arises via the usual form available to the poor, institutionalised self-teaching, is undirected because of
the dislocation of an insignificance that transfigures into a non-objectification and a non-objectivisation whose sense they bear, "thi's nothin' the'er fo' 'em an' it shows in ahr thi' ahr". Their possibilities are manifest via their actuality and circumscribed by it because cognition inheres in developmental relational processes that connect us with a fabric whose disclosure constitute forms appropriated via being subject to such modalities. Our capacities are effects of collectivity, they inhere in belonging and are individualised effects of connections that disclose aspects which infuse being with inflections of absorption that enmesh us in a fabric whose sense we experience being physiognomically materialised so that we experience being subject to possibilities via their actualisation. We acquire capacities as effects of being involved in situations which disclose the forms appropriated via experiences of their physiognomic materialisation so that we experience being able to project via them because we experience their actualisation as a constitutive aspect of being-there, of a context, a 'there' whose disclosive forms we experience via being situated via such mediations. Conditions somehow infect presence because being is a possession of interpersonally disclosed forms which constitute traces of the conditions from which they emerge. The tangibility of social conditions arises from the way being is an effect of its grounding in affectedness, the way the coherence of a cultural world is disclosed via relationships whose sense individuals bear because they are pre-objectively and pre-intentionally enveloped by aspects that are dimensions of our relationship to the world. The persistence of aspects of expressivity arises from ways of being affected by the pre-reflective mimesis that constitutes legible aspects of existence whose incorporation sediment meanings that are objective components of an expressive universe whose autonomy arises from divisions rooted in negations that constitute the sense of absences rooted in experiences of unrealisation that disclose inabilities born of the opacity of aspects, meanings whose forms cannot be experienced, so that existence is denuded of possibilities, constituting poverties of reference that are inscribed aspects of the sense of divisions whose tenacity arise from practices that allude to objectivities sustained via such mediations. The ineffable is manifest via its effects on presence which possesses a viscosity arising from the way we become engulfed by forms we experience being realised in relation to so that limitations are constituted and our capacities delineated so that we face a world of determinate possibilities informed by the tenacity of objectivities arising from the elemental relation between being and world. Sense arises as aspects of interactive processes in which different objectivities find different modalities of realisation via the forms of life characteristic of expressivities that arise from the personalisation of sociocultural conditions that become meaningful by being objectified. Without the embedding of realisations that constitute capacities that inhere in experiences of being able to appropriate aspects because one experiences capacities arising from being subject to such modalities, individuals experience an insecurity born of an insignificance that will characterise all of their public experience. One is reminded of the temporal experience of the pre-capitalist world whose conditions preclude the means to form the dispositions required to function economically in the capitalist world (Bourdieu 1979: 16). The discrepancy between agents economic dispositions and the economic world in which they are situated, emerges here:
Ah caught this lad steelin' diesel from one'r mi tanks an Ah ses "aren't yer scared'r gunna prison", yer know what hi said? "Ahr, but gunna w'k scares mi mo'ore". Thi' just scumbags, thi's no work in 'em. Ah'm tellin' yer, wi' need immigrants because thi' ohnny ones who'll w'k. Lots'r young in areas like this, wain't w'k, thi' dunna w'k, thi've no w'k in 'em, thi've no ability t' w'k. Ah wo' talkin' to a Polish taxi driver when Ah wo' in Poland an he said t' mi, "we dun't 'ave any 'r these problems wi' immigrants because everyone who comes 'ere 'as t' w'k, thi' can't come 'ere an' just claim benefits so thi' dun't come 'cos thi' ohnny gunna 'ave t' w'k same as whe'er thi' come from.

What are ignored is the conditions required to initiate the adoption of 'rational' forms of economic behavior. What are the conditions necessary for individuals to accede to social and economic functionality? What is being spontaneously perceived in the description, "Thi' just scumbags, thi's no work in 'em...Lots'r young in areas like this, wain't w'k, thi' dunna w'k, thi've no w'k in 'em, thi've no ability t' w'k", the repetition elucidates a fundamental modality arising from the condition whose effects are rendered via the description: unrealisation. It is clear that the inability to work is perceived as an essential trait of the devalued. Why and how can this be? Because the shape of dispositions arise via developmental realisations which materialise aspects absorbed via such modalities, capacities inhere in ways of being-situated, cognitive processes arise via such processes. Without the satisfaction of such conditions, individuals will appear viscerally indisposed to perform roles whose interpersonal grounds remain unavailable so that they cannot accede to a sense of capacity born of a sense arising from a projection rooted in realisation. Individuals have little control over their expressive projection because it arises from relational conditions whose sense they bear. Because of the projective nature of being, without realisations of form arising from circumstantial aspects rooted in being-there, without context and situation, individuals will appear viscerally indisposed to manifest properties whose relational grounds are unavailable. Moreover, because forms of objectification arise from exclusive forms of involvement, masked via a distinction tacitly practiced via the use of private institutional relationships to materialise the appearance of public forms, some experience barriers that take the form of absences of mediation rooted in absences of recognition that transpose into a lack of contact, a lack of realisation, so that the projective nature of being is not constituted and fundamental developmental modalities are not materialised and they feel confused, disoriented, unable to know how to carry-on or how to mediate access to anything, they exist in a state akin to social paralysis arising from the nature of the reciprocal constitution of referential forms incorporated via subjection to such differences of condition that become transfigured into different ways of being-there. In this way differences can be transfigured into what appear to be essential differences that relate to expressivities rooted in different ways of being situated, different configurations of significance, arising from the surreptitious recognition of differences that disclose different aspects that orient individuals in relation to properties that inhere in the way space is constituted. It is clear that excess competition is interpersonally constituted as discontinuous oppositions that constitute barriers whose sense individuals bear as an effect of a tangibility of forms arising from their incorporation. The youngest poor, appear forlorn as an effect of unrealisations that leave them unable to appropriate a fabric that is an interpersonally instantiated configuring of forms whose sense they appropriate via being so that unrealisation constitutes absences in relation to ways of being that
preclude the ability to constitute forms that subtend awareness so that cognition is affected by a deprivation of grounds whose sense are constitutive of sociality, the unrealisation attendant on such a state, robs individuals of experiences that physiognomically materialise the sense constitutive of capacities, without involvement and absorption in forms, neurophysiological potentialities cannot emerge from a fabric arising from being itself. The sense of loss arising from the stigma of poverty arises from an experience of being forlorn, denied access to constitutive interpersonal forms that disclose modalities that human fruition requires. Absences of form arise from absences of grounds: the nothing that exists and whose silence subtends the sense presence manifests. Human beings are so inflected with the sense of elemental expressivities rooted in their forms of realisation that unrealisation constitutes the sense of a silence that is expressive of an existential manner rooted in an inability to countermand a condition whose determining efficacy is manifest via the unnaturalness of an inert inexpressivity that is testament to the death of the expressive impulse that infuses being as an effect of perceptions that exhibit sensitivities to experiences of being human that annul potentiality and manifest an absence of access to its constitutive conditions. The absence of absorption in the interpersonal forms that disclose a world appropriated via realisations that physiognomically materialise the sense appropriated via experiences of being realised in relation to such modalities, is manifest via imperceptible effects, sensed, that arise from engagement so that the numerous unconscious miniscule movements and adjustments, reactively instantiated, mirror a reduction arising from curtailment that is experienced as the barrenness of a world bereft of possibilities that becomes incorporated via the effects of conditions so that individuals bear the sense of partial forms of existence that leave them frustrated and lacking in the mediations that connect them to a shared tissue, the fabric of being, that ties them to the world via meanings they experience being able to appropriate because they experience involvement in its interpersonal constitution. Existential manner manifests latent significances rooted in the expressivity of human forms arising from a form of life which taints its surroundings so that forms emerging via conditions of existence carry a sense which reproduces these forms because of the way significances are reciprocally situated within the class structure. The poor are not held by integrative grounds that realise them in relation to forms of personhood that constitute them on a terrain of coherences that relate to realisations that they experience being so that they sense the reality of their existence via relational forms that assure them of being so that they undergo a developmental process that discloses grounds which function as resources, socially. An example of this phenomenon arose in the following:

[Foot slams as the individual stumbles upstairs: bang! (Aware of disturbing)] Ah yer alrait? Yer food rait? Yer want me to se’ owt t’ manager?

What is interesting is how the forlorn intonation of those without access to public conditions of realisation is covered via an appropriation rooted in the immediate context so that public forms are appropriated to misdirect attention from a form of comportment rooted in social invalidity. Invalidity is covered by using the context to produce the sense of competence and social generosity so that the individual can
accede to a recognised form of social existence, by proxy, via spuriously appropriating the notion of a role that is not the individual’s. Bourdieu captures the basis of this phenomenon:

Excluded from the game, dispossessed of the vital illusion of having a function or a mission, of having to be or do something, these people may, in order to escape from the non-time of a life in which nothing happens and where there is nothing to expect, and in order to feel they exist, resort to activities which...offer an escape from the negated time of a life without justification or possible investment, by recreating the temporal vector and reintroducing expectation...which is in itself a source of satisfaction. And, to try to escape from the sense...of being the plaything of external constraints...and to break out from a fatalistic submission to the forces of the world...as a desperate way of existing in the eyes of others, for others, of achieving a recognized form of social existence, or, quite simply, of making something happen rather than nothing. (Bourdieu 2000: 222)

In this example, an individual appropriates a situation in order to project and realise the sense of forms arising from a purpose not his own, in order to accede to an experience of capacity and escape the finitude of insignificance. The insignificant is appropriated in order, relationally, to accede to relational states constituting significances experienced via being subject to the realisations of form the individual projects via. Absences of competence and the sense of incompetence are a temporally materialised sedimentation haunting the instantiated configurations arising from existing in relation to absences of form that are aspectual configurations whose sense one bears as an effect of such materialisations of objective sense that position one outside of the physiognomic patterns constitutive of competence. Incapacity is an effect of a way of existing devoid of possibility and it is a real personal effect of excessive labour market competition and excessively mediated insecurity. Employers themselves find it impossible to assign roles to individuals who are viscerally indisposed to perform them. The chief attraction of neoliberalism, the pacification of labour, is bought at the price of the destruction of the capacity of labour to labour and as class relations harden, major forms of social organisation meant to address the void of absence arising from these divisions, simply become sensed for what they are.

Valuation and devaluation: legitimation and delegitimation

A key manifestation of the rampant invalidity consequential on these valuationary processes is resentment arising from the absence of access to the grounds of belief in forms individuals do not experience the intersubjective donation of: so that they don’t experience the sense of determinate possibilities because they don’t experience the availability of forms whose sense constitute identities rooted in their public realisation. There are grounds of sense which are invisible which the ability-to-be competent arises in relation to and these grounds affect the ability to cognize certain forms which are sense-relationally constituted, this is why interview panels exclude the working class because they can’t believe in forms which arise as qualities which are sense-relationally constituted: they are not subject to being-constituted, being-treated, as subject to those qualities so that they don’t share a sense of the relational forms because they don’t experience being-capable-of bearing the sense of forms which require recognition and disclosure for individuals to experience their
ascription and possibility. As one person described: “I interview people so I know what senior management think, they look at qualified people and think “they’re gunna bi’ a trouble maker”, it’s worse than not ‘avin' any skills, ‘cos they think “this person’s gunna bi stirin’ up shit wi’ everybody”. This is why one person can say, “the one person interviewing me said "you are obviously smart but rather sarcastic", in a very disapproving manner...I didn’t get the job. I hate lying and dissimulation so I don’t bother. I cannot...no, I won't lie like that...and yet...if that is the prerequisite for finding work...so, basically I...should learn to cover my inner self and thoughts better to get a job”. The reason individuals cannot lie is they lack access to a terrain of incorporated aspects that they can thoughtlessly utilise to produce the appearance of a competence rooted in realisations that can be effortlessly instantiated as a sensible resource from which to derive responses because they exist on a terrain of actualisation in relation to mediations whose sense-relational forms constitute them, meaningfully, via such processes of disclosure. The issues arising from discrimination are complex. What distinctions do is constitute, selectively, access to the interpersonal grounds for the ascription of aspects whose sense are relationally constituted effects of experiences of being recognised that physiognomically materialise differences authenticated via interpersonal processes that ensure some appear, miraculously, correct because they bear the sense of continuous realisation in relation to a fabric that striates institutional and public space. The real basis of complex forms of competence are relational processes that sub tend development. Without access to the relational forms which disclose the sense of aspects individuals experience via their physiognomic materialisation, how can individuals ascribe to themselves intentional forms whose possibilities they don't experience? The experience of being-able requires experiencing being-realised so that one intuits, via the physiognomic materialisation of forms relating to recognitions which constitute such possibilities, the sense of being-able-to-satisfy particular conditions relating to an ascription disclosed via aspects that are interpersonally constituted via such processes. In order to feel capable one needs to experience being-able-to-be-perceived as able to satisfy conditions which require recognition and such recognitions are institutionally constituted via disclosures which situate individually, relationally, institutional and spatially, so that individuals accede to determinate forms of objectivity. This is a key stake of labour market competition and part of the daily politics of discriminations and recriminations that constitute institutional space and public life. Without access to involvements that arise from recognitions which constitute the sense of forms appropriated via being subject to such processes, how can individuals even lie? From where can the dispossessed fabricate public existences? They are lacking the experiential basis even of fabrication: they cannot lie because, lacking access to the conditions which satisfy intentional states they are not privy to, they cannot even imagine appropriate responses, let alone feel instituted to accredit to themselves intentional states whose identity and determinacy they don’t experience being individuated. They are lacking access to the constitutive grounds of aspects and this is manifest in the demeanour of lower class people who are personally insecure because they don't experience interpersonally realising mediations relative to public functions and remain unsure as to ascriptions concerned with their personhood, because they exist outside of interpersonally realising mediations which ascribe competence.
Experiencing the conditional nature of attributions of competence, they remain uncertain as to their being-for-others. In terms of human functionality, capacities aren't effects of understanding rules, or intentional contents, but are adaptive responses arising via realisations which constitute dispositions so that individuals absorb reason. This is why the devalued, who don't experience recognitions which disclose forms appropriated via being-subject to such mediations, don't feel any assurance in relation to how they appear because how they experience being does not arise from absorption in an interpersonally disclosed sphere which constitutes such objectivities. Intentional states are characterised not merely by their subjectivity but by their publicness, their ascription, and self-ascription, require the satisfaction of particular aspects which are interpersonally constituted elements of interaction. Conditions which satisfy the aspects via which ascriptions are established relate to compatibility, expressive physiognomy does not represent the conditions required for it to be consolidated, rather it alludes to what manner expresses, the sense of conditions, acquired mimetically, via realisations born of not merely proximity but direct contact, the traces of contexts expressive of the life whose forms physiognomy echoes because of the necessary relation between such aspects and conditions of existence. In other words, economic conditions are expressed, sense-relationally, as aspectual forms, components of a condition that physiognomy expresses because we are vulnerable because development, cognition, arises from an interpersonal fabric born of visibility, born of objectivity, publicness, and the way being expresses aspects incorporated via the sense of such modalities. The dispositions arise from developmental conditions, processes of realisation, from experiences of actualisation that physiognomically materialise a sense appropriated via experiencing such ways of being, or intentional states, that arise from processes of incorporation that constitute the sense of objectivities rooted in the way this order plays out between aggregates who experience the ways of being of significances that are mobilisations of forms of life. Neurophysiological mechanisms are not absorbed as rules, consciously, but via responses to ways of being-there, so that intentional forms are absorbed not as mental contents but as neurophysiological structures, as aspects of potentialities via experiences of realisation that physiognomically materialise capacities arising from the sense of forms appropriated via being subject to an experience of such potentialities because one experiences actually being constituted via them, that is, one experiences being-able-to-bear their sense because one experiences being-able-to-instantiate their sense because one can project via moments whose disclosure realise one so that one experiences meanings emerging via being subject to such mediations. In this sense capacities inhere in the constitution of an interpersonal fabric of meanings experienced via being subject to such processes. Neurophysiological structures absorb reason via the social grounds of forms that exist in incorporated states (Marcoulatos 2001). This is why individuals feel possessed of a need to lie in the face of aspects they don't experience being realised in relation to and why the labour market is, essentially, structurally rigged. The devalued exist outside of the interpersonal conditions constitutive of capacities and they face a choice: lie or fail. Without absorption in a sphere of relations which involve one in forms constituted interpersonally so that one experiences the sense of forms whose meaning inhere in absorption in sequential disclosures which sustain what is incorporated via the
realisation of such moments, individuals feel bereft of the capacity to instantiate appropriate forms and this is why the excess competition that supports displaced educational processes erodes human capacity because any relation between education and context becomes more attenuated by competition which erodes the basis of human capital by problematizing access to its conditions for all but the elite. What excess labour market does is displace larger numbers so that it renders viable educational practices that have little validity and what it does is to increase displacement and make the real grounds of attributions of competence visible via labour market that operate via the institutional closures that are, often, obscured by processes of legitimation that legitimise symbolic violence by using ‘soft’ or interpersonally indirect forms of discrimination that are, often, purely personal, and perceived to concern the purely individual, their physical capital, how attractive they are, how urbane and engaging they are, that is, properties that are the perceptible effects of results of sources of embedding in the public sphere. As Bourdieu puts it:

Strictly biological differences are underlined and symbolically accentuated by differences in bearing, differences in gesture, posture and behaviour which express a whole relationship to the social world. To these are added all the deliberate modifications of appearance, especially by use of the set of marks -- cosmetic (hairstyle, make-up...whiskers, etc.) or vestimentary—which, because they depend on the economic and cultural means that can be invested in them, function as social markers deriving their meaning and value from their position in the system of distinctive signs which they constitute and which is itself homologous with the system of social positions. The sign-bearing, sign-wearing body is also a producer of signs which are physically marked by the relationship to the body...The body, a social product which is the only tangible manifestation of the 'person', is commonly perceived as the most natural expression of innermost nature. There are no merely 'physical' facial signs; the colour and thickness of lipstick, or expressions, as well as the shape of the mouth, are immediately read as indices of a 'moral' physiognomy, socially characterized, i.e., of a 'vulgar' or 'distinguished' mind, naturally 'natural' or naturally 'cultivated'. The signs constituting the perceived body, cultural products which differentiate groups by their degree of culture, that is, their distance from nature, seem grounded in nature. (Bourdieu 1984: 192)

This is why educational processes utilise indirect forms of mediation that reduce to a purely privatised institutional processing that provides access to nothing but which can be used to signify practices that are, paradoxically, used to deny access under the guise of opportunity. People feel under the inert pressure of not-being-able-to instantiate appropriate forms because they incorporate a sense of absence arising from experiencing being negatively-perceived and this negation constitutes the spatial forms of their life, affecting their expressivity. The absorption of forms, via realisations that constitute meanings appropriated via being subject to the disclosive medium that existence arises from, is part of processes of becoming that sub tend intentional life because the forms of this life arise from aspects that are nonintentional and which enable intentional states. The development of dispositions requires the actualisation of forms, interpersonally disclosed, that physiognomically materialise an experience of being-capable of intuiting the sense of forms which are constituted as responsiveness, via this actualisation, which is a constitutive moment allowing the individual to sustain a hold on forms via experiencing being realised in relation to them so that they experience a certainty born of capacities experienced via being situated via such meanings. This is why congruence is a critical condition required for the development of dispositions.
Development requires the emergence of elicited forms arising via validating relational states that disclose possibilities whose actuality inhere in being subject to such processes and this is why delegitimation and invalidation are key aspects of the veiled economic struggle occurring in public space. This is why negation constitutes problems of actuality and self-ascription and why the anxiety and insecurity of non-being that the devalued experience, leave them facing the stark choice between lying or failing. Both are aspects of existing outside of the interpersonally constituted grounds of objectivities whose actuality require the surreptitious organisational effects of recognitions which disclose the relational forms constitutive of capacities for intuition and instantiation that are the effects of experiences of being-realised and, thereby, contextualised, so that one mimetically incorporates the sense of forms born of the projective experience of being-capable because one experiences such modalities as situated aspects of membership and involvement in a fabric constitutive of being, arising from experiences of being-there, precisely what so much education lacks. The sense of inability is a learned aspect of discrimination and devaluation, because one absorbs a sense of inability as an effect of the unrealisation that negation involves. Facility arises from realisation, from connection, and the devalued experience continuous dislocation and unrealisation so that they experience being physiognomically regenerated a sense of inability that is an essential reference of their form of life: they have nowhere to go and no reason for being anywhere and much education merely reproduces such modalities, physiognomically regenerating the sense of such aspects as individual traits and this is a key aspect of the legitimation that education constitutes, it validates some via surreptitious processes that obscure the public nature of this reality because it is materialised via private institutional processes. The working class just feel unable to give appropriate responses and lying is the only strategy available to them. That they experience interview situations as contexts in which the only available possibility is to lie, says a great deal about the ontological reduction characteristic of the mediations constitutive of their being-for-others. When one teacher says, “Thi’ don’t have a learnin or studyin’ ethos” it’s partly because the way they experience being in the world doesn’t support their realisation in relation to those forms which, in reality, outside of science, cannot grant them access to a world in which those dispositions are required. What the institutional system does is validate some so that they need never feel they lie about actualities they experience being-realised-in-relation-to so that they have merely to respond in order to produce appropriate forms because they have absorbed the sense of the forms, relationally, as responses to disclosures which physiognomically materialise neurophysiological structures, with the shape of dispositions arising from the realisation of their situated instantiation, so that individuals absorb their sense as a capacity arising via experiences of being-there, so that they are subject to developmental processes or involvement in a world whose disclosure constitutes a dispositional mechanism whose conditions we need to attend to if we want to rescue the devalued from the finitude of a poverty that attacks the very seat of their identity and basis of their humanity. Whilst those consecrated have absorbed forms via their realisation so that, even in repose, they appear appropriate, others, cannot constitute appropriate responses because they don’t experience being in relation to any of the sense-relational mediations constitutive of the reality whose relational conditions disclose
the possibility of belonging to a world for which individuals are disposed because their dispositions arise as sense-relational mediations of its experienced forms.

Capacities for instantiation require the capacity to project which requires access to realisations whose form inhere in moments which disclose such modalities as aspects of one's being-for-others, they inhere in disclosive mediations which constitute an interpersonal fabric, a medium, from which our humanity arises. Excessive inequalities, institutionally mediated, distort this fabric and leave the devalued floundering because fundamental aspects concerned with their personhood are mutilated. A mode of incorporation of forms that operate like a latent energy, enabling the use of cultural forms which require recognition arises, via forms of realisation, in which the radiating perspectives synchronise to facilitate actualisation, and repeated exposure to reactive possibilities which realise an individual in relation to the conditioned certainty of appearing in relation to aspects that are a configurational property of the meanings they experience being. Because these aspects are instantiated configurations enacted via disclosures, they exist as moments that locate existence temporally so that our comportment is fused with this sense of its determining grounds: "I felt like there was no place for me there, that I could not breathe there. I could not stand it. I had to get out, just could not function there. All I could see was judging eyes". Notice how judgements are reported via their effects, via their manifestation, their disclosure, which are described via their experience, their effect on physiology because their manifestation is part of the disclosure of physiognomically materialised effects whose sense constitute meanings experienced via the unitary nature of human being. Inferiorisation is realised through instantiated patterns that attune individuals to public aspects whose sense have direct physiological effects through the hyperthalamic-pituatary-adrenal axis on both the cardiovascular and immune systems (Wilkinson 2000). Judgements are experienced via their manifestation and their effects are described by the effects of their sense on the way the individual experiences being: "I felt...that I could not breathe", and notice how the constriction of the sense of space, the absence of a signifying atmosphere that realised the individual on an expansive terrain of capacity and abilities born of experiencing the physiognomic materialisation of their grounds, is described as asphyxiating. The spatial forms constitutive of forms whose sense constrict our experience of meanings experienced via being subject to a negation, a judgement, that renders the individual passively, via a disengagement that precludes access to the interpersonal grounds of representational forms of intentionality and to aspects that constitute possibilities for engagement and realisation, are experienced as asphyxiating: negation has toxic effects and physiology is affected by meanings experienced via being subject to forms that subtend intentionality. The sense of being unable to breathe arises as an effect of the decomposition of the grounds of one’s reactional capacity in relation to interactional forms which constitute moments that realise one’s capacity to function so that one is dispossessed of the capacity to project because the constitutive medium is absent so that one cannot instantiate forms required to operate effectively. This has real effects upon an individual's capacity to project via the moment into a future because one becomes configured via these absences which are part of the interpersonal constitution of forms of intelligibility which arise from practiced allusions which constitute, simultaneously, the individuals
subject to the disclosure of such forms and a collective perception attuned via such constitutive practices which sediment meanings which become, thereby, co-opted as part of the visibility individuals experience being constitutive of their presence and the meaning of their being, there, realised in relation to an expressive universe whose aspects arise from objective components possessed of an interactive autonomy. Feeling unable to breathe is an effect of unrealisation that causes stress and frustration: one is hopeless in the face of the reality collective perception proposes. Because the grounds of incorporation of the sense arising via this background, are diffuse and nonrepresentational, recognisable ways of being consist of a correlation of elements whose coherence are a sensible effect of immersive sequences whose regularities become sedimented in the physiognomically acquired instantiations assimilated via repeated exposure to sense-bearing processes manifest in realisations arising from position. It is as if space itself is striated via sense via the different ways of being-there that arise from the perception of differences which constitute differences in objectivity that subtend different modalities that relate to different forms of actualisation, different statuses, that are effects of valuations that constitute the signifying atmosphere arising from exposure to this medium that individuals experience being constituted via presence so that sedimentations of uncodified forms, reactively materialised, are effects of immersion in a medium whose modalities require a complex vocabulary to represent. The perception of difference reactively constitutes different ways of being situated that physiognomically materialise experiences of being so that presence coopts a sense arising from the attunement of disclosures which constitute aspects of the reality emerging from the sense individuals bear as they experience actualisation as part of the constitution of this reality. The visceral efficacy of presence arises from how it is pervaded by the sense of aspects that constitute the shape of one's intentional life because possibilities are experienced via immersion in disclosures that constitute such aspects. Perspectives are implied in the sense inscribed in the positional differences that constitute ways of being arising from exposure to such aspects. It is as if the significances of the public sphere affect the individual because the realisation of negation leads to the incorporation of an experience of absence and of curtailment that infects the intimate terrain of physiology, expressive physiognomy attuning individuals to aspects whose reach affect the sympathetic nervous system directly because our perception is sense-mediated and therefore, relational: we are dominated, pre-ontologically, by the world which constitutes our entry to being via the meanings we experience. Behavioural patterns instantiate significances that realise individuals in relation to aspects they sense via being-realised-in-relation-to these radiating patterns which constitute space as a configuring property of being so that unthought evaluations are felt via such positional attributes which constitute the very qualities individuals experience being. This is well expressed in the following:

Whatever I do I feel criticised, never feel comfortable. I don’t feel free, in my body I feel determined by these elements. To try and put meanings together without instincts, I don’t know what I mean. It’s my instincts that come from how I feel from how I find it here that allow me to think.
Uncertainty about the future, arising from the absence of involvement in anything that assures one of its arrival, entails uncertainty about oneself, about one’s social being and one’s objective properties. The devalued are dispossessed of the power to give sense to their lives and are "condemned to live in a time oriented by others, an alienated time" (Bourdieu 2000: 237). Individuals feel determined via absences that constitute the unavailability of anything to them so that they experience being circumscribed by forms whose sense they appear to bear as an effect of how they experience being-realised via disclosures which elicit the sense constitutive of the form. This experience counterposes to the feeling of freedom arising from being realised in relation to others so that one experiences a way of being given opportunity to emerge into conspicuous significances via realisation. One experiences reality via significances relating to how one experiences being, manifest in relation to expressivities that relate to this public fabric of instantiated forms: “You don’t want to always be in a place where people look down on you where you’re stupid and ugly, and I feel pressurised all the time”. One feels an inert mutilation in relation to forms that constitute one’s significance outside of any opportunity for realisation as a consequence of absences of opportunity to be-realised in relation to aspects that configure one via forms of co-presence. One requires access to the mimetic acquisition of a culture via involvement in order to emerge as competent: objectivisation in relation to aspectual disclosures which are enacted forms, from which perceivable and classifiable properties emerge, are the condition of objectification. We come alive via realisations because they embed us in collective forms which presume recognition and disclosures which physiognomically regenerate our experience of being validated in relation to the individuated mediations which constitute competence so that we are assured of our existing in relation to others via forms that constitute what is recognisable about aggregative attributes so that validation is an experience of being-realised in relation to others in a way that grants access to the animating, spirited, aspects of humanity. In highly differentiated societies these mediations are structural properties of public fields in which these forms are contested such that access has economic conditions that arise via the symbolic mediations arising from the segregation that is a routine part of the practice of differences (in value) that appear to concern individual competence because individuation is an essential aspect of these collective forms. The thing about these modalities is that they require an individuated relation to the collectivity whose forms you acquire as the sense of a world whose disclosure constitute you so that you intuit references, and instantiate forms, that render you recognisable, and competent, as an effect of the traces of co-presence which inform the sense of relations somatised via such processes. Because the possibility of experiencing being part of a world belongs to certain qualities whose disclosure realise some in relation to forms which constitute the sense of properties arising via the horizon of discrete realms, realised via the boundary instantiated via the disclosure of the forms that constitute the properties arising from their recognition, there is only really a system in existence for those who experience the interpersonal moments constitutive of qualities that arise from relations of involvement that disclose aspects arising as consequential forms within the institutional spheres materialised via such processes. What is perceived as valued is an effect of the use of space to constitute forms that signify via closures that render positively visible a
distinction whose sense is born of effacement of those who are not recognised, and not involved, whose CVs manifest no distinguishing forms: the absence of these forms is an effect of the generic nature of institutional processes that, largely, involve nothing and are accepted as being the process available to those who can satisfy financial criteria which are what the process reduces to for the devalued as the mediations constitutive of public existence make apparent the reality of their significance. Selection criteria for positions in the labour market relate to determinate forms of objectivity that arise from specific forms of institutional embedding that arise from closures, whereas the processes available to the poor are akin to unemployment in that they constitute an indeterminate, generic, form of objectivity, usually arising from impersonal and anonymous processes, that lack institutional specificity and, thereby, significance. These modalities are manifest via presence which exhibits the effects of experiences of being-realised in relation to disclosures which physiognomically regenerate an experience of being-different arising from a different experience of being-there that involves attention, disclosure and realisation, as opposed to the neglect, non-mediation and unrealisation characteristic of the anonymous administrative processes that constitute the reality of education for many of the socially devalued. Those recognised experience an involvement that positions them so that they undergo the physiognomic materialisation of the sense of forms that inhere in the disclosures that constitute involvement in a reality whose sense arises via an orientation rooted in absorption in ways of being forms that arise from co-presence so that those recognised become possessed of a sense that they discover via experiencing being subject to the relational aspects that disclose such modalities so that it is via integration that individuals experience the emergence of their actuality via appropriation of possibilities that relate to the use of space to constitute such processes. Where those recognised, and involved, experience reality via absorption in forms that make the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as part of the reciprocal constitution of such modalities, so that their way-of-being arises via forms that inhere in realisations that constitute an experience of being actually possessed of the sense of forms whose determinacy arise from difference, those who are not involved, remain uncertain because they do not experience the physiognomic materialisation of aspects that inhere in belonging and their attempts to master cultural forms remain merely echoes because they do not accede to a veracity possessed via actualisation. Possession of cultural competencies requires actualisation and yet this is precisely what is absent as attributions of competence become more contested by increased competition. Whilst increased competition secures the appearance of fairness, the reality is that the labour market is rigged by the processes that constitute the forms that lead to the recognition and attribution of competence. This is why mass higher education is bereft of recognition or opportunities to manifest competence because recognition of competence inheres in the perception of aspects that are the preserve of an elite. One can appreciate the institutional mechanisms that subend the objectivity Bourdieu describes:

In fact the strength of the neo-liberal ideology is that it is based on a kind of social neo-Darwinism: it is ‘the brightest and the best’, as they say at Harvard, who come out on top...Behind the globalist vision of the International of the dominant groups, there is a philosophy of competence according to which it is the most competent who govern and who have jobs,
which implies that those who do not have jobs are not competent. There are the ‘winners’ and
the ‘losers’, there is the aristocracy, those I call the state nobility, in other words those people
who have all the properties of a nobility in the medieval sense of the word and who owe their
authority to education, or, as they see it, to intelligence, seen as a gift from Heaven, whereas we
know that in reality it is distributed by society and that inequalities in intelligence are social
inequalities. The ideology of competence serves very well to justify an opposition which is rather
like that between masters and slaves. On the one hand there are full citizens who have very rare
and overpaid capacities and activities, who are able to choose their employer (whereas the
others are at best chosen by their employer), who are able to obtain very high incomes on the
international labour market...and then, on the other side, there is a great mass of people
condemned to borderline jobs or unemployment.

Max Weber said that dominant groups always need a ‘theodicy of their own privilege’, or more
precisely, a sociodicy, in other words a theoretical justification of the fact that they are privileged.
Competence is nowadays at the heart of that sociodicy, which is accepted, naturally, by the
dominant -- it is in their interest -- but also by others. In the suffering of those excluded from
work, in the wretchedness of the long-term unemployed, there is something more than there
was in the past. The Anglo-American ideology, always somewhat sanctimonious, distinguished
the ‘undeserving poor’, who had brought it upon themselves, from the ‘deserving poor’, who
were judged worthy of charity. Alongside or in place of this ethical justification there is now an
intellectual justification. The poor are not just immoral, alcoholic and degenerate, they are
stupid, they lack intelligence. A large part of social suffering stems from the poverty of people’s
relationship to the educational system, which not only shapes social destinies but also the image
they have of their destiny (which undoubtedly helps to explain what is called the passivity of the
dominated, the difficulty in mobilizing them etc.). Plato had a view of the social world which
resembles that of our technocrats, with the philosophers, the guardians, and then the people.
This philosophy is inscribed, in implicit form, in the educational system. It is very powerful, and
very deeply internalized. (Bourdieu 1998: 42-44)

Experiences of being competent are now not merely more mediated, they are more
contested, and the difficulties the devalued face arise from the way valuation affects
recognition because of the way institutional apparatus are appropriated to
constitute the determining efficacy of criteria that are constituted via closures that
arise from an experience of being that is an effect of involvement in the grounds of
such objectivities. The sense of this sociodicy is inscribed in relational processes that
situate some so that they experience an efficacy born of the inscription of forms
arising from recognitions which absorb them in experiences of being-there that arise
from the practice of a boundary whose sense they bear so that properties arise as
active aspects of identities they experience being constituted via involvements that
manifest a boundary between themselves and those who function as a foil for the
materialisation of a distinction whose efficacy is physiognomically regenerated via
tacit reference to those who experience their insignificance being transfigured into
inabilities to function merely as an effect of the forms constitutive of objectivities
arising from the recognition, disclosure and practice of such aspects. When
individuals cannot be situated except as the relational foil for the materialisation of
the appearance of functions devoid of contextualising mediations, then the
individuals who are charged with the problem of resolving the problem of an
education that reduces to their self-mediation of documentary forms whose
administration materialise the appearance of functions devoid of actuality, face
exactly the same destructuring of their existence as any other member of the
unemployed. And, moreover, they face the same problems of dislocation born of
the insignificance of their labour and this is apparent in the way the products of their
labour are processed via relationships that validate others without efforts being
made to intervene to connect them to contexts: the mediations constitutive of the appearance of a process concern the relational presence, and significances, arising from relational forms of employees, and little, if any, attention is paid to the subjects of the process. Moreover, the absence of resources, reducing the poor to functioning as an administrative-bureaucratic resource, with the possibilities available to them limited to the financing of processes that have little reality beyond the administrative processes surrounding the processing of the products of student labour in order to materialise the appearance of a functioning system, means that there is no embedding, contextualisation nor involvement in anything and it becomes ever more difficult for the poor to contextualise or connect themselves with anything because the real identity of competencies emerge from closures that arise from the use of institutional space to constitute valuations, objectifying forms, relating to modes of objectivisation, that consecrate allowing the valued to emblematise their form of life establishing the interpersonal conditions for their emergence via experiences of being competent via the use of space as a context of relational processes that materialise the forms of such modalities. Education becomes merely another aspect of the way space is appropriated and resources constituted via relationships whose aspects legitimate the state of affairs and, in reality, education tends to merely reproduce the dynamics constitutive of inequalities: the elite access context-specific, immersive, realising, validating educational processes inseparable from being-situated and the poor access dislocated, abstracted, unrealising processes separate from experiences of co-presence and the mediations constitutive of the appearance of their process do not connect directly with anything and are, consequentially, insignificant. The insignificance of the process is apparent by the absence of contact. Moreover, the nature of what contact there is makes clear the insignificance of students: the use of displacement and evasion manifest the way such relationships make available an operative intentionality in which strategic aspects are practically prominent with students functioning as a foil for the elaboration of character and an experience of being competent arising from the realisation of such strategies: duplicity and effacement of reality are real skills of manipulators and manipulation is a real aspect of processes that extort the sense of aspects that are part of the institutional grounds of objectivities arising from such relational processes. The nature of what contact there is manifests the extortion of the sense of a process that is peremptory and obligatory manifesting the way the poor function purely as an existential resource for the materialisation of the appearance of work-processes that involve little effort. The lack of engagement with them is an effect of an insignificance that is effortlessly reconstituted as they fail to elicit recognition and solicit contact and, consequentially, have no idea how to involve themselves and have nowhere to go and nothing much to do resulting in an empty CV which is itself testament to the worthlessness of what is available to them. The worthlessness of processes and the insignificance of students is manifest via the nature of the absence of any capacity for students to embed themselves in anything beyond their own labour. The absence of involvement is a manifestation of the absence of mediation arising from the insignificance of students so that a lack of mediation, a lack of contact, manifests the lack of institutional acts that might consecrate individuals which is why the biographies of students of different trajectories exhibit such different experiences of
being-situated. Lack of involvement is a key mediation of an insignificance that becomes constituted as absence on CVs. Without involvement in relational forms that constitute aspects which satisfy the conditions required to accede to representational forms of intentionality, how can individuals describe themselves? Without involvement how can they arrive at descriptions of properties of themselves that inhere in recognition of aspects constituted via such mediations? In reality, students function as a source of the derivation of such aspects without themselves being subject to such modalities because they function as a foil for the elaboration of character and experience of properties whose objectivity inhere in such relational processes. Without embedding, individuals cannot accede to the sense of such aspects and they endure an experience whose identity is rooted in the same valuationary dynamics that constitute unemployment. The institutional acts that consecrate some via exclusive experiences are conditional upon the recognition of congruities of form that realise the dispositions perceived and physiognomically regenerated via such processes: this is why the elect are selected in order to provide congruence and similarity, an experience of validation that subtends the function of educational spaces constituted from the recognition of differences that subtend modalities obscured by a mass competition whose informal instantiation renders invisible states of affairs rooted in the public institution of private distinctions that constitute institutional space privately, providing the sense of intimacy characteristic of exclusive spaces: those who arrive are those selected via informal processes of validation that assure those successful of qualities they discover as real aspects of their being-for-others so that they experience an assurance arising from an actualisation that constitutes the very properties whose sense they experience being physiognomically materialised via differences whose intelligibility arise from their practice, their allusion to those who are uninvited, and uninvolved, who wander around without any reasons-for-being-anywhere who bear the sense of an uncertainty, and insecurity, that is an aspect of a disorientation that arises as a status they experience being physiognomically regenerated via the tacit reference of aspects that inhere in modalities relating to the way the grounds of competence are selectively constituted, their identity-conditions protected via the use of space to objectify some in relation to objectivisations whose closures are rendered invisible by their surreptitious materialisation. The necessity of certain possibilities inheres in the relationships which constitute the intelligibility, and legibility, of certain differences so that the functional structure of the significance, its identity, inheres in the relationships that make that possibility necessary and signify without the presence of certain categories acceding to any experience of possibilities by virtue of existing as the tacit conditions of reference whose form they experience being actualised by the sense manifest by their being-perceived. The functional structure of the significance (Derrida 1988) arises from its identity conditions which inscribe the sense manifest via its disclosure via the relationships that make essential the sense incorporated via the circumscriptions that arise from the involvement in truths whose necessity are manifest via the form of their actualisation. The functional structure of these significance arises via reference to the negation implied in their constitution, they imply reference to the negated who undergo processes devoid of presence and contextualisation. The constitution of such axiological distinctions mirrors experiences of being-there that physiognomically materialise the personal
reality of such differences: those recognised access realisation and accede to competence via such constitutive relational forms whilst the negated experience an absence of these modalities, experiencing being passively signified, and discovering, after the education supposed to address their exclusion ends, the inscribed traces of significances arising from relational aspects they never elicited, that they remain emmired in a significance whose conditions inscribe such an objectivity. Objectivities are constituted via involvements which manifest recognition which assure employers of properties rooted in experiences of realisation that arise from such conditions so that the closures constitutive of such objectivities manifest the sense of forms that inhere in experiences of realisation in relation to the forms that inscribe the boundary constitutive of the sense of the form. What this means is that the devalued, who are socially dislocated, cannot accede to the conditions of attribution of properties whose sense inhere in involvements that realise some actively so that they experience their possibility as aspects of their being-for-others whilst they attempt to passively acquire an experience of being competent without access to any sphere of interpersonal realisation in relation to forms they attempt to appropriately privately, outside of access to any conditions in which they use, in any way, the forms they attempt to inscribe via solitary labour. Educational processes surreptitiously reconstitute modalities that are aspects of the social structure because of the way educational spaces are used to institute closures, and constitute forms, that publicly institute the distinction, viability and public efficacy, of those with the resources to mobilise, socially and institutionally, to constitute such possibilities as aspects for their being-for-one-another so that, via actualisation, they experience the sense of possibilities whose form constitute their capacity to manifest properties which they experience being emerging via. Differences in objectivity, differences of significance, are manifest in differences of involvement that constitute different modalities, different ways of being-there, and different capacities arising from such mediations, and these differences are apparent on CVs that merely exhibit the social effects of significances whose relational materialisation become crystallised via trajectories whose possibility become apparent via such processes. How would people in such a situation constitute anything worthwhile? The educational reclassification of the poor, usually reproduces the parameters of their existence quite precisely, they are usually mobilised as a resource, as opposed to their fundamental condition being altered and them accessing resources. This is apparent in the way the poor must develop projects from outside of involvement and secure the financing of the products of their dislocated labour and the way the elite develop from an embedding in fields in which involvement constitutes the very nature of their labour in that the form of their labour is inseparable from its context of production. What this means is that the elite are validated by access to conditions which constitute capacities that inhere in experiences of being situated in relation to closures that ensure the validation of their process. This is not the case in subjects lacking a sphere of *public* research practice in which students must develop projects outside of access to any mediums of involvement that validate their labour and in which self-generated self-education materialises the appearance of institutional functions that validate and remunerate those who constitute the symbolic forms required to materialise closures via association of their names with the judgement of the products of others' labour. This issue haunts attempts to connect because once
there is over-supply of students it comes down to issues of value which usually concern objectification: those operating from within networks via categories whose operationalisation are part of the mobilisation of the group instituting the closures constitutive of the possibility of acceding to the functionality inscribed in the experience of being part of such conditions, will be privileged because they sustain the reputation of the department because their labour has an objectivity arising from its institutional conditions of production. Approaching an academic, attempting to mediate access to an application process, I was told: "unfortunately, it sounds to me like your research interests are in a quite different area to this project". Because my work arises from the isolation of a working community it is never going to be unequivocal that I satisfy their criteria so there would have to be interpretation of the relevance of the work, that is recognition, but because the grounds of the work are not a recognised objectivity, this recognition is not forthcoming and it is not perceived as congruent. There are institutional conditions for the perception of competence and yet the educational process that many undergo cannot situate labour in relation to anything beyond the administrative mediations which constitute the traces of a process where none exists. It is not merely that individuals produce amidst value-constitutive relationships that degrade some, but how can some produce appropriate forms? Do the social conditions exist for the labour of some to be recognised? There is no mediation, no connection to any sphere of disclosure, how can individuals who are attempting to constitute projects in competition with others attune their production so that it appears relevant from outside of any involvement in any interpersonal sphere of contact? How can you represent yourself without access to relational forms that dignify your labour? How can you represent yourself when your labour does not emerge from involvement in any institutional sphere? If you are not part of the network producing the criteria you have to reframe the optic via a different representational apparatus and as soon as you do that, they don't recognise its relevance. The underlying problem is the way barriers are used to inscribe forms of value in relation to experiences which constitute capacities to function that inhere in belonging to a boundary whose interpersonal disclosure constitutes the sense appropriated via forms of realisation that render individuals capable of functioning because they are privy to a horizon they experience being interpersonally disclosed so that they share a sense of aspects that inhere in such modalities. Without membership of an institutional network that constitutes the objectivity of your labour as appropriate, the identity of your competence will not be established and you will be perceived, basically, as one of the also-rans who purchased a PhD in order to make it look as if there is a functioning public system, when, in reality, the perception of the identity of the competence, and the capacity to interface appropriately, arise from the same valuationary closures. If you belong to networks producing representational apparatus and you are privy to interactions which disclose such forms via relationships that physiognomically materialise a capacity for reference that inhere in belonging to a boundary practiced via the essential terrain of being itself, then you will be able to represent yourself appropriately and deploy appropriate categories that manifest capacities for intuition and representation that inhere in the circumscription of the boundary as a valuationary effect of such processes. Without membership, the identity of your competence will not be recognised and you will
occupy a position essentially the same as any other member of the unemployed and this is, more or less, what occurs to lower class students in the labour market. Clearly, it is involvement in relations that constitute both, the grounds of recognisable objectivities rooted in the institutional effects of the disclosure of such modalities, and capacities rooted in subjection to such forms, that matter in the labour market which is precisely why these relational modalities are conditional and obscured by the anonymity characteristic of the institutional processing of the devalued who merely function as a public reference whose referential conditions arise from the practice of such distinctions. One can appreciate why Bourdieu concludes:

In this way, the social world, particularly through properties and their distribution, attains, in the objective world itself, the status of a *symbolic system* which, like a system of phonemes, is organized in accordance with the logic of difference, of differential deviation, which is thus constituted as significant distinction. The social space, and the differences that 'spontaneously' emerge within it, tend to function symbolically as a *space of life-styles* or as a set of *Stande*, of groups characterized by different life-styles. (Bourdieu 1992b: 237)

What we have to confront is the way being is inflected so that understanding is affected so that possibilities are precluded so that individuals cannot appropriate forms, cannot experience interpersonal modalities, constitutive of their appropriation of forms which realise them on a developmental terrain in which they can accede to actualities via grounds which assure them of their being-for-others, because their knowing arises from processes which make such aspects available. Without access to any directly personal level of contact that initiated contact with an actual sphere of public existence that allows an individual to intuit the sense of forms so that they can begin to assimilate and adapt schema via combinations born of a synthesis arising from an integration rooted in an absorption that orients primordially, combining faculties via the transcendence of a circumspective concern arising from engaged involvement, how can an individual compete? Whatever individuals in such conditions produce is never going to be valued because of the way valuationary processes are constituted via closures that institute a boundary at the heart of the embedding of some in interpersonally disclosed modalities that materialize capacities born of the inscription of the sense of a boundary enacted via such mediations so that they accede to capacities that appear essentially personal, arising from the seat of an identity whose public conditions are effaced via the anonymity of the divisions: when processes are instituted outside of contact, what is there to document? There are only traces of the public annihilation of those who are condemned to a private and anonymous existence. The education of the poor is usually enmired in the effects of poverty and dislocation and their processes are generally so dislocated that they are then prey to further educational processes that exploit their dislocation and constitute the appearance of functions that remain unavailable out of something akin to playing-at functions that competition ensures remain unavailable, and, in turn, these processes are devalued because there is always in-play a distinction between the employed from elite trajectories who are given access to the relational forms constitutive of the appearance of competence and the others who can't access the attributional grounds of competencies who are condemned to function as foils for the materialisation of the appearance of
functions that involve little beyond association with the administration of their labour. The problem of contextualisation is a key aspect of competence. Access to the social grounds of experiences of being competent and to forms constitutive of its public perception, to the identity conditions constitutive of attributions of competence, remain a problem, however much education is used to efface the inequalities, and their institutional roots, that subtend actual differences in capacities to function, socially and publicly. Dislocation and non-contextualisation are effects of valuationary processes that affect orientation and capacity. The uninvolved characteristic of the education of those who are least socially valued is an effect of an absence of mediation that is a fundamental part of the negation arising from the perception of their difference, their insignificance, so that their inability to elicit recognition transfigures into an inability to solicit contact which transposes into the absence of any experience of co-presence that makes their education consist of the rearticulation of the sense of forms that mirror, directly, the condition of the unemployed who undergo precisely an existence arising from the same interpersonal coordinates rooted in the same constitutive forms or terms. The processes constitute objectivities that become crystallised via subjection to differences that render individuals legible so that deficits, instead of being addressed, are merely being constituted. Once there are excess numbers, then credentials become conditional for their value and negation becomes as prominent an aspect of credentialisation as validation. What really differentiates candidates is experiences of recognition and experiences of being attended to so that some experience disclosures that constitute ways of being-there that physiognomically materialise a sense of capacities born of experiences of bearing the sense of forms discovered via experiences of being subject to them. The real differences relate to ways of being-there, to involvements that contextualise some so that they are capable of referring appropriately to intra-worldly aspects that are part of ways of being situated that are interpersonally disclosed as part of the constitution of ways of being part of a world they experience being capable of functioning in because they are part of its reciprocal constitution. The devalued experience a dislocation born of an anonymity that is an effect of an insignificance they experience being physiognomically regenerated via perception of a difference inscribed in space via the sense of ways of being rooted in the perception of such differences so that it is recognition which constitutes modalities relating to ways of being that constitute space. Space is used, relationally, to constitute forms that objectify via experiences of being different whose disclosure physiognomically materialise the sense appropriated via experiences of being subject to such processes. It is subjection, interpersonally, to such forms that physiognomically materialises a sense arising from inhabiting the world disclosed via such intra-worldly aspects so that one intuits a sense that subtends meaning without it itself being representationally constituted. Processes of validation and invalidation are interpersonal modalities that disclose forms that have constitutive effects on the sensibility and expressivity of individuals who experience being mediated via such processes. Being valued elicits different interpersonal modalities to being devalued so that individuals’ experience being situated against a different fabric of mediations that function as a medium that being arises from. The medium of the social world is different depending on one’s value and position within it and whilst the valued face developmental mediations,
the poor often face a world bereft of the interpersonal conditions required for the satisfaction of representational forms of intentionality and their expressivity bears the traces of a sense they experience being physiognomically regenerated as an effect of referentialities that inhere in being itself. The position of the devalued is constituted across state bureaucracies and reduces to a fundamental experience of a way of being bereft of capacities that arise from solicitation, engagement and realisation, so that devaluation is transfigured into inabilities for reference that inhere in a reduction that is an effect of curtailment and limitation. If you are not engaged with via ways that absorb you in forms whose disclosure constitute capacities born of experiences of being subject to such modalities and if there is no effort to involve you in the interpersonal forms which constitute capacities for reference that inhere in the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects, then how can you intuit appropriate responses, via what medium can practical sense and the grounds of corporeal schema that inhere in belonging, arise? What you experience is absence, and an inability to refer to anything, because there is nowhere the constitution of the aspects that inhere in the sharing of a world arise and such modalities can physiognomically materialise the appearance of inabilities as essential aspects of public identities that inhere in the recognition, disclosure and practice, of such forms as terms of existence that constitute the sense of a way of being. This is why the working class experience there being nothing-there via their way of being-there because individuals' sense of the possible relates to forms of actualisation which arise via the possibilities of sense-relational forms whose aspects constitute actualities individuals experience being because these public forms are constitutive. One’s sphere of movement is an individuated effect of forms of realisation which constitute meanings one experiences being-via so that one experiences the determinacy of possibility via modalities of disclosure which constitute how one experiences being so that one bears the sense of forms which affect one’s appropriation of existence because how one exists affects how one appears, it affects what one can intuit and it has consequences for how one can constitute oneself relationally because the sense of being arises via forms of disclosure which are part of an interpersonal fabric utilised interactionally as a resource so that self-appropriation is an interpersonally mediated process arising via forms which function as valuationary aspects within the fields which constitute the world. People evaluate as an effect of existing in relation to forms which constitute the qualities whose sense individuals bear as an effect of barriers that have cognitive conditions: intuiting forms, via experiences of being in relation to them, is part of disclosing horizons whose circumscription constitute awareness so that shared forms of life are a condition of cognitive function and this is a basic modality of the social structure, whose significance is practically rearticulated across labour markets. Entitlements are constituted via realizations which recognize individuals in relation to aspects which constitute moments whose sense are a condition of appropriating certain forms. Those who are unrecognised experience a progressive dissipation of a facility they have no relation to being-realised in relation to so that they experience a prolonged decomposition arising from their inability to elicit access to the interpersonal conditions required to experience realisation in relation to particular distinguishing aspects so that their lack of objectivisation results in their non-objectification. The sense of moments which fail to constitute integrating grounds
for one’s realisation, emerges in descriptions of “shattering” experiences or of being “in bits” or “in pieces”. Because we achieve an experience of equilibrium via realisations of form that integrate and sustain a hold on meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities, our capacities for projection require realisations that sustain capacities integrated progressively, via such modalities, so that we become capable of extending schema whose status ought, in appropriate, developmental conditions, to be forever provisional, but, in reality, when conditions are not satisfied for the shape of dispositions to be physiognomically regenerated via responses which constitute neurophysiological structures, we have a sense of our losing integration and losing a hold on forms whose fit are world-to-mind and require absorption in contextualising aspects that constitute such modalities. Shattering experiences are effects of conditions in which we do not experience realisation and the projective nature of being implodes with a sense of disintegration because projection, and realisation, are integrative aspects of being that constitute conditions of satisfaction of intentional forms. It is prolonged exposure to unrealising, disintegrative, conditions that cause a decomposition of the aspects that individuals are capable of instantiating, only, via continuous eliciting of their form interactionally so that the ability to regenerate the physiognomic materiality of manners requires a continuous synchronisation that is the basis of a fluid, and agile, command of forms which arise from being subject to recognitions that emerge from valuations rooted at the elemental level of this way of being publicly realised so that individuals experience being realised-in-relation-to synchronising forms that connect them with the public conditions that satisfy intentional states rooted in, and arising from, a form of life that is fully functional, because tacitly organised via, this uncodified level of interpersonal transactions. There is a certainty whose occurrence is a way of acting that arises from being-realised in relation to aspects whose sense you experience being so that some manifest a doubt born of an inability to be-realised in relation to elicited disclosures which relate to a sense of being-perceived to embody uncodified configurations that manifest lineage and heritage. If one cannot elicit recognition, then the enacted configurations, whose aspects realise one as part of the conditions which satisfy the attribution of competences physiognomically materialised via exposure to such forms, via recognitions, which elicit qualities whose sense one experiences via their manifestation, rooted in such processes, remain unavailable and one experiences being ghostly in relation to all that one is attempting to incarnate outside of conditions that require one to instantiate forms so that one's efforts are abortive. Exposure to the sense of forms becomes co-opted into presence via the absorption of meanings experienced via their revelation via instantiations which disclose a sense that touches us by realising us consequentially so that meanings become sedimented, incorporated, via exposure to a reactive substrate of practiced allusions to actualities constituted as part of an aspeclual space that agents unknowingly negotiate via expressive physiognomies whose persistence arise as part of the objective components of this expressive universe reciprocally constituted via processes of valuation that inflect social being. As one person describes:

I lose all immanence, lose all sense of myself, I become a ghost, I feel anxious, I can’t move myself properly, we don’t have our own being, I am really the creature of my relations, I don’t have my
own value, I need it from them...I've no self authority...I need it from them, that's why I'm fuckin' doing this degree...

The need for validation is a need to appropriate a world whose differences encompass us so that we need introducing to modalities that inhere in belonging so that we experience the assurance of recognitions which disclose possibilities as actualities appropriated via membership. Without recognition, without contact, we face an impersonal world, anonymously, without access to a medium which discloses a fabric which constitutes the possibility of appropriating forms and experiencing life, meanings, grasped by being significant so that we experience the certainty of forms whose disclosure assure us of our being-for-others because their disclosure constitute us so that we experience an attunement rooted in the physiognomic materialisation of forms whose sense integrate our affective and cognitive faculties. Without recognition, the devalued experience the annihilation of dispositions they are attempting to acquire outside of conditions which realise them in relation to forms that presume organisational aspects that are tacitly and invisibly reproduced via an educational system that uses informality to surreptitiously realise different ways of appearing that arise from informal selections which materialise opportunities via sense-relational forms that objectify those recognised. Barriers to the acquisition of a competence are reproduced via excessive differentiation in a civil sphere whose institutions reproduce the grounds of sense of the overall hierarchy they emerge from and within which the meaning of an individual’s value is located via informally realised differences that arise as part of a mode of operation that individuals’ ability is judged in relation to via proximities and affinities of interest manifest as forms of objectification: those who bear the sense of congruence will likely function because their ability is part of a mode of incorporation of sense-bearing aspects that are constitutive of being-competent. The poor face a civil sphere in which any access to an experience of realisation in relation to any public situating of themselves becomes conditional. The possibility of certain intentional forms emerge from grounds whose shapes are part of a diffuse coherence whose conditions are rendered invisible because of social divisions so that the ‘reasons’-for-holding certain beliefs are immanent to forms of disclosure whose constitutive efficacy are affective and based in the withholding of the grounds of certain possibilities as the signifying efficacy of the normative arises via interpersonal modalities whose grounds realise distinctions whose behavioural forms are invisible because they are embedded in tacit forms of difference reproduced via informal mediations that are, nevertheless, consequential for being realised outside of the remit of rights and obligations. Social objectivities become transubstantiated via configurations whose realisation constitute a sense immanent to sociality which is incorporated via existing in relation to manners of actualisation which are ways of being meanings disclosed via this essentialising, quasi-naturally, sensed fabric of intelligible streams that tacitly refer via implications immanent to the sense constituted as an effect of existing amidst realisations that imply referentialities whose sense is an organizing effect of this autonomously operative and interactive differentiation. Competence is an effect of positional realisations and excessive competition displaces individuals so that they experience no coherence that allows no appropriation of forms to become sedimented via a practiced facility rooted in
realisation. Forms of life are rooted in actualisations whose interpersonal forms arise from the sense-relational constitution of aspects that individuals experience being via so that their sensitivity is acquired as a facility actualised via developmental processes that delimit possibilities which are recognised as attributes of the person’s expressivity, as quasi-natural, because of the grounds via which they arise. These aspects of reality emerge via the essential circumscriptions that locate individuals as emergent effects of biosociocultural configurations that subtend sense-relational forms constitutive of cultural mediations that characterise persons. It is the primitive reactions arising from our contextualisation that inform our developmental capacities. Our ability to appropriate recognisable human forms requires the capacity to appropriate forms as an effect of relational possibilities via which competence emerges as an aspectually sequential disclosure sustained via attributive, intercorporeal, synchronisations that inform the sense we experience being via such processes. Primitive reactions are mimetically incorporated relational aspects that manifest sensitivities rooted in the exigencies of a world whose sense is manifest via such configurations that carry valuationary forms rooted in processes of becoming whose possibility are actualized via these sense-bearing aspects of forms of life. These sense-manifesting reactions disclose possibilities which are endured as exposures that attune individuals to processes constitutive of meanings they experience being via the configuration of forms which reciprocally constitute this order which is inscribed via the institutions which mediate access to forms of significance that are sedimented via temporalised processes of becoming in relation to sense-constitutive mediations which affect individuals’ capacity to contest the labour market. Awareness is a fundamental medium of disclosure that manifests objectivities reciprocally constituted via recognitions arising via public grounds. Social functionality is a property of an emergent process of incorporated sequential elements whose appropriative conditions of acquisition arise via sense-relational forms that establish the possibility of acquiring the agility rooted in these elemental forms which run to the core of what we experience being in relation to. Instantiated forms disclose what is a constitutive medium whose effects appear individually: they take an individuated form but arise from collective conditions which appear to unite individuals in relation to qualitative aspects that are an individuated form of collective exposure to the same sensible conditions born via similar aspectual configurations born of mimetic acquisition of references incorporated via awareness of forms rooted in the sense-relational attunement of a sensibility unified via a diffuse aggregative exposure. The aspects comportment is realised in relation to, manifest forms of sense that arise from habitual exposure to aspects that materialise sense so that individuals manifest the reciprocal formation of the dispositions they are habituated to being-realised in relation to. Bourdieu suggests “Dispositions cannot be formed without the means” (Bourdieu 1979: 85): it is worth recalling that for Aristotle (1976), ‘disposition’ means an arrangement of that which has parts and hexis is an arrangement of parts. We might see dispositions, therefore, as sensible properties that emerge via enacted configurations of aspects which facilitate the emergence of recognisable forms of social competence rooted in an associational condition, via which individuals appropriate a sense whose certainty arises as an emergent process of actualisation, so that latent potentialities emerge via realisations whose sense energize individuals by realising them on a terrain in which
certain forms “make sense” because they are appropriated via realisations that physiognomically materialise the sense experienced via such conditions. Because value is transfigured into significances incorporated via experiences of being-realised in relation to disclosures that manifest forms transfigured into meanings via experiencing being subject to such possibilities, experiencing the recognition constitutive of such modalities physiognomically materialises a sense of latent power that is an effect of intersubjective donations whose realisation sediment meanings incorporated and sedimented via such processes so that individuals experience the potentiality immanent to an actualisation whose public disclosure assures them of their efficacy. Forms of significance are an effect of being-realised in relation to aspects that become a reactive bearer of the forms constituted via the form one experiences being materialised as an effect of circumscriptions which arise as a cognitive process whose grounds are constitutive of how one experiences being. The properties one is perceived to manifest relate to configurations arising from disclosures which realise aspects constitutive of the sense of qualities one experiences being via such revelations which reveal meanings via being subject to such mediations. Qualities of treatment relate to aspects which disclose the sense appropriated via realisation in relation to a networked positionality that synchronises diffuse aspects via incorporations constitutive of recognisable physiognomies. Interactants perceive individuals via mute processes of assessment in which assessments of significance arise via immediate awareness of positional senses that are behavioural attunements that elicit what they perceive via processes of recognition that are a constitutive aspect of the reality interactants experience. The sense of environments are expressively realised as experiences of being whose referential forms are incorporated properties arising from realisation in relation to the world so disclosed:

...the length thi’ go to, eyeballs, glances to communicate get ‘rid of them’ that’s how they do it, it’s like a coordination they are like a gang, they are a gang, they’re better than us at it ‘cos we ‘ave to fuckin’ spend money battlin’, they just do it all natural. They use like mutual understandin’ wi’ a glance, we have to make everything say it, them glance totally wiyahnt any dialogue exchanged. They make us, they make us spiteful so wi’ don’t giv fuck...It’s black an white wi’ them...wi’ us we’re totally different, nothing similar wi’ different, they’re tryin’ to keep this gap between semi-professional to distance themselves further from us...Wi too different, we need a generation between us to stand a chance’r mekin’ it...I understand it totally, they’re protecting their way of life...but ahr lives are that hard we chasin’ this, that, we an’t got the time to fight them...yer just think fuck it Ah’ll tek it...

We get a sense of the interactional autonomy of this expressive universe which is burdened with practiced allusions whose instantiation elicit the sense of aspects arising from the disclosure of such forms; "they make us spiteful so wi’ don’t giv a fuck"; that become sedimented via experiences of space infused with such aspects so that they become co-opted into presence via expressivities arising from awareness of forms which manifest responses whose sense arise as part of a process whereby comportment continuously undergoes imperceptible adjustments arising from awareness of the sense of such forms so that individuals manifest responses, elicited, that arise as part of a dialectic of recognition which inscribes sense, responsively, at the behavioural level. Individuals experience being-perceived so that their awareness, responsively manifest, arises as a practical sensitivity emerging
from immediacies of response that materialise specific acts of perception whose sense they inscribe via the elicited effects of such acts at the behavioural level so that meanings become sedimented, via co-presence, that compose elements of an expressive order that is pre-intentional, and interactively autonomous, and yet which constitute historically embedded relational processes that physiognomically regenerate objectivities as part of the sense of relational forms that become, via such processes, part of the schema of understanding arising from exposure to such differences. Subjection to experiences of being-perceived, manifest via immediacies of responses, that exhibit a sense, physiognomically regenerated via subjection to such processes, constitute an awareness sedimented in the elemental, expressive, forms that arise from the experience of a particular collectivity. This is why sensitivity and understanding are manifest via redescriptions of the responsive substrate that constitute acts of perception at a behavioural level which inscribe a sense manifesting proto-conceptual schemata rooted in aspects alluded to via such instantiated patterns which radiate intentional structures. The reach of such processes is significant because they constitute the very fabric via which we experience ourselves as humanly significant and capable of appropriating forms via experiences of being-able-to instantiate meanings because we experience being realised in relation to aspects that inhere in belonging to a world whose interpersonal constitution makes the world for which people are disposed emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of objectivities whose interpersonal constitution become evident via such moments. Immediacies of response, function as allusions, behaviourally realised, that establish qualitative differences; differences of value; that function as practiced allusions that establish possibilities and limit potential manoeuvre so that some are burdened by their exclusion from relational forms that constitute possibilities so that they cannot accede to validating and developmental relationships because of the nature of the way of being a person that they experience being publicly materialised. It is clear that subordinate individuals endure a world in which they experience the burden of practical sanctions that shape their intentional life because they cannot satisfy the interpersonal conditions required to accede to recognised forms of existence and endure the misery of an existence without justification, "we ‘ave to fuckin’ spend money battlin’, they just do it all natural": the allusion to the relative unworthiness of others’ arises from behavioural patterns that are unthought evaluations that constitute the fabric of space (Marcoulatos 2001). Unthought evaluations, the manifestation of immediate responses that disclose a sense, experienced as injurious, because of what they reveal, an inferiority that involves the absence of access to the interpersonal conditions constitutive of capacities for functionality, ensuring individuals experience sanctions constituted via practiced allusions that affect their experience of sovereignty, robbing them of an experience of possibility arising from experiences of actualisation, are part of the way spaces are tacitly constituted via autonomous objectivities whose impersonal demeanour radiate implicit configurations of sense, behaviourally disclosed, that constitute a signifying atmosphere that manifests aspects which become sedimented and co-opted into presence via exposure to it so that forms of value can be fused with experiences of competence with devaluation entailing a sense of inability that is a constitutive dynamic, and stake of, public space and the contestation of resources distributed via the sense of aspects whose
grounds are part of an aggregative, class, struggle (Marcoulatos 2001). Others' are the source of forms that experiences of co-presence elicit and it is via the responsive actualisation of elicited forms that are rooted in an experience of co-presence that individuals' experience the physiognomic materialisation of the sense of such forms, as well as the synthesis they constitute, whereby individuals' appropriate meaning by experiencing acceding to it, relationally. Assurance arises from an experience of public actualisation because one becomes certain of the sense of the properties one's presence manifests via experiencing being realised in relation to their interpersonally constitutive forms so that one's capacity to project via the sense of such forms arises from experiences of their realisation. One difference between dominant and subordinate individuals is that the dominant are assured of their being-for-others because they belong to groups that constitute the public, relational, basis of schema whose efficacy inhere in establishment of the interpersonal forms constitutive of the disclosive medium that makes the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of a way of being arising from such conditions. The devalued can never be sure as to how they will be-perceived because their capacities for projection are weakened by their condemnation to face divisions that render the forms of their comportment stigmatising. This means that they can never be sure of the schema via which they will be-perceived nor of the characteristics they will be-perceived to manifest as an effect of contestations that are part of the structural divisions that constitute public space.

What is devastating is the unrealisation of negation in that without the engagement of disclosures that physiognomically materialise forms that absorb one in ways of being-there, synthesis does not occur and there is a destructuring of one's latent capacities because without such modalities, one's faculties are not actualised and so, without possibility, they are not possessed, causing an inertia that promotes an anxiety born of the absence of significance experienced via a devaluation that transfigures objectivity into meaninglessness and the absurdity of an existence without justification, without reason-for-being. One can appreciate why Heidegger says that the "substance" of the human being "is not spirit as synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence" (Heidegger 1962: 153). Being-there, being situated, being located, being contextualised, is an effect of relations of involvement that constitute meanings experienced via being the possibility that inheres in the form of life one experiences being disclosed, interpersonally. Disclosures manifest aspects whose sense we experience via being subject to recognitions which physiognomically materialise forms we intuit via an allusion that delimits, practically, the forms of experience we intuit via transivities whose sense flit between subjects so that involvement constitutes ways of being realised arising from the impersonal demeanour of objectivities that are publicly constituted via such processes. Behavioural forms constitute informal valuations that materialise the sense of distances inscribed in space itself. As Bourdieu puts it:

In matters of taste, more than anywhere else, all determination is negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance ('sick-making') of the tastes of others...each taste feels itself to be natural – and so it almost is, being a habitus – which amounts to rejecting others as unnatural and therefore vicious. Aesthetic intolerance can be terribly violent. Aversion to different life-styles is perhaps one of the strongest barriers between the classes; class endogamy is evidence of this. (Bourdieu 1984: 57)
As one person described their experience of presence via disclosures that manifest fundamental valuations, “we’re sort a thing that meks a smell, that’s what uni’s like, thi’ mek it obvious you shun’t bi the’er, yer’ve now’t them people want, that’s what it’s abaht”. As someone else described:

That’s one thing I notice. I can’t socialise in those groups…it’s like they tag you as a scrubber before they even speak to you. The way people interact is completely different and you can’t fake it either it’s like you are giving off a smell or something as a sign. I think the only way is to get socialised really early. I went to University too late. I was already twenty four I’d been working since sixteen my brother went right from School, he did go to sixth form, then to uni and met a girl there who he stayed with. He’s alienated from me now quite a lot because his whole way of operating socially changed. They train themselves to promote a personality brand socially. Their whole way of operating is self promotion within social competition and or mutual validation. If you don’t have the money to waste on designer stuff then you are out of it all. if you are not some kind of ‘standard consumer personality’ you are outing now. Certain People are getting more and more priced out of social interaction. If you don’t wear the right stuff, have the right phone, you are outing now, it’s fuckin’ everywhere, these 'luxury fashion food' places opening all over and anything normal being shut down or just not frequented anymore. It’s all office food, you can go somewhere and pay five fucking euros for a coffee ten for a shit sarnie (sorry panini) and still be hungry after it, normal people just can’t afford it. RCAT [Rotherham College of Arts and Technology] was a whole different world. It was much nicer actually, full of misfits and characters. University was like the midwich cuckoos.

People experience their own presence via their visibility, that is, they experience appearing via disclosures which constitute a sense they experience via being-there, so that they intuit their public value and this affects the meanings they experience being. Immediacies of response manifest evaluations whose form constitute the fabric of social environments. Without recognition there is no disclosure, there is no connection, no constitution of realising mediations that materialise a signifying atmosphere that individuals confront existentially, that animates a human presence with a latent consistency arising from the configurations of significance whose sense individuals bear as effects of experiencing being subject to practiced allusions that sanction an individual prohibiting possibilities born of elective affinity and condemning them to an experience of negation whose relational effects denude individuals of experiences of fruition and realisation. If you are not contextualised then you are not realised. Without contextualisation there is no disclosure of a horizon which constitutes intra-worldly aspects which function as a referential frame arising from the enablement of the constitution of a world alluded to via meanings sedimented via ways of being-there, living in the ‘same world’. Without involvement in relationships which realise you by constituting intra-worldly aspects that constitute a common sphere, it is impossible to orient oneself socially and dislocation leads to what appear to be critical outbursts because individuals are not privy to the constitutive grounds of interaction. Individuals’ identities emerge as forms of significance arising via sense-relational configurations constitutive of their being via a process of becoming whose sense they incorporate via meanings that exist as ways of being-realised. This is alluded to in the following formulation, “it’s like people giy aht vibrations an’ some are giyin’ aht terrible vibrations all time”, which captures the way individuals exist as an effect of corporealised processes of incorporation resulting from subjection to responses which disclose aspects whose
sense they bear. Someone else alludes to experiences of being manifest in relation to disclosures which constitute inabilitys to respond in the following:

Connection was what I missed in London. People were like...facades you never saw what was behind, or at least you were not supposed to they were like some grand houses, trying to look dignified and yet you suspected there were rats gnawing in the cellar all the same...they were just...cardboard...here, people are simpler. I suppose we appear plain stupid to other nationalities, being so quiet and reticent but to me it feels more wholesome somehow. They were a pretty bloodless bunch, and I think they resented the working class for having that blood still in them. It just...uh...hard to explain, but the look in their eyes was sometimes scary. Like the time when they saw us laughing in garden and the master of the house had come back, we suddenly noticed him skulking on the balcony. He had been listening and staring. We appear stupid since there is no connection there. Nothing to buzz off. (S: So how did you feel if you had to interact with them?) I dreaded it. I just avoided them as much as possible. They would make me feel clumsy and stupid.

The evaluative geography, arising from existing in relation to configurations whose aspects one experiences sense via, is part of the historical concretion of forms whose sense invalidates and incapacitates as an effect of being-realised amidst boundaries materialised relationally via behaviourally realised distances that reduce individuals to absences which affect their actual capacities because the sense of existing is part of the materialisation of relational forms via which individuals encounter being as a constitutive terrain and the actualisation of nothingness is an everyday aspect of the ways in which the devalued exist. Our situation arises as an encounter with disclosures which constitute the forms we incorporate via existing in relation to such circumstances so that we are subject to treatments that disclose modalities that enmire us in the sanctions arising from the forms constitutive of such objectivities. One grasps a situation by being realised in relation to relational disclosures which realise aspects sensed via being realised via forms that affect what you manifest via an awareness that is itself a physiognomically materialised effect of responses to forms which constitute your objectivity. These forms of nonrepresentational intentionality are continuously referential reactions arising as elicited immediacies of co-presence whose sense orients us, objectively via the ‘subjectivity’ constituted via the relational invocations constitutive of the reactive basis of the sensitivities we incorporate as an effect of these actualisations rooted in the materialisation of immanences whose sense we incorporate as aspects of our being-for-others. We experience the reality of the sense disclosed as an occurrence realised over time so that we are enmired in significances whose sense we experience being but the ideational nature of the mediations is not an aspect of presence, it is invisible because we experience sense disclosed interactionally: meanings are realized in such a way that they are experienced via temporal experiences so that we undergo presence in relation to these forms and their ideational constitution is an effect of interpersonally constituted aspects which produce consequential forms which we experience reality via. We sense immanent patterns which are temporally sequential via interpersonal realisations which disclose aspects which have a configuring property that is constitutive of how we experience being as a sensible attribute of our way of existing in relation to immanent existential forms which delineate what is available. The personhood of others requires disclosures that enact the possibility of their realisation in relation to ways of being that constitute
the emergence of a subject whose terms of actualization emerge via these grounding forms. A person is a being who is realised in relation to interpersonal configurations which aspectually disclose the possibility of existing via moments arising as interactional forms whose sense are experienced as a way of being so that what consciousness emerges from is an interpersonally constituted realm of actualisation that affects the sense of properties which arise via an interpersonal fabric constitutive of public life. Individuals exist, to-one-another, via the relational aspects of social environments which exist expressively via aspects incorporated as a consequence of the ways individuals exist as part of the sense constitutive of these environments. This sense is a temporally sustained effect of co-presence which leads individuals to bear the sense of incorporated realisations which are aspects of the concrete historicity individuals are enmired in. This level of incorporation of objectively discernible configurations which arise as aspctal forms, reactivity, is not representational because it is itself a form of realisation of ways of being whose sense restricts what is cognitively available to us beyond the moment whose immanence realises us objectively in relation to configurational forms that manifest qualities we are perceived to exist in relation to because they are constitutive aspects of our being-for-others. This is why contexts exist expressively and spatiality is an existential phenomena. Via expressivity, sense is experienced, meanings revealed via experiences of being subject to a fabric whose forms touch us, bring us to awareness because we are encompassed by the nature of a sensitivity to meaning, something we cognitively merely apprehend, and yet which renders the devalued vulnerable to debilitating aspects of hierarchy that wealth is used to evade. How we are perceived is manifest via responses that disclose forms that we experience being-via so that ways of being-there arise via a fabric of uncodified configurations which constitute meanings we imbibe via repeated exposure to a fabric of responses that circumscribe forms of life whose expressivity arise via the manifest effects of such processes which are physiognomically regenerated via stances that constitute such reciprocally reconstituted aspects of a social order whose practice emerges from recognitions whose disclosure constitute the grounds of forms whose circumscription materialise conditions of existence incorporated via ways of being situated in relation to such processes. Presence immediately subjects us to disclosures of our significance which realise us so that we experience space via the possibilities being constitutes. As Merleau-Ponty put it, “subject and object are two abstract moments of a unique structure which is presence” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 430). The ability to function in a space relates to the sense of forms incorporated via habitual realisations that we experience being exposed to as part of the way space is interpersonally constituted via valuationary processes that realise those recognised, while degrading others, so that individuals experience persistent aspects of manner that appear intentional but which they experience being unintentionally elicited via ways they experience being-realised via forms that render them subject to aspects whose physiognomic materialisation subject them to an attunement that arises via a terrain being discloses. The possibility of reciprocation and the physiognomic regeneration of aspects summoned by the forms disclosed so as to constitute moments which offer the possibility of the enhancement and consolidation of a facility-with-being rooted in this behaviourally constituted order whose sense is an inscribed facet of space, is not equitably distributed because of
the structural function of social spaces which arise from a segregation that is at the heart of their emergence. Those who enter spaces congruent with their physiognomy find their gestures resonating with a sense that elicits further gestural gestalts because the flow of interaction echoes what is solicited via those who experience being realised in relation to forms constitutive of such spaces. Those who find spaces continuous with their ability to belong to them, do so because the forms they experience being inhere in the constitution of the space so that their dispositions emerge as an aspect of the way the space is used to make the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of the gestalts they experience being-realised in relation to via recognitions which constitute such aspects so that they experience their perceptual apparatus arising from a shared horizon disclosed via membership. The behavioural constitution of the sense of forms inscribes a boundary via possibilities that inhere in the actualisation constitutive of its sense, but via tacit reference, behaviourally manifest, to elements of composure which materialise acts of perception that inscribe sense so that proto-conceptual aspects subtend the gestalts that constitute the signifying aura determining experiences of being-there. What occurs is an authorisation and legitimation that is a structural condition of the constitution of social space. Competence is an effect of relational coherences that are a structural effect of the emergence of spaces in structurally divided societies in which the division itself has a constitutive effect rendering the excluded invisible since they are forced to exclude themselves as an effect of refusing conditions of negation and unrealisation that deprive them of the very possibility of actualisation. This is why anxiety, dissociative and pathology of self disorders are a pervasive effect of excessive labour market competition. Engagement requires disclosures that constitute aspects whose sense are realised as an experience of the meaning of being realised as an effect of incorporated aspects which are physiognomically regenerated via interactions which take the tacit ‘references’ of enacted forms as bedrock for the possibility of being-realised in relation to the expressivities constitutive of the space and experiences of being-there that are an individually consecratory effect of a co-presence rooted in selective recognitions characteristic of differentiated societies in which these aspects determine the very ability to exist in relation to sense-relational forms that have economic consequences because they are constituted to render some functional, while others appear dull, sad, uninteresting and uninterested, resentful and dim. As one person articulated:

It looks like workin’ class are not as clever because thi’ dun’t fit in so when yer dun’t fit in yer dun’t look same. It’s like thi’s a big difference between ahr people who w’k look to them that dun’t w’k an’ yer get same at uni’ them that dun’t fit in thi’ look like people who’re unemployed. (S: Ye’ thi’ve no reason to be there, that’s why! ye’ yer right, Ah just used to gu in, think “what Ah’m a doin’ ‘ere”, do what Ah needed an’ leave. Ah wo’ ohnny the’er fo’ lectures an’ ‘and in work. (S: So, yer din’t really ‘ave friends or contact when yer went in?) Naow, yer dun’t get them openings wi’ students what ye’d se’ get rahnd ‘ere, if yer not in a hall ‘r residence yer dun’t know anybody ‘cos yer ohnny see people at odd lecture, thi’s no reason to talk to anyone, really, so long as yer ‘and yer w’k in, that’s all the’er is too it.

One can well appreciate why Bourdieu says:

…there is no worse deprivation, no worse privation, perhaps, than that of the losers in the
symbolic struggle for recognition, for access to a socially recognized social being, in a word, to humanity...it is competition for a power that can only be won from others competing for the same power, a power over others that derives its existence from others, from their perception and appreciation...Although it is the product of subjective donations of meaning (not necessarily implying consciousness and representation), this symbolic power, charm...charisma, appears endowed with objective reality, as if determining the gazes which produce it...Every kind of capital...tends...to function as symbolic capital...when it obtains an explicit or practical recognition, that of a habitus structured according to the very structures of the space in which it has been engendered. In other words, symbolic capital...is not a particular kind of capital but what every kind of capital becomes when it is misrecognized as capital, that is, to know and recognize it on the basis of cognitive structures able and inclined to grant it recognition because they are attuned to what it is. Produced by the transfiguration of a power relation into a sense relation, symbolic capital rescues agents from insignificance, the absence of importance and meaning. (Bourdieu 2000: 241)

This is an effect of the constitution of space. The grounds of incorporation of sense-relational forms tacitly summon abilities whose interactional conditions are unrecognised via practiced segregations whose sense inhere in distances that allude to possibilities which arise from complementarity. A world of reference is enacted via the physiognomic materialisation of forms rooted in incorporations arising from disclosures whose configurational aspects arise as an effect of existing via conditions in which homologous existential patterns facilitate realisation so that one experiences an efficacy whose sense inhere in appropriations of form arising from participation and actualisation as one experiences the transmutation of possibility to actuality as an effect of these modalities. The acquisition of the configurations constitutive of the recognised form of accomplishment relate to a form of actualisation in which aspects are synchronously appropriated via a diffuse participation that realises the individual on a terrain of actuality in which they are perceived to manifest an authenticity arising from a depth their surface complexity manifests: they appear to spontaneously manifest a dexterity and agility which is an effect of synchronisations rooted in these tacit modalities of organisation. Embedding has interpersonal but also individualised conditions that are the terrain via which discrimination operates as if distinctions are purely natural, purely personal. One can appreciate why Plato privileged participation as the way a being acceded to its existence by virtue of its participation in a form, privileging both mimesis and presence. Mastery of form requires events of appropriation whereby individuals accede to capacities via experiences of their actualisation that require contact, immersion in the effects of co-presence, that constitute capacities to experience the physiognomic materialisation of aspects mimetically incorporated as part of involvement in a fabric whose interpersonal disclosure constitute such possibilities. This is why educational processes, like sociology, that tend to involve the valued processing those below them in the social hierarchy, consist of very little involvement or co-presence and why the mediations constitutive of the traces of a process tend to be abstracted and attenuated because the relational processes that constitute the conditions of acquisition and attribution of competence relate to closures that are part of the mode of givenness of such aspects. The unrealisation of the devalued is a personally disintegrative phenomena so that the valueless manifest absences of the sense of aspects which co-presence physiognomically materialises so that the devalued appear essentially incapable of manifesting forms they don’t experience being attributed to them. Barriers take the form of sense-relational,
configurational, grounds that render individuals unable to show up in relation to aspects they can't be perceived to manifest because they cannot elicit recognitions of the properties whose conditions of possibility they do not experience being available. Incapacity is a physiognomically materialised effect of inability to appear in relation to forms whose sense disclose the actual experience of an inability-to-be as an effect of the inability-to-bear the sense of forms which cannot be incorporated because one lacks access to the conditions of realisation that make actual the possibility of appropriating, mimetically, aspects which are physiognomically materialised via qualities acquired via synchronisations embedded in contacts whose logic are embedded in immediacies of recognition arising from participation in different forms of the social. The emptiness of poverty is a sense-relational materialisation of absences of realisation in relation to aspects that constitute the ability-to-emerge from insignificance which is itself an essential deprivation of the resources of form required to accede to an agile and dexterous relation to the constitutive fabric of being itself: the incapacity of the poor is an individualised effect of experiences they undergo as an effect of the devaluation which is itself a consequence of an economy which is organised in relation to these forms. Emerging into being is an effect of forms whose disclosure constitute our ability to appropriate these modalities as available possibilities via which we experience our actuality and we bear the sense of the agility of the skilled appropriation of these aspects when we speak of people being “on form”. It is because our assimilation of the grounds of competence is an effect of synchronising appropriations which require a world via which we emerge, as recognisable, in relation to the expressive physiognomy our comportment manifests, that our competence, and what appears to be our essence, is open to decline and relative to cultural conditions.

**Validation and realisation, devaluation and negation**

Individuals experience being-realised in relation to different possibilities via recognition of differences that constitute the interpersonal fabric of being-there, they experience a different 'there', different qualities via being subject to such aspects. Perception of difference exposes individuals to the interpersonal grounds of divisions because the recognition of difference reconstitutes the grounds of differences in expressivity rooted in experiences of being different that are part of the routinized practice of allusions that limit without ever having to be articulated. When you are perceived to be different, you undergo the physiognomic regeneration of the sense of this difference via exposure to interpersonal processes that ensure you are locked in conditions that reconstitute such objectivities. The perception of difference discloses aspects which have a constitutive effect on individuals experience of being. Ways of being-perceived are manifest by recognitions which situate individuals so that they experience being located, interpersonally, in relation to forms physiognomically regenerated via such processes. Experiencing being-perceived differently is manifest via different ways of attending to one that physiognomically regenerate an experience of public space such that individuals incorporate a sense arising via the disclosure of such forms. Exposure to differences relate to ways of being-perceived that constitute the interpersonal fabric whose sense inform ways of being realised via this fabric so that
spatial differences are manifest via the inherent incorporation of the sense of such forms via awareness of being-perceived in relation to their physiognomic materialisation so that ways of being-perceived function as triggers, calling individuals to an order whose sense inhere in such relational processes, so that the individual, simply by being aware, manifests aspects that physiognomically regenerate a sense arising from the social structure. Take, for example, the following description of the way subjectivity is affected by manifestations of differences in objectivity:

I know that in the city I am from the countryside, I am looked down on, even one day, when I went to shop for clothes, I was looked down on as a customer, when they look down on me I feel lack of confidence, I know she looked down on me and I apologise to her, I say "I am sorry I cannot afford your clothes". The clerk was very cold and she turned her face away quickly. They look down on you with very evil eyes and I feel like it was all my fault that she looked down on me and that I should not be there. I am looked down on, I cannot afford their clothes. In the city, I was looked down on all the time. I feel so sorry, I feel that it was my fault. I want to say, "Oh sorry I should not be looking at your clothes", I feel so boring. I feel like I am a boring person who has nothing to offer. A boy from the countryside, do not have any confidence to interact with city people. Country boys and country girls are looked down on by the city girls and city boys. They know they are looked down on for their clothes and their accent and things they say. Sometimes we give information to the clerk that it is ok for you to insult me, in my mind I have no confidence I think in my mind "I am so poor, I cannot afford your clothes, I should not touch your clothes, I should not be here". You need inner strength and lots of positive energy so you can become strong against these negative attitudes and behaviours but how can you have them? They don’t want to make friends with you, they even laugh at your clothes when you are from the countryside. They look down on people who are from the countryside, they are not sincere at all. Especially if you are from a poor family, if others are from rich families, even we do not have the same topic of conversation. We often meet good friends, who come from the countryside, the same type of village, because we have the same background and similar values. We can make someone who comes from our background, we can have same topic, same conversation, even, because we come from the same area but if you go to city, you cannot meet a friend, you feel bad, like you cannot cope at all. When we are young we are very sincere with people, but after that I can sense snobbish people and fake people in our lives. We have to learn to see the fake and insincere people in the city. But you are alone a lot if you are from the countryside. For me, at college, it was full of fake friendships, they just want to use you, if you were good at studying, they will want your help, then go, they just use you. They only interacted with me when they needed me. After ten years, I realise, she just want to use me, that is why she is close. I know, this is how it is for me and I must face this. Every day I feel sorry when I go out to walk through the streets. I know I will always be looked down upon. It makes pain in my heart. When I was at university it was also like this. I was from a farming district in the countryside. I did not have the same as the others who were born in the city. My mother and father worked, they did not go to university. Sincereness is priceless but city people have no sincereness at all. They lie to deceive people to get what they want. Also they do NOT know what sincere is. When I was very young, my older brother told me to be careful of these kind of men who would pretend to be very sincere in a city. Some of his friends who were city men always involved with several girls at the same time. Also, my brother said they were very manipulative so that sincere people were very easily deceived by them. Insincere people treat sincere people as rubbish. Snobbish people when they need you they close to you, when they do not need you, they disappear. People in City are very snobbish, more snobbish than people who live in villages because it is very competitive. In countryside people are nice friendly, kind but in city it is very competitive. My sister, my brother, all dislike city people, they tell me "keep city people away from you", they are never sincere, they are never honest. When I first came to the university, I trusted everyone but they just use me. I trusted them but I was hurt by them several times. After I was hurt by snobbish people I was not the same.
S: In what way you were not the same?

I became more cold. I did not feel the same way. After that I realise city people are colder than country people. They use you if they need you then ignore you. Everything is money for them. I would rather not have such people as friends.

We get a sense, here, of how the determination of the identity of human forms constitute the circumstantial aspects we experience being-there via. What is manifest is how perception establishes the identity of forms whose determinacy arise from the sense instantiated that discloses meanings experienced via being subject to such aspects. We sense how attention is oriented via sense-bearing aspects that elicit circumscriptions that constitute the meaning of being-there in relation to a nested context of the space as a field of significances disclosed via ways of being, and forms of relation. A nested field, a 'circumstance', is sensed through the arresting of our projection via the disabsorption arising from the disclosure of forms that manifest negation. "Every day I feel sorry when I go out to walk through the streets. It makes pain in my heart": the circumscription involves a way of being limited by the meaning of exhibiting aspects whose physiognomic materialisation arise from being-perceived via disclosures which elicit such aspects so that one senses one's objectivity by experiencing being constituted via it. The identity of forms that constitute how we experience being-there arises from the sense we experience being disclosed so that out anticipatory attention discovers the actuality of the possibilities proposed by collective perception and we discover ourselves via an objectivity we experience being constituted via such circumscriptions. The determination of what is going on is an effect of a responsiveness that is part of our actualisation, so that how we experience being-perceived arises from how we are engaged with: recognitions disclose aspects which realise us so that we are responsively actualised in relation to forms which reveal the character of what we grasp via the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects, the 'here' we experience being via. We sense through an anticipation arising from subjection to such processes so that we incorporate understanding via realisations which physiognomically materialise such aspects as anticipatory sensitivities so that we can intuit the sense of forms which constitute the context. Perceptual contextuality has a definite nested form arising from the sense-relational nature of human being. The nature of our experience of being-there, our awareness rooted in the nested qualities of disclosures which contextualise us, means our embodiment is the locus of our acquisition of categories because, via the realisation of its sensibility, we grasp forms of actuality that make determinate aspects of the perceptual field. In this way, it is actualisation that progressively establishes capacities that require relational circumscriptions that devaluation erodes. Negation limits how we experience being in the world, it curtails, it circumscribes, and it involves disclosures which constitute an unrealisation that ensures particular modalities remain unavailable entailing a frustration that not merely limits but curtails, damages. For these reasons, the interpersonal can be a major stressor for the devalued, affecting their spatial existence, and form of life. When the stressors indicating our worthlessness are others, the trauma can be long-lasting because our humanity inheres in being valued and attachment functions, biologically, as a regulator of physiological arousal so that its deprivation has not merely existential but biological, psycho-social or socio-somatic, effects because of
the way human being arises from intervolving mediations that enable cognitive functions. Being subject to unthought evaluations circumscribes the totality of the hybrid beings we are, involving us, cognitively and affectively, in dealing with the effects of limitations that are part of the essential constitution of ourselves amidst economically consequential public relationships that will affect every detail of our existence. Unthought evaluations arise from hierarchical statuses that emerge from the way groups make virtues of their necessity so that insincerity becomes a mark of sophistication, because those higher in the occupational order need to carefully present self so as to better manipulate others, and sincerity becomes a mark of those whose position precludes self-presentation because their sociality emerges from a reduction to a functionality that precludes stylisation. Sincerity becomes a key aspect of those whose practical ethics arise from subjection to an inability to manipulate how they are perceived because their way of being arises from a vulnerability whose sense they bear. Elements of comportment materialize the effects of ways of being-perceived that themselves manifest acts of perception at the behavioural level. The dialectic of recognition means individuals are affected by experiences of being-perceived that constitute a composure arising from being situated, socially, realized, via the meanings disclosed, that manifest such aspects as revelations whose physiognomic materialization are summoned by such processes that manifest our vulnerability to an interpersonal fabric that constitutes our way of being enironed, such that a surrounding environment becomes ontically involved with inhabiting subjectivities before it is ever appropriated representationally by means of being lived-through. Elements of one's composure, one's expressivity, physiognomically materialize the effects of being-perceived which manifest the sense of forms themselves experienced through this temporal experience of subjection to sequences of form that reveal our meaning, via an encounter with public significances, whose manifestation allude to our objectivity so that we absorb an evaluative demeanour comportmentally so that our composure discloses the self revealed, and experienced, via being subject to such moments which mould the impersonal demeanour of objectivities constituted via the reciprocal objectification of subjects. Via such mediations one absorbs an evaluative demeanour, so that ways of being, identities, are enacted via a dialectic of recognition that constitutes aspects of subjectivity that emerge via the impersonal demeanour of objectivities. Notice how transitivities of sense are described as experienced via the disclosure of expressive forms, "when they look down on me I feel lack of confidence", as if meanings are co-opted via presence via a responsiveness burdened by the practical allusions of an expressive universe whose components arise from experiences of realisation which shape the intentional life of inhabitants who experience being via such spatial distinctions. We get a sense of the way in which individuals absorb an evaluative demeanour, ways of enacting a social identity, via the ways of being they experience being interpersonally disclosed so that they experience the sense of forms that become manifest via such aspects so that they absorb implicit configurations of sense practically alluded to so that they responsively incorporate forms whose sense they bear as adaptive responses that constitute neurophysiological structures as elements of an expressive universe that are impersonally constituted via the space of positions which affect demeanour. The individual formulates a key problem that manifests the way they concede
sovereignty in the face of impersonal sanctions that manifest aspects which rob them of any means to project via a fabric whose interpersonal constitution realises them on a terrain of mutuality, reciprocity and possibility, "You need inner strength and lots of positive energy so you can become strong against these negative attitudes and behaviours but how can you have them?" We can appreciate the way subjects concede aspects of their sovereignty via encounters that reveal aspects whose perception are mediums that materialize a sense whose revelation constitute such aspects so that moments become part of the way elements of subjectivity become infused with the sense of a fabric, behaviourally disclosed, so that moments of reciprocal objectification shape the character of the reality experienced. Individuals concede sovereignty in the face of sanctions which mutilate because our being is elaborated via appropriations that constitute cognitive possibilities via horizons whose disclosure relate to contact and immersion, a synchronisation arising from being-there (Marcoulatos 2001). Notice how understanding of the significance disclosed behaviourally affects the sense of capacity, and notice how capacity reduces to income: without income social significances cannot be countermanded, they have to be accepted and individuals remain trapped in the sense of behavioural forms that constitute a schema that delineates ways of being born of being affected by the meaning of being-there, in a way of being enmired in moments sustained by the individual incorporating the sense of such forms so that they are etched into memory as they are incorporated via the body, a primal trauma of an individual experiencing being trapped in a collective perception whose schema arise from the effects of being-realised via such aspects so that the perceived recognise the categories of perception applied to them so that they also experience themselves via them. Passive, unconscious reactions arise from an experience of alienation arising from the absence of the forms required to matter for others so that they engage via forms that disclose an efficacy that arises from such modalities, being valued is a condition of access to an interpersonal fabric that constitutes capacities arising from being positively perceived. Negation leads individuals to betray themselves and become trapped in the destiny proposed by meanings experienced by being realised via such aspects so that one cannot accede to functionality. Confidence is an effect of experiences of realisation in relation to disclosures which constitute capacities appropriated via experience of the meanings you experience being realised so that you experience properties whose objectivity assure you of your ability to appear legitimately because such a modality is constitutive of your experience, and equally, insecurity is an effect of a de-legitimation that is an effect of a negation that discloses a sense of inability to accede to such modalities so that how you experience being-perceived is not congruent with your projection because you don't experience the interpersonal grounds constitutive of your actualisation so that a mutilation occurs as an effect of a contestation that is part of a public sphere constituted via such processes. Confidence is an effect of the properties you experience being disclosed so that you accede to experiences of being-able-to instantiate such aspects because you experience their actualisation. One needs the chance to experience possibilities and to experience properties as aspects of one's being-for-others so that one experiences a validity arising from experiences of realisation in relation to the sense of forms one experiences being interpersonally constituted so that one feels confident because of meanings experienced via being
subject to such possibilities as aspects of one's being-for-others, real because they arise from actualisations that constitute such experiences so that one experiences properties as part of belonging to a sphere circumscribed via the recognitions and involvements that constitute such aspects as part of closures that materialise such objectivities. Because neurophysiological mechanisms are constituted via the absorption of forms that physiognomically materialise meanings the individual experiences being realised via responsive adaptations arising from being situated in relation to forms that constitute events that meanings inhere in, our sense of our properties is part of a fabric whose interpersonal constitution allows us to accede to possibilities via their actualisation. Adaptive responses to disclosures which realise us lead to the absorption of neurophysiological structures that constitute our sense of an ability to satisfy conditions because we experience such possibilities as modalities of our being-for-others (Marcoulatos 2001). Without recognition, disclosure, realisation, involvement, the shapes of forms that constitute events of meaning arising from experiences of being contextualised via such aspects are absent and individuals experience a sense of inability, they experience not-being-able-to-cope as an effect of the physiognomic materialisation of a sense of absence born of the recognition of a difference that constitutes such aspects as real effects of being-there. Being-able-to project requires disclosures which realise us so that we experience the actualisation of a realisation that sustains a grasp on forms constituted via such processes. The incorporation of forms via the sedimentation of meanings experienced via being subject to their physiognomic materialisation is a key aspect of the shapes that constitute the topography of the social landscape. Notice the way description of the interpersonal forms constitutive of negation manifest conditions that preclude accession to representational forms of intentionality; the "clerk was very cold and she turned her face away quickly. They look down on you with very evil eyes and I feel like it was all my fault that she looked down on me and that I should not be there"; the individual feels violated by the meanings she experiences being revealed as aspects essentialised by schema whose sense are incorporated and constituted via such interpersonal mediations. Notice how the individual describes a reduction that is behaviourally instantiated that manifests acts of perception that are proto-conceptual, "The clerk was very cold and she turned her face away quickly", and which are felt as the sense incorporated via transitivities that arise from the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects which limit the individual, interactionally, reducing their exposure to temporalized sequences of form that interknit a subject who emerges as an agent via experiencing being subject to practical allusions that manifest such objectivities so that the individual absorbs the sense of schema via acts which manifest perceptions that are behaviourally disclosed. The rational and the affective-corporeal are essentially linked via the hybrid nature of being-in-the-world. Capacities inhere in ways of being realised that compose the significance of one's presence so that one absorbs intentional aspects in relation to a world whose possibilities affect cognition. We glimpse how schema are acquired via exposure to forms that materialize acts of perception, behaviourally, which disclose forms experienced via being subject to such aspects so that the individual experiences a sense that affects behavior which arises from an understanding of forms by being affected, by being rendered subject, sensitive, to such aspects which constitute her so that she feels the need to align her
behavior with the sense revealed, "I feel like it was all my fault that she looked down on me and that I should not be there". Individuals are sensitive to such aspects of the interpersonal because they disclose the sense we experience being physiognomically materialised. That is, they convey significance, they are vehicles of content, that are concurrent and ontologically coincidental with the behavioural routines that actualise such states, they are intentions in action, that constitute the social fabric we experience being in relation to. As one person describes their experience of the revelation of such differences:

In here...when we know people’s background we only made conclusion about their character. Some Indonesian give respect to foreigners more than their own...Like what happened in Bali...The people who work in hotel or club...give priority to...foreigners...they [are] not afraid to tell Indonesian guests to move [to] another table...[they] said that the table is already reserved. The Indo Chinese people or the rich people spend more money and time rather than the foreigners. I feel like that when I go out with my ex-boyfriend [A European]. The waiter respect him but the waiter[s] eyes look at me like a piece of shit. They don't have to say anything...their eyes...they screening you up and down a thousand times before giving you a smile. That's why I don't really interested in my own people...That's why I don't really like to go to touristic places. Too much superficial and artificial things.

What is significant here is the way the individual is attentive to the temporal sequence of the gestural routines, and how they signify the act of looking prior to recognition, “they screening you up and down a thousand times before giving you a smile”, so that the hesitancy is perceived to reveal an underlying significance that orients and constitutes such responses so that the responses themselves convey that significance. Individuals clearly spontaneously perceive the effects of their being-perceived as a fundamental circumscribing aspect of the meanings they experience being via the effects of their objectivity. Fanon alludes to this hesitancy: “Since the other hesitated to recognize me, there remained only one solution: to make myself known” (Fanon 1967: 115) and Morrison captures it:

The grey head of Mr. Yacobowski looms up over the counter. He urges his eyes out of his thoughts to encounter her...somewhere between retina and object, between vision and view, his eyes draw back, hesitate, and hover. At some fixed point in time and space he senses that he need not waste the effort of a glance. He does not see her, because for him there is nothing to see...She looks up at him and sees...the total absence of human recognition—the glazed separateness...this vacuum is not new to her. It has an edge; somewhere in the bottom lid is the distaste. She has seen it lurking in the eyes of all white people. So. The distaste must be for her, her blackness. All things in her are flux and anticipation. But her blackness is static and dread. And it is the blackness that accounts for, that creates, the vacuum edged with distaste in white eyes. (Morrison 1990: 36-37)

Perception arises from the sense of divisions whose actualisation constitute their efficacy. An efficacy born of the immediate responsiveness arising from our perception of the sense of physiognomies that are imbued with intentional aspects via such moments that constitute a somatic compliance, beyond, or beneath, the will that constitutes a propensity to unconsciously validate anticipated evaluations that one becomes attuned to reality via. Social interaction involves an intuitively evaluative component that is a perceptual aspect of its constitution in that social contexts arise from subjection to others vision which manifest responses which
constitute evaluations which affect how we experience being-there. Vision involves a projection of an understanding of forms arising from divisions which constitute an objectivity arising from subjection to such processes. Also, perceptual manner, how an individual perceives, is an aspect affecting their expressivity, their manner and bearing, which compels others to function as a source of realisation. The problem is, clearly, that physiognomies arising from different conditions cannot serve as a conduit of their mutual objectivisation and so experience an inability that affects their own experience of capacity, which is why people who are too far away in social space must use 'small talk' to avoid confronting the difference that common categories signify because of the difference in their domestic and cultural environments. In other words, divisions imply sanctions that compel us to function as reciprocating aspects of social spheres whilst condemning some to an experience of inability born of the projective aspect of being. Being negatively perceived neutralises the individual who experiences their being-for-others via a vital diminution arising from an absence they experience being a constitutive aspect of their being-for-others, they lack an essential aspect that elicits the attention which discloses possibilities which require actualisation so that they experience reduction and curtailment, they experience inability because our capacities relate to moments of realisation which constitute capacities for projection that arise from absorption in disclosures whose form allow for the retention of aspects that inhere in these very modalities so that one accedes to a fluency that is an effect of experiencing being valued, positively perceived: recognised. Self assurance is an effect of a certainty arising from experiencing being-realised in relation to aspects that intersubjectively donate the sense of forms appropriated via experiencing being-perceived via recognitions which constitute such modalities and those who experience negation become possessed by a fascination with their difference because they experience being possessed by the gaze of others because it realises them, in relation to a sense that becomes sedimented, coopted into presence, via experiences of the physiognomic materialisation of aspects revealed via such moments: "when they look down on me I feel lack of confidence". Why would devaluation cause fear? Why does negation lead to trauma? Look at the conceptual linkages in the following articulation:

In the city, I was looked down on all the time. I feel so sorry, I feel that it was my fault. I want to say, "Oh sorry I should not be looking at your clothes", I feel so boring. I feel like I am a boring person who has nothing. A boy from the country or country girl, do not have any confidence to interact with city people.

Behavioural fluency is an effect of experiences of being realised so that one experiences the sense of capacities arising via an absorption in disclosures whose moments realise us so that the actualisation of the form constitutes an experience of the meaning, via experiencing being-able to appropriate such forms, because one's capacity to instantiate the forms arises via such modalities. Neurophysiological structures are absorbed, not as rules, but via the sense of forms experienced via their disclosure so that implicit configurations of sense are exchanged as transitivities via the actuality of a demeanour adopted via its inscription as part of the shapes of a specific reality. This is why demeanour, the quasi-natural actuality of a person, manifests a sense inscribed via exposure to shapes that constitute a
specific reality and people's intentional life is affected by such mediations. Notice you have a sense of perspectives inscribed in physiognomy: "They know they are looked down on for their clothes and their accent and things they say. I know, this is how it is for me and I must face this. Every day I feel sorry when I go out to walk through the streets" and a sense is experienced via alignment via autonomous objectivities that radiate existential structures, or implicit configurations of sense, that constitute forms of life. Implicit configurations of sense are constituted by the interaction of physiognomies which radiate uncodified forms, sensed and felt, via injunctions that manifest not merely valuations but possibilities, they allude to actualities experienced as behavioural aspects realising the sense of forms which disclose modalities experienced via such processes. Individuals reactively absorb forms whose sense they bear as effects of subjection to aspects whose interactive autonomy constitute objectivities which constitute some viably whilst others face a diminution, a sanctioning, which affects their sovereignty by limiting the very access they have to their own humanity. Sovereignty is affected because possibilities are curtailed, the grounds of objectivities establish possibilities that function to limit becoming, because the fabric constitutive of the ability to appear competent is absent. Individuals cannot tacitly summon what arise as the effects of a history of experiences of being-realised in relation to interpersonal forms that intersubjectively donate aspects sedimented via an experience of presence arising from ways of being that have responsively constituted a facility emerging from the absorption of neurophysiological structures that arise as the shapes of intentional forms rooted in such conditions of existence. You cannot tacitly summon competencies, you have to acquire them via the incorporation realisations of form that sediment dispositions that exist via their physiognomic materialisation. The impersonal demeanour of objectivities constitutes the reciprocal objectification of subjects whose sense inhere in experiences of being subject to practical allusions whose behavioural forms arise from perceptions which disclose aspects manifest via positionings experienced via the significance of one's embodiment so that one intuits a sense of forms perceived at a behavioural level that reciprocally determine sensitivities arising from the attunement arising from experiences of being subject to such processes. Behavioural fluency is an effect of realisations that constitute a sense physiognomically materialised via ways of being-there so that one becomes possessed of capacities by experiencing being-able to manifest appropriate responses because one accesses contextualisation via the sense of forms whose disclosure constitute neurophysiological structures that have absorbed reason and manifest a logic arising from the way the individual experiences emerging from insignificance via involvements that constitute the functional shape of dispositions which emerge from ways of being realised that arise from disclosures which constitute capacities that inhere in the differences and distances that shape the manner of actualisation of forms that shape capacities. The significance of one's presence is experienced via disclosures which realise us in relation to aspects that arise from distances that are transposed into the sense of congruencies, or incongruities, whose sense are effects of the way elements of behavioural fluency compose one's posture as an effect of the sense of forms that are primarily corporealised effects of realisations that physiognomically materialise aspects so that ways of being manifest the sense of forms which subtend capacities that inhere
in positions constituted via the often unspoken interaction of objectivities constituted via such mediations. Ways of being treated are manners of actualisation that constitute the sense expressed in manner: the effect of an expressive universe constituted via such mediations so that individuals bear the sense of position as capacities that inhere in such objectivities. Within discrete spheres, individuals make the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of those who are capable of realising such modalities, but notice that the ability to function, as a reciprocal medium that protensionally realises individuals in relation to qualities of experience they want to experience, requires congruity. Embodied significance is felt via those present and perspectives are mutually implicated via a synchronisation that is part of the anticipated dynamics of interaction so that a surrounding environment affects the individuals who inhabit it and who are subject to the processes via which it is interpersonally constituted. The ability to facilitate the dynamics of a type of interaction arise as embodied significance, as individuals experience the emergence of their significance, via aspects whose disclosure sediment the sense of forms whose disclosure realise individuals in relation to the flow of forms constitutive of significances they embody as an effect of the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects. The inability to instantiate the forms required to function as a reciprocating protension towards the world, or an accessory facilitating the realisation of reflexively sensed possibilities that satisfy the conditions required for the physiognomic regeneration of one's interlocutor, becomes experienced as unworthiness and a failure rooted in what it arises from: devaluation so that devaluation and incompetence become reciprocally constituted effects of the way some emerge into significance via the condemnation of others to non-being and to an experience of inability born of an insignificance experienced as inability to function as a worthy interlocutor (Marcoulatos 2001). It is because of this need to experience a capacity that is infused via the functional shapes arising from aggregative forms that individuals feel unable to satisfy such conditions and feel an inability that is rooted in the shame of a worthlessness that renders them unable to function. Notice how experiences of being-in-space are infused with judgements encountered via being-there: "I feel like I am a boring person who has nothing", the individual experiences their objectivity via qualities they experience being revealed, coopted and sedimented, via ways of being that physiognomically materialise such meanings as aspects of their being-for-others, their objectivity. Disclosures involve us in forms whose realisation implicate us in meanings sensed via their realisation so that we are submitted to processes via which we attain the sense of a reality that engrosses us in the sense of qualities that inhere in being-in-the-world so that the meanings we experience constitute a sense of the dimensions of our existence. Notice that subjection to behavioural forms constitutes a sense of properties experienced as qualities relating to both value and capacity: without value you are incapacitated because social functionality arises from reciprocities of form that are the physiognomically materialised effects of a structural compatibility and the projection of existential manner constitutes a sense of reciprocal forms required for its fulfilment: actualisation requires congruity so that the interpersonal conditions required for actualisation are satisfied so that a way of being intuitively classifies other uncodified configurations of sense, incarnated, as compatible or not and this discernment of affinities via expressivities that disclose
such aspects is a structuring aspect of public interaction without it being representational. Notice how uncodified behavioural forms disclose a sense implicated in meanings experienced via being subject to sensing one's own sensible qualities: "I was looked down on all the time. I feel so sorry, I feel that it was my fault...I feel so boring. I feel like I am a boring person who has nothing to offer". The individual senses the dimensions of their existence via the form of their life via experiences of what is 'there' for them as dimensions interpersonally constituted as aspects via which they experience their properties as part of experiences of being placed in a world via a way of being arising from significances materialised via the form their lives take as an effect of the behavioural forms that convey their significance so that they experience dimensions as the qualitative terrain of their existence, "you are alone a lot if you are from the countryside". Properties are experienced via forms that establish relational conditions arising from sensing the sensible qualities constitutive of the life available to you. This is why a sense of a future immanent to such aspects is part of being subject to such processes because properties are physiognomically materialised effects of ways of being whose significance you face as the parameters of your existence. Disclosures materialise aspects that constitute circumstantial forms which realise us in relation to shapes whose physiognomic materialisation constitute dimensions of existence experienced as qualities so that we experience our significance via forms whose disclosure convey it so that we experience a qualitative and affective terrain that affects our sense of what possibilities exist for us via the existence available to us via the significance arising from the value we experience being manifest via such disclosures. This is why value constitutes competence because it discloses circumstantial aspects that constitute the 'there' being is experienced via. The inscription of sense via subjection to the disclosive medium that being is, affects cognition because cognition inheres in meanings inscribed via involvement in forms that physiognomically materialise a fabric that is the source of meaning and of the intimate reality we experience being subject to. Familiarity with significance arises from experience of being-realised in relation to disclosures that constitute forms appropriated via being subject to such modalities so that one experiences qualitative aspects by experiencing being subject to a dimensionality that is part of the materialisation of differences that constitute the nature of presence. Meanings are interpersonally constituted aspects of spatial forms that constitute experiences of being, presence subjects us to meanings experienced via their physiognomic materialisation so that individuals experience being affected by dimensions of existence that inhere in the nature of the world. Individuals experience forms of presence that arise from the dimensions of being-there that characterise properties that are effects of the way presence arises as subjection to meanings experienced as part of the expanses of sense that characterise human environments. The 'there' that human beings experience arises from forms whose disclosure constitute circumstantial forms that characterise ways of being or experiences of presence that characterise the forms whose disclosure constitute such aspects, inscribing sense, behaviourally, as events which constitute meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities. Notice how self-blame arises from a felt inability to satisfy a condition of being an attractive interlocutor, being-able-to-realise your interlocutor because you share a frame of reference arising as a way-of-being-able-to instantiate
forms because you share a medium of disclosure that relates to what it arises from, a comportment that discloses aspects of a shared world, so that a key component of reference is awareness of intraworldly aspects arising from being-in-the-world. Perceiving the behavioural manifestations of a lack of parity, individuals are aware they cannot satisfy a key function that subtends engagement: a capacity to physiognomically regenerate a sense of the other’s value via a capacity to mirror their expressivity and the individual experiences an inability born of not-being-able-to satisfy such conditions so that they experience non-being, and experience their being via an absence of the forms required to function socially. Perceived via such aspects, individuals experience the physiognomic materialisation of an objectivity that precludes heightened relational states and fear is an effect of this experience of their being-for-others, they understand how they are perceived because they experience being-realised via its manifestation. The manifestative nature of disclosures which reveal meanings experienced via being subject to such valuationary transactions, affect intentionality, these are the conditions required to constitute intentional states. Notice that the individual describes her objectivity via intentional aspects: "I feel like I am a boring person who has nothing to offer". She perceives herself via an absence that constitutes her objectivity. How can people in such conditions establish the intention of doing anything when they experience being realised via such aspects? The will arises from subjection to forms that manifest possibilities so that the actuality of our significance constitutes our practical sense of what is available. The capacity to establish the will to pursue intentions which depend upon how you are perceived is annihilated by negation because the interpersonal forms constitutive of the states are unavailable which leaves individuals unable to pursue personal strategies because the individual experiences the inability of their comportment to underwrite their projection so that the interpersonal basis of successful projection is absent and it is this absence that constitutes their experience of being unable, this is the basis of the experience of there being nothing-there experienced via experiencing being "a boring person who has nothing to offer". Those whose way of being is associated with being-from devalued regions face a discrimination that functions to reduce the modalities they experience being via so that they experience reduction and incapacity and, as an effect, cannot project. Uglification affects projection so that the devalued cannot choose to participate and so tend to exclude themselves. This is why the educational processes supposed to address such conditions have to involve them. Notice how negation leads to an experience of being-nothing that is personalised as part of an objectivity born of this necessity: of lacking necessary forms required to function as a worthy interlocutor; "I feel like I am a boring person who has nothing to offer"; the individual experiences the physiognomic regeneration of a sense of absence that is an associational effect of the meaning of being discrepant and unable to elicit engagement and satisfy the conditions necessary to realise her interlocutor. What this makes clear is the extent of the background inherent to experiencing being-there, and the extent to which individuals experience their objectivity via a background of relational articulations that constitute their efficacy, without them having the power to overcome the effects of such references via acts of the will because the will is constituted via associational processes that constitute forms of existence, ways of being-there. The inhibition of devaluation is an effect of the
unrealisation that is constituted via the physiognomic materialisation of the sense of an absence whose sense we bear as an effect of being perceived to lack the forms necessary to show up as a legitimate interlocutor. Lacking the things required to elicit recognition and realise others, we experience our dispossession, we experience our inability to refer to anything worthy because the intraworldly aspects of our lives are insufficiently engaging, or interesting, and we face the insipid mutilation and gradual dehumanisation of a poverty whose reference inheres in the effects of conditions so that individuals face a curtailment that targets the very seat of their development: their possibility and the limited actuality they experience, socially, publicly, being. Fear is an effect of being locked out of the interpersonal fabric constitutive of experiences of capacities relating to forms that realise us in relation to disclosures which constitute meaningful ways of being-there so that, via absorption in the forms which constitute capacities arising via such modalities, we experience a security, a sense of well-being arising from the physiognomic materialisation of forms that trigger dopamine and oxytocin, whereas the negated endure an anxiety born of an unrealisation that precludes accession to meaningful ways of being-there that dispossess individuals of the substrate of experiential conditions required to accede to heightened states. Because we need to experience the actuality of possibilities so that we can experience the realisation of forms which constitute meanings we experience being, devaluation causes fear because the negated experience both inability and meaninglessness, which is to say that devaluation attacks the foundations of humanity. The devalued lack access to the interpersonal fabric of realisations which constitute capacities that inhere in relationships which disclose such modalities as sense-relational aspects mimetically incorporated as part of cognitions that relate to intra-worldly aspects relating to how individuals experience being-there, being-in-a-world. Being devalued locks people out of a medium that constitutes being-able to appropriate forms via modalities that foreground possibilities and, instead, the devalued find themselves located passively, outside of mediums required to accede to intentional forms whose interpersonal conditions remain unavailable, condemning them to appear limited as an effect of frames of reference that inhere in the sense of limits incorporated via experiencing the reduction that stigma constitutes. The trauma of devaluation is the way it mediates absences of access to the interpersonal grounds of developmental and humanising aspects that allow for individuals to appropriate being as an expansive experience of existing via significances whose interpersonal constitution allow us to escape the basement of being and accede to states of mutuality that found capacities forged via the interpersonal constitution of forms that inhere in mutuality, recognition, parity and existing consequentially, as opposed to the inconsequential passivity characteristic of the retched of the earth. Clearly, value is a key aspect of the interpersonal conditions that constitute being, in the world. The interpersonal forms constitutive of the objectivisations we experience via disclosures that have a profound effect upon capacities that inhere in experiences of being-realised in relation to interpersonal forms that can enable, or confound, our ability to appropriate and project because of the nature of our experience of being, are key stakes of the everyday class struggle. Valuation constitutes modalities that inhere in our susceptibility to others at a preontological and preobjective level so that our cognitions inhere in a fabric that is fundamentally affected by this vulnerability. The
relation between value and functionality, or conversely, devaluation and dysfunctionality, is a fundamental aspect of the public contestation of aggregates who appropriate resources via command of the public grounds of objectivities that constitute them as viable, and, thereby, able, whereas others face the disorientation, dislocation, malaise and caesura of a world bereft of anchoring in the assurance of forms disclosed via recognitions that constitute, mimetically, capacities to possess aspects because their sense is a physiognomically materialised effect of how we experience being realised via a fabric constituted via modalities experienced via being subject to such mediations. Being is a terrain for the actualisation of meanings incorporated via interpersonal realisations that make available the sense of the forms constitutive of such aspects. Meanings are revealed via being, our entry to meaning is via the realisation of our being. We see the injurious nature of inequalities that attack the seat of identity because they call one to an order whose sense one bears as an effect of disclosures which constitute that order.

**Negation and judgements implied by their realisation**

One student who financed himself while living with his parents through a PhD said “I feel so judged by the criteria whenever I look at a job, before I even try to apply it’s like a mount Everest of hurdles that my education didn’t equip me to get over. I wasn’t given any of the things I needed to fill in the forms. I look in bemusement and think ‘What the fuck?’ Makes me fuckin’ sick”. The sense of these forms has an intelligibility that inheres in the totality of the relational forms that subtend the objectivity that constitutes such aspects. Individuals have only to be situated via ways of being perceived to exhibit particular characteristics for the sense of those forms to be physiognomically regenerated. These are processes of attunement, calls to order, that inscribe sense via experiences of being subject to an objectivity whose intelligibility is clear because of how it is manifest, how it is interpersonally constituted, via a responsiveness that instantiates the sense subtending disclosures which constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to an atmosphere, a clearing, that envelops presence so that responses inscribe the sense of a fabric interwoven via its interpersonal realisation. The recognition of differences subjects individuals to differences of involvement that disclose aspects that become sedimented via meanings experienced via being subject to the physiognomic materialisation of responses oriented via the meanings coopted via experiencing the realisation of such forms so that judgements are implied via disclosures which inscribe forms that are burdened with aspects that assume a responsive character through the practical allusion disclosed interactively so that individuals unknowingly negotiate traces of an expressivity burdened with an experience of being subject to the meaning of being different and positioned by the durable obstinacy of a public culture they encounter being via. Objective components of this expressive universe arise from the impersonal experiences of institutional process that ground and sustain differences individuals experience being sedimented and irreversibly coopted into presence via experiences of being subject to the meaning of forms inscribed via subjection to the perception, recognition and disclosure of such differences as aspects given a responsive character by circumscriptions which orient and determine ways of being situated. Reference and capacities to intuit the meaning of aspects inhere in the
interpersonal constitution of such forms. Judgements inhere in the interpersonal forms that disclose aspects unreflectively lived as part of the functional shapes of a form of life so that individuals experience judgements implied via circumscriptions that are effects of the recognition of aspects whose objectivity inhere in the relationships between aggregates that constitute such legible forms. Clearly, the actuality of existence is experienced via the sense that inhere in shapes which are lived via reference to differences constituted via closures which disclose the sense of aspects lived via reference to a boundary materialised institutionally and publicly in relation to those whose sense arises from the perception of differences which constitute such aspects. The lived actuality of forms of life is infused with a sense whose reference inhere in subjection to the public grounds of differences which imply an orientation, a sensitivity and a judgement, implied in the shapes arising via experiences of being situated that induce certain forms of expressivity which inhere in the responsive character of actualisations via which individuals absorb aspects they experience being physiognomically materialised via subjection to the meaning of being forms grounded in such objective elements of social reality. The sense of judgement is part of an awareness arising from subjection to the grounds of forms which sediment meanings that become coopted into presence via subjection to such conditions that constitute a visceral awareness of elemental manners that acquire a responsive character by being part of experiences of being burdened by allusions which constitute the responsiveness individuals experience being realised in relation to so that they experience being endowed with such meanings via a process of symbolic enculturation and the tightening weave of significances materialised as time subjects them to the traces of an existential manner incorporated via subjection to such processes. Existing outside of the spheres constituted via closures which circumscribe a legitimate sphere of encounter that sediments, continuously, aspects of the elemental manners of a particular collectively who undergo continuous objectification via membership, those displaced via practices that allude to what becomes publicly symbolised via privatised relational processes, endure a progressive sedimentation of meaning that becomes coopted as part of the essential references arising from such relational processes that constitute the recognisable shapes of reality. The feeling of judgement arises from differences which constitute experiences which imply negation: lower class students face an impoverished educational process that merely transfigures their inability to situate themselves via a process that reduces to their ability-to-pay into incapacities that arise from a dislocation perpetuated via a legibility perpetuated via the perception of differences that are physiognomically regenerated via such processes so that they remain unable to access the public grounds, the conditions which satisfy, intentional forms perceived via closures which disclose such possibilities as actualities for those recognised. For the working class on low-end degrees, there is a problem of objectification, what do you access that allows you to satisfy such criteria? Lacking access to the institutional grounds of properties whose identification inhere in experiences of recognition that disclose such aspects via forms that constitute an assurance that inhere in involvement in the relationships that constitute such objectivities, individuals struggle to experience being competent because they don't experience possibilities actually being ascribed to them which is an effect of the statutory nature of attributions of competence, surreptitiously, so that the feelings
of insecurity and disorientation of lower class students are natural effects of the nature of institutional acts that must manage the trick of realising differentiation via relational forms that appear to be fair. The de-realisation of non-actualisation arising from this differentiation is an inability to identify themselves as competent which is put in abeyance until the day of reckoning when they face, anonymously, from outside of any relationships that constitute capacities that inhere in involvement, labour market criteria that relate to ways of being situated that are uncharacteristic of the nature of the process their significance elicits and whose form they experience being physiognomically materialised so that, facing criteria relating to ways of being their significance did not elicit, self-elimination is forced upon them because of the absurdity of an experience characterised by an unrealisation that constitutes a de-realisation that forces inaction on them because the mediations constitutive of capacities rooted in projection, disclosure and realisation, are absent. Self-elimination is the only rational response to labour market criteria that are constituted in relation to forms of objectification whose relations of involvement are unavailable and then ceasing to look for work becomes the only way to shield oneself from the humiliation of ever having tried to compete and the shame involved in aspiring to cultural forms whose unavailability are fully manifest only at the end of a process that was supposed to address such deficits, but which tends to merely entrench them, because it emerges from divisions via which employees exert the sense of their own competence without being able to mediate access to anything beyond a charade that narcissistically realises them. During your process the unavailability of the grounds of such forms takes the form of isolation in a system in which involvement reduces to a self-mediation which is, of course, doomed: how can dislocated individuals know what they need to access without access to a horizon that discloses such possibilities? It is as absurd as the culturally dislocated knowing how to direct themselves to appropriate forms as a condition of acceding to credentials in order to try to begin to compete when the competition is already over by the time they qualify because they are judged in relation to forms that they have produced outside of involvement in anything. The perception of their significance discloses forms which preclude their experiencing being interpersonally constituted so that they are subject to aspects that inhere in attributions whose grounds remain unavailable. Not experiencing the interpersonal, institutional, grounds of properties so that they don’t experience their possibility as a manifest aspect of their being-for-others, individuals cannot identify themselves as competent and this is a problem they face when they complete their education: selection criteria merely confront individuals with crystallisations of form that relate to sedimentations of meaning whose interpersonal grounds remain unavailable so that all the individual can do is perceive an absence in themselves of properties that inhere in recognitions which disclose such possibilities: without actualisation individuals cannot inscribe the sense of forms incorporated via experiences of being realised in relation to recognitions which disclose such possibilities and they face the reality of the non-possibility that their educational process has constituted, the incorporation and sedimentation of an absence that is a real effect of attributions born of contestation that leave many facing a void inscribed via their way of being. The possibility of self-belief requires an experience of an identity relating to forms whose public identification require access to institutional-relational grounds that
constitute actualities whose conditional nature are only too apparent in the experience of the devalued who fail to experience such possibilities because they fail to be able to project because the interpersonal conditions constitutive of such aspects are absent. The confusion, uncertainty and lack of confidence of lower class students is an effect of a process that cannot ground their labour in involvements that constitute a sense of forms arising from experiences of being-subject to such possibilities. The experience of the absurdity of a contestation whose de-realisation destructures individuals who have had no capacity to inscribe the sense of forms via a projection born of an absorption in a fabric that constitutes capacities arising from subjection to exposure so such conditions, which constitute intentional forms whose attributional grounds are manifest by selection criteria, is clear in "I wasn't given any of the things I needed to fill in the forms. I look in bemusement and think 'What the fuck?" Clearly, not merely can this person not satisfy selection criteria, how can they project successfully? How can they mediate access? How could they come across with conviction as authentically able to satisfy the demands arising from circumstantial aspects whose relational conditions they don't experience being materialized? Clearly, the feelings that the process itself instills are the very feelings that the process should have dispelled: why? The feeling of "what the fuck" is an effect of having done all one could and then accessed none of the institutional grounds of criteria that relate to associational forms relating to involvements in circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter that constitute recognised forms of social existence inscribed in the difference of the tacit reference constitutive of the boundary being materialised via the use of institutional space to constitute such forms via interpersonal processes that are manifest in the experience of many who lack the value to show up as significant interlocutors and elicit recognition so that they experience an absence of mediation, an absence of involvement and, over time, the crystallisation of an objectivity arising from such absences as the negation implied in their objectivity and experienced when they confront labour market criteria relating to the grounds of social valuations, and the objectivities arising from them, relating to a different way of being-there, differences of involvement bequeathing a sense of different properties materialised via capacities arising from experiences of being subject to the recognitions which constitute such possibilities. Moreover, without a capacity to solicit attention, capacities that require attendance and arise from realisations born of elicited forms rooted in engagements that situate individuals so that they experience the disclosure of a horizon that orients capacities for projection born of the materialisation of such forms, do not get constituted and the individual cannot conceive of a way to respond to a reduction that is a fundamental aspect of the recognition of the differences that subtend such processes. Notice that responsiveness is curtailed by a reduction at the heart of negation and this unrealisation constitutes an experience of inability that divisions merely reproduce. Selection criteria arise from the embedding of some in the relational grounds constitutive of recognised forms of objectivity and those whose possibilities reduce to an anonymous, abstracted, administrative process that materialises the appearance of an educational process that involves little beyond the exchange of resources for pieces of paper whose meaning arise from such differences are left with the disorientation characteristic of those who lack the significance to elicit recognition and solicit contact and thereby face the
physiognomic regeneration of the modalities via which this insignificance is interpersonally constituted, they lack capacities for self-presentation because they lack access to the institutional grounds of properties whose identity inhere in closures and hence don't even know what they might have ever done to satisfy criteria whose grounds relate to horizons whose disclosure are private. Because the interpersonal grounds of properties whose sense inhere in relational forms that constitute the objectivity of those subject to recognitions which disclose such possibilities, are contested aspects of the everyday culture of discriminations and recriminations, some face an effacement of their possibility and an erosion of their identity, some are denied lives because of the way the public sphere is interpersonally constituted. Some are denied access to the grounds of properties which they then perceive via their crystallisation in selection criteria and their exclusion from the institutional grounds of such objectivities leads to the bemusement arising from the disorientation of a displacement at the heart of the way exclusive forms are constituted and they face the triggering of "what the fuck?" Individuals live their exclusion twice over, first institutionally, and second, privately, in relation to labour market criteria whose conditions of satisfaction are perpetually unavailable. People live through the meaning of being excluded twice, first via the institutional mediations that constitute the objectivity that they then experience when confronted with labour market criteria that they experience being unable to satisfy because they lack access to the interpersonal grounds of the forms inscribed via experiences of being-realised in relation to the circumscriptions which constitute the objectivity of such experiences as significances arising from relationships of involvement that institute the distinction experienced via subjection to such differences. Individuals incorporate the sense of incapacities via experiences of being subject to recognition of differences which transfigure into different experiences of being-there, different experiences of being situated, so that they are involved differently, constituting a sense of differences of significance that are elicited by the institutional perception of such differences which become inscribed via their realisation so that the senseless absurdity of studenthood enmired in the devaluation that constitutes the unemployment it is indistinguishable from, because it arises from occupying the same relation to publicly instituted differences, is inseparable from an experience of inability arising from the continuation of a real incapacity to solicit contact which reconstitutes an underlying condition perpetuated via processes that are subtended by the sense of such relational objectivities. Clearly, the absurdity of the student experience is an internalisation of the insignificance arising from processes that are differentially instituted in order to constitute differences of significance so that differences in value can be manifest via the way individuals are perceived and spontaneously situated. The problem is these processes reconstitute objectivities whose grounds are experientially manifest via the sense incorporated via experiencing being subject to such mediations. Moreover, this kind of disorientation could only occur when the process of acquisition of the certificates was separate from the sphere of practice that the credentials are supposed to relate to, that is, when the process that materialises the appearance of assessment is separate from any sphere of practice, allowing for the attenuated disorientation manifest by the mortified expletive, "what the fuck". In fields in which certificates were acquired via involvement, such experiences would
not arise. Education should embed individuals in an orientational medium so that they spontaneously intuit aspects elicited via the disclosure of such a fabric so that they experience being responsively absorbed in forms that constitute them appropriately, able to exhibit characteristics arising from experiences of being situated via such contextualising aspects, and this experience of disorientation and confusion is only possible because of distances that extort the sense of a process without embedding the least valued in anything, thereby physiognomically regenerating an experience of dislocation that subtends such expression. The problem is that in the situation where one's response to labour market selection criteria is "what the fuck", the mortifying disorientation arising from an attenuated relation to possibilities inherent in membership of fields that are constituted via recognition of differences that leave some in a state of structural blindness arising from the non-disclosure of a horizon that allows some to intuit possibilities because they experience their materialisation, others cannot interface at all. As you are struggling to find a way to finance the education available to you, which is a highly confusing experience since it does not involve co-presence or public contextualization, the absence of any education available to you is obscured by the desperate nature of your efforts to mediate access to something in the face of the absence of anything beyond the abstracted administrative processes that materialize the appearance of what is available to you. It is only at the end of the process that you confront the absence of anything required to satisfy labor market criteria and, alongside it, the nausea arising from the disorientation of the dislocation that leaves you unable to ever imagine being competent because you exist outside of any sphere of contact that might materialize the sense of objectivities that inhere in relational aspects that are unavailable to you. Just as you have no experience of the relational basis of aspects that inhere in recognitions which disclose involvements that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in such processes, so, too, you are unable to imagine yourself ever being able to cope with situations which would elicit the neurophysiological structures that would subtend capacity to conceive of such possibilities because you experienced their relational actualization. In this sense the absurdity of "what the fuck" makes perfect sense. Without being able to satisfy labour market criteria one remains in an isolated state outside of any of the relational modalities that constitute capacities to satisfy such criteria because one accesses their relational and institutional grounds. How can those forced to develop projects in order to secure finances to pay for the administration of their labour so that it materialises the appearance of someone else's labour process interface when what is available to them does not include the disclosure of circumstantial aspects that constitute possibilities recognised because of their exclusivity? For the poorest, condemned to develop projects from a private sphere, they remain marked, from the beginning and their usefulness is perceived via a discrepancy their process perpetuates. If they finish uninvolving processes and are judged against relational criteria that remain unavailable, what can they do? How can they interface with the labour market? A problem that their 'education' merely perpetuates. They are ignored institutionally except as a bare resource and so go on to be ignored because of an insignificance that is merely reproduced and transfigured because of the logic of valuation that constitutes public culture. From such conditions how can they mediate access? How can they interface at all? The sense of their experience will
eliminate them because they have been unable to incorporate the sense of forms that require relational engagement, and absorption in relationships that physiognomically materialise a sense of relational aspects that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being subject to such modalities. The academic game was over before they ever got chance to play it and the rules of engagement are not stated, they arise from forms of perception that disclose aspects that are part of the responsive actualisation of differences that tacitly refer to this preintentional background that constitutes reference and possibility. Engagement discloses forms that responsively manifest consequential aspects whose sense inhere in differences so that every aspect of an individual's objectivity manifests their position and individuals cannot interface because they cannot access the interpersonal grounds of possibilities that require embedding, contact and continuity, all modalities completely absent in the dislocated, anonymous, process the devalued endure. The feeling of "what the fuck" arises from the absurdity of seeing criteria and not really knowing what interpersonal forms they relate to because your educational process was utterly devoid of contact with anything. Not knowing how you would even mediate access to required forms is a natural effect of closures that leave the devalued unable to even imagine the grounds of forms they don't experience being interpersonally disclosed.

Because forms of capital are generated via relational processes that utilise institutional space exclusively, the ignorance of those excluded from the networks that legitimate some, is an essential aspect of the processes constitutive of value and competence. Capacities for reference inhere in forms of involvement that disclose abilities to refer to intra-worldly aspects that arise from a horizon disclosed via recognitions which constitute such circumstantial forms. When you have struggled to secure finances for the purchase of degrees and then you face, at the end, your complete inability to satisfy criteria whose interpersonal grounds you cannot actually imagine, the criteria confront you with the reality of an ignorance that was part of the materialisation of such distinctions as aspects of an objectivity constituted via such processes. These processes are supposed to exist to address the problems of dislocations that constitute such conditions but it appears that all they do is reconstitute problems based in the distances that subtend the process. The identity of the experience inheres in the relational forms that reproduce objectivities arising from valuationary processes that are the real stakes of divisions reproduced via relational differences that constitute differences in objectivity that are, clearly, crucial stakes of public fields. The de-realisation of non-actualisation is a key stake of forms constituted via closures whose function and meaning are fused: the forms constitutive of being able to manifest properties whose sense inhere in access to relational conditions constituted via closures rely upon their inaccessibility and this is part of the statutory attribution of competencies within a system whose fairness must be emblematised via the processing of outsiders whose difference is surreptitiously reconstituted as a public aspect of ways of being physiognomically regenerated via the practice of distinctions that subtend institutional processes. Struggling through a process that reduces to the self-generation of projects from outside of the relationships that constitute the recognised form of the competence, individuals end up confronting their non-objectification and the absurdity of the absence of access to anything educationally is followed by an inability to manage to
satisfy selection criteria because the devalued cannot represent themselves because they have never accessed the relational basis of forms that make appropriate self-descriptions available. The inability to appropriate forms and identify oneself representationally, the capacity to use self-descriptions, authentically, because one has really experienced the grounds of substantive forms that make an experience of properties manifest via being subject to their relational disclosure, arises from access to relational processes constituted differentially so that capacities for self-representation arise from capacities for self-identification whose institutional conditions of satisfaction are unavailable to those who face a world whose possibilities reduce to the purchase of credentials whose meanings inhere in anonymous administrative processes that subject individuals to what one PhD student described in the following terms, "Ah just sit in ma room fartin' an smellin' an eatin' an' drinkin', not botherin' abaht when Ah get showered, cos Ah don't see anybody anyway", a reduction that sediments meanings inscribed via the recognition of differences that condemn some to such restricted spheres, and forms, of existence. This experience of privation arises from the absence of significance which reconstitutes an inability to elicit recognition and solicit contact, it arises from an inability to show up as a worthy interlocutor in a system whose mediations are purely private, concerning the use of private forms of engagement to materialise the appearance of public processes which condemn the devalued to the idleness of a privation that is an effect of an insignificance that becomes transfigured into an inability to function because one simply does not access the interpersonal aspects that constitute contextualising mediations that disclose a capacity for reference that inheres in experiencing being realised in relation to a horizon whose disclosure constitutes such modalities. The problem for people in such conditions is, how can they possibly be aware of what they will require to compete when they are not involved in any sphere that discloses such aspects? Moreover, how can they act to acquire what they cannot possibly know they need without the divulging of such requirements? Moreover, why are people condemned to such conditions? Because educationalists want to avoid the emergence of a need whose satisfaction requires engagement, time, effort, and, worst of all, resources, to situate people who the institutions cannot effectively situate because of a competition that renders them superfluous and insignificant. The international elites who have CVs full of visiting studentships and, when younger, attendance at international language schools and the purchase of varieties of forms of certification that manifest their ability to satisfy conditions that their capacities arise from, merely efface the poor. Whilst a postgraduate student, the only way I could discover the criteria against which I could be judged was to pull the snarled up CV of an international student out of a malfunctioning printer. When I saw the international summer schools, visiting studentships at the Sorbonne and Cambridge, attached to prestigious professors, whilst at an Ivy League American university, and university teaching on her CV, I spoke to a professor who reassured me, "you have to remember that it's very unusual to be up against such a quality student", which manifests how these aspects of privilege are perceived. Such forms are not interpreted for what they are: the effects of income, but are perceived via their transfiguration into moral qualities. How, then, are those whose PhDs reduce to self-teaching and struggling to find ways to pay for processes of certification that reduce one to farting in a bedroom at one’s
parent's house supposed to satisfy entry-level criteria of the following kind: “We are looking for a Lecturer with exceptional research profile”; or "To be considered for the position you have to hold a PhD in urban studies or a related discipline and have some teaching experience"? Harvard University advertised a post-doctoral position with the following conditions: "Experience or comfort with interdisciplinary scholarship strongly recommended, as is proficiency in data management and commitment to the principles of open research. Must possess strong communication, interpersonal, and analytical skills". Given that the process available to many reduces to sitting farting in a bedroom whilst struggling to produce the thesis that materialises the appearance of one's educational process, how would such conditions ever be satisfied? The problems that await upon on completion of credentials are part of the fundamental forms of objectivity that constitute the nature of what is available which, clearly, lack domains of mediation. Clearly, criteria like "experience or comfort with interdisciplinary scholarship, communication, interpersonal, and analytical skills" presume forms of institutional existence that are uncharacteristic of the educational process available to many of the poorest who experience being, not merely confined but completely unable to contact anything via university. Attempting to mediate contact with anyone is a major problem within institutional processes that provide no reason-for-being-anywhere and the whole of the interpersonal sphere implodes into the sectarian nature of a divided reality in which divisions are used to naturalise the sense of differences in capacity whilst effacing their institutional grounds in domains of mediation whose interpersonal nature efface the reality being constituted as part of the positioning of those negated via such processes. Moreover, the unavailability of constitutive modalities is an effect of the way the interpersonal is used, surreptitiously, to disclose a medium that physiognomically materialises the basis of the sense of aspects whose institutional legitimacy are perceived in the labour market so that the practice of differences that inhere in their recognition constitutes what appear to be essential differences of will as class differences are constituted on a purposive terrain whose nature is obscured as part of the production of its validity. How is someone whose only hope in life consists in the struggle it takes for the poor to finance 'access' to such processes which, then, involve nothing, supposed to address such criteria? What they face is the perpetuation of an underlying dislocation from which the absences manifest on their CV arise: access to the certification process is merely a statutory right that does not grant access to the conditions required to accede to the actual competence: as this distinction is practiced via perception of differences of expressivity physiognomically regenerated via its recognition, so, too, naturally, there is the practice of a statutory distinction by institutional agents who must screen out the also-rans who access a vacuous, de-realising, administered, process that narcissistically realizes educationalists from those whose recognition is manifest by an embedding arising from the progressive involvement of a trajectory exhibiting the effects of a sense incorporated via its constitutive condition: being perceived to be significant. Differences of significance are manifest via the perception of differences which inscribe traces of that difference via an objectivity arising from such grounds. But, how, are individuals trapped farting in bedrooms supposed to address the issue of their objectification? How can they engage institutional agents when there is no day-to-day sphere of co-presence? How can they know the criteria
they will face and when they face them, upon completion, how can they address deficits that are inherent to the differences being casually reconstituted via processes in which symbolic forms are key resources in a game in which resources are so scarce that those condemned to farting in bedrooms must turn themselves into a resource to attempt to mediate access to such vacuous forms? But how, once such individuals face criteria they cannot satisfy, are they to even address such deficits? The answer is they cannot and go straight back to the dole queue. The inability to satisfy such forms and the absence of the grounds of involvements that might constitute intentional aspects rooted in such possibilities reduces individuals to a state of confusion, antipathy and malaise manifest by the expression, "Ah just sit in ma room fartin’ an smellin’ an eatin’ an’ drinkin’, not botherin’ abaht when Ah get showered, cos Ah don’t see anybody anyway": the inability to satisfy criteria that relate to the interpersonal grounds of institutional forms of objectivity arising from co-presence physiognomically regenerates an experience of inability that is an effect of an experience of deprivation that transfigures an experience born of the recognition of difference into an inability to accede to forms of functionality that are rooted in sources of the self that arise from forms of actualization that intersubjectively donate significances physiognomically materialized via ways of being situated, interpersonally, so that capacities for reference inhere in disclosures which constitute a horizon experienced via being subject to such possibilities. This is the form life takes when one's labour is not grounded in anything that discloses a need for, and therefore realises one in relation to, dispositions relating to what one is attempting to acquire via such a solitary, private, existence, thus affecting the sense of the form's acquired via such conditions. One doesn't experience a need for what one attempts to teach oneself in order to provide, for oneself, what should arise from a cultural embedding that is clearly absent. This kind of 'educational success' entails withdrawal from public existence because it doesn't involve connection, or access, to anything: the poverty you endure leads to shame which leads to self-mediated failure because one lacks any frame of common reference because the process one undergoes is merely the source of the individuated derivation of a sense extorted via the administration of one's labour via relationships that objectify others. The absence of any embedding of the education in anything, publicly, is only too apparent and this, in time, constitutes its public significance because it is an effect of differences of significances that a privatized process effortlessly reproduces. 'Educational success' entails a withdrawal because the 'education' cannot embed all students in public relationships that constitute rare forms of value that are effects of a valuation manifest via access to the interpersonal grounds of exclusive forms. The withdrawal entailed by forms of insignificance physiognomically regenerated via distinctions that constitute the circumscription manifest via experiences of failing to accede to recognized form of social existence emerges in the following, "My intellectual pretensions are completely hidden, it's just a private secret life for me, I do the work, trip in to uni' when I see the supervisor, that’s about it for me. There’s no point in it, it’s not gettin’ yer anywhere but yer’ve got so far, yer just realize yer need it, so yer ‘ave to accept it". This is an effect of experiences of meanings arising from ways of being rooted in the perception of differences that condemn some to the anonymity of public inexistence and the conditional accession of 'universal statuses' that belie the real grounds of
distinctions that are ratified in ways easily concealed by the privacy of an educational process that reduces to the individuated administration of the products of student labour. The form of the education forces significances, incorporated via subjection to its form, upon individuals. The experience arises from subjection to spatial forms that constitute its sense, "it’s just a private secret life for me": the education entails subjection to significances that arise from the tacit reference implied in the difference experienced via subjection to the form. How can individuals in laboring communities accede to public existence when the institutional mediations available to them privatize their labor? This kind of existence arises from distances that obscure their reality and involve individuals in ways of being involved in aspects that are sense-bearing without their will being active so that they inscribe a sense of difference that determines their existence without having any capacity to affect their destiny or day-to-day existence because of a fundamental lack of mediation or involvement that exposes them to the incorporation of the same sense that they have turned to university escape. What are being reproduced are differences of status relating to forms of life lived as ways of being-there, as forms of existence that are reproduced via distances that are reproduced via their recognition so that the sense imbibed via exposure to such conditions physiognomically regenerates them via inscriptions of difference immanent to the way such processes constitute meanings arising from experiences of being realised in such ways via the effects of the perception of such differences. Precisely what the educational process should do, involve lower class people so that they can accede to recognised forms of existence, it cannot. All they can do is bid, via an assessment process they must produce themselves, for access to forms whose grounds remain unavailable, leaving the form of their life unchanged, they continue to live a form of solitary social death characteristic of other publicly devalued members of their class, their existence is akin to that of the unemployed, which is why, functionally, their credentials are perceived via the same logic, if now effaced via the efforts at reclassification. What is clear is that the reality of education, for many, is to be subject to forms that reproduce the circumscriptions arising from involvements in meanings experienced via being-perceived to bear the sense of aspects that inhere in such conditions so that nothing is changed beyond subjecting oneself to a more personal experience of the nature of barriers that, generally, take the form of absences of contact and the absurdity of the meaninglessness arising from not-being-able-to-constitute oneself as a worthy interlocutor because one exists outside of any sphere of existence inscribed via forms of realisation that constitute forms whose sense inhere in experiencing a realm of reference arising from the disclosures which constitute such circumscribing aspects. One is involved in reality via forms whose realisation physiognomically materialise the sense experienced via being subject to such processes. Disclosures constitute the sense of relational aspects that constitute capacities for functionality based on congruency and the inscription of forms arising from experiences of recognition. This is why selection criteria attend to involvement and to exclusive relational forms that manifest membership because value is constitutive of competence. Moreover, one intuits that this absence of any need for what one attempts to teach oneself, in order to satisfy the criteria that materialise the appearance of one's 'education', relates to a status you experience being physiognomically regenerated via the disorientation that is an effect of an absence
of value, an absence of significance, that has huge personal ramifications, denuding one of access to situational and contextualising circumscriptions whose disclosure constitute capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being subject to the disclosures which constitute such aspects. The reconstitution of inability as an effect of the physiognomic materialisation of aspects relating to different ways of being rooted in such processes is at the heart of the constitution of objectivities that denude individuals of possibilities, reducing them to such forms of existence. The problem is that such processes reconstitute a sense of absence arising from the perception of the insignificance of such individuals and transfigure their insignificance into an inability to satisfy selection criteria. Lacking an ability to elicit recognition and solicit contact they cannot, then, bear the sense of the grounds of objectivities that inhere in relational states born of the perception of properties that are themselves effects of experiences of being-recognised as a legitimate interlocutor. In others words, the perception of differences of value transfigures such perceptions into the grounds of properties that are effects of such processes. This is why the process is akin to abuse because individuals are subject to relational transactions that elicit the sense of properties that inhere in relational aspects that they have little control over. The toxic nature of the experience of humanities departments is that it depends upon how you are perceived which determines the grounds of the qualities that you will be-perceived to manifest and once you are perceived as discrepant then the form of your education will consist of a surreptitious ostracism inseparable from the usual ways the middle classes use 'public' institutions in order to constitute distinctions whose form transfigure the sense of relationships into meanings inscribed via being subject to involvements that constitute such objectivities and involve individuals in different ways of being that circumscribe their possibility, determining their actuality. A 'public' institutional background is used to institute differences that are perceived to exhibit distinction in relation to exclusive forms of involvement that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in the disclosure of a horizon whose practice realises some so that they experience the physiognomic materialisation of the sense of aspects that constitute ways of being-there, circumscriptions that constitute circumstances experienced via being subject to such modalities. Where some are involved, others are reduced to an isolation that manifests an insignificance that renders unnecessary self-care and bodily maintenance, showering becomes unnecessary because one never goes anywhere or meets anyone. How could someone subject to this actually compete in the labour market when success in the labour market arises from recognition of associational processes crystallised as significances incorporated that allow those recognised to represent themselves because they experience being subject to interactional forms that constitute representational forms of intentionality. The devalued come off PhDs with nothing relevant to the academic labour market and with credentials that have no wider public significance. When this is the reality you face, how do you get to actually do anything? When the mediations supposed to deliver you to opportunity and competence condemn you to the privation of a bedroom and isolation, then how do you establish any kind of will to actually attempt to do anything? What we see is the lack of mediation, the lack of involvement, arising from the way the appearance of functions can be materialised via association with the administration of others' labour. The lack of mediation
constitutes the absence of circumscribing aspects that disclose contextual cues that absorb individuals in forms that realise them so that they experience possibilities via the projection of this realisation and experience an integration of past and future via the retention of forms synchronised via absorption in such modalities, assuring individuals of their being-for-others because the possibilities they experience emerge from engagement with others who situate their being via such processes. The lack of mediation, the lack of circumstantial aspects, constitute the absence of a fundamental structural condition of meanings which require involvement in spheres of existence, and, in place of an experience of presence infused with such aspects, we have the reduction characteristic of the devalued, to a private sphere and non-relational ways of being, "Ah just sit in ma room fartin’ an smellin’ an eatin’ an’ drinkin’, not botherin’ abah when Ah get showered, cos Ah don’t see anybody anyway". Being ignored is a fundamental aspect of the valuationary processes that constitute the experience of being a student. In fields without any consequential sphere of application, without any sphere of public practice, you access what you are deemed to warrant and that is an effect of forms incorporated via access to the grounds of whatever life is available. Those with institutional leverage are fee-paying and mediation depends on how you appear with the grounds of incorporation of recognised forms requiring access to the interpersonal grounds of rare forms. How students are perceived depends, primarily, on the sense of forms incorporated via forms of existence that are circumscribed via class lifestyles. Academics are able to immediately sense discrepancies in populations that are, largely, homogenous. What this means is that exclusion has many aspects and the real stake is access to the interpersonal grounds via which appropriate forms are incorporated and this is why the university is so constituted by absences of contact: for contact to signify valuationary forms it has to be exclusive so that the institutional production of differences that constitute required significances arises from intentional aspects that are encountered as the anonymity of institutional space and the absence of reasons-for-being-anywhere which transfigure devaluation into a disorientation, malaise and antipathy, that is an effect of the abstracted relationships via which value is extorted. What is clear is that the discredited discredit themselves as an effect of meanings they incorporate via experiences of being subject to such processes. The absence of mediation leads to the physiognomic materialisation of a sense of absence that functions as an essential reference to an inability to project arising from an absence of the conditions required to satisfy such conditions so that the individual comes to bear the sense of an inability to refer adequately which is an essentialised effect of experiencing being realised in such ways. The absence of mediation discloses an absence of the conditions required to satisfy intentional states, leaving individuals unable to refer adequately to themselves vis-à-vis relational aspects that constitute capacities for reference so that their expressivity appears to manifest this absence as an incorporated effect of a devaluation that haunts the flesh, enveloping an expressivity born of perception of a difference physiognomically regenerated via such processes. When labour market criteria relate to associational forms that constitute the sense of relational states, we see why such criterial traces of forms of
social organisation are used: because they mirror the tacit forms of organisation that
working class people experience as the anonymity of an insignificance in which they
appear inappropriate because they don't bear the traces of individualised forms
incorporated via membership of the groups able to inscribe their social power
through such institutional mechanisms and, via such processes, social value is
transfigured into what appear to be differences of ability. The very difficulty the
poor face is that labour market criteria relate to relational aspects that they have
least control over because of the way their education is privatised as part of the
refraction of the appearance of processes that involve nothing beyond their own
isolated projection and solitary labour. There are completely different ways of being
involved which is why the sense of properties arising from these differences is so
different. Worse still, when divisions are such a prominent aspect of the disclosure
of ways of being situated, how can individuals not manifest awareness of the effects
of the different structuring efficacy arising from significances that income
constitutes? If you don't access the disclosure of a shared sphere, how do you
interface at all? This inability is what, actually, constitutes your presence,
institutionally, and institutional processes merely transfigure such aspects into what
appear to be differences of capacity. For human beings, because meanings are
appropriated via realisations in relation to interpersonal disclosures that constitute
forms of presence, experiences of being-in require involvement, they require
contextualising aspects so that one accedes to interpersonally disclosed modalities
via experiencing being subject to such possibilities. The devalued, clearly,
experience a dislocation and privation that transfigures their absence of value into
what are physiognomically materialised inabilities to project, and, 'understand',
appropriately because they do not experience interpersonal forms that constitute
meanings incorporated as forms of expressivity that are physiognomically
materialised via experiences of being subject to such processes. This is why selection
processes attend carefully to evidence of involvement that manifest aspects that are
disclosed via experiences of being subject to such disclosures: precisely what
education lacks for many. The underlying experience of educationalism, of enforced
idleness, senselessness, purposelessness and hopelessness, the reduction to farting,
alone, in a room, unencumbered by concern for your being-for-others because your
education does not situate you leaving you engulfed by the meaninglessness of a
purposeless existence, is characteristic of processes in which the appearance of role-
performance, and competence, are extorted via a theatre surrounding the
judgement of forms produced outside of connection with anything, so that
administrative-bureaucratic relationships constitute access to a sphere of responsive
actualisation for the employees who benefit from their monopolisation of
instruments of objectification that force such conditions on those who remain
degraded, irrespective of educational level. What is clear is that the sphere of
existence, and the form of life, that devalued individuals experience, arises from a
fundamental absence of mediation and that the circumscription they experience
relates to significances whose form inhere in the perception of differences that
condemn them to forms of existence that physiognomically regenerate expressive
aspects rooted in such processes that are themselves effects of the meaning of being
forms that are reciprocally constituted as aspects of the public materialization of
objectivities that relate to social positions realized via experiences of the
interpersonal grounds, the forms, of such meanings which become inscribed via being subject to such aspects. The absence of mediation constitutes a lack of realisation which means there is no access to a constitutive medium, no access to the appropriation of forms via the certitude of their attributive conditions, so that individuals do not undergo processes that align their identities via experiences of being-there that constitute such aspects. People don't experience possibilities via such processes, they don't experience realisations that constitute accession to purposive relations to being-there, they remains enmired in a "there" that arises from a way of being whose perception constitutes the barrier via which such conditions of existence are physiognomically regenerated. Circumstances, ways of being, arise from perceptions that disclose a medium that constitutes forms of existence whose meaning are inscribed via subjection to such processes. Imputations of inferiority are aversive because they constitute what is available to us as a medium whose disclosure materialise the very fabric of being, the very medium via which cognizance and developmental possibilities arise and they constitute a sphere of realisation via which such modalities become actualized which is why negation is so devastating because the reduction that it involves curtails possibilities and condemns individuals to a non-developmental relation to being that precludes their accession to recognized forms of social existence. How can individuals who experience being in such a situation constitute projects or accede to a purposive relation to being when they experience a reduction as empathic as described here: "Ah just sit in ma room faritin' an smellin' an eatin' an' drinkin', not botherin' abaht when Ah get showered, cos Ah don't see anybody anyway"? What is clear is that the absence of mediation, the absence of connection, constitutes an absence of realisation that manifests what becomes signified as an absence of the conditions required to attribute competencies, and, clearly, this prejudice is correct because people who face such conditions cannot accede to the conditions which satisfy intentional forms whose constitutive conditions remain unavailable, irrespective of educational level. Their efforts reduce to struggling to pay for processes of self-certification whose relational basis materialize the appearance of the competence of others. Given that competence is identified via relational states whose institutional conditions are, clearly, inequitably distributed, we can see how administrative-bureaucratic relationships can be used to materialize their appearance, provided some are willing to enter the relationships: dispossession forces such conditions on the poor for whom education offers their only hope. This person talked to me about the lengths he had to go to in order to establish his economic viability so as to assure the university of its income, and yet what did he pay for? Moreover, what is the hallmark of the condition described? The condition described is characterized by non-mediation and non-contextualisation, by precisely the same conditions which constitute the condition of the unemployed. So, given such considerations are people being educated? Those who have no chance are given no chance, they access no developmental pathway, and cannot elicit the recognition of forms whose interpersonal grounds remain inaccessible. In this sense, they are denied a form of life and face the physiognomic regeneration of meanings inscribed via being subject to the perception of differences that constitute properties sustained via such processes. Without a developmental pathway, they remain unable to project in relation to forms whose grounds remain unavailable and remain enmired in the
sense of references that inhere in their passive actualization, the reality of this reduction manifest in the parameters of a form of life circumscribed via the absence of mediation, the absence of involvement in anything constitutive: "Ah just sit in ma room fartin’ an smellin’ an eatin’ an’ drinkin’, not botherin’ abaht when Ah get showered, cos Ah don’t see anybody anyway". Those who have no chance experience the absence of the relational conditions that constitute possibilities appropriated via the actualization of disclosures which constitute circumstantial forms transfigured into ways of being via experience of such modalities, they experience not-being-able to conceive of themselves as able and experience the physiognomic materialization of not-being-able to imagine satisfying the conditions required to function, they experience "...at uni’, I should have left in first couple’re months, I should’ve said I can’t do this, in sense ‘r Ah can’t make this, it’s not suitin’ me, I can’t do anythin’"; they experience not-being-able to imagine being-able to fit-in or contribute which is perfectly comprehensible when one understands the way neurophysiological structures are absorbed via responsive actualisation emerging from experiences of ways of being-realised. The devalued experience non-being as a constitutive aspect of a public significance that is physiognomically materialised via their experience of presence, or being-there. Without access to relational states that disclose the sense of forms constituted via such mediations, how can reference arise? When your educational process reduces to sitting in a bedroom farting, how do you refer to yourself as subject of intentional aspects whose grounds remain unavailable? This is where the labour market, and the recognised forms of competence, are stitched up, via circumscriptions relating to trajectory and the meaning of being rooted in the effect of such aspects. Even if one succeeds one will fail because the institutional forms that constitute the intelligibility of competence are absent and this is why lower class people experience the unintelligibility, the senselessness, the pointless absurdity of their education. The absence of mediation, and the unrealisation arising from the absence of disclosures which inscribe presence with forms elicited via experiences of being subject to such modalities, characterize an underlying objectivity that is being reconstituted via the interpersonal processes that sub tend access to the conditions constitutive of capacities whose attribution are part of the realisations that disclose the circumstantial aspects inscribed via experiencing being subject to such modalities that physiognomically materialize forms appropriated via their disclosure that constitute the sense of such aspects. The devalued experience precisely the same kind of dislocation that constitutes the public objectivity arising from the intersection of such processes via their recognition. Education is just another institutional mediation of underlying class processes that constitute differences of contextualization inscribed in the meaning of being subject to such aspects. When you undergo a process that involves so few possibilities for realisation that it condemns you to this lifestyle, how are you supposed to mediate access? Given that mediation requires resources, given that it requires the instantiation of aspects incorporated via their realisation, via disclosures that constitute such possibilities, how can people who face an experience of an objectivity they experience being physiognomically regenerated via recognition of a difference that constitutes such a form of life, mediate access? With what can they negotiate contact when contact itself is mediated via the sense of objectivities arising from such grounds? With the
status of credentials eroded, the mediations required to accede to objectification are absent. To contest the labour market one needs precisely what this type of education cannot provide: contact, involvement, embedding. If neurophysiological structures are absorbed via responsive actualisation to situational and relational aspects that constitute capacities to appropriate forms via being subject to the realisations that materialise the possibility of such modalities, who is accessing such mediations? The reality of educationalism is that there is really only contact over those moments that materialise the appearance of the function of the institutional agents who experience the grounds of their own competence via such relational aspects and who access resources via such processes. For students, they must function as a resource and the extortion of the sense of a process leaves them bereft, denuded of any of the traces of realisation. What for academics arises as part of their nestling in relationships that require little labour, or effort, or even time or co-presence, discloses the appearance of their function, whilst for students, they must function as a medium of realisation in relation to relational processes that extort forms via their labour, without them, necessarily, accessing anything. This is why the majority of the mediations relating to your presence are abstracted, taking place over a distance, without co-presence, and this is part of the destructuring of devaluation: you have to satisfy financial criteria to accede to any co-presence or contextualisation and you cannot, from such conditions, direct your labour appropriately nor develop. Who is accessing the relational basis of aspects via which attributions of competence arise? Who is accessing the grounds of functionality? Sitting and farting in a bedroom in your parents isn’t conducive to accessing the basis of human capacities, the disclosive conditions of being are absent, with the consequential effect, that individuals feel incapacitated and overwhelmed by an experience of inadequacy that is an effect of the valuationary processes that subtend the reality. Where some are given projects and contexts via which they develop in relation to determinate possibilities, others have to find a way to develop projects from the private sphere they are condemned to, in order to find a way to pay for certification processes that never introduce them to any disclosive medium and such relational differences transfigure class relational differences into what appear to be legitimate differences in competence. Where some experience actualization and possibility, others experience the de-realisation of negation and the presence of absence arising from the perception of a difference that precludes their presence so that they don’t even experience being privy to their own educational processing which takes place across distances whilst extorting the sense of functions and competencies for the institutional agents who institute the charade of their ‘education’. The mark of worthless disciplines that you can do nothing with is that they involve, largely, doing-nothing across the many years you are forced to invest in attempting to qualify yourself outside of the relationships constitutive of attributions of competence and, when you finish the PhD, you cannot get an interview because your labour has never been embedded and there are, rightly, questions about the status of your competence: questions that arise from how you are situated in relation to statuses that are merely transfigured into legitimated differences in status via such processes so that the credentials that the poor obtain are not really functional because they lack significances arising from forms of involvement that constitute conditions which satisfy intentional states attributed via the recognitions
which disclose such modalities. When selection criteria ask for "Documentation of other relevant activities concerning the position requirements" and when the only sphere of possibility available reduces to you filling-in-forms in order to shift finances, bearing your name, between bureaucracies who materialise the appearance of public objectivities via such relational processes, then how are you to satisfy such criteria? How can you document anything when your education reduces you to the utter privation of a bedroom? How can you even experience properties relating to a process that reduces you to solitary reading, never, relationally, speaking? How could you exhibit any sense of security in manifesting a being-for-others that arises from the intersubjective donations of significance that arise from disclosures which constitute such aspects? And, without access to such an interpersonal fabric how could you bear the sense of modalities that presume a projection that is clearly annihilated via the reduction described in "Ah just sit in ma room fartin’ an smellin’ an eatin’ an’ drinkin’, not botherin’ abaut when Ah get showered, cos Ah don’t see anybody anyway"? People cannot resolve problems of their relational objectivity alone. The absence of contact, the absence of involvement, are manifestations of the absence of a pathway, they are effects of dislocations arising from the perception of differences that, in being perceived, constitute differences that physiognomically materialise, forms incorporated via involvement in ways of being different arising from experiences of subjection to such processes. Moreover, without mediation, without the realisation and affirmation of experiences of being situated in relation to recognitions of such differences so that you are involved as an effect of a barrier whose sense is inscribed via the practice of this order inscribed in forms of visibility arising from its interpersonal realisation, how can appropriate dispositions form or ever be sustained? The ability to appear appropriate requires the incorporation of aspects absorbed via experiences of being situated that presume a recognition that becomes more conditional the more education becomes devalued by mass competition. Without the tacit disclosure of forms that constitute circumstantial aspects relating to ways of being-there that arise relationally, individuals, via their being, incorporate the sense of a difference that is an essential reference arising from such aspects and they will appear to lack a capacity arising from the way the intra-worldly is interpersonally constituted. If your best hope relates to a process of privation that reduces you to farting in a bedroom at your parents, then what frame of reference will you share with those whose education arises from a mobilisation that realises them so that they experience an operative intentionality rooted in the recognition of such differences? The efficacy of differences is part of their instantiation and they are inscribed as ways of being rooted in the practice of the social order. Involvements constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to possibilities so that one accedes to capacities via discovering oneself subject to them, relationally, and this is why discrimination does so much damage because it mutilates the sphere of possibility and negatively determines actuality so that individuals experience being denuded of the relational conditions required to satisfy intentional forms and feel disabled by essentialised forms rooted in the way they experience being interpersonally constituted. Because meanings are inscribed via ways of being-there, you have to be 'inside' the space constituted via the recognitions which disclose aspects experienced via being subject to such modalities. Forms cannot be appropriated from outside their conditions of
possibility which means that involvement in relationships that responsively actualise possibilities is a key stake and, yet, as competition increases, access to such conditions becomes more temporally and spatially displaced as the public significance of education-for-all is materialised via relational processes that efface such a state of affairs. Problems concerned with accessing modes of objectivisation concern the nature of institutional processes that subtend the appearance of forms whose relational basis lead some to be able to incorporate the sense of the relational processes that constitute such forms whilst others face a life in which the non-relational basis of their process reduces them to the privation of living with parents because they are not economically embedded and must function as an institutional resource that only entrenches their experience of reduction. As competition increases, inflation ensues and involvement recedes. The problem is processes that don't embed individuals can't involve them in the relationships that constitute recognised forms of objectivity and cannot enmesh individuals in the conditions which constitute capacities to satisfy the personal basis of relational states that individuals don't experience being interpersonally constituted. Education becomes like a game in which individuals, from outside of any access to anything, publicly, must offer forms as an aspect of a bid to participate whose conditions are never provided, leading to the perpetuation of aspects rooted in divisions which merely become transfigured into a sense of discrepancy that is itself an effect of the institutional processes that individuals endure. Mediation and embedding are the disclosive conditions for individuals to experience being capable of intuiting forms appropriated via such modalities and yet, clearly, such conditions are absent for the devalued, leading them to experience an absence of capacity as an effect of ways of being involved in reality via recognition of differences that constitute such modalities. If organisational and contextual aspects play a pervasive role in human cognitive functioning, how is someone forced to live like this because of the absence of mediations that constitute such modalities supposed to develop? If the locus of neurophysiological structures is involvement in disclosures that constitute capacities forged responsively so that individuals absorb neurophysiological structures so that the shape of dispositions and their physiognomic materialisation arise from absorption in aspects that constitute definite spheres or contexts, then how are individuals whose education consists of the absence of such modalities supposed to accede to competence? Capacities inhere in meanings whose disclosure constitute the forms appropriated via being-subject to the sense physiognomically materialised such that one experiences such modalities as aspects of one's being-for-others. One needs a context to gel with others and to share referentialities that emerge from being-there and this is absent when you go through these types of isolated self-education in an attempt to objectify yourself via relationships that objectify others. It is via involvements in interpersonal forms that disclose the sense of references that inhere in a horizon instantiated via such modalities that capacities inhere. It is via being-related to meaning-bearing aspects that are ontologically coincidental with interactional forms that subtend ways of being situated that capacities for instantiation, via which attributions of competence are constituted, arise and education that involves informally instantiated divisions via which a sense of value is extorted, clearly, involves many in nothing beyond the administrative mediations that materialise the appearance of functions that have little reality. In a world in
which the over-supply of credentials renders those forms available, to those who must be processed in order to obscure the way distinctions are realised in a system that must materialise the appearance of a public service that, really, is commandeered for private, capital-generating ends, generic, in which complex lineages are obscured by the temporal and spatial breaks that make tracing such processes difficult, the poor are not driven out, they are merely never situated to begin with and their difference is rendered intelligible via its personalised, and privatised, constitution: the poor are those who have credentials that relate to nothing with that nothing being manifest via an absence of contact, an absence of embedding, an absence of involvement in the rare forms that the elite use institutions to provide in order to derive precisely this distinction as an operative aspect of an intentionality whose interpersonal forms, constitute the private politics of discriminations and recriminations that characterise the reality individuals face. People aren't driven out of the labor market, they are merely unable to mediate the transitions that constitute the forms via which they accede to recognized forms of social existence and they, consequentially, live in an atrophied and asocial way, the forms of their existence etiolated by an insignificance that robs them of any capacity to contest forms that inhere in ways of being whose grounds remain unavailable. As Fanon said, “No one had barred him from it; it was just impossible for him. Not prohibited but unrealizable” (Fanon 1967: 175). The sense of properties, that is, the experience of being able to bear the sense of meanings, inhere in recognitions which disclose access to the interpersonal ground of involvements that disclose such modalities so that individuals experience meanings via being engaged via their form so that they experience being responsively actualised in relation to intentional states arising from the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects so that they intuit aspects which make sense because their sense is engendered in the actualisation of experiencing being subject to such modalities. The problem is that how you are perceived locates you so that you are passively subject to the grounds of distinctions that are ways of being realised via subjection to being-perceived to bear the sense of meaning-bearing components that are ontologically coincidental with being situated in such ways via forms that function as closures that constitute such aspects. Existential significance, realised as ways of being-there, relate to involvement in a ‘there’ in which actualisation of form temporally sustains sequences incorporated via being subject to a stasis that is part of the meaning of being subject to such objectifying forms which are physiognomically materialised via transitivities of sense that are intercorporeal, constituted via uses of space to constitute a ‘there’ realised via being subject to the forms that constitute the circumstances constituted via the disclosure of such aspects. It is important to note that these are realized as ways of being-there, not objectified representationally. Meanings are sedimented via exposure to the interpersonal grounds of forms that constitute objectivities that inhere in the sense inscribed via perception of such differences. In this sense, social conditions are meanings inscribed via being subject to the sense of divisions which circumscribe objective properties that inhere in the use of space to materialise such forms. Legibility is an effect of the disclosure of forms that constitute a medium experienced via being subject to the interpersonal grounds of such differences. It is as if the labour market is constituted in relation to a system of signals whose grounds arise from the cultural medium that establishes their intelligibility via an
underlying practical logic arising from the mode of operation of institutional agents who constitute such modalities. In order to understand how these legibilities work, it is worth considering an example. Calling about a post, I was told by the Professor involved:

...we view all candidates on merit, but what we need is a research profile and teaching. Did you teach?
S: Well, yes, I did a P.G.C.E for Further and Higher Education.
Yes but did you actually teach.
S: I taught during my Ph.D.
But did you teach?
Yes I taught in the college where I was a research fellow.
Did you lecture? (S: Yes, I taught.) Yes but the particular thing is did you do lecturing...the crucial thing for us, is did you give a lecture course? The crucial thing is that you lectured and then the research and that’s the issue. We need someone with publications, the potential to develop research projects.
S: I have a number of things that I’ve written and which I am working on that I could bring with me that I have difficulty placing at the moment. If I had colleagues I might be able to get help placing these pieces of writing. I know a number of working class men have trouble getting their work published. They refer us to academics and we don’t even know any...
We have an equal opportunities policy and I have no interest in your feelings of personal exclusion.
S: Do you not see the problem I am trying to point out that it is impossible for us to meet the requirements...why do you have no concern about what I am trying to point out?
...I think you are being rather aggressive unnecessarily and you’re not paying sufficient attention to what I’m saying.

What we see is how instituted differences render individuals legible via the sense of forms whose disclosure constitute objectivising differences that lead the devalued to experience a real incapacity that is an effect of the recognition of forms whose consequential efficacy arise from the mobilisation of agents, institutionally, who constitute such forms via the recognition of differences arising from a public culture in which the middle classes have institutions protecting their interests via recognition of their culture. In order to render individuals legible, it merely requires differences to be instituted via their recognition so that individuals face an interpersonal fabric constituted via the casual recognition of differences effaced via an informal culture that obscures the systemic nature of what is occurring. What is perceived as characteristic of an individual is their objectivity and this is why the questioning is so uncharitable and non-conciliatory. The goal of this interrogation is to eliminate someone who had performed a minor miracle just to access what he had. We also see how uncharitable the institution of criteria are: ‘research’ refers to projects arising from institutional involvement, from employment, not the amateurish efforts of people who are displaced by the ever increasing mediation of objectivities as competition increases. We see how eliminatory the criteria of selection are and can appreciate the real nature of the agents who casually reproduce such differences. What is clear is that there is no affirmation because there is no recognition of competencies because the differentiation arising from excess competition allows for the progressive elimination of people as an effect of the fake plurality of an institutional field that has to produce the appearance of being a public system whilst groups within it reconstitute themselves via surreptitious differences reproduced via the private use of institutional space to
reconstitute differences via recognitions of differences that physiognomically regenerate experiences of being relating to closures that are the effects of the use of institutional space to constitute circumscribed realms of legitimate encounter. Even those who manage to ‘succeed’ face the recognition of their difference via differences in experiential forms that arise from the recognition of a difference that constitutes such problems. Because of how individuals experience being located, we can see that their way-of-being becomes a problem, self-presentation becomes a problem because the devalued experience real inabilities born of their inability to show up as worthy interlocutors which means they lack access to the interpersonal grounds of the forms which constitute representational forms of intentionality which remain unavailable so that they face difficulties representing themselves and functioning in interactions like this. What we can see is that without access to the constitutive relational involvements of these objectivities you cannot interface with the agents who use exclusion to render legible differences in objectivity that arise via the perception of such differences. Moreover, what we can see is how experience functions against a background of distinctions whose sense constitutes the interaction: the sense of the distinctions function as a disclosive medium that renders individuals legible: the grounds of these differences are forms of realisation that constitute experiences of being arising amidst this signifying matrix. The individual is located in relation to the objectivity that their experience emerges from: it is the objectivity of these differences that constitutes the efficacy of such sign-reading operations. What one can see is how difficult it is for the devalued to establish communication in relation to labour market processes. What is clear is the way in which exclusions arise from differences whose recognition constitute the grounds of the sense of differences in objectivity that constitute real differences in capacity because the medium of being arises via recognitions which disclose forms which constitute capacities for reference that inhere in the circumscriptions of differences of contextualisation that arise via such processes. In order for discrimination to occur you only need agents to casually reproduce differences via their perception of them so that individuals are located in relation to a fabric constituted via such processes so that they become, themselves, aware of objectivities that constitute them so that they feel the sense incorporated via subjection to the interpersonal practice of this order. The reduction arising from the sense of such relational processes is manifest in this exchange. The academic is using understanding of differences of involvement to eliminate his interlocutor as an effective agent and he can do this by using the sense of relational forms that constitute a real inability to function in this conversation: I could not represent myself adequately because I have not been subject to the relational grounds of these forms whose sense constitute capacities for reference that inhere in the relations of involvement constitutive of the recognised form of the competence. Once institutional locations are personneled by agents with dispositions to discern differences relevant to the field being constituted to validate the expressive physiognomy of members of groups who the institutions serve, then it’s obvious that the devalued will face nothing more than the progressive revelation of an objectivity whose repression is so effective because their treatment calls them back, continuously, to an original objectivity that constitutes the meaning of their being, as that is publicly, progressively, revealed via such processes. What is clear, is that once
you have agents in position who can instantiate an order repressed by the autonomy arising from the extension of higher education, then misrecognition can be used to reconstitute forms of life whose grounds are part of the fabric of economic space. The devalued struggle for involvement, struggle to satisfy labour market criteria that arise from a different way of being-there and when they are unable to answer to the grounds of forms that remain unavailable they are deemed unsuitable. What we see is how the unavailability of very particular relations of involvement can be used to constitute the sense of differences that are effects of statuses that surreptitiously reproduce the processes of recognition that organise educational ascents and disclose forms of access that cannot be offered to all. What you have are circumscriptions of individuals via a sense perceived as an effect of divisions that people are subject to so that the way they are perceived becomes incorporated via the sense arising from the effects of this so that, over time, objectivities are crystallised and, for the individual, the effects of these circumscriptions materialise a sense of inability that is an effect of the forms they experience being disclosed so that they feel unsure and insecure, anxiety-ridden, as an effect of processes of contestation that affect their poise because of how they experience being curtailed because of being negatively perceived via institutional hierarchies that limit their experience of possibilities because of the mass competition that constitutes an anonymity that merely reproduces the dynamics constitutive of the forms valued in labour markets. As space is used, privately, to institute distinctions whose materialisation constitute ways of being situated via such differences, those objectified, involved, counterpose to those who face the generic administration of their labour which is not objectified by exclusive forms so that the value of credentials is relative to other processes that education finances without providing for all. As you are subject to circumscriptions arising from experiences of being negatively perceived, the exclusion takes the form of uninvolvement which gives you no reason-for-being anywhere so that you endure the discrimination of differentiation as pointlessness, malaise and antipathy and a sense of feeling disabled, unable to have anywhere to go or anything to do so that your life plays out elsewhere, beyond the metropolitan areas financed via mass higher education, you sense distinctions via their materialisation that constitute neurotic and maladaptive responses as the forms you experience being guide you to spaces that can only physiognomically regenerate the very basis of the stigma whose sense you bear as an effect of the incorporation of such differences via the effects of their recognition. The sense of divisions are given life by their interpersonal actualisation as sense-relational aspects constituted via recognitions which disclose the sense perceived of flesh itself constituted via such dynamics. The perception of difference is at the heart of the institution of identities because it’s the circumscription arising from being-negatively perceived that physiognomically materialises a sense of boundaries that relate to the qualities one experiences being realised via this background. Boundaries are surreptitiously imposed as forms of realisation so that particular experiences remain unavailable and one experiences being realised in relation to disclosures that render unavailable anything constitutive. Circumscriptions institute identities. Identities are experienced via experiences of being circumscribed via the sense of forms whose recognition disclose a sense of an objectivity individuals experience being physiognomically regenerated via such processes which situate
them in relation to the grounds of such processes. Without involvement it means there are no spatial or temporal forms that realise transitions so that individuals can project successfully via disclosures whose realisation constitute meaningful experiences of being and, lacking access to a medium whose physiognomic materialisation constitutes the fabric of the interpersonal meanings appropriated via the forms arising from absorption in the moments of the modalities of these significances, individuals can’t project and can’t transition, they appear locked in a stilted expressivity whose grounds relate to an existence lived elsewhere. Social boundaries appear as personalised forms incorporated via the physiognomic regeneration of differences whose significance arise from the sense relational nature of such processes. It is perceived that this stilted expressivity arises from an “inability to adapt” or from an essential lack of ability to intuit appropriate forms, conversationally, when, in reality, the inability to respond is an effect of experiences of distance whose interpersonal form arise as absences of contact so that individuals face being triggered by silent injunctions which call them to an order physiognomically regenerated via experiences of being perceived via such processes so that individuals cannot adapt, cannot instantiate appropriate forms, because of the way they experience being situated. The sense individuals bear is an effect of realisations that sediment forms incorporated via subjection to disclosures which involve them in meanings they experience being via. The capacity to instantiate appropriate forms presumes processes of realisation that constitute the ability to project via forms that presume a process of acquisition whose interpersonal grounds are absent for some who depict this absence via expressions like “there’s nothing there”: there is nothing at the heart of the ‘there’ they experience being interpersonally disclosed because they lack the forms required to accede to recognised forms of social existence and to modalities born of efficacy which transmute into an impoverished relation to aspects of the world that are constituted via involvement: within the world, the world’s circumstantial aspects arise from being-present to their interpersonal constitution, and this terrain is affected by devaluation because valuation is at the heart of the disclosure of intra-worldly aspects that found meaningful ways of being-there. Without involvement, individuals cannot transition. Recognition and mediation continuously immerse individuals in experiences of co-presence that disclose a medium appropriated via experiences of being able to project via such modalities and appropriate forms that sustain a hold on forms retained via experiences of their physiognomic regeneration so that adaptation is a continuous effect of experiences of being realised via an interpersonal fabric constituted via such processes. Adaptation and maladaptation are modalities relating to ways of being-perceived that are prepersonally constituted in institutions that must impersonalise discrimination in order to sustain the plausible deniability of discriminations that are realised unintentionally. One way to materialise the appearance of unintentional processes is to have purely impersonal processes and this is how universities are. As credentials become devalued individuals are not connected to contexts via validating interpersonal experiences: as those who institute distinctions via private uses of institutional networks withdraw leaving only the relational shell that they leave others to institute via administrative forms that utilise student labour to materialise their appearance, individuals experience a withdrawal that is really an effect of a devaluation that can’t even be
represented as exclusion because the processes don’t involve acts, and individuals experience the absence of the interpersonal grounds that constitute competencies. They then can’t constitute themselves and a key manifestation of this absence is that they can’t constitute a will to act because they lack any of the interpersonal mediations that might render them subject to such possibilities. The devalued undergo a lack of education and then find themselves unable to get interviews: from where, via what, would they ever appear as an attractive or legitimate interlocutor? The informality of educational space realises the materialisation of differences surreptitiously and insidiously via interpersonal forms that obscure the nature of differences whose effacement are part of the legitimation of differences of distinction within a mass system that relies on the funding provided by large numbers who merely experience their instituted incapacity as a statutory effect of differences whose ratification arise from recognition of forms that arise from proximities that subtend the incorporation of expressive forms that function as analogues of what they express: shared conditions of existence. Shared conditions of existence are manifest by commonalities of reference that inhere in common ways of being so that communication can be successful because reference arises from the shared forms of common ways of being. Common background is manifest by congruencies of expressive form that arise from the physiognomic regeneration of such forms via the mimetic acquisition of such forms so that they manifest what they are an analogue of and function as the basis of elective affinities that produce the substrate of forms of expressivity that arise from an overlap in institutional conditions of existence that guarantee successful communication because interlocutors share, not merely, a background but intuitions arising from experiences of being situated via intercorporeal forms which intersubjectively donate the basis of senses they share so that they have merely to perceive in order to commune with the basis of an effective, publicly mobilised, system of differences transmuted, via such processes, into forms of life. Expressive physiognomy is not merely a purely personal aspect of human being, it involves the ways in which valuationary processes affect individuals, particularly, the way individuals are able to solicit contact so that it manifests the interpersonal grounds of differences of significance that are given expressive life via the play upon the individual of recognitions which constitute the sense of their value arising from how they experience being as an effect of what they experience being manifest about themselves as an effect of experiences of being realised in relation to determinate forms of significance materialised via such processes. Divisions take form, they are part of the ways that individuals come to experience meanings via existing in relation to forms of treatment that constitute the very properties they intuit via experiences of being realised in relation to forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute experiences of being-there. In this sense presence, and the sense it manifests are part of an interpersonal contestation that is a key stake of public culture. Significances have such profound effects because they are physiognomically materialised forms that are the basis not merely of cognition but of our very sense of capacity because meanings are aspects of being, they arise from the very interpersonal fabric constitutive of our access to the well-spring of being, they arise from the very substrate of existence and constitute our access to possibilities. This is why hierarchy is so unjust because it circumscribes the access of some to the very basis of human ability, meanings experienced via being
subject to their possibility. Divisions affect individuals because they are subject to judgements about their social competence based on aspects of expressive physiognomy that are effects of how individuals are perceived which function as a trigger calling individuals to an order inscribed via the recognition of such differences such that the act of recognition physiognomically materialises what appear to be essential aspects of character that are effects of individuals dealing with the forms expressive of the sense of an order incorporated via the poise arising from subjection to such constitutive moments. Experiencing being-perceived arises from experiences of being-recognised which disclose aspects that lead to an understanding of the world around us that is rooted in ways of being-realised via the sense of such relational processes so that experiences of the world arise from this interpersonal sphere expressed in poise, or expressive physiognomies, rooted in the nature of this order of the flesh that cannot be gained by merely observing. Poise manifests capacities that are effects of schema incorporated via their mimetic acquisition via circumscriptions that are effects of divisions that institutions reproduce. What you have are certificates that aren’t valid in the fields financed through the administrative process that constitutes the illusion of a process and processes which cannot introduce individuals to any sphere of actualisation that would be publicly accepted as constituting a recognised competence. So, you have people who turn to education because they are unable to access any recognised sphere of competence who end up side-tracked by processes that materialise the appearance of the labour process of others which are constituted in distinction to the labour market practice because those forms need to be protected to ensure various capital-flows. So, what you have are educational processes that are illusory and merely a way of financing the very groups who are sustaining a hold on resources via practicing distinctions surreptitiously. What this type of education does is foster maladaptive responses because individuals aren’t contextualised and, as is clear, the sense of inability is reproduced: the academic knows precisely how to reduce an individual to meanings arising from their subjection to divisions which are contested aspects of the competition for recognition that characterises the anonymous administration of students labour which is just more unemployment. What we see is how aspects of the social structure are constituted via the use of space to produce differences of form which are legible effects of the system of differences that render individuals subject to processes of recognition whose conditions of possibility are the practice of these differences of form which constitute the sense of the schema applied to individuals via such processes. What is being recognised, here? It is the meanings constituted, interpersonally, that determine the form of the interaction. The academic can discern the objectivity of the interlocutor because the questions are meant to disclose what the system of differences constitute so that such objectivities emerge via the forms which constitute the meanings that emerge from the practice of such differences. What we see is how the social structure emerges via forms whose interpersonal basis constitute meanings relating to experiences of being situated via forms whose legibility emerge from their public efficacy. So, that, under the guise of a public system, a private system of differences is instituted that transposes class differences into differences of competence rooted in the nature of these differences. Instead of satisfying criteria via the educational process available, exclusions based in
hierarchies are reproduced. Recognition of differences via the forms of involvement characteristic of particular objectivities constitute a mode of operation arising from these conditions. Perception of differences facilitate the instantiation of differences of form whose inscription constitute subjection to spatial processes that denude individuals of capacities to appropriate forms because they don’t experience being realised in relation to the disclosures that constitute the modalities they are instantiated to constitute. The meaning of being arises from constitutive interpersonal forms that disclose meanings as ways of being situated in relation to forms which constitute such objectivities. The meaning arises from recognition of differences so that individuals are subject to a circumscription that arises from the way they experience being realised in relation to modalities whose spatial nature can be repressed by the nature of the way opportunities can be used to mask exclusions, particularly when the excluded can be used to constitute the appearance of institutional processes for which others are remunerated. The system of differences relates to modes of actualization that arise from recognition of forms which disclose the interpersonal basis of dispositions that are the materialised effect of ways of being situated in relation to such conditions. Recognitions of form disclose judgments which are immanent properties of the contestation the questioning manifests. Meanings arising via such forms function as judgements which constitute stances which are mutually referential. Meanings arise as forms whose disclosure constitute ways of being so that individuals experience the meaning of their being via how they experience being-there. It is not the case that all face a meaningless competition, a symbolic war of all against all, some are privy to the disclosure of forms that arise from recognitions that materialise capacities guaranteed by their constitution so that they are assured of existing via the grounds of capacities appropriated via such processes, some face a continuous actualisation that physiognomically materialises capacities for response arising from a circumscription rooted in an experience of being-there, actually publicly situated and realised, so that they can function contextually because they experience the disclosure of circumstantial forms, a ‘there’, which orients their way-of-being so that they can effortlessly refer because their responses are constituted via a shared experience of co-presence. Others face a process of disembedding born of the perception of a difference whose recognition constitutes a dislocation that materialises awareness of the sense that moments of presence disclose so that while some are actualised, others are de-realised, their lives played out elsewhere because of the fundamentally orienting nature of processes of recognition that constitute meanings whose spatial orientation involve tacit forms of organisation that arise from an order of immediacy that is used to constitute such distinctions as natural and ‘unintentional’. A peremptory manner is part of the stylisation of an egality of equal indifference to all that obscures how many have no access to any sphere that might ground or elicit qualities because the process they undergo does not allow for the appropriation of forms elicited via an experience of being-there that discloses properties that emerge via the embedding of individuals in a shared sphere of practice. For qualities to emerge individuals need access to the interpersonal grounds of instantiations of form that elicit what is materialised via being-there, situated via a context whose disclosure elicits such characteristics as physiognomically materialised effect of being-there, and yet the process the poorest
undergo is merely a vacuous administrative process that serves no purpose other-
than to manifest that there is a systemic process available to them and the real
significances are manifest via the extent of the labour academics invest and the way
they exist socially, aspects generally hidden by the private nature of the processing
many undergo and the private nature of the constitution of academic space to bear
the sense of distinctions whose modes of actualisation are manifest only fleetingly to
the excluded by the absence of any real process so that they merely experience the
materialisation of a devaluation that is at the heart of the legibility being constituted,
interpersonally, so that any direct questioning of the nature of their existence will
eliminate them because their form of life arises from public recognition of forms that
the system is constituted via. Individuals need to access the subpersonal effects of
interpersonal modalities that constitute meanings and capacities for reference that
inhere in a way of being-realised such that they accede to capacities as an effect of
the tacit action of belonging. What employers are looking for, what is manifest in
this academic’s questioning, is actualisation, they are looking for people whose
biography manifests a situating in relation to the contextualising disclosures which
are the conditions of acquisition of the forms whose grounds arise from recognition
of a difference that academic space is organised to institute. The academic is looking
for evidence of the conditions of acquisition of dispositions which arise from
continuous realisation in relation to a system of differences that are at the heart of a
system in which anyone can purchase higher degrees. The academic wants
evidence, a capacity to respond appropriately, that arises from the sedimentation of
forms arising from being positioned because one is recognised as superior and more
effective in relation to the also-rans who manage, somehow, to finance the
administration of their production so as to accede to certificates that, clearly, have
no real value given the conditions via which they acquire them. The academic knows
that the dispositions are elicited effects of materialised forms whose symbolic
efficacy arise from an existential and political terrain of contestation that is social
valuation. They understand that the actual grounds of academic competences are
relations of involvement in the charade surrounding students and it’s very important
to take individuals who have been positioned on the right side of the instantiated
boundary which is why the questioning is so attendant upon performative aspects,
they know they need someone who has incorporated the appropriate expressive
techniques arising from habituation to academic culture and they know that this
arises from recognition of elite trajectory so that any kind of public mobilisation is
itself a manifestation of what space is used to emblematise so that presence arising
from invitational forms guarantees qualities that the space is constituted to make
available. These are the distinctions that academic space is used to materialise so
that its relational processes function as actualising, and de-realising, mediums
depending upon the class of the individual attempting to constitute themselves.
Dispositions are formed via recognitions which disclose potentialities appropriated
via their actualisation. Potentialities are immanent to ways of being situated which
means that potentialities, for some, remain forever dormant because they have no
means of access to realising mediations. The conditions of actualisation of the forms
constitutive of the ability to instantiate academic capacities arise from the
incorporation of forms arising from repeated exposure to recognitions that sustain
capacities by physiognomically regenerating an experience of capacity born of an
experience of being-there rooted in recognition of such differences. For the poor, even what they attempt to acquire outside of any interpersonally mediated relationships via which they use academic competence, remains dormant because they exist outside of any sphere of existence in which they need what they attempt to acquire alone. The informal nature of the way institutional space is used to constitute such differences means that lower class students can be ‘educated’ because that merely reduces to the administration of their labour which materialises the traces of an institutional process for which finances are transacted but the real distinctions are manifest in the words of this professor who exhibits precise understandings of the differences in status that the education of the poor finances. Those who have been recognised, and realised, share a sphere of existence whose materialisation is continuously sustained, the poorest face a continuous interrogation that is part of the very fabric constitutive of the space so that only a few accede to an experience that allows them to answer such questions. It is because neurophysiological structures arise as adaptive responses that constitute the shape of dispositions that are reactively absorbed as part of appropriations of form that inhere in involvement in modalities born of recognitions which disclose contextual aspects that constitute capacities for attendance to forms, because one experiences being realised via them, that selection criteria obsess over precisely what is least available to the poor: contact, involvement and evidence of significances that are materialised via engagement and exclusive participation. Bourdieu expresses the conditions constitutive of competence, very well, when he says:

The specific logic of a field is established in the incorporated state in the form of a specific habitus, or, more precisely, a sense of the game, ordinarily inscribed as a ‘spirit’ or ‘sense’ ('philosophical', 'literary', 'artistic', etc.), which is practically never set out or imposed in an explicit way. Because it takes place insensibly, in other words gradually, progressively and imperceptibly, the conversion of the original habitus, a more or less radical process (depending on the distance), which is required by entry into the game and acquisition of the specific habitus, passes for the most part unnoticed. (Bourdieu 2000: 11)

As Bourdieu goes on, "the essential part of what is transmitted in and by that situation is a hidden effect of the situation itself" (Bourdieu 2000: 14) and this is because 'the situation' for human beings, arises from ways of being situated in relation to disclosures arising from forms of recognition which physiognomically materialise aspects that constitute circumstances inscribed via the meaning of being subject to such processes. What is essential inheres in ways of being arising from the interpersonal constitution of contexts that disclose meanings inscribed via being subject to circumstantial aspects that constitute capacities to intuit forms because we are subject to the sense physiognomically materialised via experiencing being subject to such possibilities. One can appreciate why Bourdieu says "conditions of possibility...are conditions of existence" (Bourdieu 2000: 14) because the possibilities we experience being physiognomically materialised circumscribe our existence and constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to such actualities. Capacities inhere in reactively instantiated aspects that constitute the preintensional substrate whose physiognomic materialisation establishes the basis of possibilities intuited as potential stances arising from their actualisation so that the sense of aspects inhere
in preintentional and nonintentional aspects founded in ways of being situated that disclose such potentialities inscribed via the incorporation of forms whose realisation constitute such aspects. Capacities inhere in conditions which realise individuals in relation to a substrate of forms incorporated via their physiognomic generation so that individuals feel possessed of a sense arising relationally through the actualisation of such potentialities as available aspects appropriated via experiences of being subject to such modalities. Existential significance, realised as forms of life, actualised as ways of being, emerge from being subject to forms whose significance arise from forms that constitute aspects whose realisation materialise capacities to intuit sense because such aspects are realised via such modalities, they are ontologically coincidental with experiences of being situated, relationally, so that one experiences the sense of properties appropriated via being subject to their recognition so that one accesses the grounds of their manifestation and, thereby, accedes to capacities born of forms of involvement that constitute a medium appropriated via being subject to such modalities. This is why attempts to interface with employers immediately reduce to exchanges over exclusive relational forms constituted via boundaries whose sense arise from closures that are conditions of accession to the required forms and why the open-ended, mass, self-financed charade of English postgraduate education fails to deliver the poor to competence. Without contextualisation, any labour is irrelevant and no competence will be recognised which puts those from non-literate populations characterised by diffuse forms of sociality in trouble because their labour will have no significance and any competence arising from such conditions will not be recognised and this is exactly the position the unemployed are in. When you have to develop projects from the confines of a bedroom in order to finance the administration of your labour via relationships that objectify others, you are functioning as a contextualising medium for those who experience ‘involvement’ in the single afternoon of your viva that constitutes the extent of your involvement because what is available to you is to function as a source of narcissistic supply, self-actualisation and objectification, for institutional agents who do nothing beyond use the products of your labour to formulate judgements that are constituted from schema attuned precisely to such functions. When the extent of your public existence is one-afternoon after a decade of work, how are you going to answer questions relating to the appearance of functions whose relational grounds remain unavailable? The manner of this questioning is based on elimination using questions concerned with associational forms that are exclusive: if this is how you are screened for access to such forms and the educational process you undergo involves nothing associationally or publicly, then how can you exhibit characteristics whose forms of realisation are unavailable? The lack of opportunity to be situated and relationally contextualised is a manifestation of the absence of the grounds of collective forms of intentionality as part of the exclusive constitution of such forms that function as capital via the practice of distinctions that physiognomically materialise capacities for reference that inhere in realisations that disclose circumstantial, or intra-worldly, aspects, that require the disclosure of recognitions which are unavailable to those who function as the tacit reference via which the distinction is materialised. Forms of capital are constituted exclusively via associational processes that disclose a horizon physiognomically inscribed via the sense of relational processes that relate to a
mode of closure that is an effect of how institutional space is appropriated, privately, by aggregates, groups, who experience being-able to manifest properties that inhere in a boundary inscribed via realisations that physiognomically materialise its sense as part of an experience of being-subject to such processes. What we can glimpse are the problems of interfacing with institutional agents who are demanding capacities for reference that inhere in ways of being whose interpersonal conditions arise from exclusive relational states that are uncharacteristic of the experience of many, leading them to be unable to manifest appropriate characteristics because the grounds of such meaning-bearing aspects inhere in, and are ontologically coincidental with, experiences of being-realised in relation to forms whose significance arise from their exclusivity; their unavailability to the majority; via whom the boundary constitutive of the sense the selection criteria mirror, is constituted. If you are in this position you have no way to overcome these barriers that are inscribed in the shapes arising from the forms which disclose the fabric from which your way of being arises. If functionality arises from realisations that absorb us in meanings experienced via being subject to such possibilities, so that the physiognomic materialisation of absorption in realisations born of disclosures constituting meanings experienced via being subject to such processes, so that our cognitive faculties are actualised via moments that require temporal and spatial conditions, then those who endure the dislocation of devaluation will not be capable of exhibit properties whose grounds inhere in collective and aggregative relational processes that are constituted in distinction to them. What we see is the difficulty of interfacing with institutional agents when interaction presumes experiential forms that relate to ways of being-there arising from aggregative, public, processes when your education reduces to an individualised, private, process. This contradiction is an effect of the way value is constituted via the use of institutional space to materialise forms that constitute a boundary whose sense is inscribed in the practice of those who use the space to produce exclusive forms that constitute them as capable of referencing forms whose sense inhere in a horizon disclosed via the interpersonal constitution of such modalities. The silence enforced by absences of contact is an echo of not-being-able-to-access the interpersonal grounds of representational forms of intentionality so that, unable to represent oneself via the sense of forms inscribed relationally, which require allusion to forms of realisation that are ontologically coincidental with the objectivity of the intentional form, accepted as its manifestation, via recognition of the relational-forms constitutive of its appropriation and, thereby, attribution, individuals must mumble and endure a reduction to incapacity, experiencing being unable to project, because the interpersonal fabric constitutive of being is absent and this is a fundamental aspect of a way of being in the world, for the devalued, born of absences of realisation, or absences of form, born of recognitions which intersubjectively donate, intercorporeally, aspects whose realisation physiognomically materialise a sense that inheres in modalities appropriated via experiences of being subject to such possibilities. Furthermore, notice that the questioning is not based on eliciting qualities or even allowing me to discuss the work I had done. This is a very important detail in a system that requires individuals to develop projects outside of any contact with anything whatsoever. The only hope for a lower class person is to turn themselves into an institutional resource via the development of a project that
they use to attempt to appropriate forms that remain unavailable because of the refraction of the appearance of an educational process via association with the administration of their labour: their labour is not situated to begin with which means they don’t access a medium of disclosure and, instead, must function as providers of such a medium: their labour constitutes a disclosive medium for those who associate their names with the administration of their labour so as to materialise the appearance of their own labour-process. But notice how interrogative this interaction is, the individual, who exists outside of any institutional matrix constitutive of such objectivities, is reduced via such questioning to an inability to function, conversationally, that arises from precisely such interactional and associational grounds: the absence of access to such associational forms which constitute the conditions of satisfaction of intentional aspects arising from experiencing being subject to such processes denudes the individual of any way to be socially and interactionally realised so that what constitutes such a state is the relational basis of the forms that subtend it. Clearly, the questioning relates to a capacity to evidence access to the interpersonal grounds of closures that constitute collective forms of intentionality and the educational process supposed to enable individuals to be capable of manifesting such forms doesn’t involve access to the conditions which satisfy such possibilities. Is the education available to the poorest, then, education at all or is it just a form constituted from relations of cultural dependency that arise from control of such grounds? Rather than fostering autonomy and enabling capacities, there is a curtailment arising from the way in which the sense of processes are extorted that function as valuationary forms that constitute the basis of economically consequential forms that foster dependency. The situation is well described in the following:

It is because of these multiple dependencies that development geared toward self-reliance and the satisfaction of human needs is inhibited. The satisfaction of such fundamental human needs as Subsistence, Protection, Participation, Creation, Identity and Freedom is restricted by the demands which the...centers of power, either explicitly or implicitly, impose upon the...periphery...This is apparent in matters of political models, guidelines for economic growth, cultural patterns, incorporation of technologies, options for consumption, exchange relationships and ways of solving social conflicts. The acceptance of such demands not only nurtures dependencies, but also reinforces them...The dependence on such patterns of consumption is encouraged...by power groups that reap the benefits derived from marketing them...We are caught in a vicious circle within which little or nothing can be accomplished in terms of satisfying the most vital needs of the...masses...Under such conditions, it would be more accurate to speak of “anti-development”...The prevailing political models and development styles have been unable to make compatible personal development and social development...only by combining personal and social development is it possible to achieve a healthy society comprised of healthy individuals. (Max-Neef 1991: 56-59)

The reductive nature of the questioning manifests the boundaries constitutive of meanings inscribed via realisations that are coincidental with being-realised via recognitions which disclose forms appropriated via situated in relation to such opportunities. The reductive nature of the questioning mirrors the mode of operation that constitutes such exclusive forms: as the questioning reduces those lacking in the constitutive experiences to silence, so too the interpersonal recognition of difference discloses an absence that is a precursor of this silence: without disclosures of aspetual forms constitutive of experiences of a ‘there’
relating to forms of presence that are modalities of such forms, individuals have nothing to say because their experience arises from a boundary that materialises an inability to refer to intra-worldly aspects that are part of the use of space to constitute such modalities. The questioning reduces merit to public, institutional, relational, aspects via which such a property is perceived: recognition and the provision of access to the interpersonal and institutional grounds of such forms is therefore presumed by labour market criteria but education does not provide such opportunities, many are merely competing, outside of any public or institutional relationships that might constitute such objectivities. Clearly, therefore, personal and social development and the integration of individuals from the periphery cannot take place because such processes only deepen cultural dependencies and forms of exploitation by making those from peripheral spaces compete via relationships that validate and remunerate others. What is clear from this interaction, is that the institutional sphere that subtends the conditions of the middle classes being able to intuit forms whose sense arise from mediations constitutive of their own practices is a source of awareness that is an effect of the system of differences being constituted: the capacities are effects of distinctions whose practice inscribe sense in space via comportmental aspects that constitute some via modalities rooted in recognition and valuation whilst others endure the de-realisation of an anonymity that is part of the inscription of a boundary physiognomially regenerated via such processes. The middle classes have only to rely upon their own institutional agents to operate via the same kinds of intentionality for differences to be constituted that render differences legible. What we see is how the labour market criteria are eliminative: there is a pervasive absence of charity in relation to criteria that arise via surreptitious selections whose organisational forms relate to the private use of institutions and this absence of charity and the judgements being made counterpose to a field that is constituted, at postgraduate level, via the self-education, and decontextualised labour, of individuals who must find a use-for-themselves via the administrative procuring of finances outside of any relations of involvement that finance the institutions while constituting the appearance of the pedagogic function of those who materialise the appearance of their labour process via the processing of documents whose administration is largely done by secretaries. The modes of closure characteristic of the forms of value that govern access to employment are at odds with the egalitarian intentions of those who institute a fraud that is becoming ever more publicly manifest as it is democratised. While there is the institution of the appearance of inclusivity via the educational processing of larger numbers of students on non-elite trajectories, the real criteria remain exclusive. What we see are the conditions for the attribution of significance to the labour of individuals and why the educational process is not itself a source of valuation, except via the negations constituted via tacit reference to those who exhibit the significance required to elicit recognition and access the interpersonal forms of realisation constitutive of the recognised form of the competence. Unless you access forms of involvement that mirror the realisations constitutive of the role, your labour has no labour market significance: this is manifest by the rapid responses of the professor who places ever more stringent criteria in order to reconstitute a negation that he clearly knows is pervasive by the way he knows how to differentiate the appropriate candidate from the type of students who are processed as part of the economic
necessity of producing the conditions for the economic reproduction of the spaces the middle classes rely upon to constitute the distinctions they need to be publicly actualised in order to sustain control of resources. What you see is that educational success can be ceded away as the sale of administered certificates are a prime source of income but in what sense do they involve success? Educational success is cheap when the condition of your success is you paying for it. Why would institutions not take you? It’s free objectification for the academics who associate with the administration of your production and the condition of your accessing the relationship via which your labour is administrated is that you provide finances to the institution. The processes via which credentials are validated, the forms of involvement and the forms of access to possibilities that have public significance, remain unavailable: indeed, the conditions under which credentials are ceded away are such that they benefit the group who institute the state of affairs. The real economic stakes are rooted in the use of space to institute consequential significances that operate via the extortion of sense via public institutions. The conditions of attribution of the competence are realisations of form rooted in a recognition which constitutes an organisational impetus that individuates the sense of the ability via the objective conditions constitutive of a directing of forms arising from this organisation so that the experience of being competent and the experience of being consecrated are two parts of the same process and individuals are instituted to be competent via access to the recognised form of the competence constituted via access to the forms of realisation constitutive of the labour market whereas others have to finance this by functioning as the fodder via which the sense of this distinction is instituted. The real distinction being articulated is between individuals as sources of income for a labour whose value comes from opportunities for contextualisation that constitute the appropriate form of the labour. How can individuals who are positioned outside of the relations of involvement constitutive of the value of labour produce forms appropriate to the field itself when the field continuously articulates differences of contextualisation via relations of involvement that constitute forms of value relative to the field? There is ‘involvement’ as far as you can act as a source of income and a source of the relational derivation of forms which constitute the appearance of a function for the staff who attach their names to the administration of the products of your labour but when it comes to attempting to interface with the field relative to your labour then the criteria are eliminative: there isn’t even the attempt to enquire as to the content of the labour of the interlocutor: the only modality of self-actualisation available to a student: to labour alone to produce forms relative to their processing in the name of a field is not even engaged with because the only thing that counts is the significance of that labour relative to institutional grounds that are unavailable. What you see is that behind the veil of educational inclusivity constituted via the processing of large numbers of lower class students, the real criteria belong to modalities of involvement that relate to employment: the teaching of a course within a university would require one to be selected in relation to a labour market whose fundamental modalities remain unavailable. It is clear that the real criteria are unavailable to the majority who finance higher degrees that consist of them teaching themselves to produce forms whose administration materialise the appearance of a process via which they are certified. It is one mode of practice, the unavailable form of,
teaching, that is privileged: lecturing. The real criteria, are employment related, and relate to forms of involvement that are disclosed via private relations within the public sphere: a mass field, public education, creates the conditions of possibility for the instituted difference between those who are processed, the educated, and those who are employed via the field arising via this processing, which is why education is worthless even within what you are supposedly educated in and employment is valued even where academics are completely negligent. What we see is that behind labour market criteria are a range of distinctions whose grounds relate to class forms and that education is just a way of legitimating economic relationships that consecrate some, allowing them access to the grounds of competencies, whereas others cannot negotiate this ‘open’ market because its forms arise from exclusivity and closure. Labour market selection criteria relate to exclusive forms that institutional space is used to constitute via closures which signify those who occupy networks that use institutional space, privately, whilst occupying ‘public’ space and, thereby, constituting the sense of academic practices whose legitimacy are constituted via the idea of mass processes. This is why the question as to the treatment of different categories of student is so important. The labour of some is, clearly, irrelevant because it is not signified. In this sense objectification and the validation of credentials is not universal, but relates to the use of space to materialise differences of status occluded by their private realisation. Despite the spurious democratisation arising from the extension of an administered process of judgement that anyone can purchase access to, discontinuous oppositions are constituted via the private use of institutional space to manifest distinctions arising from different ways of being-there, different ways of being involved in a fabric constituted via difference. The devaluation of credentials, manifest via the anonymity of their processes of acquisition, mirroring the instrumental relations that subtend the constitution of the appearance of ‘public’ processes via relationships in which many do not seem to matter, only exacerbate the differences constitutive of the real grounds of attribution of competences whose statutory grounds are occluded by their private realisation. The massification of higher education ensures an anonymity that occludes the discontinuous oppositions whose sense are inscribed via closures that are manifest in the absence of contact characteristic of the education of the poor. Streams of intelligibility arise from the interpersonal forms individuals experience being disclosed so that they experience being subject to the sense of grounds that constitute differences in objectivity that are manifest via exposure to such differences. The forms discontinuous oppositions take are evident in different forms of access to different ways of being-there; different forms of involvement; that are constituted via closures. Clearly, education cannot touch this underlying culture when its institutional processes are enmired in it. In this sense, discrimination arises from being perceived to bear the sense of a discrepancy that is itself an effect of distances whose form education should address but, clearly, merely reproduces. Involvement constitutes a purposive relation to being via being situated via the contextualising mediations of disclosures which realise forms whose sense inhere in being subject to such modalities and yet this is absent for those who face the physiognomic regeneration of a discrepancy arising from recognitions which reconstitute the sense of properties that inhere in subjection to such aspects. Labour market criteria confront those excluded with the lifeworld events that
constitute meanings inscribed via forms of presence arising from recognitions which constitute capacities that inhere in such modalities: without mediation, without involvement, how can they accede to forms whose grounds remain unavailable? Finally, giving up, and stopping applying, is just enlightened self-interest, a cessation of the pain implied in continuing the humiliation of a projection that is not merely futile, but vain. The excluded always exclude themselves because they aren't interpersonally constituted to be viable, socially, so that the only way they can live with the shame of inabilities arising from incapacities for reference that inhere in the physiognomic materialization of forms that disclose intra-worldly or circumstantial aspects that constitute human capacities for reference inscribed via forms rooted in being-there, is to avoid further the instantiation of incapacities as part of the statutory attribution of differences in objectivity inscribed in the order of being via a social world constituted from the conflictual character of elementary aspects of presence that constitute being in the world. The problems of contextualisation, contact and access to the grounds that disclose forms whose appropriation constitute developmental modalities remain, and exactly the same processes governing the determination of these aspects are sustained, you merely experience the same dynamics of dislocation, unrealisation and malaise, via a different state-bureaucracy which reproduces the sense of the same objectivity because the same conditions obtain, for precisely the same reasons: the reproduction of social objectivities rooted in the same valuationary mediations. What do you access that would allow you to satisfy the following criteria: “a select few individuals are able to demonstrate skills and experience that more closely match the precise requirements of our client”. The problem is you are not situated so that you are able to manifest any objective properties resulting from realisations of form that constitute both the basis of the ability, and the conditions which satisfy, the attribution of the competence by others, as well as for yourself. The problem for the devalued and socially dislocated, those who exist outside of the circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter that, via the inscription of a boundary, constitute rare or distinguishing forms, is that they cannot acquire capacities that require antecedent conditions so that they can, via realisation, experience possibilities appropriated via a spontaneity and an agility that is discovered via being subject to disclosures which physiognomically materialise such aspects so that they acquire an experience of being-able-to-bear the sense of capacities whose determinacy are effects of circumstantial aspects which constitute such possibilities as aspects of their being for others. This is why labour market criteria relate to associational and collective aspects of intentionality and yet the educational processes the poor undergo tend to be privatised and individualised because social valuation is a fundamentally constitutive aspect of institutional relationships that constitute iterable aspects that arise from constellations of evolving relational processes. Awareness of capacities, the ability to ascribe substantive properties, requires access to the interpersonal, public, conditions of their attribution, and a capacity to project, with assurance, that is, with awareness that one's expressivity is constituted via repeated exposure to forms physiognomically materialised via immersion, contact and co-presence, via osmosis, requires temporal, relational and spatial aspects that are satisfied in only a few cases. It is noteworthy that elite education, training for elite positions, guarantees access to these conditions, whereas the kinds of educationalism
characteristic of the education of the poor, do not, because fundamental valuationary processes govern the spatial, institutional and relational forms that characterise the experiences of individuals from different positions. Individuals cannot merely appear and incarnate appropriate forms, they must undergo a process of progressive involvement in which, via interactive coexistence, they undergo a process of perpetual transmutation in which they progressively incorporate, via formative interpenetrations, characteristics whose sense they experience via being realised in relation to such aspects. This is why the devalued, whose educational processes are characterised via the effects of subjection to differences whose grounds they discover via recognition of their difference and the unavailability of aspects that concern the grounds of capacities that inhere in the recognition of capacities, experience an inability that is an effect of subjection to such conditions: the absence of opportunity arising from the perception of differences arising from subjection to such differences reconstitutes a sense of inability because the grounds for the acquisition of the sense of such forms, as physiognomically materialised aspects of one's being-for-others, are unavailable. Selection criteria arise from recognition of the grounds constitutive of the aspects whose conditions are satisfied via access to such forms but these are not provided by the education the poor receive. This is a key difference between elite and non-elite education or between the education of the poor and the elite, because institutional leverage is an aspect of viability that arises from income. The source of financing affects capacity to determine access: if you are poor, you are "lucky to be there", and, because your presence is financed via an anonymous state bureaucracy that has no contact with the bureaucracy you are using to purchase credentials via equally anonymous relationships that materialise the appearance of a process, you have no leverage institutionally. Fee-paying students have leverage that gives them viability, socially. They have to be indulged and their vanities are effects of different qualities of treatment that constitute the sense of different aspects. Attention is a very rare commodity which is why its manifest forms are significant because the manifestation of forms and significances that arise from them are effects of subjection to it which is why the empty CVs of the reclassified unemployed are so deeply revealing of the fundamental valuationary processes that reconstitute modalities born of subjection to such processes. Involvement and realisation are key aspects of contextualisation that manifest recognition and these are constitutive aspects of capacities to intuit forms arising from experiencing a horizon disclosed via such modalities which is why selection criteria arise from the determining efficacy of aggregative processes of closure that constitute such aspects and why such criteria require an anonymous, public, institutional system to generate the legitimacy of distinctions practiced via cultural processes whose effects are clear aspects of the reality people experience. Those recognised are organised into position via the organisation of their ascent. This means that properties that require such conditions are disclosed via realisations that constitute their sense so that the individuals can appropriate them via experiencing being capable of manifesting them as properties of an objectivity rooted in such conditions. Those recognised are organised into positions because the positions available, the space relationally disclosed, is constituted so that those who are recognised accede to forms that manifest that recognition: they are exclusive, and so they are, in turn, recognised because of being subject to such forms
in the labour market. The labour market is not equally anonymous for all candidates because there are different ways of being positioned in relation to the relational processes constitutive of the space of positions. The space of positions arises from forms of objectification that are effects of inequalities, differences in forms of value, that constitute forms of capital that arise from the practice of the recognition of such forms. Forms of objectification are the crystallised effects of relations of involvement whose significance are constituted via closures, via the institutional derivation of a sense arising from a barrier whose interpersonal derivation is only too apparent in much of the testimony used in this work. Equally, those who are perceived to be discrepant, even when they can find the money to pay for the administration of the labour that they produce outside of any relation to anything, academically, are merely affirmed in another form of objectivity. When I attended a meeting with a potential supervisor, within a few minutes of meeting me, I was told, "you come across as very unintellectual". When initial meetings manifest sign-reading operations rooted in divisions the education could only resolve if it could locate individuals in a shared, and common, experience, an experience disavowed via the nature of the people instituting the fraud that is public education, then what chance do people from regions distant from the metropolitan centres have? Such judgements will affect what is disclosed relationally, which will affect the nature of the space the individual experiences being-via and such processes will crystallise the sense of forms actualised via such conditions. So, anonymous institutional processes belie the way in which labour markets are rigged in favour of key groups who are able to enshrine their distinction in what appear to be differences of intentionality arising from command of the space of positions which determine what possibilities there are in existence in a given social formation. Attribution of intentional aspects relates to ways of being situated to such a degree that many who occupy positions do not exhibit the intentional aspects accredited to them but the condition of attribution of the personal sense relates to occupying the position whose sense is constituted via the relational basis of the institutional position and role-performance, usually, involves appropriate relational forms so as to constitute such a sense often in the face of the reality of a difference that lower class students experience as part of a dislocation that is part of the evasion and displacement that is a key aspect of the dissimulation strategies made available to academics by their command of this space of appearances constituted via relationships of presence and absence. The problem is that objectification is not a function of credentials but of the relations of involvement that signify the credentials which is an effect of capacities to elicit recognition which are effects of uncodified forms incorporated via realisations that transfigure relational aspects into an incorporated state so that expressive physiognomy manifests the sense of aspects that are effects of circumscriptions that disclose a horizon whose physiognomic materialisation constitutes the sense appropriated via being subject to such modalities so that capacities are effects of realisations that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in involvement and belonging. What an employer looks at is how you have been situated which means how you have been involved because these are manifestations of social value which are a condition of competence because the perception of value discloses forms appropriated via being subject to such modalities. Judgements concerned with competence relate to relations of
involvement that are perceived to manifest properties, intentional aspects, whose sense arise relationally from experiences of being subject to such modalities. Being perceived as a legitimate interlocutor and, thereby, recognised so that one undergoes disclosures that constitute a fabric that envelopes one in spatially materialised, circumstantial aspects, that circumscribe possibilities appropriated via experiences of such actualities, is a condition of acceding to intentional states that inhere in such modalities. Being recognised is a constitutive aspect of experiencing participation in the fabric constitutive of being-able to manifest aspects that inhere in experiences of being subject to such modalities. The problem is that such conditions are contested and unavailable to particular categories. The problem is that for those who are negatively perceived, they undergo the physiognomic regeneration of a sense of properties whose grounds they cannot countermand so that they have little control over, either, how they experience being-perceived or how this affects their capacities and life-chances. The discomfort, so often described, is, simultaneously, of an ostracism that crystallises judgements whose sense are incorporated via subjection to the absence of any orientational horizon born of the disclosure of forms which constitute an operative intentionality that inhere in such modalities, and also of being triggered by the classificatory effects of criteria whose determining efficacy arise from the practice of such distinctions. There are two moments to subjection to the grounds of such aspects: the first is an experience of judgement within a bureaucratised process whose administrative anonymity manifests the minimal proceduralism required to dispense with obligations to the poor who are condemned to a degraded position that lack of opportunity for any education only entrenches. When a process requires them to develop their own projects in order to finance the purchase of credentials that relate to nothing beyond lives bereft of involvement in anything, how can they develop relevant work, let alone appropriate congruent forms? The second is then further discovering the meaning of this objectivity by being unable to solicit contact via a labour market which recognises the meaning of forms crystallised by experiences of being subject to such processes. Clearly, individuals experience impugning negations that are effects of an objectivity that arises via such processes. When individuals are investing in processes that subject them, not to possibilities, but to mutilated forms of objectivity, in which their education arises as a struggle against the absence of anything and an inability to solicit contact, and when they endure a process constituted by the complete absence of opportunity to do anything in order to face the reproduction of the same conditions via a further reclassification, as unemployed, rather than a student, then we can imagine the pain of negation and the confusion arising from subjection to such conditions. Judgements that are implied through strategies of evasion and displacement that manifest an insignificance physiognomically materialised via differences arising from the experience of subjection to the perception of differences whose recognition manifest such aspects become crystallised via lives led elsewhere, outside of involvement in circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter, which validate, and objectify, some via the sense of relational forms which inscribe boundaries via temporal processes of incorporation arising from being repeatedly subject to the public grounds of such differences as part of the meaning of being-there, situated via the sense of boundaries which operate imperceptibly, outside of contact and
therefore, without any real means of demonstration. The conceptual effort required to manifest such aspects cannot itself be validated because the mechanisms of legitimation and invalidation are surreptitiously realised via boundaries that cover their own tracks, requiring a labour of representation that would merely function as a rupture in the representational apparatus of those who institute such processes. Subjection to the relational forms that constitute the public objectivity arising via the transfiguration of economic relationships into the sense-relational aspects of institutional processes, clearly causes damage to people’s identity, and it is only too apparent that they are not being equipped to access the interpersonal relational forms that constitute criteria arising from involvement. When someone can say, “I feel so judged by the criteria whenever I look at a job, before I even try to apply it’s like a mount Everest of hurdles that my education didn’t equip me to get over. I wasn’t given any of the things I needed to fill in the forms. I look in bemusement and think ‘What the fuck?’ Makes me fuckin’ sick”, the experience of inability arises from an absence of access to relational aspects, to forms of intentionality that presume collective, associational, conditions. As the grounds of objectivities are relationally constituted, recognitions disclosing the sense of forms that inhere in the involvements which are the grounds establishing the identity of properties that arise from experiences of being subject to such modalities, lead employers to develop selection criteria that are crystallisations of aggregative activities that constitute closures whose determinative efficacy are manifest by selection criteria that arise from the interpersonal processes that constitute such objectivities. In this sense, the institutional, public, culture, carries immanent differences whose practice constitute the sense incorporated via experiences of being subject to possibilities that relate to differences of form whose actualisation constitute such objectivities. The devalued undergo an effacement that denudes them of access to the interpersonal conditions required to incorporate capacities that inhere in relational states they don’t experience being possibilities available so that the grounds of differences imply a humiliation that is sedimented via subjection to differences that constitute such objectivities. Looking at labour market criteria confronts the devalued with the reality of possibilities they never experienced being available to them so that the exclusion characteristic of their institutional processing becomes constituted, publicly, for what was obscured via the nature of what they experienced being available to them, via institutional relationships that were private. The effacement characteristic of devaluation obscures their exclusion from the excluded so that confronting labour market criteria at the end of a process in which they have had to work to attempt to accede to objectivities reveals the reality of the effects of private institutional forms that remain inaccessible to them. Given that neurophysiological structures are absorbed by the individual, not as intentional contents but, as adaptive responses, then the dislocations characteristic of the educational processing of the poor cannot be conducive to competence because they have no access to the interpersonal processes, to the contexts, that constitute such possibilities. Lacking actualisation, they face a de-realisation that is recognised in the labour market because differences constitute not merely legibilities, but possibilities, whose actuality inhere in different ways of being situated, contextualised and realised, with the devalued experiencing the nothing that exists outside of contexts as a struggle against the annihilation of dispositions they have no interpersonal
experience of being constituted via, a problem that policy needs to address if we are to rescue individuals from the finitude of a poverty that inheres in a deprivation of necessary forms required to accede to human fruition and functionality. Just as the grounds of competencies relate to ways of being-there that presume recognition, disclosure and involvement in contextualising mediations, equally, negation is an interpersonal process whereby meanings become sedimented, coopted into presence, via subjection to the interpersonal grounds of forms which have acquired a responsive, aspectual character, arising from subjection to disclosures which situate and compose ways of being in the world that are, as an effect of such conditions, burdened with practiced allusions to objectivities that become crystallised via repeated exposure to the meaning of being forms that individuals negotiate practically which compose traces of an existential manner whose persistence arises from its public efficacy, and realisation, so that individuals, merely by being different, are exposed to circumscribing aspects whose interactive autonomy are components of the reality they experience via being subject to such processes (Marcoulatos 2001). In this sense, labour market criteria that are crystallisations of differences constituted via closures that are experienced via the nothing experienced via being outside of contexts, imply a negation that is part of subjection to the meaning of being arising from the public efficacy and actualisation of such meanings so that the devalued face "a mount Everest of hurdles that my education didn’t equip me to get over" because the meaning of their credentials is embedded in the negation of their decontextualisation. What selection criteria do is confront the devalued with the reality of the absurdity of the forms of involvement that constitute their negation in relation to social and institutional structures that subtend perceptions of competence whose interpersonal grounds reduce to recognitions and involvements that disclose capacities that inhere in experiencing being subject to such modalities. The criteria relate to forms of involvement that materialise aspects inscribed via experiences of being subject to such mediations so that individuals experience the disclosure of a horizon whose sense inheres in being subject to the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects as ways of being-there, subject to such mediations. The reason such criteria are used is because they relate to the conditions of satisfaction constitutive of such intentional states and, therefore, you might expect education to provide access to such conditions, if the goal was to produce competent agents who have adaptively absorbed appropriate neurophysiological structures as an effect of experiencing being subject of such modalities. What this means is that competence and objectivisation inhere, primarily, in qualities of involvement and to mediations that disclose appropriate forms, so that those subject to such possibilities manifest appropriate qualities and yet, clearly, education fails to provide any quality of interface, any mediation of qualities, which is why products of it exhibit weak qualities mirroring the absence of their embedding in anything disclosive. What we see is that barriers are sense-relationally constituted via relationships that constitute differences in objectivity that relate to different ways of being situated that constitute different horizons of possibility so that there is no common process without the embedding of education, and individuals, in something. These differences of involvement physiognomically materialise different ways of being-there, different ways of being situated, so that individuals experience the transfiguration of relations of difference into a sense of
their difference and to differences in competence that are merely the transmutation of social positions into what appear to be differences of competence, differences of ability and status, whereas, in reality, the technical competence arises from particular statutory conditions constitutive of its attribution which are, clearly, unavailable to many via their educational process. We can appreciate why Bourdieu says, "the propensity to acquire what is called technical competence rises with social competence, that is, as a function of social recognition of being worthy and therefore called upon to acquire that competence" (Bourdieu 1993: 160) and "the academic title is the paradigmatic manifestation of this "state magic" whereby social identities and destinies are manufactured under cover of being recorded, social and technical competency fused, and exorbitant privileges transmuted into rightful duties" (Bourdieu 1996: xviii). It is not difficult to see why those who would be disqualified can be 'educated' and undergo a disenfranchisement that achieves the same aim via the appearance of an open system materialised via their 'inclusion' whereas, the reality can be obscured by their use as decoys to efface the fundamental relationships that subtend the acquisition and attribution of competences protected via constitutive conditions that can be easily obscured by a process that reduces, almost solely, to privatised bureaucratic acts and relationships. Selection criteria are crystallisations of closures that constitute such aspects and they imply judgements whose interpersonal forms relate to absences that the devalued cannot countermand because of the nature of the institutional processes characteristic of the sense of the forms they experience being responsively articulated via allusions that are part of their contextualisation so that the meaning of being-there is a crucial medium for the inhibition of development because discrimination affects the ways of being that the devalued experience, condemning them to a curtailment that is an effect of the sense of positions whose physiognomic materialisation characterise meanings experienced via being subject to such processes. The devalued endure the absence characteristic of their institutional treatment and then they are confronted with the effects of what are constituted as deficits in relation to the very objectivity whose grounds they have had to endure. In this sense, attempting to contest positions involves an implied violence that triggers those who are in the situation they are in because of objectivities arising from being subject to such processes. The absence of recognition, the absence of disclosure, constitutes the nothing arising from a dislocation that robs individuals of a viability that appears to concern attributes essentialised by the eternalisation of such conditions: without mediations, how can individuals escape deficits that are an essential aspect of references that inhere in meanings experienced via being situated via such processes? There is a violation implied in being-perceived via processes that locate you as lacking forms required to accede to recognised forms of public existence so that individuals confront such interminable barriers that are inscribed via the very grounds constitutive of what is available to them. Struggling within parameters whose meaning inscribe such deficits, what can the devalued do? They experience the continuous inscription of a boundary that becomes an essential reference of a difference that is perpetually reconstituted so that anything they accede to merely becomes embroiled in a logic arising from their difference. Clearly, the devalued are enmired in conditions of existence that preclude their accession to the relational aspects constitutive of human capacities. When you are not involved,
how can you know how to become involved? Without a horizon disclosed via
belonging that discloses aspects you perceive via absorption in recognitions which
constitute access to representational forms of intentionality, how can you accede to
an assurance arising from a dexterity arising from realisations that physiognomically
materialise aspects whose objectivity you are assured of because you experience
being the meanings they constitute. If you are not involved in any sphere of public
existence, how can you discover how to access what can only be elicited via
significances whose form inhere in the materialisation of a boundary via recognitions
of form that physiognomically materialise aspects whose sense are born via
exposure to such distinctions? Experiencing the availability of aspects that arise
from involvement in a world requires experience of the disclosure of possibilities
that inhere in belonging to a world, it requires relational aspects that constitute
possession of attributes that inhere in the disclosure of a boundary whose sense
materialises capacities that inhere in its physiognomic materialisation and, clearly,
such modalities are absent, leaving people immobilised in a condition that their
'education' has merely perpetuated. Because competencies have mediated
conditions of attribution, they condemn some to an immobilisation that arises from
the complexity of the matrix of private institutional relationships that subtend
acquisition of any sense of their identity. Condemning those unable to elicit
recognition to a condition that education merely perpetuates. The devalued go
through an anonymous educational process in which they must work to disclose
mediations that constitute others while generating bureaucratised traces of
relational processes that are purely abstracted, attenuated and de-realising, and
then, their inability to elicit recognition transfigures into a sense of an absence, of
both capacities that require attention and relationships of co-presence, that is, direct
mediations, which do not characterise the institutional experience characteristic of
their group, and so their condition is perpetuated, they experience an
immobilisation arising from a significance whose objectivity arises from a mode of
givenness that has been regenerated via the relational processes that subtend the
meanings they experience being physiognomically materialised via the educational
processes available to them. Recognition of difference exposes individuals to the
grounds of objectivities whose sense are inscribed via exposure to relational aspects
that physiognomically materialise differences in expressivity that inhere in the
circumscriptions arising from experiences of the meaning of being subject to such
aspects. Being situated via perceptions of difference physiognomically regenerates
aspects that educative action should address but seldom does because the relational
basis of access to consequential forms of existence are constituted via closures
which ensure the legibility of such aspects in order to ensure their social efficacy and
access to personal experiences inscribed in their realisation. Having undergone an
experience of absence that is part of the reproduction of an experience of being
significant in a determinate way, constituted via the absence of recognitions
required to disclose capacities inscribed in recognitions which disclose possibilities
realised via attention, individuals then experience a continuation of an underlying
inability that is an effect of a way of being rooted in a mode of givenness that is
being publicly reproduced. Without recognition there is no disclosure of a horizon of
possibility, no accession to operative forms of intentionality, and individuals become
overwhelmed by the disorientation of an insignificance materialised via dislocation
and an experience of being unable because they lack access to a fabric whose essence they inscribe via flesh attuned via subjection to such a condition. The destructuring of existence that unemployment entails is a fundamental aspect of the valuationary processes that sub tend the institutional apparatus that mediate competence. The destructuring of existence arises from an absence of involvement that constitutes an unrealisation that ensures that individuals cannot incorporate dispositions because the modalities constitutive of their objectivity are absent so that, instead of them bearing the sense of forms whose incorporation are effects of realisations in relation to disclosures that constitute intentional aspects that are ontologically coincidental with the realisation of such forms, with experiencing intra-worldly and circumstantial aspects that inhere in recognitions which constitute an environing arising via being subject to such processes, they incorporate a sense of absence that is a physiognomically regenerated aspect of statuses realised through the perception of such differences. Because neurophysiological structures are acquired via adaptive responses to forms that have been absorbed via such processes, the absence of mediation, the absence of access to the interpersonal grounds of aspects, that constitute the physiognomically materialised substrate of intentional forms, subjects individuals to an order whose naturalisation is part of the appearance of its legitimacy. Those valued accede to capacities that inhere in ways of being situated whilst others face the absence of mediation and the constitution of the sense of their being nothing-there that is an effect of their being, being constituted via an absence of a ‘there’, so that they lack access to realisations that inhere in involvement in a world and yet this impoverishment is manifest via an expressivity attuned via the incorporation of such aspects as meaning-bearing aspects of their way-of-being. How can people facing such conditions escape an objectivity constituted from the perception of absence when that perception constitutes an inability disclosed via the way they experience being situated as an effect of processes of valuation that disclose a horizon that materialises such aspects as if they were essential, intentional, attributes? The way individuals experience being-perceived situates them in relation to a fabric whose recognition constitutes aspects which become sedimented, coopted into presence via subjection to experiences of being realised in relation to forms that physiognomically materialise the effects of being situated via such conditions which become ways of being, forms of existence, arising from the reciprocal permutations of imputations that have a real efficacy by affecting how individuals are perceived, and, thereby, the sense they experience relationally, as they negotiate persistent traces of an existential manner that are objective components of an expressive universe whose sense arises from its interpersonal constitution. There can be no greater experience of impotence than when one cannot accede to possibilities despite huge efforts to command cultural forms whose grounds remain unavailable, reproducing the sense of forms that it is impossible to command because their mode of givenness, the form of life in which they inhere, remain unavailable. Imputations of inferiority are constituted via the fabric of being and endured via processes of incorporation that are irreversible leading to an experience of judgement that revisits the humiliation implied in the anonymous process of de-legitimation that lower class people endure. As this person continued, "do you think I feel anything but rage and disappointment at this instituted helplessness, what do you think I feel when I trawl through post after post
saying, “wanted: some bourgeois cunt”. How are people facing such conditions supposed to orient themselves without the disclosure of an orientational fabric that constitutes them viably so that they can appropriate forms, experience meanings, via being realised in relation to them, as capacities they intuit via the actualisation of such possibilities as aspects of their being-for-others? If someone who has the motivation and diligence to, in turn, finance, and then endure, the solitary slog of a PhD finds themselves in such conditions, then what about others? What is occurring, educationally? What is the relation between the institutional fields that constitute 'educational' processes and processes relating to employment because if the criteria for employment relate to processes that education does not address, then are people being educated at all? All employers attend to are the relationships of involvement that constitute the significance of your credentials because your objectification is an effect of significances arising from recognitions which disclose possibilities appropriated via being-situated via forms whose elicitation constitute such aspects. Objectivity is a function of position and education is merely another manifestation of underlying differences that constitute distances transfigured into forms of sense arising from such processes. This is why the education of the elite is involving, contextualising, situating, and the education of the poor anonymous and dislocating. If mechanisms of selection relate to processes that are selectively, privately, constituted, within educational institutions, then perhaps we need to ask serious questions about the 'public' nature of those institutions and address the nature of the processes constitutive of the 'publics' who use educational institutions to secure their legitimacy and economic reproduction. Contextualisation involves not merely social or institutional aspects, but profound existential ones that relate to the core issues of humanity in contemporary societies. If human being, and capacities arising from it, inheres in involvement, membership: in modalities based in aggregative, reciprocal forms of interactive co-existence, then division erodes the very basis of human existence and this warrants attention if it condemns many to conditions in which their labour power is un-signified because of a mutilation that inheres in the very conditions governing the acquisition of capacities that inhere in recognised forms of existence, in experiences of significance, of counting for others, that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in appropriations rooted in being-there, in being situated, in experiencing access to contexts that validate and enrich, instead of condemning individuals to the anonymity of implied negations that inhere in a competition that merely disables many who remain unsure of what they know because their education is separate from experiences of realisation or contextualisation. The reason why contextual forms of realisation are used to screen candidates is because contextualisation is a condition for the acquisition of the recognised form of the competence, this is why education is so segregated by valuationary forms because the poor cannot command what they don’t elicit. The situating of individuals costs money, it requires resources, this is why employment is so hard to access and the education that the poor get tends to be the least contextualising and least resourced, and consequentially, easily accessible. This means that the problem of their contextualisation is impacted by issues concerned with their value, they tend to be on the most anonymous, uninvolving, educational processes that involve the least contextualisation and they tend to be on processes where they function as a resource without really accessing resources of any kind.
Indeed, their sphere of movement is as curtailed by poverty as their capacity to connect institutionally by the objectivity arising from subjection to such conditions, which only further impairs their capacities for functionality because, lacking any capacity to connect, they lack any capacity to experience the disclosure of a horizon which constitutes capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being subject to such modalities. Contact is rare because the processes they undergo usually reduce them to functioning as solitary producers of forms whose administration materialise the appearance of a process whose labour is largely done by secretaries, with academics realised purely as judges, allocators of valuations which ignore differences in conditions of the acquisition of cultural forms whose grounds remain as unavailable to the reclassified unemployed as to any other members of the unemployed. The education of the poor tends to merely reproduce the same dynamics that characterise their public existence generally because of issues arising from the class constitution of institutional spaces influenced by varieties of capital because institutions generally function as multipliers of such forms and thereby reflect their public conditions of legibility. Moreover, the issue of realisations that constitute the significances valued in the labour market are contested aspects of institutional space so that academics don’t want students to access forms that might be consequential and middle class students themselves compete to render unavailable the social forms via which they attempt to publicly determine the significances that validate them relative to their cohort. In reality, the education of the elite involves completely different modalities and different forms of contextualisation to that experienced by the poor, the types of education that rich and poor undergo are diametrically opposite, the elite access contextualisation, disclosure and realisation, the poor endure dislocation and de-realisation.

Dispositions, meaning, appropriation of being

When Bourdieu says, “Dispositions cannot be formed without the means” (Bourdieu 1979: 85), the means to appropriate dispositions are realisations of form which require contextualisation and yet an excessively mediated labour market cannot contextualise many who undergo the continuous decomposition of what forms of competence they might experience in relation to groups which are themselves fragmented by these economic conditions. Via many of the degrees the poorest undergo there is no experience of practical mastery tied to situations that the degree process introduces them to because the educational processes achieve an autonomy via the filtering of students via educational tracks in which their potential choices are limited by the limits imposed by the education available. The experience the institutional conditions produce emerges in the following:

Ah never had a confidence that I wo’ in the right place, erm, erm, an if I was goin’ five minutes fo’ a lecture, the’r might ‘ave been nobody there so I’d immediately think “Oh, I’m in wrong fuckin’ place, What day is it? What time is it? Shit! Shit! Check mi’ diary, Ahm a in right fuckin’ place?” Nah, yer might’a checked yer diary two or three times befo’ore but yer wo still not confident o’r even beenin’ in right fuckin’ place, becos yer wo’ light-headed, it wo like bee’in’ a fuckin’ day dream, quite often yer know, the mornin’s in college wo’ like bee’in’ in a fuckin day dream an’ thinkin’ “fuckin’ we’er do ah need to be, what du I need to be du’in’ nahr? I’ve a forgot sumat? What I’ve a forgot? Fuckin’ ell!” Ye know? But by afternoon when ye’d been in a lecture when ye’d been in a seminar or couple, yer know, mebe odd lecture or, followed by a
seminar, falled by a tutorial, or whatever, yer know, by late afternoon, this light-headedness had gone an' what'd 'appen is ye'd 'ave a fuckin' band o'r tension, yer know, right round head, yer know, “Shit!” yer know, it's as if someb'dy's fuckin' got a sort'a band at back'r yer head an' tightenin' it up all the time...an' that wo so through most'r year but then what 'appened was, about a month before wi got to end'a year, Ah wo' startin' to feel light headed all way through (t') day, an, what that meant was that I weren't fuckin' tekkin' anythin' on board really at all. (Pause) An' I realised later that wot wo' 'appenin' is, I weren't turnin' up, I weren't fuckin' du'in' the fuckin' seminars, that I wo' actually missin' 'em, the things that I wo' most fuckin' frightened of, of missin' things, is wot I wo actually du'in' but wot that led to was, about two or three weeks before exams, I can't remember when it wo' exactly, but about two or three weeks before't exams, I'd got exams on mi mind an' I went to college one mornin' an' I thought “No I dun't wanna gu to college but I berra' gu, I berra' gu, 'cos we've got so-an'-so, I need to gu, I need to gu, I need to keep gu'in.” So one mornin' ah set off fo' college at abah't 'alfe past eight, an late in afternoon I recognised, it wo' almost like wekkin' up from a dream, it wo' like wakin' up from a dream, ah wo puttin’ petrol in at Scotch corner, an’ that, an’ that, I’m thinkin’ “fuckin’ ell, what A’m a du’in at scotch corner?” An’ “why am I puttin’ petrol in at Scotch corner?”

This captures the dissociation arising from a de-realisation characteristic of the vacuity of processes that can’t situate individuals so that individuals exist in relation to an insecurity born of a dislocation that the education only perpetuates. What one can appreciate is how the impersonal nature of such bureaucratised, decontextualized, processes leads to a depersonalisation where individuals sense the unreality of what they are ‘doing’ via mediations that involve little co-presence so that they lack access to synchronisations which realise them so that they experience the embedding of ways of being that sublend the confluence from which functionality arises so that they experience reality via forms that ground its perception in a sense that reciprocally constitutes capacities arising from being situated in relation to realities intersubjectively constituted via such processes. This is because practice arises as an interaction between constituent aspects, as latent identities whose unformulated nature sublend the sense exchanged via expressivities that radiate existential forms which are positions inscribed in shapes arising from such processes that constitute a sphere of existence. Because these exchanges of existential sense arise as unformulated aspects expressing latent identities, actualisation is a key stake in fields in which attributions of significance require constitutive institutional acts that realise individuals so that they experience significances appropriated via being subject to the modalities physiognomically materialised via recognitions which disclose such possibilities. Expressivities function as analogues of our sociocultural and psychosocial constitution and it is because subject-hood emerges imperceptibly via processes of osmosis arising from contact, via mimesis, that the devalued are so dispropriated via the anonymous, decontextualised, conditions that characterise their social existence. It is because being arises from an inter-belonging arising from an unreflective mimesis in which individuals are touched via the sense of forms that sediment meanings they experience being constituted intercorporeally that individuals suffer a senselessness and meaninglessness born of an inability to be absorbed in forms that realise their nascent faculties because there is, as working people say, "nothing there". Because of the inter-belonging of subject and world, the dislocation of devaluation erodes the basis of cognitive functions and individuals lose touch with a reality they don't experience being viably realised in relation to. The destructuring of existence
experienced is clear in the testimony. Dislocation disorientates and individuals flounder. Lacking realisation in relation to intersubjective donations of significance that constitute capacities born of a shared horizon which situates perceptions rooted in the experience of the physiognomic materialisation of the forms, individuals sense the unreality of the reality being constituted via the extortion of the appearance of a process via people whose labour cannot be grounded or publicly validated. It isn’t difficult to see why those who are dislocated feel disassociated from reality itself when the practices they endure lack context or embedding, the senselessness of their experience is an effect of the absence of access to any shared sphere of reciprocal disclosure that physiognomically regenerates the sense of forms that individuals experience being actualised via the realising mediation of a contextualisation that absorbs individuals in the sense of forms emergent from connection with a reality constituted via such modalities. We also get a sense of the pervasive depersonalisation that such processes involve. As Simone Weil (1978) remarked, the human being “doesn’t regard his existence as a good, he always wants something else than simply to exist” because reasons for being arise as part of the emergence of the means to experience being, interpersonally, so that the resources required to actualise possibilities belong to the forms materialised as significances born as an effect of barriers whose public grounds constitute possibilities, selectively, which is why the experience of place and value fundamentally locate institutional processes. Individuals are compelled to exist via the forms available to them and these forms are disclosures which constitute the meaning of being. Becoming is an effect of public disclosures whose difference one intuits via being subject to their meaning as actualisations of form rooted in the way possibilities are constituted in relation to forms whose grounds are unavailable via an educational process which reduces to minimal pedagogy so that individuals face the slog of a dissociating unrealisation un-grounded from any contextualising realisations that constitute the social objectivities they are supposedly training to access:

I feel very tired, and without any strength to continue in academia. I find it meaningless: it doesn’t seem a real life to me, I only suffer a continuous stress when I think about it, it seems to me that someone other than me lives my own life. I suppose this effect of disembodification is connected with the fact that my life trajectory cannot accommodate such different experiences as a working class background and a university situation.

The exhaustion is an effect of a meaninglessness experienced via the unrealisation arising from an insignificance experienced via the absence of involvement in relational forms that disclose possibilities for responsive actualisation that behaviourally constitute aspects of presence infused with a sense incorporated via realisations that physiognomically materialise the sense appropriated via experiences of being subject to such modalities so that neurophysiological structures are constituted via intersubjective donations of the substrate of meanings whose disclosure involve us in aspects of forms of life that constitute being-in-the-world. The attribution of competencies presume involvement in relational aspects that constitute their grounds and these are effects of recognitions which disclose access to such modalities so that those who are able to elicit recognition and solicit contact accede to forms of realisation that constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to such possibilities. This is why the experience of capacity arises from experiences of
being situated so that one accedes to such possibilities. What this means is that the effacement of identity involves the perception of difference so that some are not situated and experience a malaise arising from their experience of an absence that they experience being constitutive of how they experience being situated: lacking the value to elicit recognition and solicit contact they experience an absence of mediation, an absence of involvement and, thereby, the absence of the grounds of forms that constitute meanings experienced via being subject to such possibilities.

An absence of value becomes transfigured into an absence of any capacity to represent oneself as subject to possibilities which inhere in closures and the destructuring of existence that the poor undergo is manifest via a poverty of reference arising from a circumscription born of an inability to access discrete spheres and experience forms of objectivisation rooted in closures that constitute the basis of representational forms of intentionality whose reference inhere in participation and realisations that make available self-descriptions rooted in experiences of being subject to such processes. Hence the sense of unreality arising from the unrealisation of negation, "it doesn't seem a real life to me, I only suffer a continuous stress". The strain is an effect of the continuous unrealisation of an insecurity that concerns one's being-for-others: an insecurity concerned with the public attribution of qualities whose intersubjective donation constitute their actuality. Without absorption in disclosures whose form constitute a sense physiognomically materialised via their actualisation, individuals experience a malaise that concerns their public objectivity because this is what they are attempting to resolve via a projection whose failure concerns an objectivity that cannot resolve such problems given excess competition. It is clear that devaluation has profound cognitive implications because it affects the substrate of ways of being that subtend our involvement in an interpersonal fabric that constitute meanings and our capacities. Notice the spontaneous linking of these aspects: "I find it meaningless: it doesn't seem a real life to me, I only suffer a continuous stress": meaninglessness, unreality and stress. These are modalities rooted in devaluation and dislocation. It doesn't seem a real life because the individual doesn't experience disclosures that physiognomically materialise a capacity to instantiate meanings experienced via being subject to their interpersonal grounds so that they experience a de-realisation that physiognomically materialises an experience of the meaninglessness of a projection that fails because the conditions of its satisfaction are absent and the individual endures such conditions as part of the constitution of forms which materialise an objectivity arising from experiences of being subject to such modalities. It doesn't "seem real" because the individual does not experience realisations that constitute the sense of forms that constitute circumstantial aspects that inhere in disclosures which realise the individual in relation to shapes that inhere in the disclosures that realise forms that physiognomically materialise capacities arising from experiences of being subject to such modalities. The individual is subject to tacitly summoned configurations of existence that they experience being realised via so that they experience their presence via meanings inscribed via being subject to such mediations and it is via such processes that dispositions arising from such conditions emerge. It is via realisations of form arising from absorption in disclosures which constitute meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities that individuals accede to a functionality that is part
of the elemental manner of an encounter with reality constituted via such processes. Notice the linking of intentional states to conditions of existence arising as an encounter with presence via such meaning-bearing aspects: "I feel very tired...without...strength to continue in academia. I find it meaningless: it doesn't seem a real life to me, I...suffer...continuous stress". We have exhaustion meaninglessness, unreality, and strain. It is because contexts exist expressively, that is, aspects of our circumstance are negotiated via a physiognomy constituted via a dialectic of recognition concerned with expressivity, that we existentially negotiate our placement via experiences of being-realised in relation to forms that constitute meanings experienced via presence, via being-subject to realisations that constitute transitivities of sense that are modalities of being experienced via existing via such a background. It is because of the relation between significance and worth that the devalued experience their worthlessness via an absence of meaning, that is, their insignificance is part of the elemental constitution of aspects given behavioural actuality by experiences of being subject to forms that preclude their accession to the grounds of representational forms of intentionality. The devalued don't experience possibility, they don't experience the interpersonal grounds which disclose an experience of potentiality, and lacking the realisation of recognitions which disclose such aspects they experience both an absence of meaning and a loss of motivation: they lack the energy arising from realisations which intersubjectively donate forms that constitute meanings which physiognomically materialise neurophysiological structures, trigger the release of dopamine and oxytocin that produce a sense of security rooted in an experience of counting for others that is inseparable from an experience of being significant, valued. Experiencing the realisation of disclosures which constitute potentialities appropriated via being subject to such modalities produces a motivation, an energy, born of absorption in a fabric whose experience constitutes being able to experience properties born of responsive actualisations that assure us of our potentiality, of our humanity, because we experience being subject to such aspects. Being-able inheres in realisations that constitute meanings experienced via being subject to such possibilities and yet, clearly, the relation between worth and significance affects realisation, affects the fundamental relation between being and world. The loss of energy, the loss of motivation and the absence of meaning are key effects of a contestation that plays out through the institutions that subtend the economy. Labour power, human capacity, is clearly affected by excess competition which de-structures the existence of some, condemning them to experiences of inability that are essentialised effects of the lack of opportunity that makes de-realising, non-contextualising education their only hope, a hope which is soon decimated by the reality of a condition effaced by a reclassification whose reality is soon manifest via experiences of being subject to the form of the education available. The need to be subject to such relational processes is economically guaranteed by the effects of control over the rate of exchange on symbolic capital by control over its disclosive grounds and the effects on individuals are dependencies which enforce poverty and mutilation as access to the conditions constitutive of development become conditional by the effects of such competition. The effects are clear in the following:
The pressure that I feel in my life about my life is constant. I don’t want to do something that is totally dependent on other people. If I continue in university, I will be dependent for money and on others and all it causes is worry, worry, worry. For what? What is real of this world for me?

What we see is how education fosters dependency, not autonomy, and, thereby, insecurity and how this individual is aware that the closures constitutive of the recognised form of the competence inhibit and curtail, ensuring a dependency upon institutional mediations that elicit anxiety. Dependence is ensured by the groups whose control of the real tokens necessary for involvement curtail access to resources via relationships that encourage further dependency and ensure individuals have to attempt to mediate access via relationships whose poverty reduce to a charade that materialises the appearance of functions whilst the sense of an underlying space of positions is physiognomically regenerated via perceptions of difference which are proto-conceptual and sense-bearing so that individuals become attuned and aligned via sedimentations of significance that become coopted into presence via subjection to such processes. We get a sense of the phenomenal texture of reality and how experience arises from the imperceptible grounds, the sense exchanged, through uncodified aspects of expressivity, that makes tracing aspects of nonrepresentational forms of intentionality arising from the autonomous implication of differences arising as self-realising dynamics within social reality a significant project. Asynchronous relational forms constitute anxiety because many educational relationships extort sense via relationships that constitute the grounds of an operative intentionality for those who associate their names with the administration, and judgement, of the dislocated labour of others. Such processes don’t realise individuals so that they accede to representational forms of intentionality and they remain insecure as to an objectivity they experience being reproduced via the conditional nature of attributions of competence in a labour market in which such attributions relate to aspects rooted in practices of recognition which constitute an elite, under the guise of a mass competition that de-realises many establishing evaluative hierarchies whose grounds can only be traced via pain-staking labour. The final question the person raises: "...all it causes is worry, worry, worry. For what? What is real of this world for me?", relates to the effects of the significance of the education. As the education has become more conditional for its significance, its capacity to rescue individuals from an existence without justification has disappeared. The restructuring of the system, around the anonymity of the devaluation that is an effect of the conditional nature of valuation, or the interpersonal processes via which groups constitute themselves publicly, with ever more falling into anxiety-ridden states of dislocation whilst generating an appearance of inclusivity, obscures the pernicious and sacralising way in which differences are surreptitiously reconstituted. Is this dissociation an effect of a depersonalisation arising from the anonymous, impersonal, nature of the administrative processes that individuals face? Is what this person describes an effect of not experiencing realisation, not experiencing the intersubjective donation of significances via disclosures that materialise forms appropriated via being-situated via such mediations that constitute the inherence of a way-of-being, in a 'there' that renders necessary the projection whose frustration causes such malaise? Because there is no context of actualisation, projection is abortive and the individual is merely dis-absorbed from the world that their way of being is accommodated to so
that their education merely constitutes a sense of malaise born of an unrealisation in relation to the schema that they attempt to appropriate without access to the grounds of the interpersonal forms that make such forms sensible so that the individual faces an absurdity born of structural dislocations that are effects of the way the symbolic relates to class processes that leave many dispossessed. What is clear is the derealisation that is an effect of unrealisation. These people find the forms they're projecting via senseless because they are excluded from any sphere of involvement that discloses their sense so that their attempts to appropriate such forms merely constitute a sense of malaise with the effect that they experience the unreality of the world whose forms they are attempting to appropriate. Without realisation, the sense of the world, and their way of being, are impoverished and they experience the unreality of their attempts to appropriate forms and the senselessness of their existence because their constitutive efforts cannot be anchored in embedding interpersonal forms. Individuals experience the unreality of the reality of objectivities whose forms they are trying to appropriate because they lack access to the interpersonal grounds of forms whose disclosure intersubjectively donate the sense of forms physiognomically materialised so that individuals feel possessed of a sense arising from this realisation. It is through realisation that we discover ourselves via aspects disclosed via experiencing being-in-the-world as subject to such possibilities as actualities of our person. That is, through actualisation we experience our constitution. Through realisation in relation to spheres of involvement we become who we are via moments that disclose the forms that are the very fabric via which we experience being so that through such moments we do not merely employ the skills that give us determinacy as subjects but develop them in the first place and it is via such processes that we experience our emergence as practically self-composed agents. We need involvement and realisation so that we experience a horizon from which our capacities arise by being interpersonally constituted. We experience orientation via being-situated via a fabric whose disclosure constitutes us so that we accede to capacities via realisations that manifest qualities we experience via being subject to such moments. We discover ourselves as subject to such possibilities via experiencing being able to manifest such possibilities because we experience being actualised via the interpersonal forms constitutive of such objectivities. Knowledgeability and the sense of being capable is an effect of how we experience being-realised in relation to forms which situate us. Being-able to function is an effect of a horizon that is disclosed via involvement. This is why access to an interpersonal sphere of public existence is so important and why disciplines that condemn individuals to exist as solitary producers of administered forms merely perpetuate a condition that condemns individuals to the same experience of redundancy, uselessness and incompetence. What it is very important to recognise is that there is not mediation unless certain interpersonal conditions are satisfied that relate to the sources of value that render conditional access to the modalities arising from recognition and accession to co-presence. A student has to resolve the problem of finding a way to accede to some kind of value, and, thereby, functionality, for the poorest from outside of anything. This is a massive hidden difference in the nature of educational processes. Some are manoeuvred into position via direct mediations arising from involvement on a continuous trajectory that constitutes one of the key forms of
value relative to those from distant regions of social space for whom the opposite occurs. The more useless the discipline, the more dependent it will be on fee-paying students which, paradoxically, makes the most useless subjects the most worthless and renders insignificant most of the forms arising from purchasing access to the institutional paraphernalia of objectification appropriated by the class groups who monopolise such machineries in order to enforce the dependency arising from control of the capacity to constitute the exchange value of different symbolic forms whose value arises from the use of space to constitute such aspects. The more worthless the subject the less involvement there is because competition is increased by the inconsequential nature of competence, rendering incompetence invisible. Moreover, competence, like academic role-performance, reduces to signification, to being able to manifest membership of particular, value-constituting, institutional-relational processes. In the case of Sociology, because the subject is useless, the possible function you can serve within it is limited to that of being a medium of the objectification of an academic: but, in order to satisfy these conditions, you have to labour in order to constitute yourself as valued to them, that is, as someone who bears the sense of forms that make them available as associational aspects of the expressive physiognomy and institutional, public, value of the academic whilst, also, being someone capable of functioning, without aid or resources, as such a disclosive medium for an academic who experiences objectivisation and objectification via the institutional association. How can individuals direct themselves and, via their own direction, establish access to forms that they are attempting to elicit? The ground is reversed. It isn't that the student is embedded in disclosive mediations that constitute their means of appropriating forms whose sense are the medium of their cognitive development, rather, the student is the medium of the disclosure of such modalities for those who, via association surrounding the administration of their labour, experience the constitutive conditions of the viability of judgemental faculties that arise as part of the manifestation of such aspects via the relational basis of the differences of forms of value, and sources of identity, that are physiognomically materialised via the charade constitutive of the education of the most deprived. Academics are able to operate via a directly mediated sphere of relationships that constitutes forms of visibility that are projectively realised aspect of forms appropriated via those relationships so that there is no contradiction between appearing the furious incarnation of moral and political values that they use to represent themselves and their practice whilst neglecting students completely because the interpersonal processes constitutive of the institutional traces of the education of the poorest are materialised via the labour of secretaries who manage the institutionalised forms arising from the administration of students' labour. Academics, in subjects that lack a consequential sphere of application or research practice, operate in relation to a sphere of visibility that arises via a network and they only have to attend to their presentation of form, using the interactions within the network as a disclosive medium in which they ambiguously avow possibilities that relate to their self-presentation vis-à-vis the network. The problem for the devalued in shit subjects that involve nothing beyond self-teaching and the production of the work whose administration materialises the appearance of their education is that academics cannot situate you, or your labour, which means that they cannot introduce you to any of the conditions which constitute objectification.
The real coup is to manage this trick of appropriating resources via relational forms that disclose the sense of public aspects via relationships that provide access to the conditions constitutive of the experience of competence arising from an experience of being-realised in relation to aspects whose sense inhere in the relational basis of the forms, whilst denying the supposed beneficiaries, and subjects, of the educative action access to such conditions but the more competition there is, the more educational fields operate via a veiled distinction between the employed (valued) and unemployed (devalued) whose sense is merely rearticulated via the interpersonal processes that reconstitute such forms of objectivity. The thing with shit subjects like sociology is that they do not objectify students who are merely a source of the objectification of staff. In proper subjects the work you do means something and you accede to a professional position through an educational process that involves you in a sphere of intellectual production in which that production has institutional objectivity because it arises from a work-context, a place of employment. In sociology, it is educationalism, you pay to access an individualised relation within which the products of your labour are administrated which materialises the appearance of someone else's labour-process but you are not yourself objectified and this is manifest when you attempt to access the labour market after the 'education' and what you face is the effects of the objectivity that has been materialised via the difference the process crystallised. The problem in sociology is that you are never situated in relation to the academics who materialise the appearance of their function purely via association of their names with the administration of the products of your labour so that you never access any sphere of public existence through it and, thereby, you never go to them because nothing is forthcoming in relation to them. There is no attempt to mediate access to anything because they can accede to visibility via one-another without contact with students and can derive the sense of aspects rooted in relationships that have little actuality. What you have are people who exist outside of the networks whose closures constitute the exclusivity recognised as constitutive of competence and who are, thereby, forced, across distances to engage in purely formal, anonymous, administrative relationships that refract the appearance of public processes that have no public contexts apart from for the employees who undergo objectivisation and objectification via the production of the administrative-bureaucratic traces of processes whose reality are dubious. Fundamentally, you are required to con yourself and, via your own labour, attempt to constitute an identity that is as illusory as the process you undergo is fake, so it is of little surprise that lower class people never really believe the lie of their education and have great difficulty relating to themselves via objectivities whose conditional grounds are constituted in relation to their expressive physiognomy. The inability to believe in forms of competence whose grounds remain unavailable is merely an effect of the conditional, and contested, institutional grounds of competencies whose forms are exclusively derived via private institutional networks that must materialise the appearance of public functions that require little more than lower class people to labour to secure the finances to enter the administrative relationships that constitute such a reality. The relational, institutional, basis of the forms that symbolise and signify competence remain unavailable so that those who lack value, experience an insignificance that such institutional processes transfigure into what appear to be an
absence of competence and those for whom possibilities reduce to ability-to-pay, experience themselves unable to signify themselves as an effect of experiencing a de-realisation that is an everyday aspect of the institutional reality they face and experience being unable to access the grounds of forms that might constitute access to resources. Without access to resources, you cannot accede to the institutional grounds that constitute functionality. Instead of experiencing education as the founding of capacities born of experiences of realisation in relation to disclosures which constitute forms appropriated via your experience of being subject to such interpersonal processes, you experience an inability constituted via such conditions: you cannot project, you have no hope, you exist outside of any capacity to accede to a purposive relation to what you are trying to do via seeking the education in the first place. The cognitive modalities experienced via devaluation in this field are identical with the effects of the same destructuring of existence endured via the effects of devaluation in relation to other public fields and education, which was supposed to found possibilities, becomes just another source of the annihilation of the poor. Educational fields become, like any other public field, just another site in which they poor endure their humiliation at the hands of the rich. The problem with these intermediary sites that are supposed to address the forms of deficits rooted in the social mediation of economic access, is that the devalued are subject to the same valuationary processes in these informal markets as they are in the labour market which means they are being constituted in relation to the same forms and realised in the same ways which means that the dispositions that are being physiognomically regenerated are the same, arising from the same fundamental forms that are effects of subjection to impugning injunctions in the social fields that constitute their labour market position more generally. How can a process that merely reconstitutes forms of objectivity develop the poor? If the process is merely another medium for the realisation of dispositions rooted in negation and dislocation, how can it do anything other-than reconstitute the sense of divisions via a brutally personal range of mechanisms that transpose social deficits into what appear to be personal characteristics? Access to involvement and realisation, to institutional embedding, to the personal basis of the grounds of developmental processes, is the real stake that is inequitably distributed by the institutional processes that subtend accession to economic functionality and recognised forms of objectivity. The real coup, is the appropriation of space via economically consequential value-constituting relational forms whose public efficacy are inseparable from the physiognomic materialisation of differences of status that appear to concern essential characteristics of individuals but which relate to the social and public grounds of the forms of objectivity that they experience being physiognomically regenerated. In order for the conditions of satisfaction of certain modalities to be realised, the individual has to be involved in something that discloses forms elicited via the realisation of their embedding. Without some effort on someone's part, without mediation, without invitations, involvement, access to resources like space, what is there 'there'? This is why it is experienced in the way that it is, as there being "nothing there" via a way of being arising from experiencing being-realised via such processes. Without some kind of spatial orientation through involvement in spatial forms, individuals are disoriented and modalities based in absorption are absent, causing people to be absent from the institution. This is why
non-participation, despite its being covered by a naturalising language that betrays the way valuation transmutes into forms perceived to relate to intentionality via perceptions of expressivity rooted in the practice of the forms that elicit such aspects, is such a significant issue that concerns the significances that constitute such aspects. This is why education that is separate from any sphere of involvement in anything causes confusion for individuals because, without a sphere of research practice or access to teaching, the individual doesn’t experience involvement or realisation, they experience a condition constituted via the conditional nature of recognition without any means to exhibit either labour or characteristics that require contextualisation for their public constitution so that the individual cannot represent themselves adequately because the grounds of the self-determinations required to constitute the self are absent: the individual cannot successfully project out-of-nothing. Without a shared sphere of existence relating to the introduction to a practice that constitutes capacities arising from shared perception of the sense of the forms disclosed via that contextualisation, there is nothing there. Without shared access to a disclosive medium rooted in co-presence directed to the production of a horizon within which aspects of reality can be perceived via the agreement arising from such conditions, the whole process is bankrupt and skewed toward the narcissistic actualisation of those whose authority to validate their practice is an effect to the divisions that subtend the process, which are inimical to science. These divisions may be value-constituting but they function exclusively and this inescapable logical condition of capital-generation inhibits science and this is manifest in the judgement of representations and the assessment of students. Without involvement in a sphere of application of what people are, largely, required to study alone because of the absence of any sphere of application, individuals endure a process that constitutes them in the same way as if they were unemployed in that they experience the irrelevance of their work and experience the irrelevance of the form of their labour as a constitutive effect of distances that are transmuted into significances whose sense they bear as effects of the recognition of such differences.

Properties, contexts, insignificance and dislocation

What is worse, is the way characteristics are read-off of their constitutive grounds via employers who recognise, practically, the efficacy of the real, effaced, sources of value manifest via recognitions which constitute those valued as able to interweave elemental components because they experience their interpersonal disclosure so that they accede to an agility born of an actuality whose assurance arises from a continuous realisation that constitutes a viability experienced via manifesting forms whose sense one bears because one intuits them as an effect of being subject to such possibilities as aspects of inhering in a world as a particular emanation of the possible. Contextualisation and realisation cost money, which is why they are effaced aspects of different types of education, and many students exist only so far as they can secure the revenue required to finance their own self-generated process of self-certification. This issue of context, skill and money comes through in the following:
...unequivocally what that means is that fields are closed at a certain level unless candidates have sufficient relevant experience to demonstrate they can perform the role. This role not only requires many years experience of reporting and presenting data, but an in-depth knowledge of technologies such as SQL Server, SQL programming skills and MS Office (inc. Word, PowerPoint, Excel and Access – with the ability to write Macros and Pivot Tables). I don’t doubt that you would be more than capable of picking up these skills, but it is extremely expensive and time consuming to train people in these areas, so candidates need to have already proved they can handle them.

The labour market is too fractured as an effect of the displacements arising from the control of labour markets by particular class groups who can access closed public spaces that generate the symbolic forms that function as emblems of recognitions that guarantee the competencies disclosed via the circumscription arising from being-one-of-them. Employers perceive your competence via your objectivity, via the contexts constitutive of it: because contexts are the conditions that satisfy intentional states, so that their attribution arises from recognition of access to contexts which are the grounds of their acquisition, without experiences of involving realisations, individuals are unlikely to be capable of manifesting the effects of ways of being-there that arise from recognitions which disclose such aspects. This is why employers look to the form of involvement that manifests the disclosive grounds required to accede to mastery of forms that inhere in being subject to such relational processes. This is why elite education is involving because involvement constitutes both the conditions necessary to accede to competence and the conditions required for the public perception, the public recognition, of those competences because recognition is a crucial, if effaced, condition for the emergence of individuals into competence via experiences of engagement that disclose a horizon whose realisation constitutes the sense of forms appropriated via experiences of being-realised via aspects that physiognomically materialise meanings grasped via being situated via a background rooted in co-presence. You are only objectified via employment relations. Skills that are acquired via self-teaching, the standard process most lower class students undergo, are not signified in the labour market. As one person described their experience, "All it is is self-study. All I did on my MBA was sit in a room and research my projects, then hand them in, that was it". This is why the types of self-financed, self-certification, via administrative relationships that objectify others, characteristic of the educationalism that typifies the 'education' of the poor tends to be worthless. It is also why products of such processes find it difficult to attribute competences to themselves because their attempts to generate a labour-process, without contextualisation, inhibits both their development and their sense of capacities whose interpersonal grounds remain closed because closures are the means whereby groups, simultaneously, constitute the conditions which satisfy the attribution of competencies that are inseparable from such conditions, and ensure an experience of being competent arising from involvement in the relational forms that constitute such objectivities. It is only via relationships of involvement that skills are dignified via their publicly instituted grounds, anything that is done privately, is irrelevant and this is the case with credentials acquired via the self-financed, self-constituted, 'education' characteristic of the educational processes available to the poor. It is only forms arising from closures constitutive of public fields, employment, that count and in relation to which skills are recognised,
otherwise they have a mutilated status. Competences are recognised via the institutional closures constitutive of objectivities that are effects of relational forms that constitute them so that people's competence is read-off from their social embedding. Contextualisation functions as a guarantee of dispositions forged via the sedimentation of the realisations that constitute capacities that being-there manifests, so that potential employers accept presence as a guarantee of that which arises via it, as an effect of the satisfaction of conditions that constitute it. Because neurophysiological structures are absorbed, not as intentional contents, but via disclosures that responsively constitute dispositions whose shape arise from experience of being-realised in relation to the involvements that realise ways of being that can thereby be presumed to be analogues of forms arising from experiences of such conditions, employers use contextualisation as a guarantee of what, logically, arises from it. This is clear in the following:

It's off junction thirty-two, Ah 'ad an' interview the'er, site agent job, walks in, hi' ses..."tha used t' w'k at' pit din't tha'?” Ah ses, "Ahr, Ah wo' straight dahm after schoil, till thi' shut Wath", hi' ses, "tha'll du fo' me. When can tha' start?” Ah ended up' Scotland, on a site up the'er, H wo' the'er fo' two y'r.

Obviously, the selector understands that working in a pit functions as a guarantee of certain required dispositions which are attractive aspects of potential employees. This is why the self-education that tends to characterise the education of the poor doesn't affect the underlying significance arising from the inability of individuals to situate themselves that is an effect of the dislocation characteristic of the devalued. Equally, the devalued find continuously rearticulated distances that render legible objectivities that constitute the significance of everything they are capable of acquiring, their whole educational processes rooted in the social effects of economic closures that render their effort meaningless and their skills worthless. The one thing that the devalued face is utterly anonymous, generic, educational processes that do not situate them in any way and then they are judged in relation to the extent to which their CVs manifest what is forever dependent on public value: involvement. It is because relations of involvement constitute the grounds of competence and are manifestations of what it arises from, social value, that the exclusive functions as it does in the economy. The way the interpersonal forms, constitutive of value, function is to constitute absolutes that eternalise conditions of existence. Without access to the interpersonal conditions constitutive of the recognised forms of competence, you have no competence and these function as absolutes: without access to the closures constitutive of the field, you will not get a chance to access these conditions and will remain in a negated state. What you realise is the extent to which reasoning plays no role in the way resources are distributed. We see how little reasoning plays in the negotiation of labour market access: the fundamental means via which most individuals will attempt to access resources. What are transacted in communications are socially grounded objectivities that arise from the meaning-of-being forms whose grounds arise via such processes. When you look at selection meetings, what are discussed are the significances of forms of objectivity that exist at a more primal institutional level as interpersonal relationships that constitute such objectivities. When candidates are discussed in selection meetings, what forms are used to constitute the sense of the
viability and efficacy of the candidate? What are transacted are meanings that arise from relational sources of institutional objectivity. When selection panels discuss a candidate, and this is particularly the case given how little access to any sources of institutional-interpersonal contact characterise the educational processes of the least valued, they transact significances whose operational basis, whose meaning, arise from the institutional grounds from which they arise relationally. The legitimacy of the distinctions inheres in the differences that constitute them and which some experience being realised as available sources that inform their identity because they experience their disclosure as an interpersonally mediated domain. The physiognomic materialisation of the meanings as capacities are experienced as potentialities inscribed in the social being of those who experience their being institutionally realised via recognition of such possibilities as aspects of a status they experience being constituted via such processes. The real issues governing the attribution of competence are the closures that constitute these forms. The point is, that these forms of significance can be merely further differentiated by a mass system of education that is rigged throughout by the efficacy of capital. Without access to the means, the spatially constituted relations of involvement that objectivise and objectify, what individuals face is manifest in the following:

Although age discrimination is illegal its not made a shred of difference as they just state that the position is now filled and piss off because you don’t meet the criteria. HR departments are full of people who are directed to policies aimed at excluding. The government brought in legislation to monitor their activities discrimination acts - sex age race disability. They no longer are allowed to discriminate on these grounds but they still do and half the time they only portray inclusion to ensure the legislative process does not interfere. They exclude by just not acknowledging or saying other candidates had a better profile. God awful process.

As Bourdieu puts it, "A number of official criteria in fact serve as a mask for hidden criteria: for example, the requirement of a given diploma can be a way of demanding a particular social origin" (Bourdieu 1984: 102). One gets criteria like the following: "At the time of recruitment, you must be within the first four years of your research career (measured from the date of obtaining the degree which entitles you to embark on PhD studies)". Why would pace of ascent be a factor when many lower class students study without a direction arising from the dislocation that is an effect of the disorientation that is itself an effect of the lack of embedding of their credentials in anything, to say nothing of struggles to finance higher degrees. Those whose progression is continuous are those who have had the capacity to elicit recognition and solicit the engagement required to ensure that they knew how to mediate progression because, fundamentally, its possibility was made available to them, the others struggle to even find out how to mediate such processes and the form of their attempts is as marked by such aspects as the CVs arising from such processes are by what becomes signified, via such instituted differences, as 'lost time': the traces of an insignificance arising from forms which constitute barriers whose sense arise from such differences. What employers do is use euphemised forms to avoid stating the criteria being effaced via the use of euphemisms to avoid saying explicitly what is being avoided via the use of such formulations. The Levehulme Trust early career fellowships presume someone under the age of thirty-five who already has established a “proven record of research” and the British
Academy for their post-doctoral fellowships expect a candidate to “normally” have finished their doctorate by thirty:

Those aged over 30 who have followed a traditional path in higher education and cannot plead exceptional circumstances (e.g. simply taking a long time over preparing the doctoral thesis, preferring to take paid employment and then trying to return to research etc) will be unlikely to be successful in this competition.

Contacting an academic about a criteria that stipulated twenty-eight years of age as the limit for the completion of the PhD I was told:

The word ‘normally’ appears there. If you are over 28 and think that you would make a valid candidate it is up to you to make a case, which would be considered on its merits. In general JRF’s are, however, regarded as junior (training) posts in the academic scheme of things. We offer other posts which are only for more senior candidates.

The problem is that the posts for more senior candidates require actual employment which you can’t access when you complete your PhD because you are too junior so that you are reduced to attempting to get a post-doctoral position because you cannot compete with those in employment who use their networks to produce the criteria which have a determining efficacy on a labour market constituted via these processes. The thing is, how can you make a case if you have merely been exploited via undistinguished technical colleges in the north of England and all that is accessible to you is merely what is generic because you can only access what the nation-state will finance? If your efficacy relies upon state-finance to render you viable for a charade that dispossess you of that revenue while instituting the charade of a public process, then what can you do? If you have the characteristic processing of those with the least value whereby you are reduced to existing as a conduit of resources for those who assess you, then you are unlikely to elicit any help of any kind that might make available anything distinguishing and even if you are one of the small few who managed to get one of the limited national awards then how can you possibly meet these criteria? You are reduced to attempting to get the lowest level of post until you run up against the criteria designed to eliminate the also-rans who managed to finance the administration of their projects so as to certify themselves but who lack access to the constitutive interpersonal grounds of the real criteria. Post-doctoral positions ask for people who have “recently completed” PhDs in order to eliminate the multitude of people who have got them without being able to become involved in anything because the real criteria relate to aspects whose unavailability are constitutive of a significance arising from the realisations which naturally arise via the use of the space to selectively constitute access to such forms via recognitions rooted in congruities whose sense individuals manifest as an effect of forms of existence rooted in shared conditions. What you are up-against is the unavailability of anything in relation to the educational process available, the unavailability of the practice and then the criteria of excellence which arise from existing in relation to conditions that you cannot access. So, for example, one advert uses the following formulation:

The role will involve working on a wide range of materials giving you the chance, at an early stage in your career, to gain valuable experience in a wide range of writing styles which will
serve you well in your future writing career. To be considered for this position you must hold a PhD in the life sciences and be a native English speaker.

The category "early career" is a euphemism for "young", which, given that it requires a PhD, presumes a particular trajectory and the institutional conditions constitutive of such objectivities. In time, asking for a "native English speaker" will come to be seen as discriminatory as more and more overseas students come here for education and entry to professional positions. When UK institutions are financed via fee-paying overseas students, it hardly seems fair to allow the public use of such criteria and this injustice will become visible via the logic of legitimation that the international rich operationalise via their use of such institutional processes. When many of the international rich speak English better than the English one wonders what the categorisation "native English speaker" is there to achieve?

Social Closures and Selection Criteria

The problem is that the criteria emerge from closures which circumscribe modalities born of relations of involvement which disclose forms appropriated via experiences of being that relate to an experience arising via such conditions and these produce particular constellations of significance that arise from such grounds and these are unavailable to the mass who become negatively signified, and visible, in contradistinction to those on elite trajectories, every difference constituted via the absence arising from a lack of access characteristic of those who have little available to them beyond vacuous, de-realising, decontextualized, assessments that constitute an education that can’t provide a reason for knowing anything one, largely, teaches oneself and in which negation plays a key role as assessors take the quickest route to visibility in a process in which students cannot even allude to reality because assessments exploit the closures that constitute the legitimacy of such processes. As those within the institutions use private processes in order to materialise the appearance of a function that is degraded by its use as a labour-saving device hiding the lack of education the process available involves, there is an effective privatisation of the mediations constitutive of the physiognomic regeneration of the sense of capacities that inhere in this ‘public’ situating of individuals in relation to private networks that establish institutional space via its use to produce a privatised system of differences born of tacit, situational, reference to those whose labour is situated outside of the institutions by the effect of an institutional culture that condemns them to anonymity and to a retreat to a locality that furnishes what experiences of co-presence are available to the poor in a society constituted via such processes. As institutional processes arise as class processes, relating to the function that institutions have for the aggregates who can transpose their public visibility into a private institutional existence providing forms of competence born of involvement in a sphere generated via the need to establish distinctions manifest via closures that appropriate space via signifying it via such exclusive forms, meanings are constituted in relation to interpersonal disclosures which render some functional, capable of referring to forms they are privy to being realised in relation to. For the poor social ageing starts very young since they cannot access any of the conditions required to satisfy selection criteria, and, more importantly, cannot access the interpersonal
grounds of disclosures of form that allow them to appropriate possibilities as actualities arising from their being-for-others so that they face the continuous rearticulation of a negation that becomes sedimented as it is incorporated via relational forms which constitute objectivities. It is the recognitions constitutive of involvement that disclose forms that constitute the nature of space so that how one exists is manifest via the sense of the space one occupies because of the objectivity of these public processes. This is why employers look at how you’ve occupied space, that is, they look for the conspicuous effects of recognitions which have a public meaning. As one person described:

All employers are interested in are where you’ve been, what yer’ve done, who’ve yer’ve worked with. My CV is just shite cos Ah’ve worked in shite places, that’s it. So, Ah’ve no chances ’r anythin’ in life ‘sept the same shit Ah’ve allous ‘ad t’ do ‘cos thi’s now’t Ah can do.

As someone else puts it:

People now only care about what you have...what you can give. All an employer wants to know is what you’ve done. Where you worked. What you did there. Nothing else matters.

In other words, all that counts is their objectivity as that is publicly constituted by its circumscription in involvement in public fields that realise its significance and constitute possibilities that are experienced as possessed of determining efficacy. What this means is that individuals cannot pursue goals, cannot orient themselves intentionally without access to the mediating grounds of such possibilities as actual aspects of their potentiality which determines the actuality they experience being constituted via such conditions. This poses problems that individuals experience as a curtailment arising from the grounds of their objectivity:

You have to change yourself or you will be left behind...that is the world. Trouble is I can’t change stuck in the same rut. I need a chance to learn new things. If I go to the same job where they treat me the same I cannot change. That’s why I need a new training. Business has changed and I have to change but I need to be in a company that is right to learn the new things.

The individual confronts the problem of experiencing the physiognomic materialisation of interpersonal forms that might function as vehicles of intentional content whose conditions of satisfaction remain unavailable so that they experience the unavailability of possibilities and a stultifying curtailment born of the nature of the way they experience being publicly constituted in relation to the only available field that mediates their objectivity: the labour market. Objectification is a function of embedding: how individuals are perceived via the inscribed traces of their CVs arises from how they experience being situated via significances whose recognition disclose possibilities whose actuality they experience being public facets of their objectivity. Employers perceive competence as an effect of status attributes that relate to the positioning of individuals and labour that does not arise from a public context is not valued, not even in educational fields financed via the decontextualized, and privatised, labour of the poor. Within academic labour markets, products of educationalism, as opposed to those whose PhDs emerge from research communities, fair badly. Within the economy everything functions as a sign
of conditions which render sensible its form. As one recruiter explained, “Thanks for the application, however the competitive market requires people to have previous experience in the area of market access. Not the answer you’re looking for I know, but I’m afraid its experience over qualifications”. It appears an interminable problem: how do you access fields when what are available, credentials, aren’t valued and what is valued, arises from closures that constitute such significances? There is no competence beyond its signification via institutional and social closures that constitute some via the form of a boundary that materialises the difference in relation to circumscriptions which constitute a horizon within which the possibility of acceding to functionality arises via forms of realisation that physiognomically regenerate the sense of capacities that inhere in the relations of involvement that constitute such conditions of existence. Even if you have a competence it doesn’t mean that you do because it’s the cultural signification of that competence that matters: the way cultural forms are constituted publicly via closures that ensure the rarity of the experience, its exclusivity. This is why the skills of some are invisible because they do not access the grounds of objectification and the absence of relations of involvement affect the form of the competence as well as affecting their experience of their objectivity. This is why you have PhD students who can say:

Yesterday I met a woman in uni, asked what it was that made her (and me by implication in the later ‘we’) not know about the part time and temporary lectureship posts that a few of our ‘colleagues’ had got for next year. She then found plenty of resonance with me when she described how after now finishing her PhD SHE DOESN’T KNOW WHAT SHE KNOWS and could not sit a first year sociology exam.

The certification process some undergo, clearly, does not establish their public value because the process itself is enmired in valuationary processes that constitute valences of capital that subtend the form of such processes which have existential analogues constituting some as authorised, those recognised and realised, those chosen for teaching, as opposed to those who undergo an invalidation arising from the perception of a difference manifest by an insignificance realised via the absence of provision of teaching opportunities: the distribution of exclusive forms of employment manifesting the valuationary processes that constitute some as able via a circumscription whose realisation physiognomically materialises capacities for intuition arising from experiencing being situated in relation to such aspects and those who experience an opacity arising from the absence of disclosure of interpersonal aspects that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in such processes. Some occupy a qualified status in which their competence is not recognised, they are qualified but the nature of their competence cannot be established because they exist outside of the channels of legitimacy that constitute the closures that produce the exclusive relational forms that circumscribe some in relation to circumstantial aspects that disclose capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being realised in relation to the recognitions which disclose such forms. The significant point is that those who are able to constitute their institutional lives exclusively, have only, when writing their CVs, to consider how they want to represent their involvement in a sphere they constitute, via practical strategies, to manifest the sense they have only to represent conceptually, in order to appear distinguished and essentially competent, whereas, looking at what the
unavailability of anything to most lower class, the opposite obtains: they have nothing they can render conceptually beyond a representational apparatus as convoluted as their experience is inchoate and tortuous. Involvement and exclusion are inscribed in the fabric of the being of those who experience the disclosure of such differences via perception of embodied, dispositional, forms that inhere in the disclosure of such aspects. The point, not to overlook, is that the forms required to access employment relate to mediations that concern being-perceived appropriately which arise from recognitions of form that are clearly inequitably distributed. How can people subject to such experiences solicit the contact required to access the forms required to accede to recognitions of competence? Moreover, you cannot overlook that these are students who have somehow managed to secure the finances to purchase higher degrees via processes whose inconsequential anonymity are only too apparent. Some are mobilised, introduced to the relational basis of forms incorporated via experiences of being-realised in relation to recognitions that manifest access to spatial forms that mirror the forms of involvement characteristic of the role, they experience a process informed by the recognition of the difference manifest by their selection for teaching and, thereby, experience the validity of their labour which is transformed into a resource, whilst others experience the interpersonal grounds of the distinction being derived via different ways of being situated, different ways of being contextualised, in relation to a distinction that manifests what is academically profitable. Labour market judgements are immanent to how individuals experience spatial-relational processes that constitute appearances via distinctions that relate to significances that constitute such differences of objectivity. What cannot be overlooked is that those recognised experience the physiognomic materialisation of the interpersonal basis of capacities for reference that inhere in the forms they experience being disclosed via differences realised spatially via the sense of the differences enacted. Those recognised, and selected, experience being rendered functional, their labour a valuable personal resource based in a capacity arising from their experience of being situated via the recognition which constitutes such modalities, assuring them of the efficacy of a public difference they experience being incarnated via experiences of being subject to the disclosure, and constitution, of such differences whereas others experience the anonymity of a devaluation that physiognomically regenerates an insignificance that circumscribes their existence, they have nowhere to go and nothing to do and this experience of being-there is an effect of a significance rearticulated via such processes. Where some experience capacities for projection born of disclosures which interpersonally realise them so that they accede to a sense incorporated via experiencing being subject to such modalities, others experience the annihilation of a negation whose sense they bear as an inability to refer to aspects they don't experience being interpersonally constituted. Negation constitutes an impoverished relation to being, you are world-impoverished by a stigma that is an effect of competition. It is overlooked that students' attitudes to what they are doing are effects of their involvement in this institutional reality. Some experience being economically active whilst others experience their insignificance and the worthlessness of their labour remediated via these institutional relationships that sub tend these differences in objectivity. What greater class distinctions could possibly be drawn? The interpersonal forms that sub tend the crystallisation of
objectivities arising from recognitions which subtend attributions of competence are only too clear. The social structures that subtend economic space are interpersonally constituted, transposing ways of being-perceived into capacities for reference that inhere in projections rooted in ways of being-realised that physiognomically materialise the sense appropriated via experiencing being subject to the disclosure of circumstantial aspects that constitute the 'there' experienced via being. The problem is that capacity to mediate, and thereby to project, requires realisations that constitute not merely forms of objectivity but also capacities for instantiation arising from the sense incorporated via experiences of being subject to the physiognomic materialisation of aspects which inhere in relational forms that constitute circumstantial forms arising from experiences of being subject to the 'there' arising from experiences of recognition which, thereby, mediate continuities rooted in the recognition of such differences. Different modalities are constituted via different ways of being-there that constitute a different sense of capacities, clearly, the testimony jumps from the recognition of a difference of status: "I met a woman in uni, asked what it was that made her (and me by implication in the later 'we') not know about the part time and temporary lectureship posts that a few of our 'colleagues' had got for next year" to an effect of not-being-able: "after now finishing her PhD SHE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT SHE KNOWS and could not sit a first year sociology exam". The differences in status, the lack of equality, acknowledged in the parenthesising of "'colleagues'", is perceived to note differences in the conditions constitutive of a developmental medium. The meaning of credentials emerges from a constellation of aspects that inhere in recognitions that disclose actualising possibilities so that where some experience engagement and realisation, others experience anonymity, implied rejection and unrealisation: the existential modalities that subtend projection and access to purposive states that cognitively realise those recognised, engaged and realised, are completely different so that different ways of being arise from different experiences of being-there and differences of status transfigure the perception of differences into differences of capacity that inhere in the constitution of significance spatially. The use of space to manifest differences, realises the sense of forms, via relationships of involvement that constitute modalities arising from the terrain of being. It is important to notice that even where there is contact, the form of that contact is significant in that it arises from a background whose sense inheres in recognitions which physiognomically regenerate the sense of differences which transfigure significance into different ways of being-there, differences in involvement that constitute different forms of presence arising from different forms of attention relating to different ways of being-perceived, different ways of showing-up as 'there', that are effects of the incorporation of aspects that constitute differences of circumstance, different conditions of existence. Different properties inhere in being situated in relation to forms of contact that inscribe the sense of such aspects. Educational fields are just public fields that operate via the perception and realisation of the same forms of involvement that constitute forms of public objectivity that inhere in the support for different class groups that institutional space offers. Obviously, different forms of recognition lead to different forms of attention, different experiences of presence rooted in different ways of being attended to, that merely physiognomically regenerate primal experiences of value that transfigure different
valences of capital into different ways of being situated, different relationships of involvement that constitute capacities for reference and instantiation that inhere in the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects as facets of the objectivities realised via such processes. When recognition affects ways of being realised, thus affecting capacities that require the projection of realisation in relation to distinct possibilities, those engaged experience the interpersonal disclosure of a fabric whose sense inhere in ways of being-realised that physiognomically materialise capacities that inhere in the mobilisation of their faculties arising from the recognitions which involve them so that they experience the substrate of sense that inheres in being whereas the devalued experience the absence of interpersonal forms that transpose sense into being via experiences of realisation in relation to forms whose spatial materialisation constitute capacities for reference that inhere in being subject to such modalities. Notice that involvement in consequential, and clearly exclusive, forms, requires ways of being recognised that disclose forms that constitute the sense of properties themselves recognised by being-able-to-manifest subjection to such aspects so that one appropriates the sense of forms via a referentiality that inheres in this dialectic of recognition. The feeling of inability is attendant on the non-disclosure of forms that affect the circumstances individuals experience so that they become unable to refer to aspects they don't experience being-able-to-project-via and, thereby, don't experience being able to attribute to themselves, so that the identity of their competence inheres in statuses that education merely reproduces. It is not inconsequential that labour market selection criteria focus on precisely what is clearly conditional: involvement, and qualities of contact that manifest forms of attention that disclose the sense of properties that inhere in experiences of being realised in relation to processes that, clearly, manifest different experiences of being situated that affect capacities for reference because of their constitutive nature. When individuals are located via such perceptions, what can they do? The significances arising from experiences of being subject to such mediations will preclude their mediation of further possibilities as an effect of the forms of significance they experience being subject to, they can neither mediate access to the interpersonal grounds of consequential forms, nor accede to a functionality whose interpersonal grounds they don't experience being constituted, so what can they do? Their intentional lives are limited by the realisation of a boundary that precludes accession to possibilities as an effect of a competition within educational fields that concerns the tacit "criteria of legitimate membership and legitimate hierarchy" (Bourdieu 1992b: 11). Distinctions are physiognomically materialised via disclosures which constitute horizons whose actuality are lived as determinate possibilities that circumscribe forms of existence whose consequential nature are only too clearly manifest. Subjection to the perception of such differences physiognomically regenerates the sense realised via experiences of being subject to such processes. The absence of the actualisation of relational states, the absence of contact, the absence of engagement, the absence of being-able-to access the constitutive conditions of the recognised form of the competence, teaching, mean that those subject to such processes cannot represent themselves appropriately because they are perceived to manifest intentional states they experience being physiognomically regenerated via recognitions of differences which constitute the absence of such possibilities. How can they refer to themselves on
future markets when they experience the determination of their objectivity via such mediations? How would you take yourself seriously when this was your experience, when you are so confused, after finishing a credential that "SHE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT SHE KNOWS" and how is this possible? What is clear is that the devalued are de-legitimated via processes that extort the sense of the competence of those who manoeuvre around the relationships via which the products of student labour are administered in order to materialise the appearance of processes that do little beyond narcissistically realise the institutional agents, the employees, involved, whilst reproducing fundamental modalities rooted in the class hierarchy. The agents responsible take themselves very seriously, why, and how? And if you went through a process of self-education and isolated production of texts which functioned as foils for the responsive actualisation of others, would you feel any authority? Moreover, given such conditions, how would such people establish any intention to participate? Without mediation how could you establish an intention to participate? How would you arrive at an experience of properties whose sense you experience bearing as an effect of your experience of recognitions which disclose the interpersonal fabric constitutive of their realisation? Without an experience of being-capable of bearing-the-sense of such aspects, how would you frame an intention to 'participate' when your experience of the spaces constituted via the closures which constitute such modalities was of insignificance and invisibility? Your very experience of the possibilities available to you precludes experiences of being-capable of manifesting forms that inhere in the closures that constitute the hidden difference between the valued and the devalued, the sacred and the profane. This is why the experience of differences physiognomically regenerates a sense of absence experienced via the sense of properties that inhere in experiencing their physiognomic regeneration so that the devalued experience the inscription, via their experience of being-there, via presence, of a sense of lack that is an effect of the interpersonal constitution of such aspects. Devaluation transposes into difference, into different ways of being-there arising from the recognition of differences physiognomically regenerated via subjection to such forms: this is why selection criteria focus on membership, on involvement, because it is a constitutive condition of aspects that arise from being subject to the disclosure of a medium whose interpersonal realisation constitutes mode of access to the real. Belief is only half of being because it has interpersonal conditions which constitute it and authenticity requires the satisfaction of those conditions. Clearly, the inauthenticity of failed projection is a key aspect of this person's encounter with being, "after now finishing her PhD SHE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT SHE KNOWS". One can appreciate why Bourdieu says:

*Illusio* understood as immediate adherence to the necessity of a field is all the less likely to appear to consciousness because it is in a sense removed from discussion: as the fundamental belief in the value of the stakes of the dispute and in the presuppositions inscribed in the very fact of disputing, it is the unexamined condition of the dispute. To undertake to discuss arguments, one has to believe that they merit discussion and to believe, in any case, in the merits of the dispute. *Illusio* does not belong to the order of explicit principles, theses that are put forward and defended, but of action, routine, things that are done, and that are done because they are things that one does and that have always been done that way. All those who are involved in the fields...share a tacit adherence to the same *doxa* which makes their competition possible and assigns its limits (the heretic remains a believer who preaches a return to purer forms of the faith). It effectively forbids questioning of the principles of belief, which would
threaten the very existence of the field. Participants have ultimately no answer to questions about the reasons for their membership in the game, their visceral commitment to it; and the principles which may be invoked in such a case are merely post festum rationalisations intended to justify an unjustifiable investment, to themselves as much as to others. (Bourdieu 2000: 102)

It is hardly surprising that:

> The specific habitus, which is demanded of the new entrants as a condition of entry, is nothing other than a specific mode of thought (an *eidos*), the principle of a specific construction of reality, grounded in a prereflective belief in the undisputed value of the instruments of construction and of the objects thus constructed (an *ethos*). (In reality, what the new entrant must bring into the game is not the habitus that is tacitly or expressed demanded there, but a habitus that is practically compatible, or sufficiently close, and above all malleable and capable of being converted into the required habitus, why operations of co-option, whether in the recruitment of a rugby player, a professor, a civil servant or a policeman, are so attentive not only to the signs of competence but also to the barely perceptible indices, generally corporeal ones -- dress, bearing, manners -- of dispositions to be, and above all to become, 'one of us'.) (Bourdieu 2000: 99)

Given the interpersonal institution of authenticities of commitment, that are modalities of ways of being realised born of recognitions which, as Kierkegaard understood, regenerate commitments by realising individuals in relation to aspects constitutive of their meaningful expression, it is not surprising that the field transposes differences of status into what appear to be differences of competence because the field functions via a logic of denial that represses social positions whilst rearticulating them via a transposition of form arising from its autonomy: the poor function as resources which secure a distance from necessity that makes miscognition an authentic professional strategy. As one Sociologist explained the selection criteria:

> It isn't just qualifications there's a set of narrowly defined character traits that you require...like you must not be cynical...

Notice the naturalisation of this range of issues and attribution of suitability to "character" which should alert us to the way differences are perceived via modalities that are part of their interpersonal constitution so as to instantiate precisely this transposition. It is perfectly clear that, as Bourdieu describes:

> It is quite apparent that a purely scholastic culture is not simply a partial culture or a part of culture, but an inferior culture, because the very elements of which it is composed do not have the same significance they would have in a larger whole...Every item of knowledge therefore has to be seen both as an element in a constellation and as a moment in the cultural itinerary as a totality, in which each point on the curve contains the whole curve. And, finally, it is the personal manner of performing cultural acts which give them their specifically cultural character: thus, ironic casualness, mannered elegance, or the statutory assurance which lends ease or the affectation of ease are almost always the mark of students from the upper classes, where such manners signal membership in the elite. (Bourdieu 1979: 45)

But what subtends such differences are different ways of being culturally realised, institutionally and publicly, for different categories so that even those from the poorest backgrounds who manage to accede to the sphere of the available financed via the state apparatus used to appropriate resources via professional bodies that, clearly, institute distinctions via complex relational mediations that constitute the
naturalisation of differences transposing them into what appear to be differences of capacity that arise from different forms of involvement arising from the perception, and reproduction, of such differences. The problem is that given the limited forms of contact characteristic of the relationships that materialise the appearance of the education of the poor, and given the relation between the absence of any embedding, mediation or involvement, that manifests the naked cash nexus subtending what limited forms of presence they accede to, how can such a reality not call them to the sense of the order immanent to such aspects? How can the devalued avoid cynicism? Can people, really, accede to any sense of, any experience of being, competent, from outside of involvement in the relationships and institutional networks that consecrate those publicly sanctified via their use of such processes to institute the relational basis of experiences of difference that constitute circumstantial aspects that subtend such realities? When the process available to you reduces to an isolated attempt to project via cultural forms whose interpersonal grounds are unavailable, then you are forever insecure as to capacities whose conditions of attribution are affected by such conditions. Without projection born of realisation in relation to distinct possibilities whose disclosure assure you of forms appropriated via their interpersonal materialisation, how can you feel any assurance and feel possessed of capacities for understanding born of a shared sphere of existence? Clearly, those who are not invited to teach exist outside of the relational grounds constitutive of attributions of competence and endure an insecurity the same as other members of the unemployed. How can individuals manifest the incorporated effects of continuous realisations that make commitment sensible? Without embedding, there cannot be synchronisation and without realisation projection is frustrated and commitment becomes impossible, affecting expressive physiognomy as those experiencing being de-legitimised incorporate a sense they experience being physiognomically regenerated as a purposelessness arising from the recognition of a difference that renders their attempts to projectively constitute themselves futile. Status differences are merely transfigured into what appear to be legitimate differences in attitude via the institution of differences of status that transpose status into competence. When institutional acts consecrate and legitimate some, and rob others of any capacity to either represent themselves appropriately or experience being competent, how could individuals not, by manifesting awareness of such differences, not appear to have an attitude problem and not appear cynical and limited? Poverty transposes into ignorance as the poor never have reason to be anywhere and this reverberates throughout the institutional structure. Are such people being educated for anything or are their feelings of doubt and insecurity manifestations of fundamental spatial forms whose personalisation inhere in fundamental class processes? Poverty constitutes different ways of being-there and confusion is an effect of the absence of the mediations that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in intuitions born of experiencing being-realised in relation to circumstantial aspects whose physiognomic materialisation are fundamental aspects of the transfiguration of differences into what appear to be differences of inclination and capacity relating to the formations of dispositions arising from such processes. The sense of ignorance and inability is an effect of not being involved in any interpersonal sphere. If schema are incorporated, mimetically, via realisations relating to recognitions which disclose aspects appropriated via
involvement and embedding in contextualising aspects that constitute capacities intuited via experiencing being subject to such possibilities, then those who are not invited are, really, re-experiencing the grounds of an objectivity reproduced via recognition of properties physiognomically regenerated via the sense of a barrier articulated via such processes. If your expressivity arises from such conditions, then how has the 'education' addressed the barriers that subtend the problems faced by those who can't access the labour market and are so distant from the institutional mediations that constitute its required forms that they are privy to such processes? Such individuals are being subject to the grounds via which their problems arise because what dispositions are being constituted for them? How can they countermand the effects of being subject to meanings inscribed via being subject to the recognition of the sense of such differences when their sense of their own capacities arises from the absence of possibilities reconstituting their own sense of inability because they do not access the relational or institutional basis of the sense of forms that inhere in continuous involvement? Those who are not chosen to teach are subject to forms of unrealisation that physiognomically regenerate the very sense of the objectivity responsible for their subjection to such a condition. They experience the physiognomic regeneration of the sense of an objectivity that they have turned to education to escape and yet which haunts their attempts at projection because they cannot access the grounds of its realisation and, thereby, sense aspects that inhere in the recognition of such forms: their inability to project via the absence of the mediation of possibility physiognomically materialises an experience of insignificance that is transfigured, via such mediations, into an inability to experience the sense of properties that inhere in their relational actualisation. They are being subject to consequential distinctions which will affect their future capacities to satisfy labour market criteria because of a legibility that inheres in the reproduction of such relational aspects. What subtends this experience is an education in which any form of connection to recognised forms of public existence is conditional upon recognitions that disclose access to the relational grounds of such aspects so that those from distant areas of social space cannot access such forms, cannot be-perceived to exhibit properties that require their involvement in realising mediations and then re-inscribe the grounds of this difference as part of a barrier whose sense is relationally reconstituted via educational processes that operate continuously with a distinction between the valued and employed the devalued and unemployed. Aren't those who are not selected merely undergoing the reproduction of the same status in relation to the particular field they 'entered' to attempt to escape such conditions? What they face is the public reconstitution of the same boundary via different variations of the same underlying logic because these areas of social space are constituted in relation to the same interpersonal processes that govern the distribution of fundamental resources more widely, the same class processes subtend the institutional mediation of access to the grounds of competence. Aren't such people merely being re-subject to the very distinction constituted via the relationships that subtend labour market access in other fields so that their educational process is merely reproducing their social position? From where would confidence arise? How could they discover themselves capable of bearing the sense of properties that are relationally constituted aspects of their being-for-others when they experience the disclosure of absences of forms that
constitute the conditions which satisfy such possibilities? Moreover, being passively subject to the revelation of such aspects, they experience a self-doubt that is merely an effect of sensitivity to their objectivity: it is because of their capacities to intuit such aspects that they experience the inadequacy they feel as a sensitivity to the forms they experience being realised via the disclosure of such aspects. The form of their experience arises from valuationary processes that situate them so that they are subject to the realisation of forms that will elicit other forms of the same judgements: subjection to the institutional grounds of such interpersonal processes merely renders them publicly legible via their way of being involved in the referential totality that is the matrix of institutional relationships that constitute such forms of intelligibility. The disclosure of such aspects is a key medium of the facilitation of some, and the condemnation of others, via anonymous mechanisms that obscure the class based nature of such processes. It isn't hard to see why people have 'bad luck' when they are subject to sign-reading operations that situate them outside of access to the grounds of objectivities that inhere in being positively perceived and, thereby, realised, so that they access the physiognomic materialisation of aspects that constitute capacities whose sense inhere in being subject to such processes so that they projectively incorporate aspects via sequential immersion in validating moments whose significance are then recognised because they arise from a boundary whose effacement leaves others outside of such circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter. Once you are perceived to be discrepant then you are situated outside of such realising mediations, you don't experience the disclosure of a horizon whose sense inheres in intraworldly aspects constituted via the relational disclosure of the boundary so that those involved are able to refer appropriately because they experience such a capacity via its physiognomic materialisation as a substantial aspect of the social world: a sense-bearing form whose materialisation constitute such possibilities. Once you inscribe a discrepant objectivity via the materialisation of a boundary that inheres in recognition of some as suitable (which itself inhere in the prior recognitions which realise those recognised so that they incorporate such expressive forms) then you will continue to be perceived, via the anonymous processes of the labour market, as discrepant and you'll fail to be able to solicit contact and access the grounds of recognised forms of social existence, thus perpetuating the grounds of the very processes constitutive of your experience of university. Bad luck will characterise your existence and you'll endure inability as an effect of non-recognition. Without recognition you won't be able to access the interpersonal grounds of disclosures which constitute a horizon that makes manifest substantial relational aspects that constitute capacities that inhere in experiences of being subject to such modalities. The educational processes are merely aspects of other valuationary public processes that create the problems that they poor face. As someone else described:

I feel someway "lost"; I try to find a better word and I'm not able to do so, because it seems to me I was ripped of any meaningful purpose. Wishing I could be in a different situation (one that demands to have a different personal history), is now clear to me that I must never follow the academic path. It only generate aspirations and expectations that aren't at all objectively probable to me. It makes me hate those at the university, I worked the same but it's not me, that is what I learned so I'll probably look for a manual work anywhere, where I could do for a living while working in something outside academia. I never teach. Never. I only get small
fellowship that barely leave me space to live without the help of someone, like my parents or my
friends. If you want to know, when I was between fellowships, that didn't even grant my health
care (they are designed for people who could rejoice doing that, that doesn't need them as a
work, as I do), I have to ask some friends of mine to lend me money. I pay it, little by little, in the
following months. I've just been struggling to survive ethically immaculate while trying to do my
work the best I can.

It is clear that economic competition involves an erosion of the moral aspects of
being which require the physiognomic regeneration of intersubjective forms arising
as interpersonally disclosed aspects relating to being situated in relation to contexts
that constitute such modalities so that economic survival involves a moral survival
alluded to as a problem confronted by dealing with the de-realising conditions of a
negation that places so many outside of any conditions that sustain a hold on
possibilities so that they can projectively constitute forms retained via the realisation
constitutive of them. Actualisation and the de-realisation of negation are very real
stakes of societies that must obscure the injustice of institutions which are rigged in
favour of key groups whilst sustaining their hold on public goods via managing the
appearance of their legitimacy. Because this legitimacy must be realised via
interpersonal forms that materialise the sense of differences of quality, it takes place
on a personalised terrain that assaults the moral aspects of the autonomy that is
part of public statuses managed via such processes so that, for the poor, it really is as
if they experience the sense of properties that are effects of an institutional negation
that only compounds the economic degradation so clearly manifest in this
testimony. The disorientation arising from dislocation as well as the dis-absorption
arising from failed projection and the awareness of the absurdity of the annihilation
attendant on aspirations that can never be realised is all too clear. We also see how
awareness of objectivity is an effect of a situating that renders the realisation
constitutive of the sense incorporated via such processes futile. The thing that is
frightening about this experience is that if it is so hard for you to access the social,
institutional and interpersonal grounds of the recognised forms, incorporated, of
competence, what is the point of you teaching even if you could access any situation
in which you were required to speak? If it is so impossible to access any kind of
public opportunity for contact in relation to what you are attempting to project-via
in order to materialise the appearance of an educational process, in what way can
the education be worthwhile? In what sense this person accessing the grounds of
expansive intersubjective forms that constitute capacities arising from experiences
of being realised that constitute capacities for projection that synthesis actuality in
such possibilities? Clearly, this person's experience of position reduces them to a
sense of circumscription that is endured via an experience of being limited that
destroys the very dispositions education is supposed to instil. Moreover, clearly, the
individual cannot sustain a hold on capacities via the realisation of forms evoked via
their grounding in a professional context that constitutes dispositions and, instead,
what we see is the destructuring of the individual who is forced onto a terrain of
malaise, antipathy and crisis. This person is describing what it is to face the
interpersonal, institutional, grounds of impairments that concern the situating of
individuals so that they can accede to the conditions required to accede to
intentional aspects whose interpersonal grounds are contested and which
competition erodes. The projective nature of understanding is disrupted by the
insecurity of displacement that the attenuation of competition involves. As inflation embeds, contact recedes and individuals face the protraction of an underlying condition educational reclassification represses, confronting them with the problems that the unemployed face, the destructuring of their existence arising from a dislocation entrenched by excessive competition. The problem is that if organisational features of cognitive and affective life relate to possibilities whose disclosure constitute capacities to intuit meanings via experiences of their realisation via aspects that constitute such modalities, then involvement, recognition, disclosure and absorption in aspects that physiognomically materialise meanings experienced via being subject to such processes are fundamental to the embedding required for development to occur. If schema are mimetically incorporated via processes of osmosis, then being subject to educational processes that are informed by divisions that affect involvement and embedding, ensuring a reproduction of different ways of being situated will merely reproduce the sense of differences and reproduce dispositional forms born of subjection to such processes. If you go into an educational institution and are judged, without possibilities for involvement, then the grounds are being reproduced of properties incorporated via uninvolve and how can individuals inscribe the sense of appropriate forms when they cannot access the grounds of acquisition of the sense of aspects that inhere in responsive actualisation? And this is the real coup of educationalism, it offers educationalists access to the relational basis of the sense of forms absorbed via involvement in relationships that refract the appearance of competence without such modalities necessarily being available to those via whom they refract the appearance of their competence. This is why, in the words of one educationalist, "we all want good students". That is, they all want students capable of producing first-rate teaching materials that teach them the grounds of categories via reproducing the relationships between semantic units so they can acquire a facility rooted in realisation arising from occupying a role whose appearance is materialised via associating their names with the administration of such products. If neurophysiological mechanisms arise as adaptive responses to forms whose absorption constitute neurophysiological structures, then the experience of absence arising from educational processes devoid of opportunity, or contact, makes perfect sense. The experience of absence of involvement, and the manifest dislocation arising from educational processes in which, even PhD students, must show up as appropriate to access forms whose manifestation require recognitions which disclose such aspects, indicates how the excess competition which supports such educational forms, leads to conditions in which the poor merely face the reproduction of conditions they have turned to education to escape. What we see, described by victims, is the difficulty of accessing the interpersonal grounds of developmental capacities. "I cannot work smoothly", alludes to integratory realisations that constitute dispositions absorbed via such modalities so that meaningful forms are experienced that subtend experiences of capacity. Clearly, if educational 'successes' face such conditions, we might question the way the social structure affects educational processes. The sense of not knowing what one knows, described in "SHE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT SHE KNOWS", is an effect of a disorientation arising from an uninvolve that constitutes a sense, physiognomically materialised, arising from an insignificance that constitutes an
absence of value that transfigures into an absence of access to a relational fabric that intersubjectively donates the basis of an orientational medium, a 'there', involvement in which constitutes the basis of an operative intentionality arising from a purposive relation to being-subject to conditions which materialise such states. Value is manifest via significances which are behaviourally disclosed and transfigure value into a sense-relational aspect that constitutes ways of being relating to a fabric constituted via such aspects. In this sense, circumstantial aspects that relate to being-there are effects of valuationary processes that transmute significance into aspects experienced via being subject to processes that manifest significances revealed via subjection to such mediations. Meanings are revealed via disclosures which constitute circumstantial aspects of ways of being-there, they arise as ways of being that are aspects of the world arising from such processes. Meanings are ways of being involved with the world that arise from forms of involvement that constitute such aspects. In this way meanings involve presence in experiencing events that constitute such forms. In this sense, involvement, is a key constitutive aspect of experiences of being capable because individuals need to experience absorption in forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute the capacity appropriated via experiences of being realised, responsively, so that they absorb neurophysiological structures as part of the sustaining of dispositions that arise as reciprocating protensions towards a world whose aspects inhere in disclosures that constitute such aspects so that referentiality inheres in experiences of being part of a 'there' that is experienced as being meaningful because the meanings are revealed via ways of being-realised in relation to circumstantial aspects that constitute space. The not knowing what one knows is an effect of an uncertainty rooted in an educational process that cannot situate individuals in relation to any practical, or consequential, sphere of realisation of forms appropriated via solitary labour so that 'doing sociology' is bereft of an experience of any need for what one teaches oneself in order to materialise the appearance of sociologists' function via materialising, via one's labour, the appearance of functions that have no real existential, or practical, parameters because students merely function as foils for the narcissistic self-actualisation of those who, via associating themselves with the administration of their labour, experience the cogency of forms which function as mediums of their objectivisation. Precisely what the student is denied, is what is extorted via the association surrounding the processing of her labour which refracts the appearance of processes that have little reality for students, hence the sense of malaise, disorientation and confusion characteristic of those who experience no justification for existing, no feeling of counting for others, and thereby, to herself, because her lack of significance is manifest by the revelation of a distinction, the revealing of a meaning via differences in the world that constitute a different way of being-in-the-world through acceding to a different relation to the world mediated via forms whose disclosure constitute a purposive relation to spatial forms that orient and embed an individual in the fabric of existence that constitutes capacities for cognition born of the absorption of forms whose sense constitute such modalities. Those who lack significance lack an experience of realisation born of recognitions which physiognomically materialise an experience of being perceived to be a worthy interlocutor. The valuationary processes that constitute co-presence, affect access to the relational forms of involvement whose appropriation realise the individual so
that they experience a capacity arising from the sense absorbed via experiencing being subject to such mediations. Meanings are revealed via events that manifest distinctions whose perception constitute such aspects so that differences in way of being-perceived, recognition, constitute capacities for reference that inhere in the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects. Intra-worldly aspects, like lacking the significance to be selected to teach, manifest aspects which are conditions which satisfy intentional possibilities realised via experiencing being subject to such actualities. In this way, value constitutes ways of being-there, and inscribes different cognitive states. Not knowing what one knows is a sure sign of an absence of involvement in a medium constitutive of being and when people emerge from protracted educational processes professing such a state, then careful consideration of the nature of such processes is warranted. Clearly, not all students are involved in the same way, not all are subject to the same forms of disclosure which realise them so that they access the interpersonal grounds of properties whose identification inhere in being able to inscribe access to such conditions representationally via their CVs. Different ways of being-perceived constitute different forms of recognition which disclose different ways of being-there, a different 'there' experienced via a different way of being, different circumstantial aspects arising from significances relating to valences of capital constituted via such mediations. Without a common form of involvement, are educational institutions, unified fields constituted via shared forms? Are they the same for all, or is the private one-to-one nature of postgraduate education merely a way of obscuring the materialisation of differences of significance relating to social value via the use of 'public' institutions to practice a range of differences relating to the interests of the groups who generate the appearance of their competence, and legitimacy, via the manipulation of institutional relationships in order to do so? Given that competence is identified via involvement in circumscribed sphere of legitimate encounter relating to private uses of institutional space that operate, continuously, via tacit reference to the generic experience purchased by those 'lucky to be there', are the least valued being helped to escape conditions which lead to the attribution of an incompetence born of an insignificance that is an effect of closures that constitute such aspects or are they merely being condemned to another variation of the same valuationary mediations that constitute the objectivities that enmire them in an experience of insignificance whose interpersonal constitution constitutes inabilities born of the interpersonal, and spatial, effects of being subject to such conditions so that they don't access the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states relating to associational forms whose grounds they do not experience? Such institutional processes ensure there is a discrepancy between credentials and the conditions of attribution of competencies whose grounds relate to institutional, interpersonal, aspects that the class mobilisation 'behind the scenes' of institutional processes obscures. If involvement in recognised forms of social existence requires capacities arising from the solicitation of such opportunities via significances whose social grounds are unavailable, then we would expect precisely what we see: the perpetuation of a repressed condition for the devalued who merely experience another form of the same form of life because the fundamental institutional processes constitutive of it are perpetuated because underlying institutional processes are valuationary processes that subtend the social structure. If the education of some is distant from
the relationships that disclose the forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute the ways of being whose realisation constitute the circumstantial aspects whose perception facilitate the appropriation of capacities that inhere in being situated via such mediations, then capacities require contextualisation, they require an experience of being-there because ways of being arise from experiences of a 'there' whose disclosure is part of the emergence, the revelation, of meanings via forms that constitute the identity of such aspects. This is why selection criteria relate to the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states that inhere in such forms of actualisation and this is also why those who lack the significance to have the institutional leverage to be able to command access to employment don't feel themselves capable of bearing the sense of forms they don't experience being physiognomically materialised. Without access to the interpersonal grounds of properties that inhere in recognition of such aspects, how can individuals experience themselves capable of bearing the sense of forms that constitute such modalities? Those who are not selected are experiencing the absence of a capacity: to show up as significant, that is a manifestation of a devaluation which constitutes a sense of inability born of this experience of being insignificant which physiognomically materialises a way of being arising from an absence of a sense that discloses an absence of the grounds that physiognomically materialise an experience of inability: without access to the relational grounds of such objectivities, how can they project? Without realisation, how can they sustain a hold on forms whose identity inhere in relational aspects that constitute modalities that they don't experience being constituted? Clearly, individuals who face such conditions are impaired in their capacity to contest labour market functions whose grounds remain unavailable. The interpersonal and associational grounds of properties, of meanings revealed via uses of space to inscribe such aspects, are key stakes of the social structure and this is why those with private wealth ensure they are positioned correctly to manifest aspects of objectivities that inhere in such processes. The privileging of private capital throughout education ensures those possessed of it have an institutional leverage denied those who are perceived to be "lucky to be there" precisely because of a logic arising from the exclusion of the poor. If differences of involvement are constituted, then what can we discern via such differences? What do differences of involvement manifest? What underlies these differences? What intelligibility can readers infer, because this is precisely what will occur in a labour market that is constituted, anonymously, via sign-reading operations that ignore the grounds of such distinctions? The ignoring of the grounds of such differences is part of the mode of operation of dominant groups who must materialise differences via modalities which use anonymity as a screen which is why the devalued undergo anonymous, dislocating processes in which they discover, via casual conversations, the nature of a barrier being inscribed via their dislocation: whilst they are talking privately, outside of institutional spheres, others are involved and objectified. The inscription of difference is a spatial process that materialises significances via ways of being situated and privately realised differences, rooted in the perception of differences physiognomically regenerated via such processes, constitute public differences that relate to differences of condition that are rooted in the recognition of distinctions inscribed via exposure to the interpersonal and spatial grounds of such forms. But, existing outside of an experience of involvements that arise from
recognitions which constitute such modalities, how can individuals exhibit properties that arise from the organising effects of recognitions which constitute ways of being-there, subject to such possibilities? Without access to the relational forms that constitute the sense of properties that inhere in involvements which inscribe a boundary between those provided with access to capacities that inhere in realisations which constitute capacities to bear the sense of forms arising from such conditions, individuals exist outside of a public fabric whose intelligibility arises from the recognition of such differences that become physiognomically regenerated as aspects of objectivity whose legibility inhere in the practice of such distinctions. In this sense, distinctions come to be lived via meanings inscribed via experiences of being-there arising from experiences of being-perceived to bear the sense of differences that physiognomically materialise such aspects as spatial differences whose form constitute the sense of properties experienced via differences of involvement which disclose the sense arising from experiences of being subject to such differences as ways of being situated, spatially. For those who aren't perceived to bear the sense of forms whose congruency arise from a proximity whose recognition physiognomically materialises a sense inscribed via existing in relation to such aspects, there is no access to anything publicly and their 'education' takes the form of purely private mediations, the one-to-one supervisory meetings that materialise the appearance of their 'education'. Supervision, in sociology, is just purely narcissistic because supervisors don't have to actually do anything beyond listen to supervisees construct a strategy concerned with the production of a representation because the appearance of an educational process reduces to the administered judgement of a text concerned with a project that the student has had to develop, outside of institutional relationships, in order to secure the finances to pay for access to the institutional relationships that constitute this possibility. It is a charade that narcissistically realises academics allowing them to feel significant. It is a charade that makes them feel significant and, via the relational forms that constitute the significance, they experience the capacity, they experience being able to supervise, so that the relational aspects that are constitutive of this possibility physiognomically materialise an experience of being that is appropriated via its disclosure in relation to the others. The experience of the aspects constitutive of the sense of the form arise, relationally, and are constituted via associations that involve little beyond being subject to the interpersonal disclosures that constitute such objectivities and yet these are publicly consequential distinctions. What people need is access to this constitutive medium but, if you look at the labour market, the dislocated labour of students, has no significance so that the educational process supposed to constitute capacities, doesn't, because most academics understand the fundamental forms of recognition, manifest in different experiences of being situated that CVs manifest so they can easily decipher the underlying significance constitutive of a student's trajectory, but, and this is very important, use, if necessary, a euphemised language of discrimination that misrecognises this reality that becomes possible only because of a mass system that manages the illusion of 'inclusion' whilst sustaining traditional privileges so that an ancient society can effortlessly reproduce its fundamental distinctions, transposed into what appear to be differences of capacity that are merely the effects of different ways of being situated, different experiences of presence constituted by different valences of
capital. Miscognition requires access so that the basis of institutional forms can be relationally constituted that are, nevertheless, discriminatory and eliminatory but allow these processes to occur as-if they are being materialised fairly. This is why work concerned with the institutional processing of the poor is so important because the reality of differences of trajectory and of different kinds of education needs to be understood. However, because of the private nature of the institutional processes constitutive of so much of the education that the poor undergo, it is very hard to manifest because the process they undergo is as invisible as it is discretionary. People can be made to endure processes that involvement them in nothing, that is, that involve no involvement in any relationally disclosive medium that constitutes recognised forms of objectivity merely because of a dislocation whose real interpersonal grounds, the perception of difference manifest via its actualisation, are merely perpetuated via such institutional-administrative processes that do little beyond manifest the sense of forms rooted in the relational basis of such hierarchies which extort significance whilst appearing to demand the insignificant. The point is that the materialisation of the appearance of competence is extorted via distances that appear to make necessary the mediation that constitutes the possibility of the extort of the significance that role-performance and competence reduce to amidst institutional relationships that have little reality beyond phone-calls and occasional meetings with a single individual, the supervisor, who can, effortlessly, simultaneously, do-nothing and feel satisfied by being realised in relation to the appearance of competence because this sense is physiognomically regenerated via the administrative relationships that students are forced to enter in order to satisfy the bureaucratic criteria that constitute the education available to them. It is a system that produces the objectification of academics irrespective of their actions. Negligence and incompetence are masked by a process that autonomously materialises the appearance of competence as an effect of the administrative artifacts that arise as an effect of the bureaucratic processing of the products of students' labour. The only thing this system does is reconstitute differences of value, and position, as what appear to be the sense of different properties and, thereby, different statutes of competence. The key issue is who is accessing the relational-spatial conditions of not merely attribution, but appropriation, of competence. What are the identity-conditions of these sensible forms so that some experience being actualised via forms that constitute capacities they responsively appropriate via being subject to administrative-bureaucratic acts that constitute the sense of forms they experience being constituted via the relationships via which such possibilities are enacted. The mark of fake processes, that bequeath junk credentials, is this extortion of the sense of properties via the use of an anonymous administrative process constituted via the space of positions, to autonomously constitute the sense of forms arising from access to abstracted, institutionally mediated, relationships that physiognomically materialise an experience of being competent whilst the supposed beneficiaries of the process access nothing beyond, at best, a one-off viva at the end of a solitary process that has not merely not situated them in any way but that has, because of these fundamentally constitutive relationships, merely regenerated the sense of properties that are effects of such processes. What is clear is that the forms of relationship arise from distances and from significances which they reproduce whilst transposing into the sense of forms
whose attribution require the instantiation of such aspect as constitutive of objectivities reproduced via such processes. This is why the working classes experience of education and of institutional agents is so characteristic of the sense they bear as an effect of experiencing being subject to such mediations. When educational processes don't involve initiation into the relational basis of properties whose sense inhere in the closures constitutive of the exclusivity that constitutes their significance, when what is the point? The reality is manifest when individuals face a labour market whose fundamental criterial forms they cannot access because of distinctions that education itself reproduces. In what sense can education offer anything to the devalued? All it does is reproduce their experience of the fundamental interpersonal basis of aspects that constitute their reality. They experience their insignificance, the interpersonal grounds of their negation, via the contempt masked via the fake magnanimity characteristic of narcissistic institutional processes in which institutional agents must materialise the appearance of a function that obscures the reality of their own class-based dispositions. What this means is that the interpersonal grounds of objectivities whose form inhere in such processes are unavailable. Individuals are judged via private relationships in which they exist outside of access to the grounds of properties acquired via realisations born of recognitions which situate them in relation to the relational basis of sense incorporated via access to such conditions which constitute such aspects and this then perpetuates an objectivity recognised by other institutional agents using criteria constituted via the informal practice of such distinctions. Selection criteria operate with a shrewd understanding of the distinctions being operationalised as conditions which constitute required intentional states in those valued. Aren't those who are not selected for teaching merely experiencing the rearticulation, via different institutional mediations, of a way of being rooted in the recognition of such a difference generally? In other words, aren't they merely being subject to the same conditions constitutive of their unemployment via institutional mediations supposed to address such a condition? Aren't they experiencing a 'there' constituted via a way of being born of the same fundamental mediations? It is because the shape of dispositions arise from processes of development arising via realisations that physiognomically materialise aspects arising as adaptive responses to contextualising disclosures that constitute a fabric whose sense is incorporated via experiences of being subject to such processes that neurophysiological mechanisms are constituted via a relation of conditioning similar to that described by Bourdieu:

The relation between habitus and field...is a relation of conditioning: the field structures the habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field...it is relation of knowledge or cognitive construction. Habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one's energy...the relation of knowledge depends on the relation of conditioning that precedes it and fashions the structures of the habitus. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127)

This is why those who are not recognised, those who are not involved, appear to eliminate themselves via an understanding of the field that, whilst an effect of their relation to the field and their lack of value within it, transfigures into an absence of capital required to contest the field as an effect of their positioning within it which merely rearticulates this absence by transmuting it into what appears to be a lack of
competence. Because understanding arises from conditioning, from involvements in relation to disclosures that physiognomically materialise forms that responsively realise individuals in relation to the sense of forms incorporated which constitute neurophysiological structures, shapes arising via their actualisation, that constitute dispositions arising from experiencing a 'there' via being subject to its constitutive mediations, co-presence is a key medium. Because neurophysiological structures are not absorbed as intentional contents, as rules, representationally, but via absorption in a fabric whose medium is co-presence, the absence of recognition, the absence of disclosure, the absence of involvement leaves individuals feeling the disoriented, insecurity described by "SHE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT SHE KNOWS". Not knowing what you know is part of the stupefaction of educational processes devoid of contextualizing actualization, the "contact time on the PhD is so poor. I have become quite numb", individuals undergo a progressive destructuring of their dispositions as an effect of the absence of realisation, facing a de-realisation whose progressive nature leaves individuals, clearly, with a sense of knowing nothing: inability is reproduced via relationships that, nevertheless, validate those who associate their names with the administration of the labour of the victims of such processes in order to materialise the appearance of labour processes that consist of little. What aspects of the social structure are actually being constituted via such mediations? Whilst the veil of the appearance of institutional processes can be effortlessly materialised via anonymous bureaucratic relationships, real issues to do with the actual aspects individuals experience via being subject to such processes are ignored because the invisibility of such processes is ensured via the relational processes that constitute the insignificance and non-viability of those subject to them. Significances are effects of involvements in disclosures arising from the recognition of differences which transfigure into distances which inhere in the constitution of such forms. Where some face the authenticity of forms of personhood replete with subject-hood, the actualisation of representational forms of intentionality rooted in the mutual envelopment of spatial forms that disclose possibilities appropriated via being subject to the recognitions which constitute such contextualising and realising aspects, others face the unrealisation of a destructuring that perpetuates forms of life rooted in an insignificance that is merely transfigured into negation via an inability to elicit recognition which inscribes and sediments such an objectivity via the perpetuation of differences that inhere in subjection to such aspects. Questions concerning personhood and social existence require rooting in the emergence of actuality as a contested domain in which the valued obscure the processes that constitute them visibly, publicly, at the expense of those negated. What aspects of the social structure are such processes constituting and what aspects of the structure are people experiencing via being subject to the restricted sphere of possibility arising from excess competition? Where education needs to rescue the devalued from invisibility, from an experience of insignificance that transfigures into an inability to access public, relational, forms that subtend resource-access, and where it needs to embed individuals in recognised forms of public practice, displace the nothingness of devaluation, providing a structure to existence and embedding in the wage form, it clearly cannot serve such a function because of the use of such privileged forms to distinguish the elite from the also-rans who have a 'right' to education that perpetuates forms of dislocation because it
arises from them. The form of involvement is constitutive of the sense of forms that function as both objectifications and sources of objectivisation. The perception of differences is manifest via differences of treatment which transpose into different forms of relationship, that is relationships that disclose differences of form, that materialise differences in objectivity, different ways of being situated. Clearly, the perception of differences transposes into different forms of involvement affecting how individuals experience being situated. Those selected accede to a purposive relation to being-somewhere, they experience spatial and relational aspects born of disclosures that realise them, over time, in relation to interpersonal aspects that contextualise and realise them so that they experience possibilities and the disclosure of a horizon that is actually personal, consisting of personal aspects, they accede to functional states whose conditions are satisfied via being subject to such processes, whilst the devalued are living the lives of the unemployed, unable to accede to a purposive relation to their own self-generated intellectual life because they cannot accede to relational forms that realise them. In order to accede to a purposive relation to one’s intellectual life, one would need to elicit recognition and solicit possibilities rooted in involvement, one would need an opportunity to act so that one could envisage a final goal or aim, in order to experience such possibilities, one would need to feel assured of being-able-to-show up as a worthy interlocutor in order for the mediations which constitute such possibilities to obtain and yet, clearly, for some, these conditions are not satisfied, leaving them enduring an insecurity that haunts their projection. Enduring such conditions, how could they present themselves appropriately at interview? When they experience the manifestation of their difference as significant, via non-involvement in spheres that require invitation, then how could they possess any confidence in a capacity to project via forms whose interpersonal grounds are clearly absent? Without access to a sphere of involvement you take your identity from the grounds constitutive of it. If you experience reduction to a form of life born of the circumscriptions of differences whose recognition disclose forms manifest via such modalities then you will experience the inscription and sedimentation of forms physiognomically regenerated via subjection to the spatial and temporal processes that constitute such aspects. If you are perceived to be insignificant and discrepant, that you don't exhibit properties which inhere in relational states you cannot access, then you will bear the sense of this inscribed via subjection to this form of division. These aspects, the sense of these forms, are inscribed via their physiognomic materialisation as part of forms of involvement in relational processes that constitute such differences as immediately perceivable aspects of the topography of the interpersonal landscape and the transitivities of sense that subdend its actualisation. Being able to manifest appropriate forms, coming across appropriately, involves more than individual effort, there are conditions which must be satisfied for an individual to project via realisations that manifest forms that inhere in relational states: coming across poorly at interviews and in institutional space, involves the ontology of human presence and its economic underpinnings. How individuals appear involves meanings sedimented via their inscription in forms that inhere in the reality whose sense are immanent to the forms so that individuals face discriminations, limitations of their capacities, cognitive deficits, because of how they are perceived, how they are deprived of the interpersonal conditions required to access intentional states that
inhere in interpersonal conditions rooted in value. Value is extorted via relationships that condemn others to the misery of a condition they are powerless to escape, functioning as sources of narcissistic supply within channels that validate employees, autonomously constituting forms and experiences that involve them in what remains unavailable to students. The sensible moments of meanings are aspects of interactions that constitute the ready-to-hand nature of the meaning as part of how one experiences one’s presence being-realised, required, via the sense of disclosures which make available such aspects as immanent forms of one’s presence. This is why, if certain conditions are satisfied, one can effortlessly accede to a poise arising from the flow of the appropriation of forms whose synchronisation arise from experiences of being subject to such modalities. A sense of the appropriate, required, response arises from participation in involvements that disclose such a possibility as ready-to-hand, available, via being situated in relation to such aspects. Sensible moments are dimensions of a referential totality arising from experiencing being part-of-relational processes that disclose such possibilities. Accession to meaning, and to capacity, arises via mediations which connect individuals, embroil them, in a world of forms that infuse existence with meaning. A context of codetermining relations disclose a horizon that orients individuals who appropriate being via capacities for sense that arise from experiences of being subject to such relational forms. The capacity to intuit the appropriate response, the capacity to instantiate, and thereby manifest, the appropriate response, and, over time, incorporate forms that sediment meanings arising from being subject to such processes, is an effect of being-there, of being situated appropriately, being involved, being recognised and oriented by sensible moments as aspects of entry to a distinct sphere or world. Clearly, institutional space can be surreptitiously used to institute distinctions, differences of involvement, that constitute the sense of properties that inhere in experiencing being subject to such modalities. Development is an effect of belonging because sense inheres in the practice of differences whose cognitive reach are everywhere manifest. What needs to be attended to, are the conditions required for individuals to develop and assess policies supposed to address deficits for their satisfaction of such conditions. Capacities are acquired by experiences of their requirement that constitute forms attuned via the synchronising direction of involvement in disclosures that tacitly summon such modalities as experiences of being-there so that co-presence is part of a fabric arising from recognitions which constitute such aspects. Clearly, meanings arise via relationships that constitute the requirement of the form one experiences being responsively actualised via the relational aspects which constitute the meaning of being-there. There is a necessity to meanings that also constitute a sense of purpose rooted in experiences of being situated in relation to the involvements that disclose their form as available aspects of one’s being-for-others. It is the contextualisation of forms whose disclosure arise from relational processes that constitute reasons for being that physiognomically materialise an experience of the necessity of the form as a purposive state which is why lower class students experience much of their dislocated attempts at intellectual self-projection as being meaningless. Without embedding they experience the senseless of an existence without necessity, without reason, and this experience of disorientation is an effect of distances that extort the sense of forms in relation to practices that the distances
support. Whilst the theoreticisist de-realisation characteristic of the generation of reference devoid of context satisfies the performative conditions constitutive of academic competence, those who don't experience being situated via disclosures that subtend the sense of such forms experience caesura, antipathy and malaise. They feel they learn nothing and know nothing. Because structures are absorbed not as rules via realisations that constitute the shape of forms arising via developmental mediations arising from adaptive responses, a context, a 'there' constituted via circumstantial aspects whose disclosure constitute the sense inscribed via experiences of being subject to such processes, the absence of co-presence, the absence of access to such conditions, cognitively impairs individuals who undergo, rather than the shaping of dispositions which are objectified via the manifestation of access to such conditions, the destructuring of their dispositions because the dispositions the process is supposed to elicit are not grounded in anything. Because the capacity to instantiate forms arises from a sense physiognomically materialized via absorption in the realisations of forms which recognition discloses as an aspect of being-situated via such contextualizing mediations, capacities arise via instantiations rooted in the embedding of forms that inscribe sense incorporated via experiencing being subject of such possibilities. The perception of discrepancy by institutional agents who control access to the conditions constitutive of objectification, is merely physiognomically regenerated as an aspect of the social value of the individuals who experience being positioned so that they cannot think appropriately about the process they have undergone because they have not been realised appropriately because they are not perceived to be appropriate interlocutors. As an individual, you are trapped by the nature of the inter-relational (not interpersonal) nature of a process in which possibilities relate to abstracted institutional relationships which ensure that you cannot, anymore, directly intervene in your destiny, than you can solicit engagement because what possibilities exist relate to the administrative processes that constitute an objectivity that you are powerless to affect. Your sphere of action is reduced to form-filling and then solitary labour relating to the satisfaction of administrative criteria concerned with the format-regulations governing your production of forms that materialise the appearance of processes that are instituted with little more than the cursory charade required to obscure a reality that is abstractly realised via administrative-bureaucratic processes. Any possibilities for contact, engagement, realisation, any access to forms of actualisation and representational forms of intentionality based in exclusive forms that manifest a use of space made available via recognition of difference, relate to social value and this is why the education system operates, as Bourdieu describes as:

...an objectivated classification algorithm. It distributes the individuals offered up to it into classes that are as internally homogenous and as externally heterogeneous as possible with respect to a number of fundamental criteria. Inasmuch as it tends to establish the greatest possible distance between highly homogeneous classes, it contributes to reproducing and legitimating the ensemble of distances that, at any given time, constitute social structure. (Bourdieu 1996: 139)

Without access to the interpersonal conditions which disclose capacities that inhere in realisations arising from contextualisation, it is hardly surprising that individuals
face the destructuring of a de-realisation arising from the absence of any opportunity to engage their faculties via mediations that absorb them such that they appropriate forms commanded via such moments and accede to a sense of capacity and knowledgeability, a practiced certainty, that is an effect of a security that is a status-effect of social structures, of forms of significance that transpose worth into capacity. Competition effaces the devalued who experience an absence of access to the conditions required to experience capacities that inhere in contextualising mediations that become all-the-more unavailable the more available education becomes to obscure the unavailability of the real conditions of attribution of recognised forms of social existence. Recognised forms of social existence inhere in the practice of closures that constitute the positive visibility of such forms which constitute modalities, capacities for reference that inhere in the sense physiognomically materialised via exposure to a boundary that is spatially materialised via different forms of involvement that disclose a fabric whose sense is experienced via being subject to the reality of such differences. This is what selection criteria recognise: the difference between those whose educational career manifests recognitions which position them in relation to involvements born of realisation that constitute properties whose sense inhere in such relational conditions and those whose education is devoid of such possibilities because these differences relate to forms of value that the process, not merely, makes legible but constitutes as actual differences physiognomically materialised, sedimented, and incorporated, via individuals who bear the sense of such differences as ways of being that inhere in exposure to an institutional fabric constituted via the recognition and disclosure of such differences. It is very important to recognise that what access there is, that the 'there' they experience being available, is an effect of private judgements that concern an objectivity that the process perpetuates by not providing access to the real grounds of recognised forms of social existence: employment. What is perceived as manifesting competence in the labour market is access to the employment form and yet, clearly, this is only conditionally available which means that the conditions of satisfaction of the attribution of intentional states which require involvement in relational forms that disclose such possibilities are unavailable which explains why such individuals experience themselves as unable, as this person described, "SHE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT SHE KNOWS". We discover ourselves capable of bearing the sense of forms via involvement in contexts that, relationally, disclose such possibilities, so that we experience an assurance, a certainty, arising from the realisation of forms which constitute such possibilities as aspects of our being-for-others so that we experience the actualisation of forms whose sense inhere in their physiognomic materialisation. The problem with an education that reduces to the abstracted mediation of form-filling and the charade of one-to-one meetings that materialise the appearance of a process where nothing beyond self-education exists is that individuals are subject to the same judgements concerned with the sense of properties that inhere in the divisions they have turned to education to escape. Clearly, the same judgements are made about individuals whose discrepancy is physiognomically regenerated via subjection to processes that manifest differences arising from the perception of such differences. The forms of spatial involvement arising from perception of such differences physiognomically regenerates the sense of differences in objectivity that relate to the constitution of
boundaries whose disclosure materialise a sense that manifests forms that are consequential because they are indicative of judgements which materialise the reality that creates the shapes, the forms, that inhere in relationships which circumscribe differences of possibility whose actualisation constitute capacities that inhere in subjection to modalities disclosed via such processes. Those involved are assured of differences they experience being materialised so that they accede to capacities for reference and instantiation arising from capacities for intuition that inhere in co-presence and in involvement in a circumscribed sphere of legitimate encounter constituted via recognition and accession to space disclosed via such mediations, whereas others lack access to an interpersonally disclose fabric that allows them to absorb neurophysiological structures that inhere in dispositions whose shape arise from disclosures which realise such forms so that they accede to a way of being inscribed in recognitions which constitute such modalities. The paradox is that one is driven to an abstracted vocabulary in order to attempt to represent something that is debilitating but when individuals face processes that consist of absences of relation, provision, involvement how do you describe the state arising from such conditions? If negation operates via the constitution of absence, the nothing experienced via being arising from the absence of the disclosure of a 'there' that might constitute developmental mediations, then how do you represent this? How individuals appear, the sense they bear, is not a purely individuated phenomena, it concerns the sense sedimented via exposure to forms that constitute the background from which their way of being issues. Those who are perceived to be discrepant, who are not invited to teach, exhibit properties, arising from a dislocation that is part of the unavailability of the grounds of recognised forms of objectivity, whose symbolic efficacy arise from the exclusivity of their distribution, ensuring that there is no space disclosed via forms that constitute them viably and they face a rearticulation, a reproduction, of the same form of life that they turned to education to escape. The sense individuals' bear is not a purely individuated phenomenon because self-regulation is an effect of capacities that inhere in relational processes. Those who are recognised, access the disclosure of a fabric constituted via being subject to relational processes that constitute collective forms of intentionality, they experience being circumscribed via conditions which satisfy possibilities that inhere in the physiognomic materialisation of such forms. Those who are perceived to be discrepant face a barrier arising from ways of being that physiognomically materialise an absence they experience being part of the way they exist spatially: without involvement how can they constitute themselves? How can they regulate themselves? This absence of disclosure to forms which physiognomically materialise a sense experienced via being subject to such processes is why those who exist outside of such objectifying relational processes, who face the de-realisation of a status that precludes access to the actualisation of recognised forms of public existence, find it inconceivable, unimaginable, that they might ever be capable of carrying-off an academic role because the conditions which satisfy such intentional possibilities are unavailable and, existing outside of the relational processes that constitute the conditions which satisfy such possibilities, they have no way to responsively absorb forms via experiences of their realisation that actualise ways of being that physiognomically materialise a sense constitutive of neurophysiological structures that inhere in experiences of being situated via such
aspects. You are, essentially, trying to dream your way to competence without access to any of the conditions which constitute capacities born of a projection that realises you in relation to aspects whose disclosure sustain a hold on forms you experience being realised in relation to via experiences of embedding in a context that elicits modalities whose relational processes constitute you publicly. Little wonder lower class students find the idea of being competent unimaginable. It becomes inconceivable that you might be competent because you don't experience situations in which you experience the manifestation of aspects whose public attribution constitute such possibilities. The idea of being able to 'carry off' a role and manifest the appearance of forms that relate to disclosures which constitute adaptive responses that physiognomically materialise the substrate of sense absorbed via experiences of being-realised in relation to such moments becomes inconceivable showing that neurophysiological structures are constituted not as intentional contents but via responses to a fabric whose interpersonal constitution discloses capacities for cognition whose conditions of satisfaction inhere in belonging, so that issues concerned with status and personhood have to be prominent aspects of any concern to grant people access to the possibilities of their humanity. Without involvement there is no access to the constitutive grounds of forms whose shapes are absorbed via realisations that constitute a sense appropriated via ways of being-situated by contextualising aspects that constitute the 'there' that being is experienced via. The barriers inhere in recognitions which disclose different ways of being-there. Without the same relationships of involvement, without the same forms arising from recognitions which disclose circumstantial aspects that are common to an aggregate, space is not the same and so ways of being-there are not common and different categories do not experience the same reality, and, consequentially, do not appear to exhibit the same properties. Without access to a shared sphere relating to practices that direct labour and constitute the individual in relation to a shared context, then ways of being will never be the same and selection processes will merely recognise distinctions whose meanings are sedimented via differences of treatment and contextualisation that constitute the sense of different properties that inhere in the reproduction of differences of status that relate to differences of value that transfigure different qualities of recognition into spatial analogues arising from such disclosures which constitute the sense of differences of quality that appear to inhere in the expressivity of individuals who have absorbed such meanings via being subject to their physiognomic materialisation. Clearly, the barriers to employment have highly attenuated genesis arising from the complex processes of institutional legitimation that economically dominant groups can use to transmute income into experiential forms that constitute their essential superiority. The shapes, the aspects of physiognomy, that arise within the social structure, are effects of the physiognomic materialisation of differences that relate to different ways of being situated, different ways of being involved in a heterarchic reality composed of fields constituted via closures. If the forms that constitute the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states relate to ways of being situated, relationally, that relate to recognitions which disclose such possibilities, then how can individuals who are not involved experience the sense of forms appropriated via being subject to such mediations? How can they be subject to intentional states whose identity relate to
ways of being relationally situated and realised so that they discover themselves capable of instantiating forms via a projection arising from their interpersonal realisation? How can individuals be capable of self-referential identifications when the interpersonal grounds of such objectivities, of such intentional states, or neurophysiological structures, remain unavailable? The devalued undergo a destructuring of the dispositions education is supposed to elicit because they don't experience involvements that realise them in relation to dispositions which require recognition, and realisation, so that they exhibit the effects of distinctions physiognomically regenerated via the recognition of differences of status that constitute some viably via recognitions which disclose such modalities, whilst others face the destructuring of their existence arising from the perception of a difference the organisation of the education merely perpetuates because its organisation concerns privately acquired forms of capital whose institutional grounds remain part of a contestation whose effacement is part of the charade of mass higher education. Once differences are physiognomically materialised, and temporally sustained, with the valued experiencing a continuous realisation that sustains an authority whose sense they bear as an effect of such modalities, then the devalued cannot appear cogently, except negatively, because the physiognomic materialisation of meanings sedimented via exposure to the interpersonal grounds of differences, are essential aspects of the culture of higher education. The revelation of meanings experienced via subjection to the disclosure of such differences, leads to what appear to be differences of attitude that are effects of exposure to meanings that are physiognomically materialised via recognitions which reconstitute the sense of forms inscribed via such processes. If the forms of involvement, if recognitions which disclose possibilities experienced via being subject to such modalities, are unavailable, then those subject to the reconstitution of an absence whose political efficacy arises from meanings inscribed via being subject to such differences, are not able to exhibit properties whose conditions of attribution remain unavailable, ensuring that they remain enmired in the sense of an absence whose grounds arise from the practice of such distinctions via recognitions interpersonally constituted via such processes. Instead of deficits being addressed, they are constituted by relative differences in trajectory and differences of treatment that make legible differences in uncodified, embodied, forms incorporated via subjection to experiences of the recognition of such differences which disclose such aspects that orient and render sensible a reality experienced via being subject to such processes. How individuals are perceived is manifest in how they are situated which is itself a manifestative, constitutive, aspect of the disclosure of forms which materialise not merely legible differences, but ways of being-there. A way of being projects its structural analogue spatially, intuitively classifying others in relation to aspects that constitute compatibility and congruity. A key aspect of educational space is congruity of uncodified forms that arise from private access to the grounds of forms incorporated via a natal and intimate relation to others who incarnate aspects incorporated via the repeated sedimentation of realisations that constitute a presence informed via expressivities that manifest an existential perspective radiated via its crystallisation. A key consideration of selection is congruity because congruity only arises from symmetries arising from shared trajectory so that those selected are capable of physiognomically regenerating the expressivity of their interlocutors. It is worth
remembering that neurophysiological mechanisms arise from a responsiveness arising from experiences of being realised, situationally, so that the contextualisation of individuals is a key aspect of the development of dispositions rooted in such experiences. This is why congruity is such a key aspect of selection. What is clear, however, is that how individuals experience being situated is an effect of recognitions which physiognomically materialise the sense of a barrier that inscribes differences of objectivity manifest via processes which make legible such differences as part of the constitution of differences whose meaning are inscribed via being subject to the interpersonal and spatial grounds of such distinctions. A fundamental aspect of the way resources are interpersonally constituted is via recognitions which are part of the contestation that subtends their physiognomic materialisation. In order to project successfully one needs to experience recognitions which disclose forms that are physiognomically materialised via attendance and co-presence so that expressivity is always tacitly referential, manifesting forms that subtend capacities that inhere in experiencing being subject to such sources of actualisation. This is part of the contestation of resources that are relationally constituted so that one needs to elicit recognition, via the manifestation of forms that are incorporated via the realisation of their recognition, in order to exhibit what are effects of a biography characterised by embedding: modalities that are absent for the working class who don't access realisation because of their devaluation, which is, in turn, perceived, via their expressivity, as a manifestation of intentional attributes, rather than as being an effect of the interpersonal conditions, the cultural conditions, that they face. What arises from ways of being-realised appear to be aspects of intentionality because that is an effect of how we experience being in the world. In other words, expressivity is always value-oriented because it arises from an objective order that the sense of its referentiality inheres in and human capacities arise via our embedding in a global sphere that we experience being reciprocally constituted as part of our being-in-the-world. Being-perceived, subjects individuals, institutionally, to circumscriptions which determine meanings they experience being via such processes and the disclosure of differences constitutes ways of being-there arising from relations that render intelligible aspects that constitute such objectivities: it is not accidental that these two individuals 'met' and that their shared objectivity constituted a shared condition transposed into an epistemic relation rooted in this way of being-realised. Notice how a force, a process, is constituted as responsible for ignorance: "Yesterday I met a woman in uni, asked what it was that made her (and me by implication in the later 'we') not know": being ignorant is understood to emerge from an underlying process of self-legibility, of objectivity: how is the distinction between them, and "a few of our 'colleagues'" who knew, being instituted. When universities ask for "Verification of effective teaching experience", requiring testimonials, that is, officialised forms, involving the institutional production of such documents, to say nothing of descriptions of courses taught and statements concerned with one's teaching philosophy as well as evidence of inclusive practice and awareness of issues concerned with multiculturalism, it is clear how discriminatory the grounds of these distinctions are. Satisfaction of such criteria requires access to relational states and institutional conditions that lead to the production of officialised traces of involvement that are clearly unavailable to certain categories. Those from devalued groups are unlikely to be able to satisfy
such criteria which relate to forms of institutional embedding and engagement that bequeath institutional traces, the officialised forms, that represent an objectivity arising from forms of objectivisation that are uncharacteristic of the nature of the institutional processing characteristic of the social processes that constitute their social position and their legibility. Moreover, the dispossessed, through trajectories that usually involve little involvement and a great deal of dislocation, have, as an effect of the ways they experience their significance being realised, little hope of comprehending the nature of the forms of objectification, nor their institutional roots, that might result in progression or involvement because the way they experience their significance being-realised generally precludes the disclosure of a horizon within which they understand, consciously, their exclusion until after-the-fact when it is too late for them to address their condition. As an effect of the nature of the institutional mediations that constitute their objectivity, the poor have little formal understanding of how their condition is realised, beyond a cynicism as vague as their exclusion is absolute. Without understanding forms of objectification and their relational institutional basis, how can they project? How, from outside of the institutional grounds of possibility, can they realise how to accede to recognised forms of objectivity? Without access to the institutional grounds of forms of objectification, how can they hope? How can they establish the project of acceding to forms of involvement that presume institutional conditions that the meaning of their being precludes because of the way they experience it being institutionally materialised? Evidence of teaching effectiveness and other such forms require an engagement that bequeaths bureaucratised artefacts that require an institutional labour, arising from the engagement characteristic of valuation, that is uncharacteristic of the educational processing the poor undergo, which reduce them to form-filling in order to mediate, for academics, access to the mediations that materialise the appearance of a function devoid of actuality. Look at the following criteria from a post at Leeds University: "Experience of relevant design research and Human-Centered Design methods and tools (e.g. personas; co-creation workshops). Experience of interacting with end users and stakeholders in a research context". "Evidence of generation of high quality research (e.g. academic papers, conference papers)". "Evidence of qualitative data analysis and presenting the outcomes of data analysis using Persona and journey maps". "Excellent written, visual and oral and communication skills, especially writing and presenting for academic and professional audiences". A significant issue, here, concerns those from economically distant regions of space, away from the metropolitan centres that might offer vehicles of content that might be perceived to bear the sense of "Experience of interacting with end users and stakeholders in a research context", a criteria that concerns the institutionalisation of forms. If someone studied a non-institutionalised, non-literate culture, based in informal spaces, how would one satisfy such criteria? This is a problem endemic to the social sciences which manifest a continuous bias towards the distinction of those who constitute the sense of such forms via closures, exclusively. There is a continuous presupposition of valued forms: that is, of middle class culture, that arises from the elevation of the cognitive forms of those who establish the vehicles of such possibilities via their constitution of them, via exclusionary forms that are only too apparent in such criteria. The incarnational and unreflective forms that subtend the institution of such a culture
are only too apparent throughout the testimonies we have looked at. The thing to notice is that these criteria relate to forms of institutional involvement that their symbolisation arises from. What needs to be recognised is that the symbolisation of the competence, its signification, relates to forms of institutional practice that function as the satisfaction conditions of the competence yet, for most of us, our education was solitary, involving nothing beyond privatised projection and solitary labour, the products of which were then administrated in order to produce bureaucratic artefacts that materialised the appearance of a process that was assumed to be occurring by the institutional agents that did the administrative labour. The absence of contact manifests a process that had been commandeered by the institutional agents who would offer to us the 'opportunity' to fill in forms and then teach ourselves to produce documents whose administration would generate administrative artefacts that constituted a bureaucratic process that, in turn, constituted our 'education'. It was a process constituted purely via an exclusion which constituted the necessity of making the effort to mediate the process available for those who had been educationally tracked into it. The reason labour market criteria function in terms of such forms of institutional objectivity is because the forms of involvement constitute the conditions of satisfaction of the intentional states that the involvement is accepted as being the vehicle of. The problem is that these forms of involvement are not universal and they do not characterise all educational processes. What you need to look at when considering an educational process is “what forms of objectivity am I going to access via this and in relation to what public field will those forms make me eligible to participate?” because the labour market operates in terms of exclusive forms of involvement arising from closures that constitute the significance of the objectivity. Nothing else counts in the labour market which means that the type of education many undergo is completely worthless. The educational processes do not signify the labour that students do because it is, even within the institutional relationships that refract the appearance of the objectivity of the process and institutional value, or capital, thereby, invisible because it does not arise from institutional-relational forms that elicit, and thereby constitute, its form so that the involvement guarantees intentional states because it is a vehicle of their actualisation. Academics are able to refract the appearance of their function merely by association and once those relationships are officialised and crystallised, nothing further is required, provided the students work to produce the symbolic forms that materialise the appearance of a process. Academics do very little beyond transact administrative artefacts that relate to the institutional objectivity, the social value, of students, because the appearance of a process is materialised via the bureaucratic relationships that surround the administration of the products of student labour. For the poor, there is no mediation, instead, there is a process that produces objectifying institutional-bureaucratic artefacts that function as sources of value and sources of realisation for academics: they get to be able to talk about themselves as subjects of such processes because the relationships that subtend all of this realise them in relation to institutionally consequential aspects. There is no mediation, no connection, no institutional embedding, merely the refraction of a process via abstracted relationships that materialise aspects, forms of objectivity, that are part of the functioning of these institutional fields as veiled forms of accumulation and dispossession that provide institutional agents with forms
of objectivity, often, which bear no resemblance to the reality because it is all done via a logic of negation, everyone doing what they do as if they are not doing it. Being able to satisfy selection criteria requires not merely institutional embedding, so that one experiences being subject to possibilities, but, also, a capacity to solicit the engagement constitutive of the institutional labour that generates the artefacts that become usable aspects of value, forms of capital, that require the engagement, arising from experiencing being socially valued, that produce the required bureaucratised forms, materially produced, that allow one to be actually, physically, capable of attaching the required documents to be able to complete an application which will not result in emails saying that "your application cannot be considered because it is not complete". Accession to representational forms of intentionality requires a whole relational substrate that constitute possibilities realised via actualisation that are unavailable to the devalued who experience an anonymous, generic, process that allows an elite to extort sources of value, income and, more significantly, forms of significance they experience being physiognomically materialised that constitute precisely what the poor are denied: accession to representational forms of intentionality that allow them to depict themselves, objectively, as subjects of particular forms of objectivity that presume this background. Capacity is at the heart of dispossession which is why devaluation leads individuals dispossessed of initiative, of the very sense of their possession of abilities. Even when they are 'in' education, they remain outside of the relational basis of the forms of objectification that count in the labour market because credentials are merely part of the financing of the educational field and are, thereby, generic. Hence the massive extension in their availability to the poor once the poor have been constituted as a resource that can be used to finance such fields that operate on the fallacy that those who mediate access to public fields will mediate access. Moreover, from outside of the relational grounds that constitute the forms of objectification that count in the labour market, how could the poor make informed choices and decide on a possible course? When pathways relate to forms of objectification that are exclusive, operating with an implied, tacit, distinction between those who are allowed to purchase credentials in order to materialise the appearance of a public system and those who are products of private channels of legitimation that 'public' space is used to constitute, how can the poor 'see' a way forward? This is why, for the working class, "to families as well as students, the school system increasingly seems like a mirage, the source of an immense, collective disappointment, a promised land which, like the horizon, recedes as one moves toward it" (Bourdieu 2000b: 423). When labor market access, and access to recognized forms of social existence, is so hopelessly mediated via meanings arising from positional aspects that locate individuals as subjects of particular forms of objectivity that cohere over time and space, then we can see that the capacity of the working class to mediate access becomes ever more complex, leading to forms of internal defeat far more devastating than in previous historical times, generating new forms of pathology of the self, maladies of being itself arising from the contested nature of difference in an age of rapid and continuous extension of inequality. I had to publish my PhD before I received a single invitation to speak and such criteria close-off labour market access to these relational states and, moreover, the two academics that I know have done nothing to help me satisfy these criteria,
so, really, how are those outside of channels of legitimation supposed to access such forms? The devalued exist outside of the institutional and interpersonal conditions that constitute such forms. One institution uses the following criteria: "Preference will be given to regional candidates located proximally as well as those candidates with prior university level teaching experience". Notice the stipulation of "university level teaching experience": in a system in which, clearly, some do PhDs without being privy to teaching because of the over-supply of graduates, this is highly discriminatory. One Institution uses the following criteria: “Do you have a Master’s degree plus 18 semester credit hours of graduate-level Sociology?” In the UK, where all levels of postgraduate education are conditional for their value on discretionary forms, like teaching experience, someone from an ex-industrial area, from a non-literate community, would not be able to get this experience because of the worthlessness of their credentials. In a society like the UK, whose institutions are full of overseas students who can finance multiple masters degrees, a Masters degree in Sociology is absolutely worthless and whilst some are able to use postgraduate education as a means of access to such experience, others merely struggle to finance an anonymous and, largely, contactless process. If you are from a non-literate community how do you accede to a public form of practice in relation to literate forms? If having a PhD is worthless and doesn’t guarantee such opportunities, which is the distinction being instituted via this boundary, then how would someone access such experience? UK institutions are full of fee-paying postgraduates who need to be supported because they bring revenue to the institutions, giving them leverage and cultural traction, the poor, throughout their process are marginalized, so how could an individual, facing the conditions of a generic, anonymous, contactless administrative charade, elicit recognition and solicit the engagement required to spring to mind when departmental teaching is being allocated? Those who know about the temporary lectureships are those recognized as worthy of knowing, who need to know because a demand can be constituted because it can be satisfied as part of processes of the recognition of entitlements that disclose the very conditions which satisfy the intention to teach and involvement in such a sphere of public existence materializes conditions which constitute capacities for self-attribution that inhere in assurance of being-perceived legitimately that arises from experiencing being subject to such conditions. In other words, the disposition to seek involvement requires such a modality, for the poor, they experience the unavailability of the relational conditions which constitute the grounds from which intentions to participate arise. How could one ascribe properties to oneself whose identity inhere in relational forms that one does not access? What is worse, how could one evidence such possibilities as actualities of one’s person when one doesn't access the interpersonal grounds of such publicly ascribed aspects? It is because these differences are instituted that such criteria are used to select those who incarnate the sense of forms inscribed via recognitions which disclose such modalities as experiences of being capable born of subjection to such relational mediations. But, when institutions privilege fee-paying students, the poor have no leverage and may only discover the institution of the distinction via chance conversations precisely because their educational process is bereft of embedding or contextualising mediations. What it is important to note, is that these people have not been privy to the details of the realisation of differences that inhere in
involvements that presume recognition of properties that themselves inhere in the realisations that physiognomically materialise the forms perceived as aspects of the organisation of such differences, in ways of being-there that constitute meanings inscribed via subjection to forms whose realisation constitute capacities for projection that inhere in the realisation of experiencing being situated via such disclosures so that they become able to instantiate forms as an effect of being-perceived to manifest aspects that are effects of positioning. Those who aren't involved are not privy to the data and, moreover, are not subject to aspects of presence that constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to involvement in a fabric that constitutes a level of behavioural actualisation that compose aspects of physiognomy that encompass presence and, via the way meanings are inscribed via the disclosures that constitute presence, determine conditions of compatibility that are perceived to be intentional. We might ask, what is the practice of such distinctions really rooted in? It is because vision is inscribed via a sense of such forms and because perception contains an intuitively evaluative component arising from the way such differences are constituted via a dialectic of recognition rooted in the practice of such differences, that such individuals endure exclusion from the interpersonal grounds of intentional forms so that their educational process materialises, not their ability to satisfy conditions constitutive of selection, but the appearance of the absence of required 'experiences'. When selecting colleagues, academics act as if they have a shrewd practical awareness of the necessity of the relational conditions which satisfy intentional forms they perceive as being guaranteed by the recognitions which disclose access to such grounds, yet these are denied to some, and these constitute barriers that the devalued face as aspects of their negotiation of a reality imposed via the recognition of the effects of such processes. The underlying organisation arises from the perception of differences which constitute schema whose disclosure materialise the grounds of forms incorporated via subjection to being-perceived to bear the sense of meanings sedimented via subjection to such conditions of existence so that some can neither satisfy selection criteria (be perceived as competent via anonymous administrative processes that don't involve co-presence) nor experience neurophysiological structures born of experiences of being realised in relation to the conditions which satisfy such possibilities. The denuding of some of access to the grounds of properties whose physiognomic materialisation constitute capacities that inhere in relational states is part of a mutilation arising from excess competition that can be institutionally managed and effaced via the manner of its disclosure which is why the inherently conflictual nature of this moulding of elements of subjectivity via the impersonal demeanour of objectivities, arising from the reciprocal objectification of subjects, arises via the terrain of the elementary functions of human presence that can be used to naturalise and neutralise any attempt to manifest it which makes it difficult to contest, whilst its effects are only too apparent in the life-chances of those who experience the curtailment of their possibility via perception of an actuality imposed by such conditions. The point is that what is accessible, the types of realisation available, relate to recognitions which situate individuals so that they are subject to possibilities whose determination inhere in such relational mediations. For the devalued, their primal reality is of having nowhere to go and nothing to do. Accession to involvements that constitute the possibility of experiencing a reason-
for-being-anywhere, and to a purposive relation to anything in relation to the university, rely upon recognition of properties that presume such mediations, the statutory attribution of capacities that are the condition for the acquisition of such modalities via experiences of their possibility as actual aspects of one’s being-for-others. Those who are recognised are involved and undergo the physiognomic materialisation of forms that realise them so that they develop the required competence via an experience of being appropriate that is part of an alignment that constitutes their experience. For the devalued, their inability to elicit recognition and solicit contact transfigures their position into an objectivity arising from ways of being situated and realised so that they absorb an evaluative demeanour arising from subjection to conditions which physiognomically materialise elements of subjectivity via the impersonal demeanour of objectivities reciprocally constituted via subjection to impersonal and anonymous process that involve the devalued in an experience of absence, the sense of lacking something necessary, a tangible sense of an inability to function as tangible accessories of a world they are not invited to participate in so that they experience a reality arising from the informal sanctions of a lack of opportunity: they are uninvited, they have nowhere to go, they lack a reason for being anywhere, the forms of this significance arising via a public world whose existential possibilities are unavailable, because they lack the means to interface with it and, subject to such conditions, face the continuation of this via its crystallisation so that their lack of involvement transfigures into the sense of an objectivity arising from subjection to such conditions. Lacking access to the disclosures which constitute circumstantial aspects that inhere in experiences of being-realised in relation to such mediations, they appear to lack a capacity to interface that is a physiognomically materialised effects of involvements in experiences of meanings that inhere in such modalities. The reproduction of ignorance and inability are essential aspects of the use of space to consecrate some via involvements that disclose modalities born of meanings experienced via being subject to the forms of realisation constitutive of capacities that inhere in experiencing such mediations. This is why knowing relates to the institution of a boundary that relationally transposes into a capacity: recognition and disclosure constitute an epistemic relation, knowing, whereas those who are not recognised, those negatively perceived, who the boundary is materialised in distinction to, are ignorant. Again we see the relation between value, recognition, disclosure and capacity or between the institution of a boundary, the inscription of a difference materialised via perceptions which constitute such aspects, that condemn the devalued to an experience of being devoid of modalities via which capacities arise. Ignorance is rarely bliss, it is usually an aspect of a dispossession that disempowers, denigrates and denudes individuals of relations to self that require relational aspects, dispossessing individuals of capacities because of meanings sedimented via exposure to such conditions. Involvement discloses the sense of the properties appropriated via the realisation of the forms that constitute being-there, subject of such contextualising mediations. Recognition discloses modalities appropriated via being subject to such constitutive aspects. This is why properties are read-off from circumscriptions arising from recognitions which disclose such differences which constitute the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states that inhere in experiences of being subject to such possibilities as actually activated aspects of
interactions which disclose such modalities. Recognition discloses aspects which involve us in forms whose disclosure physiognomically materialise circumstantial aspects whose sense we appropriate via being-there, via being subject to the sedimentation of meanings experienced via being subject to such constitutive relational states so that, via absorption, one accedes to possibilities, one develops via the experience of the mobilisation of faculties that inhere in a fabric whose institution constitutes the shape of one's intentional life. The problem is, if conditions are not satisfied for individuals to accede to experiences of possibilities which inhere in relational states from which properties are attributed, then they are neither objectified, publicly, nor undergo the forms of objectivisation that satisfy the conditions required to experience intentional states that inhere in meanings experienced via being subject to such aspects. Without direct mediation, without actualisations activated via connections, then is everyone 'in' education either subject to the 'same' system or being 'educated'? If some are facing the disclosure of absences rooted in the perception of differences that physiognomically regenerate the sense of forms rooted in such differences, then are they being initiated into transitional states that embed dispositions sedimented via realisations that inhere in temporal sequences that require continuity, security and embedding or are they just undergoing the same dislocation and destructuring of dispositions as other members of the unemployed? Without involvement in a sphere of disclosures that physiognomically materialise aspects that inhere in experiences of being realised via such contextualising mediations, individuals cannot accede to capacities for functionality that inhere in experiences of being actualised via involvements in forms that constitute the functional shapes of a form of life: without access to a sphere of disclosures that constitute capacities that inhere in experiences of involvement in a fabric that constitutes experiences of being part of 'the there', the situation, from which such modalities unfold via enveloping mediations that disclose a horizon that allows individuals to sense the direction of interaction, and make required adjustments, because they experience being part of a medium whose sense inscribes such possibilities as aspects of being-there, individuals cannot exhibit intentional states whose conditions they don't experience being satisfied and they appear, essentially, different because their actuality, their objectivity, arises from different experiences of being-there. Without involvement this fabric that constitutes intentional modalities is missing, leaving individuals no adaptive or developmental pathway. Given that those subject to such processes face a future born of the perception of a difference inscribed via subjection to such conditions, it appears that the latter is the case and the unemployment of PhD students attests to the repression of differences whose effacement preclude the public demonstration of processes that are materialised via the private use of institutional space. Some are being embedded via relations of involvement that disclose possibilities which inhere in being subject to such modalities such that they experience a circumscription which constitutes forms they experience being able to appropriate so that they bear the sense of properties that are effects of such processes. Moreover, being realised in relation to the relational basis of such possibilities discloses a horizon that directs the individual's consciousness so that they can attend to forms because they experience being situated via their possibility so that they experience an embedding that is part of a career and trajectory that sequentially
realises them in a reality whose expressive aspects they incorporate as effects of undergoing such processes. Clearly, the sense of such forms, physiognomically materialised, allows for a projection born of engagements which disclose modalities experienced via being situated via such relational processes. The modality, therefore, inheres in the recognitions which constitute the differences that materialise such aspects so that some accede to possibilities whose relational and associational grounds they experience being constitutive of their objectivity. Once such differences are instituted, then it is obvious that other institutional agents will merely recognise differences of status whose recognition constitute differences of competence: some are realised in relation to the forms of involvement that mirror the labour market position whereas others are not; some are actualised, others undergo a de-realisation that is an effect of excess competition within educational fields that condemns them to the same conditions which evoke the same judgement reproducing the condition. Clearly a significant difference is being institutionally operationalised and it is hardly surprising that this person completed a PhD to be unemployed. Whilst some are embedded in relation to involvements that materialise the sense of properties they experience being realised in relation to via the disclosures that constitute such modalities, others experience a dislocation and disorientation that robs them of any ability to feel competent. Disorientation is manifest in the uncertainty arising from the unrealisation of uninvolvment: a real effect of a negation effortlessly reproduced, rendering the position the education repressed intelligible, so that the appearance of a fair process can be publicly materialised at the expense of people whose plight is invisible. The feeling of ignorance is a sustained effect of dislocations which ensure the devalued exist in the state described, disoriented by a dislocation that robs them of the means to accredit themselves with capacities because the conditions of satisfaction of such intentional states are absent, affecting the intentional states they experience via being subject to such conditions. Without access to the interpersonal conditions constitutive of experiences of the actuality of recognised forms of public identity, individuals don't experience their possibility and they endure a confusion born of a disorientation that is part of the physiognomic regeneration of inabilities that arise from the grounds of contestation of recognised forms of social identity. Without actualisation, individuals cannot experience possibilities and this is manifest by their inability to conceive of themselves via aspects whose institutional grounds they do not experience being interpersonally constituted so that, unable to satisfy the conditions constitutive of such intentional states, they cannot even imagine themselves participating or being competent. Without recognition, disclosure and realisation, how can individuals appropriate such aspects of their being-for-others and even establish an intention to participate? How can they imagine themselves participating when their intentional life is born of the sense of boundaries inscribed via their flesh, via the very sense arising from how they experience being-realised, interpersonally, perceived and constituted? This is why the excluded always exclude themselves because they are attuned via being itself to a sense of forms that lead them to become what they are. Being able to conceive of oneself via determinate states requires the satisfaction of their interpersonal conditions and without these conditions being satisfied individuals lack access to such states and they live in accord with a social objectivity they experience being publicly, institutionally,
constituted. This is why the world of mutilated actuality, born of the essential references of divisions inscribed via the sense of institutional relationships that protect the grounds of attributions of competences, haunt the imagination of the devalued, who experience themselves not knowing what they know, their sense of possession of understanding as etiolated as their experience of the intersubjective donations of significance relating to recognitions that constitute opportunities to be-perceived via communicational acts that constitute manifesting understanding, the mutilation of devaluation ensuring an absence of access to the grounds of forms that constitute experiences of such capacities. Given such conditions, it is hardly surprising that lower class students feel that they are perpetrating a fraud:

My supervisor wants me to go in and do this presentation an’ I just feel as if I can’t do it...I feel I can’t face it...I feel like I’m a fraud, that I’ve kidded my way through and like I’m waiting to be found out, I feel like I’m getting caught now.

Feelings of fraudulence are natural effects of bankrupt processes that extort the sense of a process out-of-nothing, leaving individuals bereft of any experience of being competent because they do not access the interpersonal, institutional, relational conditions constitutive of intentional states that relate to ways of being arising from forms of involvement and contextualisation that are the preserve of the employed. In this sense, are they being educated? It is worth considering how individuals would develop a disposition to participate without access to the interpersonal grounds of forms which constitute the sense of being-able-to-do-so. How can individuals experience inclinations when the basis of the identification of the competence is unavailable, if they do not experience the sense of such properties as objective aspects of ways of being realised that make available such possibilities, then how can they possibly be capable of feeling inclinations in relation to experiences of ways of being that remain unavailable? The experience of desiring to participate requires access to an experience of being able to bear the sense of properties that are a contested aspect of the constitution of the space because of the way valuation and significance are elided with the effect that experiences of being valued and recognised disclose modalities experienced as capacities to bear the sense of properties that are physiognomically materialised aspects of a contestation that is a key stake of public fields. Equally, insignificance is itself an interpersonally disclosed aspect of ways of being that physiognomically regenerate a sense of inability that is an effect of the absence of circumstantial aspects whose disclosure constitute capacities to appropriate forms that are effects of recognitions which render individuals able to intuit such aspects because they inhere in experiences of being arising from the disclosure of a ‘there’ that such modalities inhere in. The sense of properties are perceived to inhere in the relationships that constitute the forms appropriated via being subject to recognitions that disclose such aspects so that involvement in exclusive relational forms consecrates those recognised, whereas, for others, they experience an absence of possibilities that is inscribed via experiences of the relational forms of such divisions so that they feel really unable to experience possibility and experience a disablement that, whilst feeling innate, is really a physiognomically regenerated effect of statuses inscribed in relations of involvement in a reality disclosed via such modalities. Impoverishment is disabling because it transfigures status into incapacities born of an absence of access
to a fabric that value constitutes. Economic divisions play out on a terrain of qualitative differences and discontinuous oppositions are constituted via the recognition of forms sedimented via exposure to the interpersonal grounds of such forms. Capacities for functionality arise from access to moments of co-presence which realise one in relation to a horizon whose disclosure constitutes capacities for reference that inhere in the realisations of projection that constitute a capacity to instantiate appropriate responses rooted in absorption in a fabric arising from being-there, situated via such circumstantial forms, which relationally materialise aspects from which neurophysiological structures arise. What is violating is the sedimentation of significances whose form inhere in their physiognomic materialisation so that individuals bear the sense of divisions which become self-replicating as an effect of the function of such significances relative to the closures that constitute them. Economic divisions are transfigured into what appear to be qualitative differences that relate to the institutional grounds of differences that relate to the use of space to constitute experiences of being capable of bearing the sense of aspects that inhere in relational states that constitute such modalities. The problem for the devalued is that these are constituted via closures which render unavailable the interpersonal basis of such aspects, and this is why they experience there being "nothing there" via a way of being arising from the absence of mediations that constitute a "there" disclosed via being, circumstantial forms are different relative to differences in value, the poor experience a different world because value mediates significant relational differences that constitute plenitude or impoverishment. Because the experience of being capable arises from an assurance based in the discovery of oneself as able to bear-the-sense of forms arising from disclosures which realise us so that we accede to experiences of being able to project via such moments, we need absorption in adaptive responses to interpersonal forms that constitute such modalities so that we accede to cognitive states or neurophysiological structures based in fruition, and co-presence, and competition, and valuation, erode the basis of these structural conditions that human being requires to experience meaning. This is why so many of the devalued experience the educational processes supposed to address the effects of their condition as merely a deepening of the same absurd experience because the form of their education is rooted in the effects of the same conditions that they turn to education to escape. It is because neurophysiological structures are rooted in adaptive responses to ways of being-there that, without involvement, individuals experience a meaninglessness that constitutes an inability born of an absence of access to the relational states that subtend capacities to appropriate forms and, thereby, experience developmental mediations and distinct human capacities. Without involvement there is no absorption in forms that constitute the sense of capacities experienced via involvement via them in a world whose circumstantial aspects relate to objectivities arising via the disclosure of such aspects. Without access to such aspects individuals don't access forms whose disclosure unfurl meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities and individuals experience an absence of meaning and an inability arising from an absence of opportunity relating to a negation physiognomically materialised via such processes. How individuals experience their properties and how they experience being-realised via recognitions which disclose aspects that constitute shapes that publicly constitute objectivities perceivable because of
disclosures which manifest such aspects, is a key stake of the constitution of institutional space: accession to appropriate forms arising from recognitions which involve the valued in exclusive forms is a key organisational aspect of institutional space. Involvements constitute events that disclose aspects arising from experiencing being part of a world whose fabric is interpersonally disclosed so that some accede to a sense of capacities via properties whose identity inhere in experiences of being realised in relation to the relational forms that are the grounds of such objectivities. How meanings emerge as aspects of the world and experiences of being-situated in relation to their interpersonal grounds are key constitutive aspects of human being and world. How meanings emerge are aspects of experiences of being and the forms that subtend meanings constitute involvements in a fabric that constitutes capacities. How meanings emerge is part of experiences of being subject to the involvements that constitute such aspects. For individuals, such processes involve modalities, ways of being that absorb them in meanings whose consequential effects are manifest via the sense they bear as an effect of subjection to such forms. Because neurophysiological structures arise via adaptive responses to disclosures which absorb us in forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute meanings appropriated via being subject to such modalities, actualisation subtends our experience of capacity, we need to experience possibilities, intersubjectively donated significances, for us to experience hope and without such modalities individuals endure a sense of inability that is an effect of statuses whose interpersonal disclosure materialise conditions that preclude accession to experiences of possibility and competence. Without the substrate of involvement in relational forms that disclose a context appropriated via experiences of being realised in relation to forms that physiognomically materialise meanings appropriated via subjection to such aspects, individuals cannot conceive of themselves as subject of such possibilities, they cannot represent themselves in terms of such possibilities or attribute such aspects to themselves and they are unable to represent themselves adequately to others and interface with the anonymous and abstracted processes that constitute the labour market. Without absorption in forms which disclose the sense appropriated via being subject to such possibilities, individuals cannot appropriate such aspects, cannot conceive of such possibilities because they don't experience the substrate of involvements that constitute such aspects. This is because meaning-bearing components are concurrent, and ontologically coincidental with, forms of realisation arising from involvement in contexts whose constitution materialise contents so that involvement in discrete spheres, constituted via closures, constitute the logical conditions for capacities that inhere in experiences of being subject to such processes. The use of space to constitute such processes materialises differences inscribed via being subject to positional forms that inscribe a sense that is an orientational feature of the interpersonal constitution of operative forms of intentionality. The problem is that the desire to participate requires a relation to being that is not interpersonally constituted so that individuals don't experience disclosures which constitute an experience of being-able to contribute and so their experience of being precludes a sense that requires forms of realisation that physiognomically materialise dispositions which inhere in reciprocating protensions towards a world whose constitutive relational forms are absent leading those who
aren't recognised to experience the absence of any sense of capacities or desire to participate because they merely experience themselves as having nothing to contribute because their experience arises from the absence of the grounds, interpersonally, that constitute recognised forms of objectivity. Because statuses are transfigured via relationships into the sense of properties that inhere in such processes, the devalued experience the transmutation of their status into an inability that constitutes a sense of malaise and antipathy arising from a disorientation that is part of the absence of disclosure of circumstantial forms that constitute reciprocating protensions that inhere in recognitions which realise individuals in relation to the sense of forms appropriated via being subject to such modalities (Marcoulatos 2001). This is why the valued appear to simply 'choose' to participate because their way of being is inscribed in spatial forms that physiognomically materialise experiences of capacity because the way they experience being, their experience of being-there, the way they experience their presence, arises from relations of involvement that disclose such modalities. The desire to participate is an effect of experiencing capacities that are experienced as properties arising from recognitions which disclose such modalities as forms one experiences being realised in relation to so that one accedes, relationally, to such possibilities because one experiences their actualisation. Without involvement in a fabric that is disclosed via recognitions which constitute such modalities, how can individuals experience a congruency that leads them to identify themselves with forms whose possibility they experience being realised in relation to? For the devalued, the exact opposite occurs where, via the absence of recognition, they experience an inability to function and they experience the annihilation of their attempts at projection and they retreat to the private sphere they are condemned to by educational processes that reduce them to an existence as a solitary producer of forms that allow them to procure the resources required to finance the administration of the products of their labour which materialise the appearance of educational processes devoid of actualisation. In this way, educational processes bereft of contact, which consists of very limited one-to-one interactions, effortlessly reproduce statuses whose grounds relate to objectivities that the process reproduces because of the stringent protection of the interpersonal grounds of forms whose relational basis arise from closures which constitute circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter. Because the interpersonal disclosures which constitute the public, institutional, attribution of properties that inhere in such relational forms (something selection for the labour market recognizes) arise from an experience of significance revealed via valuationary processes that transmute value into capacity, the devalued experience their insignificance via relational forms that constitute boundaries whose sense are inscribed via processes that leave them unable to experience the sense of properties whose identity are constituted via a distinction realised via differences of actualisation that sediment forms incorporated via exposure to a fabric realised via the recognition of such differences as aspects of the circumstantial forms of the world. The inability to experience being competent is a statutory effect of relational forms that institute such possibilities and, as always, it is access to the forms of involvement that constitute the recognised objectivity of the particular relationship constituted via the processes that lead to access to the labour market function that are recognised. Selection is an attenuated process that involves recognitions which
disclose transitional states via realisations that constitute meanings experienced via being subject to such processes so that some experience an actualisation that physiognomically materialises a sense appropriated via experiences of being subject to such modalities, and selection criteria merely recognise the forms of objectivity that closures are used to constitute in order to manifest a difference between the valued and the devalued, a distinction immanent to the space and realised via its effacement. Distinctions that cannot be publicly perceived to be being instituted must be instituted surreptitiously via a logic of negation, with institutional agents doing what they do as if they are not doing it, and educational processes that are, largely, contactless, using abstracted administrative processes to materialise the appearance of a process where nothing beyond self-financed, self-education is occurring, are perfect. The institutional culture arising from such mediations merely makes it appear that the clever select themselves and occupy institutional positions, "the world is run by those who turn up", as one university lecturer had on their door. The reality of the way immediacies of response function as unconscious endorsements of a way of being physiognomically regenerated so that the significance of valuationary forms constituted as capacities to instantiate forms that subtend such modalities is, only too apparent to the devalued:

The only thing I had to go to after the PhD induction was a seminar on how to combat isolation. So they know the reality. They tell you that after your pp one, pp two or rr one forms you'll be researching on your own, then they put up a PowerPoint about the experience of a PhD student, and they tell us "most of them suffer frustration and isolation", then they got some other PhD students to talk to us and tell us that if you go into the department you can meet with some others but if you go there is only ever the ones they interact with their and most of us don't know anyone anyway.

S: Does that affect your desire to go into the department?
Ye', it's a clique, it's the ones who are liked who are all like each other and the staff are the same as them, so I just feel like I don't want to go in, just makes me feel uncomfortable. I always feel like I should not be there.

It is clear that individuals are positioned via informal valuationary processes that are manifest via behavioural patterns that compose not merely a social environment but ways of being that constitute experiences arising from exposure to such forms. Competition for recognition and for access to the exclusive forms that constitute symbolic capital means that some are confined to an inexistence which physiognomically regenerates a sense of inability arising as a real effect of closures which leave individuals unable to refer to intra-worldly, or circumstantial, aspects that inhere in disclosures that constitute such aspects as available modalities of ways of being realised in relation to a horizon whose disclosure constitutes such possibilities. Clearly, the devalued can be educationally reclassified, or, rather, they can struggle to finance their reclassification, but the circumstantial aspects arising from their way of being-perceived arise from the same curtailment. The effects of devaluation constitute the non-viability of the devalued who face an experience that transmutes their insignificance into an experience of inability that is rooted in an experience of dislocation that involves an unrealisation that transfigures insignificance into a sense of inability born of exposure to the interpersonal roots of barriers that lock them out of a fabric whose forms subtend capacities that inhere in involvement in relational forms that constitute such aspects whose disclosure
materialise such possibilities. Recognitions disclose forms internalised via realisations that allow for an incorporation that constitutes both a continuity and a sense of a command arising from such modalities so that individuals exist via shapes whose functionality arise as part of the endorsement arising from a congruency established as part of the composition of social space ("it's the ones who are liked who are all like each other") so that those recognised accede to a lived equilibria arising from configurations of behaviours that are part of the unexamined actuality that is part of the endorsement of their way of being via its institutional consecration. We see how much ostracism is part of an experience of the spatial forms via which significances are constituted via the practice of differences physiognomically materialised via the subjection of some to interpersonal processes that rob them of access to the possibility of acceding to the sense of objectivities constituted exclusively, via closures, that ensure that some accede to an experience of being constituted via the practice of such distinctions as spatially objectified, enacted, aspects of institutional space that assure some of being-perceived via significances inscribed in the sense space is used to materialise. The revealing of meanings is part of the emergence of significances realised as forms of existence that are ontologically coincidental with events that constitute such forms (Marcoulatos 2001). Social devaluation is impairing because our capacities arise from ways of being-realised in relation to spatial and interpersonal forms that constitute events which disclose meanings revealed via their enaction so that neurophysiological structures inhere in ways of being responsively actualised in relation to such aspects. Devaluation is incapacitating because our capacities are effects of disclosures which physiognomically materialise forms appropriated via experiences of a 'there' which involves our being-realised as subject to the possibilities actualised via the realisations that constitute such aspects so it becomes possible for the negated to experience 'nothing' as an aspect of their involvement in significances constituted via perception of a lack of forms required to accede to representational forms of intentionality so that they experience the absence of negation as a fundamental world-disclosive aspect of their being and inabilities to refer to intra-worldly aspects that arise from the disclosure of circumstantial forms that constitute capacities shared via their interpersonal constitution are a fundamental constitutive aspect of their being-in-the-world. The inertial force of the order of things is a palpable aspect of reality because it constitutes ways of being. Whilst some access the disclosure of forms that constitute shapes realised via involvement in a fabric arising from recognitions which materialise the spatial effects of experiences of being subject to such processes, which constitute modalities arising from the transmutation of valuationary forms into ways of being that appear to be competencies arising from divisions; others access the obverse, they access a de-realisation and disorientation arising from dislocations rooted in the recognition of differences physiognomically regenerated via the materialisation of differences in objectivity that are aspects of the contestation of labour market functions whose possibilities relate to differences in actualisation that are surreptitiously reproduced, effortlessly, as an effect of the way such differences are interpersonally realised. The statutory attribution of competence arises via surreptitious uses of institutional space to realise differences whose cognitive effects are manifest via differences of expressivity rooted in experiences of different ways of being arising from subjection
to an order whose sense is inscribed via the recognition of differences that transmute distances into what appear to be differences of competence. Institutional agents unthinkingly, and quite practically, endorse a way of being by disclosing aspects which physiognomically regenerate capacities inscribed in sharing spatial forms arising from experiencing the world via such processes so that they are viscerally invested in forms of expressivity that constitute shapes, positions, stances, that are part of the elementary structure of interests and commitments that flow from the way resources are contested via the constitution of rights that inhere in processes of legitimization that constitute some, the valued, as competent via experiences of significance that transfigure a sense-relation into a capacity to exhibit forms arising from experiencing their interpersonal constitution whilst others feel "I should not be there". The claim to difference is a claim to worth that alludes to others' unworthiness via a division that arises from significant behavioural patterns that are effects of valuations that are informally constituted and these unthought evaluations compose the fabric of social environments via interpersonal processes that disclose a sense incorporated via subjection to the interpersonal forms that disclose such aspects as constitutive of human environments, 'there's' constituted via ways of being that disclose such aspects and in relation to which capacities for reference arise. The sense of value, and the sense of forms whose materialisation constitute recognised forms of objectivity inscribed in the perception of such differences, is a relational stake of fields constituted exclusively to produce an experience of efficacy relating to valuations that legitimate some via processes that efface others and this is part of the contestation constitutive of public space. The use of expressivity to instantiate evaluative aspects that constitute the sense of forms that affect human beings capacities to access modalities that inhere in recognition, realisation, involvement, in a word, membership, are elemental aspects that compose the latently adversarial character of human existence. Involvement constitutes meanings experienced via being subject to forms inscribed via presence that constitute the latently conflictual nature of social interaction. Moreover, there are academics who are not competent and yet whose behaviour manifests a practical belief arising from experiences of being competent because they experience the intersubjective donation of such significances via the relations of production students are forced to enter in order to validate themselves, a process in which value recedes like the horizon, leaving many with as impoverished an experience of their education as their educational process is bereft of context, or embedding, or any relational processes that might impart an experience of being competent. This is what happens when some function as a resource for others via relationships that extort what is essential while seeming to demand the insignificant via relationships that constitute the significance of one relational node and the insignificance of the other, empowering and remunerating one and dispossessing the other. The institution of the fraud leaves individuals feeling like frauds because they cannot tacitly summon competencies, which require interpersonal conditions, from the limits imposed by having to use one's labour as one's only resource to produce forms that materialise the appearance of an institutional process where little is involved beyond the cursory contact required to institute the fraud. One labours to materialise the appearance of an illusion which has real effects for those who experience objectivisation and objectification, public validation and realisation, via
the relationships that constitute the sense of institutional processes bereft of reality for the producers and yet which constitute an experience of being-able to ascribe descriptions to themselves whose determination inhere in such relationships for the employees who institute the fraud. The illusion involves de-legitimation and authentication which is why authenticity is a key stake and resource, relationally constituted via fields in which its grounds are inequitably distributed: the validated exhibit moral commitments that belie the grounds of representational forms of intentionality based on relational forms that extort the sense of such forms via exclusions that reduce others to a cynicism that is merely an aspect of a self-exclusion whose institutional conditions are obscured via the distances transfigured via such relational processes. Education is merely a means of protecting the sense-relational boundaries physiognomically regenerated via the interpersonal forms constitutive of such differences. Education can be provided that merely empowers the dominant who are even more able to extort the sense of their legitimacy, and the resources this legitimacy guarantees, by the devaluation arising from the farce that mass higher education becomes when it is used to serve other economic and political functions. The more devalued credentials become, the more easily controlled are the conditions governing exchanges of value and the transposition of value between social fields whose underlying unification can be effaced by institutional closures that render invisible the overall and underlying processes. Devaluation benefits the dominant as much as the institutional massification that empowers them by extending their sphere of institutional influence which merely obscures the nature of processes whose individuation become obscured by the anonymity arising from processes whose insignificance are only too apparent to those who undergo contactless, and thereby, contextless, de-realising processes that consist of little beyond abstracted administration and judgement. Given such conditions, it is not surprising that intentional aspects arising from such processes become key aspects of legitimation: those privy to the institution of the illusion of concern and professional practice, to a functioning educational sphere because they are part of the relationships via which the sense of such a state of affairs is constituted, manifest the effects of a validation that circumscribes ways of being arising from recognition so that they experience the physiognomic materialisation of the sense of a commitment they manifest even in repose, they are deeply committed to education; as one academic put is, "there's a saying on the left 'if you think education is expensive, try ignorance'"; for many of the recipients of their enlightenment, disillusionment is an effect of a disorientation arising from the irrelevance of the representational apparatus they experience being foist upon them without any involvement in any sphere that renders necessary its use, leaving them feeling a sense of malaise, antipathy and caesura arising from the irrelevance of what they learn because they learn outside of any involvement in anything because embedding and contextualisation are the key stakes of an economic struggle in which reasons for being and experiences of being-situated cannot be provided for all. Those able to accede to representational forms of intentionality whose sense are extorted via institutional relationships that narcissistically realise them in relation to institutional processes that consist of little beyond their actualisation find goodwill very easy since the performance of their roles involves little time, effort or labour, and is merely an effect of being subject to relational forms that autonomously
constitute the forms appropriated which materialise the appearance of their function. The institutional apparatus of assessment provides remuneration and objectification via relationships that narcissistically realise academics in relation to consecratory acts of institution that objectivise and materialise experiences of significance whose form inhere in the institutional relationships individuals are forced to enter to attempt to validate themselves. Bourdieu refers to the:

...acts of theatricalisation through which groups exhibit themselves (and, above all, to themselves) in ceremonies, festivals (like the Panathanea), processions, parades, etc. constitute the elementary form of objectification and, at the same time, the conscious realisation of the principles of division according to which these groups are objectively organised and through which the perception that they have of themselves is organised. (Bourdieu 1992: 186)

Students function as props, as narcissistic enablers, for an experience of significance whose relational form constitute the appearance of functions devoid of realising or actualising mediations because of the extortion of the sense of such aspects, with the effects that individuals are left disoriented, bereft, insecure, manifesting the effects of a dislocation that is made worse by the reconstitution of barriers that operate via such mediations so that they come to bear the sense of such aspects and come to question the rationale of processes whose vacuity leave them depleted. The effects on individuals health of a de-realisation that leaves those dispossessed facing a fear they turned to education to escape, is clear in the following:

I am not well at all because I don't even know the methodology I should use. Thematic analysis or Discourse analysis? I tried to read stuff about these. The problem is I don't also know how to analyse or start to analyse it. I have a meeting with my supervisor on 7 July and don't know what to tell her. It makes me sick because as a student in the UK, I really feel sorry for the kind of education I receive. I have to struggle alone and look for how to do a research. Finally, the supervisor is not really helpful since she doesn't read anything. Is it because we are overseas students who pay enough money for the profit of university that she behaves that way? After all we are going to get a pass and that's the most important to them.

The disorientation manifest, here, is an effect of a dislocation that is part of a generative process that, for the devalued, is destructuring: whilst some access the interpersonal disclosures which constitute an assurance born of realisations that physiognomically materialise the sense of capacities arising from a horizon constituted via direct mediations, others face the disorientation of a dislocation whose effects are only too apparent in the sense of confusion, always a mark of abusive, asymmetrical, relationships, and absence characteristic of the devaluation that manifests the logic only too apparent to the individual, "is it because we are overseas students who pay enough money for the profit of university that she behaves that way?" The form of the relationships constitutes the sense of the process and reduction and absence are fundamental aspects of the way valuations are transfigured into the personal terrain of the lives of those who have turned to such processes to attempt to rescue themselves from an absence of possibility that their educational process merely reproduces. What is notable is that the process and experience is so devoid of associational and relational mediations that might constitute capacities for reference to substantive properties experienced via experiencing such conditions which make available intentional states that inhere in
such mediations. You can see the insecurity arising from a reduction born of a recognition of difference throughout the testimony, the poverty of reference of a bankrupt process manifest in the antipathy rooted in an experience characterised by negation and aporia, the absence of any way through, manifest via an absence of mediation experienced as de-realisation and uncertainty; notice the repetition and reformulation of, "I don't even know" and "I don't also know"; a dead-end process devoid of opportunity leading to the cognitive implosion that poverty produces, the individual left sick of an existence devoid of possibility, in which they experience, relationally, the absence of devaluation and the objectivity of their negation, a reduction, "I have to struggle alone", that leaves them devoid of any capacity to satisfy labour market criteria rooted in the traces of intentional aspects rooted in association and collectivity, in relations of involvement, that manifest valuation and the invisible ontology arising from a culture constituted via the traces and effects of capital. Capital is a relational aspect and valuation is an effect of its possession. The heartbreak of failed projection, arising from an exploitation of aspirations betrayed by the falsity of those involved, "I really feel sorry for the kind of education I receive". This is why the real coup is access to the relations of involvement, the conditions which satisfy, intentional aspects that remain inaccessible for those who experience a dispropriation at the heart of bourgeois culture. Access to the interpersonal grounds constitutive of capacities for self-description require access to the conditions which satisfy intentional states whose possibilities require associational realisation and these, clearly, are contested and conditional. This is why the identification of competences via recognition of conditions, which themselves presume recognitions, which are, clearly, inaccessible, is a key aspect of the processes that condemn many to worthlessness, idleness, isolation and difficulties born of the sense of relational processes that function as barriers arising from closures which allow some profits of recognition and experiences of the capacities rooted in involvement in cultural and associational forms that physiognomically materialise capacities born of experiencing being subject to such possibilities as real aspects of their being-for-others. The university this person studied at, on its application forms, asks candidates to provide evidence of: "a high level of interpersonal and communication skills, including writing skills and the ability to communicate effectively to an academic audience and other stakeholders as appropriate; A capacity to enthuse others, work successfully as a member of a team and demonstrate an awareness of the benefits of collaborative working"; notice that such aspects are not elicited via the process, "I have to struggle alone". Individuals don't access the grounds of these institutional aspects, irrespective of their level of education: they are effects of recognition and involvement, conditional upon what they manifest: valuation, but the majority do not experience such aspects. If individuals do not access the interpersonal grounds of such modalities how can they experience capacities they don't experience being manifest aspects of the form of existence they endure as an effect of statuses that are effortlessly reproduced, "is it because we are overseas students...that she behaves this way" and notice the sorrow arising from an impoverishment rooted in the process, "I really feel sorry for the kind of education I receive". Clearly, the interpersonal and institutional conditions that satisfy the attribution of such properties are inequitably distributed and if individuals do not experience the recognitions which disclose involvements
that constitute an experience of being able to bear the sense of aspects that
presume such modalities then individuals will not be able to satisfy such criteria.
Given such conditions, are people being educated? If they don't access the
interpersonal grounds constitutive of intentional forms, then they remain unable to
accede to potentialities because they don't experience their actual possibility and
cognitive deficits are sustained because of the nature of barriers whose sense are
relationally constituted via the transfiguration of ways of being-perceived into ways
of being whose objectivity sustain what appear to be differences of capacity arising
from the mode of givenness constitutive of such aspects. What is not available to
those who drag themselves listlessly through an educational process that they know
has no future, fending for themselves through struggling to finance processes that
reduce to such anonymous mediations, clearly devoid of co-presence or the
involvement that realises individuals in relation to a horizon whose disclosure
constitutes contextualising aspects, is any pathway to an objectivity whose sense
arises from recognition, attention and, thereby, an attribution manifest via the
spatial and interpersonal processes that sub tend an identifiable objectivity whose
social grounds are inscribed in the recognitions which constitute processes that
materialise an identifiable competence rooted in the synchronising effects of
recognition and disclosure. Objectivities are relationally constituted: you have to be
able to elicit contact in order to be subject to the involvements that make the
objectivity identifiable so that the competence is attributed and, clearly, all but a
small number of students, experience a process as anonymous and dislocated as the
significance they experience being physiognomically regenerated is vacuous and
their experience of malaise and caesura is an effect of experiences of an absence of
an ability that is an effect of a sense arising from the disorientation of a
circumscription rooted in the perception of difference that so clearly constitutes
their objectivity. Undergoing such a process, how would one feel possessed of
substantive properties, experienced via being subject to interpersonal disclosures
that realise one so that one experiences their possibility as real, socially effective,
aspects of your being-for-others? Clearly, these processes merely mirror the social
hierarchy they emerge from and the devalued experience the physiognomic
materialisation of an objectivity that is, essentially, the same as unemployment: the
irrelevance of their work, the devaluation of their labour, is an effect of a field that
surreptitiously transfigures value into competence via complex interpersonal
processes that constitute a miscognition born of the state's financing of such
processes so that mediations born of distance can effortlessly transpose economic
distances into different forms of competence without the nature of the process
being recognisable because of the very nature of its materialisation. The
fundamental modalities are always revealed via being subject to experiences arising
from them. If neurophysiological mechanisms arise as adaptive responses to
regularities absorbed not as rules but as neurophysiological structures that arise as
dispositions rooted in the forms of realisation that constitute such shapes, then the
process of development, the process of actualisation, that constitutes such forms are
significant aspects of the way individuals experience sense that subtends meanings
appropriated via being subject to such aspects. If neurophysiological mechanisms
arise as adaptive responsiveness to structures of constitutive rules, absorbed by the
individual not consciously learned as rules but via interpersonal processes of
realisation that physiognomically materialise neurophysiological structures, potentialities realised via their actualisation as available forms appropriated via experience of being subject to such modalities, then, given that the shape of dispositions arises via the developmental process constitutive of the mechanism, then the acquisition of competence must arise from involvement, from immersion in engaging relational forms that disclose aspects arising from embedding in the world that individuals make emerge around them as the reciprocal constitution of dispositional forms whose efficacy arise from a congruence that is part of the structuring of the world they experience being capable of functioning in because they experience being part of it. Capacities are effects of forms whose disclosure constitute meanings appropriated via being subject to such modalities and this is why such relational processes are so injurious and why they lead to the experiences manifest here. This individual intuits the reality arising as embodied significance via an experience of the sense, physiognomically regenerated, of significance, and status and income are experienced as determinate, "is it because we are overseas students who pay enough money for the profit of university that she behaves that way?" and again we see that feelings of antipathy and malaise are effects of these conditions. The feelings of illness are effects of the insecurity of a dislocation that arises from the conditions that subvert competence: valuation. Some exist purely as foils, purely as means-for-the-materialisation of a significance that belies the absence of access to constitutive relational forms: whilst competence arises from institutional relationships that constitute collective forms of intentionality, the student's experience is privatised. How individuals are perceived affects how they inhabit the world and individuals cannot situate themselves in relation to collective relational forms whose conditions are selectively disclosed. Once you have one-to-one relationships then access is discretionary and dependent on ways of being-perceived that are mutilated by the inability of some to access to social and associational conditions constitutive of the sense of forms that inhere in mobilisation and actualisation. Similar effects are described in the following:

I never received any real support from my supervisor...not once did I ever exit a meeting feeling much more than relief and not once did I enter a meeting without feeling either dread or anxiety. And I believe she did me a favour by taking me on. So I was grateful to her. I was and still am. I therefore have chronic doubts as to the worth of my work and therefore wondering whether my whole life has been a waste is just part of the furniture of my mind. I mean, in fact, so taken-for-granted is my lack of response from others that I do not even expect it anymore...my life to date reveals a history of non-support and non-recognition. A history that makes me spontaneously and unconsciously (4 academic degrees later on) feel an imposter vis-à-vis the title "intellectual". In fact, so taken-for-granted is my lack of response from others that I do not even expect it anymore. Certainly after my PhD I do not expect it. I am on my own and in many ways am glad to be free of the pretence of their attentions. Now they don't have to pretend they are attending to me. And I don't have to attend meetings and being scared they will think I am a fool, yet always seem to realise immediately they haven't even read my stuff.

An interesting issue is what is inclusionary about this and where does exclusion occur? Is exclusion something that occurs via the labour market, after this process, and this process addresses the conditions that constitute that objectivity or is exclusion something that is continuously realised via disclosures rooted in the perception of differences that manifest barriers arising from the perception of such
differences and the institutional processes merely ratify and legitimate differences in objectivity, bringing them to an order in which they can be legitimately expressed? Clearly, what are manifest are legibilities whose sense inhere in the forms arising from the perception of some as discrepant which affects their involvement and, thereby, their significance, crystallising differences of objectivity that transmute value into capacity: without involvement how can individuals accede to functionality? Where is the developmental pathway? Is this education? Notice that just negotiating a supervisor is a major obstacle, "I believe she did me a favour by taking me on", manifesting that exclusion discloses a horizon within which mere contact becomes acceptable because of the absence of any capacity to solicit contact which itself discloses a horizon born of absence that constitutes an inability to mediate relational forms without a shared form of existence. What is clear is that the absence of anything makes occasional contact acceptable and any further embedding unimaginable. How, given such circumstances, could people solicit contact and embed themselves in anything? It is not hard to see that when the world of one's possibilities relates to a single individual, the supervisor, that the grounds of one's objectivity will be as mutilated as a sphere of existence arising from such attenuated relations that merely rearticulate valuationary processes arising from distances that obscure, from the victims themselves, the reality until they face it after completion, when any possible function they might accede to has receded and they face a world defined by an objectivity that precludes possibility. This is the experience of attempting to acquire cultural forms outside of any embedding of such forms because you cannot access the conditions in which they are elicited because of status differences that inhere in the recognitions constitutive of the disclosure of the form which is why biographies of different categories of student manifest different ways of being-there, different experiences of being, arising from the disclosure of circumstantial aspects that constitute a different 'there' arising from perception of a difference that physiognomically regenerates that difference as a difference of significance transfigured into a different way of being arising relationally so that the grounds of differences in objectivity are reproduced. The problem is that differences in the acquisition of dispositions are manifest via different ways of being realised so that the relational basis of their conditions of acquisition physiognomically materialise differences in objectivity because of the way dispositions are instantiated because they are habituated effects of realisations that require temporal and spatial synchronisations that presume embedding. How do you accede to a purposive relation to cultural forms you experience no immediate realisation in relation to when the interpersonal basis of such modalities are absent? And why are such modalities absent? Because people cannot be embedded such that they are realised and situated in relation to contexts in which they accede to meaningful forms of realisation. This frustration is an effect of statuses reproduced via the form of the process that then condemn those subject to such conditions to the ensuing unemployment of those who purchase certificates outside of any embedding in any sphere of cultural actualisation. The problem is that this unrealisation affects the dispositions acquired via subjection to such processes because the dispositions elicited via recognitions which disclose forms realised that constitute reasons-for-being-there whose sense are incorporated via experiencing such circumstantial aspects are unavailable which means that those
subject to the absence of recognition and the absence of contextualisation arising
from experiences of being-perceived to be-different face the same frustration,
unrealisation and isolation that they would if they were simply unemployed: this is
the same experience as other sectors of the marginal and surplus undergo, it is just a
particular inflection of unemployment constituted via the same forms of mediation
constituting the sense of the same forms, it is just available if you can pay because it
materialises the appearance of a public system. What it is important to recognise is
that the dislocation attendant on devaluation has existential modalities: the lack of
any interpersonal mediated relation to what one is trying to do, an absence of
realisation, an absence of any experience of being significant via an experience of
unrealisation that physiognomically materialises an experience of frustration whose
sense is incorporated as a sense of absence of "willingness" as an effect of the
annihilation of projection and notice that understanding takes the form of cynicism:
humanity implodes and an effect is the transposition of the barrier into life-world
meanings via their constitution, via the interpersonal processes via which they
become aspects of the world. The sense of a "bad attitude" or of an absence of
"willingness" or of a lack "goodwill" is an effect of never acceding to an
interpersonally mediated state of realisation in relation to cultural forms one
attempts to acquire from outside of their constitutive conditions through which the
will becomes operative as an aspect of the disclosure of forms that constitute such
modalities so that the incorporation of the sense of such aspects becomes merely
another effect of inequalities structured via such processes. Dispositions require
realisation to be physiognomically materialised so that individuals become
habituated to the sense of their form as a nascent capacity they experience being
constituted via an embedding that makes available such possibilities as aspects of
their being-for-others. Without the recognitions which disclose such aspects;
without involvement; individuals don't experience the physiognomic materialisation
of such aspects, they don't experience the constitution of a 'there' via realisations
that make such circumstantial aspects available as orientational facets of their being-in-the-world. In other words, what is surreptitiously reproduced are differences in
ways of being situated in relation to meanings whose personalisation constitute
what appear to be different statuses of competence. If you are not connected, via
the only mediations available to you to attempt to mediate connection, and if you
are not contextualised, then what dispositions are being realised? And what choice
do you have in the sense you incorporate via subjection to processes that constitute
your public objectivity, passively, so that you accede to objectivity via such
mediations? Individuals subject to such processes cannot exercise any choice in the
nature of the objectification arising from a neglect that merely reconstitutes an
insignificance only too manifest via the nature of the experience. When employers
focus primarily on aspects of involvement whose exclusivity arise from closures
whose form are clearly manifest in the nature of this experience, we see how the
worthlessness of the devalued is transfigured, via its recognition, into an
insignificance that is transposed into an inability to satisfy selection criteria that
presume relational aspects that are clearly the preserve of the elite. Because
valuation is a constitutive signifying process, disclosed via ways of being situated,
devaluation is experienced via an insignificance that constitutes an absence of
capacities arising from disclosures which manifest circumstantial aspects rooted in
non-relational forms so that the negated experience an absence of capacities to refer to relational states they don't experience being interpersonally actualised. In this way, devaluation reverberates throughout the existential structure of being and has ramifications for development, determining possibility, limiting actuality and profoundly affecting individuals' relation to themselves and the world. Moreover, given such an experience how would one interface at all? What does one have to talk about or refer to? How could one extemporise sentences about one's person given the nature of such experiences? What properties are elicited via such an experience? Moreover, given the non-relational state described here, the key phrase being, "so taken-for-granted is my lack of response from others", describing an absence of the relational conditions required to experience the responsive actualisation at the heart of the engagements that absorb us in meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities, how would someone subject to such an experience seek contact and how would they mediate it and, if they could mediate it, how would they then deal with that contact? What would they have to share? What self-understanding arises from such modalities? Without absorption in disclosures whose form inscribe capacities for reference that inhere in the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects, how would one refer successfully to intraworldly aspects that constitute aspects of being-there that relate to recognitions that disclose such modalities? Without involvement there is no realisation and the projective nature of being is not realised affecting experiences of being and denuding individuals of cognitive states that require such modalities. The perception of difference transmutes into the absence of involvement which then transfigures into the inability of the devalued to function socially because they lack access to the disclosed aspects that constitute the circumstantial aspects that characterise a form of life so that they appear to lack capacities for reference that inhere in being subject to experiences of being part of the reciprocal constitution of a shared sphere via a way of being that physiognomically materialises aspects whose sense inhere in the way individuals make the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of their existence. In this sense the formation of dispositions and the disclosure of a world via recognitions which disclose such aspects are conditions for the emergence of individuals capable of responding appropriately because their dispositions arise from participation in constitutive moments so that capacity inheres in experiencing being part of the way individuals make the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as part of the reciprocal completion of their existence. The development of dispositions and their shape arise from synchronisations that are part of the absorption of normative aspects via adaptive responses to experiences of being situated that constitute neurophysiological structures. Without such conditions being satisfied individuals will experience being bereft and unable to conceive of themselves as capable, they will not be able to experience, even ideationally, being capable, it will be unimaginable to them that they could function and hence, "...have chronic doubts as to the worth of my work and...wondering whether my whole life has been a waste is just part of the furniture of my mind". Capacity is linked to worth because being-able to elicit recognition and solicit contact is a condition for emerging into significance via the disclosure of interpersonal forms that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in being subject to such contextualising aspects. This is where
the labour market is stitched up and the social structures that subtend the economy manifest: via the disclosive relational conditions that manifest differences that constitute different ways of being-there that become legible via aspects rooted in the perception of differences that become manifest via the practice of such distinctions. When competence is identified via the relational grounds that constitute its legibility, we can see that those whose education arises from such a limited sphere of possibility face a negation that they have no way to countermand. Whilst education is supposed to mediate opportunity, clearly it involves little involvement and the references that subtend its sense arise from perceptions of difference that are merely transfigured into legitimate distinctions via the process available which consists of little beyond functioning as a foil for the narcissistic actualisation of the supervisor and examiners who accede to public forms of objectification and remuneration via association surrounding an administrative process that grants them access to the conditions constitutive of recognised forms of existence. Having undergone a process that reduces to contact with one individual, how are people who have to develop, autonomously, projects to secure financing to pay for access to this relationship supposed to be objectified? When they complete, the next problem is there are no labour market criteria that relate to the work that they have developed and their certificates have no value. The inability to solicit contact is an effect of a devaluation that cannot be overcome because how do you accede to functionality from outside of the conditions constitutive of such a modality? The idea is supposed to be that education mediates opportunities so that developmental conditions are satisfied and provisional schema constituted via involvement in spheres of actualisation and yet it is hardly surprising that people complete such processes to face the void that constitutes the implosion of sensory and cognitive capacities arising from the failure of projection arising from a negation that leaves individuals possessed by a sense of incapacity that is the physiognomically materialised effect of an existence devoid of possibility, lacking mediation in relation to aspects that materialise a sense of properties arising from experiencing being realised in relation to their interpersonal conditions. When one considers that there are few jobs in these types of area, how would people undergoing such a process ever be able to satisfy labour market criteria that arise from involvement in whatever relational forms academics use to materialise the appearance of their function? The nature of the relational ground of such appearances are manifest via the boundary whose form is rendered by such testimonies: the devalued access little, if anything, beyond a charade in which their irrelevance is only too clearly manifest: “they haven’t even read my stuff”. People whose existence reduces to the production of literary forms whose administration materialises the appearance of processes that are not performed so that there is a transmutation of devaluation via the inexistence of a process into an absence of mediation that transfigures into a sense of inability that is an effect of the absence of a disclosive medium constitutive of being-able-to-orient oneself. Feeling that one’s work is irrelevant and worthless and that one has no real abilities is merely a personalised effect of experiencing the absence of forms that require mediation: cognitive processes are founded modalities that require disclosure and yet, clearly, such conditions are not satisfied and the results only too clearly manifest: disorientation, confusion, malaise, antipathy. The authentication of competencies,
via manifestation of the grounds via which they are disclosed as aspects individuals experience being physiognomically materialised via involvement in the constitution of a medium arising from recognition, is a key aspect of selection processes which is why de-legitimation casts individuals onto a terrain of uncertainty born of an insecurity rooted in experiences of difference that transmute the sense of such aspects into ways of being situated via such mediations so that barriers are personalised and deficits entrenched before individuals have even acceded to qualified status. How are people who undergo such processes supposed to interface with a labour market whose aspects arise from recognitions that disclose circumstantial forms, ways of being-realised as capable of bearing-the-sense of such aspects, so that individuals undergo an objectivisation that allows them to represent themselves via forms they experience being physiognomically materialised as aspects of public identities so that they find available descriptions whose objectivity inhere in experiences of the actualisation of such possibilities? Devaluation discloses an absence that impoverishes capacities for self-presentation because the involvement in the background relationships, the referential totality, from which reference and capacities arise, are not experienced. The devalued do not accede to the interpersonal basis of representational forms of intentionality and this sense they bear as an effect of the physiognomic materialisation of an absence that is a real aspect of public identities that tacitly refer to such objectivities, forecloses on potentialities because of the very structural logic from which it emerges. The ability to interface with employers, requires access to the basis of realisations that constitute the dispositions arising from involvement, in the circumscribed spheres, that selection criteria recognise competence via, because these are the conditions of satisfaction of neurophysiological structures which are absorbed via being subject to ways of being situated via the involvements that constitute such aspects. In order to be able to represent oneself appropriately one must be able to bear the sense of aspects one experiences being physiognomically materialised so that one feels assured of referentialities that inhere in intra-worldly, and circumstantial, aspects arising from experiencing the disclosure of a horizon constituted via events that make meanings available as ways of being-there, as aspects of presence, part of one's being-for-others. Clearly, such modalities are absent for some, leading to an impoverished relation to the world. It is those who bear the sense of inabilities to manifest appropriate forms who are subject to such a barren experience of a void that is an essentialised attribute of meanings they experience being interpersonally realised via public significances that inhere in such processes. Lacking realisation, how can individuals project via aspects they don't experience being-materialised? How can they interface in relation to relational criteria whose interpersonal grounds they don't experience being disclosed? A constitutive aspect of being is absent because of the meaning of being situated in relation to perceptions of difference that constitute such absences so that the forms of significance arising via insignificance leave individuals bereft of capacities to instantiate appropriate forms, unable to respond appropriately and self-exclusion becomes part of the shame of an inability that is an effect of the meaning of being realised in relation to such aspects. Precisely what education is supposed to constitute, it does not, because of the interpersonal forms constitutive of structural aspects that transpose into interpretative forms via the transfiguration of significance into being via such
processes. It is clear that the least valued get the least engagement, the least mediation, and the least involvement, because they don’t show up as significant and that these mediations merely reconstitute the sense of this objectivity. Lacking significance reconstitutes the effects of being-perceived in relation to such aspects so that your way of being bears the traces of existing via the perception of such aspects. Insignificance transfigures into uninvolvement which constitutes the sense of an absence that arises from the sedimentation of such forms so that individuals experience the absence of the disclosure of a medium necessary for reference: how can those who access nothing beyond abstracted administrative relationships that refract the appearance of a process where nothing exists beyond the judgement of the products of their solitary, dislocated, labour, project successfully when the forms of realisation constitutive of forms of existence rooted in recognition are absent? Because neurophysiological structures arise as adaptive responses to a fabric that presumes, logically, engagement in contexts that constitute meanings appropriated via being subject to such modalities, neurophysiological and dispositional mechanisms, arise synchronously via embedding, they are not constituted as intentional contents but via absorption in relational processes that materialise sequential conjunctures so that the capacity to bear the sense of significances presumes involvement in a fabric whose disclosure realises forms of existence so that the capacity to project requires experiences of actualisation that physiognomically materialise aspects that intersubjectively donate meanings appropriated via experiences of being-realised in relation to aggregative and collective forms of intentionality that are effects of closures which constitute such aspects. The sense individuals bear is an effect of meaning-bearing components that are physiognomically materialised effects of involvement in worlds whose significance are constituted via closures which disclose such modalities as aspects of social organisation so that perception inscribes an order via subjection to the interpersonal forms that are its conditions of possibility. This is why the absence of involvement characteristic of devaluation constitutes a sense of inability that is a real attribute of the unemployed and why the judgements employers make are valid: the problem is that they arise from processes of validation that are constitutive. Those who lack social value are subject to processes that rob them of access to the interpersonal grounds of forms that constitute recognised forms of social existence. Without access to involvements in forms that constitute ways of being-able to project via forms whose sequential materialisation require the engagement of recognitions which absorb us in possibilities materialised via showing up as warranting such aspects, individuals cannot be capable of manifesting dispositions and neurophysiological structures whose interpersonal conditions are not satisfied and they bear the sense of a discrepancy transfigured into an objectivity arising from the meaning arising from being subject to such conditions. Notice the felt inability to identify with a possibility, described in "feel an imposter vis-a-vis the title “intellectual”". Without the interpersonal conditions that satisfy such a possibility, without absorption in interpersonal forms that physiognomically materialise the sense of being-able-to-manifest aspects because one experiences being realised in relation to their identity-conditions, the individual doesn’t experience such an objectivity because the shape of the dispositions, the basis of the neurophysiological structures constitutive of such an actuality, are absent because the individual’s form
of life arises via distances that education merely rearticulates, sustaining a sense of inability that is a really consequential aspect of the public identity of those who cannot accede to forms because they are constituted via closures that operate via the recognition of differences inscribed via the flesh of those who experience being subject to such objectivities. We see that without involvement in the relational forms that absorb individuals in ways of being that spontaneously realise them in relation to contextual aspects that constitute a horizon whose disclosure realises them in relation to ways of being-there that are aspects of their capacity to intuit possibilities and forms that physiognomically materialise physiological and neurophysiological systems in an experience of projection arising from the realisation of engagement, there are fundamental aspects of development, and of the interpersonal grounds of representational forms of intentionality, that are absent which transfigure class distances into the sense of forms born of relationships mediated via such processes. The absence of mediation physiognomically materialises a sense of absence that constitutes a sense of inability. Without absorption in the behavioural substrate of meaning-bearing components which convey significance, individuals do not experience possibilities, they don't experience being-able-to-instantiate forms as aspects of their being-for-others and they feel bereft, purposeless, unable to relate to aspects of ways of being that remain unavailable, impossible. Without absorption in spatial forms that constitute ways of being arising from experience of the circumstantial forms that constitute a 'there' an appropriate way of being spontaneously arises from, individuals experience themselves as unable to imagine being subject to forms whose grounds remain unavailable. And this as a result of an educational process supposed to address such deficits. Dispositions are acquired as aspects synthesised as part of an expressive totality that constitutes behavioural physiognomy, or the actualised potentiality of individuals who experience characteristic possibilities as part of an aggregate from which this synthesising process occurs, via the realisation of engagements that ground such constitutive modalities. Elements of behavioural fluency are ingrained via the synthesis of mediations born of engagements that realise us so that we experience being able to accede to modalities via experiencing their actuality as aspects synthesised as part of an expressive totality incorporated via recognitions that disclose such possibilities. Dispositions are acquired via the transfiguration of expressive physiognomy via involvement in a fabric which constitutes such possibilities as part of the constitution of a reality that capacities for reference inhere in via involvements that physiognomically materialise an experience of being situated that constitutes meanings conveyed via the transfiguration of a body attuned via disclosures that make intelligible possibilities as sensible properties of a wider expressive reality. What is clear is that actualisation is a key aspect of the formation of dispositions that are acquired as a totality via an integration that discloses aspects that physiognomically materialise an experience of capacity born of the sense arising from being subject to such possibilities. Socialised rationality inheres in pre-reflective roots that need to be attended to and clearly the absence of involvement constitutes an absence of disclosure, that is, an absence of mediation, manifest in allusion to the "lack of response from others" which constitute a fragmentary experience that cannot ground the dispositions the process is supposed to instil. Attention is a disclosive medium that constitutes potentialities relating to
being situated via such mediations and clearly when someone can allude to the "lack of response from others" this is itself a constitutive mediation, the perception of difference constitutes the absence of possibilities that inhere in involvement in an interpersonally disclosed medium that arises from involvement in a medium that attention materialises. Clearly, the "lack of response from others" constitutes a partial, fragmentary, experience characterised by the unrealisation of inattention and the absence of involvement so that the whole rationale of the process, and of the individual's reason for attempting to mediate access, comes into question. What is clear, is the absence of relational forms that might embed this individual in a constitutive fabric: "so taken-for-granted is my lack of response from others that I do not even expect it anymore". What is acknowledged here is the absence of access to any sphere relating to what the individual is condemned to attempt to appropriate alone. The problem for the individual is that they cannot inscribe the effects of relational states that relate to associational forms that realise them so that they inscribe aspects that inhere in belonging to a collectivity so that they experience the physiognomic materialisation of forms that manifest ways of being-there that are effects of recognitions of forms inscribed via experiences of being subject to such processes. They cannot access the interpersonally constituted fabric of realisations that allow them to become extensions of, and reciprocating protensions towards, a world whose interpersonal constitution arises from divisions so that they cannot inscribe traces of visibilities whose disclosure they are not subject to. The reason for this is because the real stakes are the relational basis of objectivities that can be impersonally constituted selectively and differentially and academics can experience the inscription of the traces of such relational processes via associations surrounding the administration of students' labour without needing to concern themselves with the conditions students endure. There is no contradiction between complete neglect and the institution of the appearance of professionalism when the appearance of a practice is constituted via abstracted, de-realising, administrative relationships that constitute value-generating aspects. Professionalism, commitment and sincerity are key aspects of professional relationships with academics who extort the sense of such forms via individualised relationships that involve very little for many. Whilst these private relationships publicly validate academics, they don't situate students who experience the absence of any constitutive relational forms: "so taken-for-granted is my lack of response from others that I do not even expect it anymore". Who gets to appear competent are keys aspects of the constitution of the space, interpersonally, and differences of status are manifest by different ways of being-there, different forms of involvement in relation to recognitions of differences which disclose such aspects so that some face an impersonal and anonymous dislocation from any fabric that might allow them to inscribe traces that require embedding, inscription and projection: all modalities that are clearly absent, sustaining the sense of differences whose physiognomic materialisation are key stakes of the everyday class struggle as it is lived by individuals who face a very different signifying atmosphere depending on the meanings they experience being interpersonally constituted via institutions that transpose class differences into what appear to be differences of nature, or competence. The prereflective roots from which a socialised rationality emerges are absent leading to the doubt, disorientation and confusion manifest in some of these
testimonies. Without realisation, individuals cannot incorporate aspects they don’t experience being interpersonally constituted and, lacking realisation, attempts at projection are annihilated, leading them to come across negatively, as unrealisation leads to the sedimentation of what are perceived to be essential aspects, of the individual, which arise from the impossibility of successful projection because the disclosures that realise them in relation to expressive elements that require the cooption of realisations that sustain such aspects, via absorption in engagements which constitute their expressive synthesis, are absent, physiognomically materialising deficits transfigured into meanings experienced via being subject to such processes. Individuals start to come across negatively because of the incoherence of a process that cannot affirm the very dispositions the process is supposed to inspire. There are intentional states that are unavailable, non-relationally individuals cannot manifest competencies whose institutional grounds are unavailable, and this is why they do not feel possessed of the sense of such forms because they do not experience their physiognomic materialisation, they don’t experience, being, via such aspects and, thereby, the conditions which satisfy such states are unavailable and this is why such people do not experience their actuality possessed of such possibilities. Precisely what education is supposed to provide: a development born of a deepening experience of being via disclosures which constitute such modalities is absent. Because our being is relational, development requires opportunities and opportunities require resources of time, effort, space and then their human aspects, attention, engagement and mediation and yet where are these modalities evident in these testimonies? The aspects of space that constitute its sense are not points in space but regions constituted via their comprehensibility arising from the way circumstantial aspects are sense-relationally disclosed so that determinate regions arise from placement amidst the signifying atmosphere constitutive of places characterised via such aspects. It is how we experience being realised in relation to such aspects via circumstantial perceptual determinations that constitute the space and disclose the aspects whose sense we intuit via forms that constitute the circumstances, the places, we experience possibilities via, via ways of being relating to the sense relationally disclosed via such processes that we experience being-there. Our experience of spontaneity requires situating in relation to recognitions which disclose aspects that absorb us in the fabric of existential reciprocations arising from interactive coexistence that constitute the formative intervolving layers we experience being physiognomically materialised so that our immersion in the sense of space constituted via ways of being-there involves a convergence rooted in the discovery of determinate capacities arising from an experience of the attribution constitutive of such aspects. Possession of capacities cannot be separated from their exercise when what we are concerned with is statutory dignities that have complex relational and institutional conditions whose satisfaction are not equitably distributed. This is why the education of the poor tends to involve separations that reconstitute modalities rooted in the forms of divisions which disproporate the poor, their education often involving a highly attenuated relation to conditions which satisfy the attribution of the competence, which is why it is possible to complete the multiple degrees required to accede to the PhD and feel you don’t know what you know because an experience of capacity requires access to disclosures which realise us so that we experience properties
physiognomically materialised via involvement in a fabric whose formative interpenetrations involve us in a confluence of forms that supersede their current status allowing for an assurance born of capacities for retention born of the successful projection arising from actualisation, from recognitions which disclose aspects that constitute accession to representational forms of intentionality whose grounds require such conditions to be satisfied. The only ones who will succeed are those who are involved and who experience realisation so that they experience the constitution of forms via successful projection so that they bear the sense of forms incorporated as an effect of the recognitions which constitute such modalities. Realisation crystallises forms via recognitions which disclose the conditions which make an experience of projection an aspect of a viability that arises from experiences of value that are constitutive of such modalities, whereas the devalued undergo the continuous unrealisation of their negation, particularly on educational markets that are based on the public production of the grounds of the efficacy of such distinctions, personalised via such processes. The devalued are subject to an experience of inability born of a sense reproduced via an inattention born of insignificance so that they undergo processes of self-qualifying existential reciprocations that inscribe the sense of an objectivity born of a condition perpetuated via the perception of differences they experience being physiognomically regenerated via such processes. What we can discern is that individuals experience existence via subjection to responses which manifest non-discursive forms so that their presence is realised via processes of continuous reciprocal permutation so that their subjectivity arises from subjection to exchanges of existential, uncodified, aspects that constitute experience of being situated via such processes. That is, they experience existing, interactively, in socially meaningful ways so that they experience the sedimentation of historically and socially located significances that relate to objectivities that are effects of such relational processes. The problem is the social, the aspectual and expressive, aspects of such processes are constitutive of an autonomously operative sense arising from types of disclosure which realise individuals so that there is a kind of vitalisation occurring, those congruent are realised and experience the energisation of accession to representational forms of intentionality rooted in recognition, whereas the devalued experience an inattention arising from an obligatory relational process that denudes them of capacities for projection that presume forms of realisation that they do not experience so that they cannot incarnate a sense of aspects relating to involvements which circumscribe forms which subtend capacities for reference that relate to such intra-worldly aspects of being-in-the-world. Presence involves the inscription of historically and biographically determinate forms that constitute objectivities, forms of sense inscribed via subjection to aspects that affect experiences of being situated. Whilst some undergo the solidification of identities whose viability arise from experiences of being subject to forms whose disclosure constitute an assurance arising from experiencing a viability born of appropriating meanings via experiencing their physiognomic materialisation, others undergo a de-realisation arising from an absence of engagement that robs them of access to the constitutive medium that attention discloses so that they experience inabilities born of the absence of recognitions and inabilities born of the incorporation of forms physiognomically regenerated via perception of such differences. What we have are self-qualifying
reciprocations arising from an interactive coexistence that, for the valued, becomes
a process of progressive convergence born of sharing an existential character they
experience being physiognomically regenerated via interactions which constitute
formative interpenetrations of properties they experience being continuously
rearticulated in permutations that supersede their origin so that they experience a
facility born of the developmental elaboration born of experiencing being infused via
such aspects, whereas, the devalued face a reduction to an original state born of
confronting space burdened with practiced allusions that physiognomically
regenerate traces whose persistence arise from the practice of their referentiality via
their recognition. Protensions towards the world are born of subjection to such
processes and they involve different modalities depending on the significance of the
individual. Clearly the devalued acquire, via exposure to such aspects, a sensibility
arising from the sense they experience being physiognomically regenerated, an
apprehension of the possibilities arising from the reality they experience via such
mediations. Instead of experiencing, via their education, a series of formative
moments of realisation that continuously supersede their current way of being, they
experience, via perceptions of a difference whose recognition condemns them to
unrealisation, reduction to a state perpetuated via subjection to such conditions. In
other words, education merely reproduces the same dynamics that characterise
their social position more generally, which is why the process effortlessly reproduces
unemployment. It is clear, again, that individuals concede aspects of their
sovereignty because accession to possibilities requires actualisation so that
appropriation of possibilities requires accession to the interpersonal conditions
which constitute a facility arising from recognitions which disclose such aspects so
that development requires involvement and mediation and this is, clearly, absent
from many of these testimonies. Are people being educated? Are they being
prepared for possibilities when there educational processes are devoid of
mediation? What reality is being disclosed? The sadness in these testimonies arises
from a sense of loss rooted in the non-opportunity that a massified public field
represents. The reality is only too apparent, "so taken-for-granted is my lack of
response from others" and, again, the reality of the absence of mediation: "I am on
my own and in many ways am glad to be free of the pretence of their attentions".
For this individual, the sole point of contact constitutive of the appearance of a
process reduced to a pretence, a pretence that narcissistically realised an academic,
an employee, in relation to relational forms which disclose a capacity to utter self
descriptions concerned with substantive aspects of their being-for-others whose
sense are extorted via such processes, leaving individuals with a sense of loss
because of the nature of the derivation of the appearance of a process where
nothing exists. The problem of this absence is a constitutive aspect of the lives, the
objectivity, of the devalued who, when having worked to produce miracles as
invisible as their experience, can be told "you do not satisfy the minimum required
criteria for selection and therefore we will not be progressing with your application"
or, as another expressed it, "We regret to inform you that we cannot consider your
application because it does not meet critical minimum qualifications needed to fulfill
this position"; or another, "the hiring committee determined that the materials
provided with your application proved insufficient in demonstrating achievement of
the minimum qualifications listed in the job announcement": having to compete,
nationally, for one of twenty-four awards to get the PhD doesn’t even equip you with the capacity to satisfy the minimum required criteria for selection. When all that is available to you is worthless, then your own national institutions are unfit for purpose and are making money purely from sustaining the unavailability of anything, forcing people to function as consuming producers of bureaucratised traces whose administration materialise the appearance of processes devoid of any signifying power. When all that is accessible is to purchase ‘access’ to a bureaucratic process in which employees associate their names with the administration of your production, and, moreover, when this process is socially dislocated, involving nothing beyond the administrative mediations that constitute traces of a process consisting of minimal contact, and when the purchased status, the reclassification one has worked to realise, does not equip you to access the relational forms constitutive of the competence, what can you do? When the criteria arise from relational conditions that are unavailable, it is not merely that individual cannot satisfy selection criteria, they won’t, actually, be capable of manifesting the effects of collective and associational forms that constitute intentional forms whose grounds remain unavailable to them and they won’t be possessed of an experience of being competent, enduring an insecurity born of a mutilation that is part of the very fabric of their existence, consequentially suffering, "chronic doubts as to the worth of my work and therefore wondering whether my whole life has been a waste is just part of the furniture of my mind". If people undergo educational processes that are devoid of attention, because their significance elicits aspects which manifest such properties, and, moreover, without realisation, how are they to incorporate aspects that can only arise from accession to protensions whose disclosure constitute capacities born of the perpetual transmutation of the involvement arising from forms of interactive coexistence that involve the individual in a continuous process of convergence arising from a synchronisation that retains forms sustained via the constitution of such modalities? How are they to appear to bear the sense of properties whose intentional conditions are not satisfied? Clearly, understanding the way inequalities affect cognition involves a range of phenomena that require detailed categorical work to elucidate. The absence of significance arising from negation transfigures into an absence of mediation which exposes individuals to the forms of barriers that function as tears in the social continuum, oppositional discontinuities are manifest via barriers inscribed via being subject to forms which physiognomically regenerate such aspects as part of public identities reciprocally solidified via practical allusions to ways of being arising from such mediations. It is not accidental that the bonds that lead to growth, enhancement and edifying support are not apparent here. This can only occur because the real forms constitutive of competence are private, institutionally, and reproduced via tacit reference to those who must work hard to reclassify themselves but who face the reproduction of an objectivity born of the relational processes constitutive of their experience of being. Some people practically don’t exist. They can’t prove that they don’t exist because they don’t accede to the publicly consequential forms of existence that allow them to intervene in their own plight and, being reduced to a state of practical inexistence, can’t even manage to projectively realise themselves without access to the interpersonal medium that allows them to retain aspects because they experience being constituted via them. Without involvement you
cannot incorporate forms and project via realisation in relation to disclosures which
intersubjectively donate such aspects so that you can project via their realisation and
feel assured of your being-for-others because the significances you experience arise
from engagement with them. Involvement discloses forms whose determinacy,
whose identity, arise from the experience of being significant rooted in the
experience of being-there, being situated, publicly, via processes which reveal
meanings sedimented via exposure to the grounds of such aspects. The
incorporation of forms and the sedimentation of meanings are key aspects of
contextualising realisations that reciprocally constitute objectivities arising from
experiences of being situated via such processes. The sedimentation of meaning is
part of the realisations constitutive of capacities that arise from experiencing being
subject to the relational forms that constitute it. Access to the interpersonal
grounds that crystallise determinate forms of objectivity are part of the
interpersonal constitution of aspects, relationally, that constitute capacities. In this
sense capacities for reference inhere in experiences of being-there that constitute
intentional aspects that inhere in involvement in forms that disclose such aspects.
Being-able-to-refer arises from experiences of the physiognomic materialisation of
aspects that constitute intentional aspects that inhere in experiences of the
realisation of such forms. Without relational actualisation, how can individuals refer
to intentional aspects whose grounds remain unavailable? The intentional state
remains opaque and the individual insecure. Without contextualisation and
realisation, what is experienced as 'there' via being? Devaluation constitutes an
absence experienced via being subject to a lack of mediation, a lack of realisation
that inflicts experience of space and identity. With such constitutive aspects of the
human fabric absent, their being implodes into the maelstrom of absences of form
that subtend capacities for reference which presume involvements that disclose the
sense of such forms. Without anchorage in the interpersonal cues that moor being
in a sea of references which remain opaque without the involvements that disclose
meanings revealed via being subject to such modalities, individuals are lost, bereft of
capacities that require attention and attendance, the qualities that transform being
via experiences of its emergence from the world. World-hood is problematic for the
devalued, they are world-impoverished and suffer cognitively because of the
absence of this constitutive condition of being. The conditions constitutive of
attributions of competence have to be observed because attribution is a constitutive
condition that elicits what is perceived via physiognomically materialising aspects
that constitute being-there. The lack of attention, the lack of co-presence, are
rudimentary manifestations of the appropriation of resources via relationships that
extort significances as a fundamental aspect of their structuring. For the working
class student who battles through the absurd experience of vacuity that is higher
education; “I had the idea that education was something special, now I realize I was
just deluded, it's a pretty empty experience”; and gets through a postgraduate
‘experience’, amounting to the following, “I don’t get any guidance, I see my
supervisor once or twice a year”, without any way to access ways of being disclosed
as aspects of involvement in spheres that constitute such modalities, there is no way
to access the grounds of even the intention to participate which is why so many have
nothing much to do with university, they experience no reason for being-anywhere
beyond the satisfaction of the administrative mediations that materialise the
appearance of their 'education', leaving others with the free time and incomes to enjoy sanctified lives of leisure without the stigma of the enforced idleness characteristic of the reclassified unemployed. The reality comes through starkly in the following:

My supervisor gave me nothin', absolutely nothin', honestly, shi did nothing, she never engaged, it was absolutely absurd...I couldn't talk to anyone, I would reveal her stupidity and look aggressive...they couldn’t even go through the illusion of teachin’ me anything, it was like “fuck me, we don’t know”, we’re a bunch of English, Americans, Canadians, cunts, we have no one who studies Scotland, even though we’ve people who’ve studied Latin America, we had a German-American, she didn’t even know where Dundee was, she knew every major European or North American university but had never been to Dundee...when we talk about being taught, it’s a fuckin’ joke...I’ve done it all myself...no one said “Oh you’re trying to study the working class, you must read that”...it would be more honest if they said “I can’t help you I haven’t a fuckin’ clue” and taking money off you to do this PhD is a total sham...my supervisor was studying Palestinian Arabs...it’s a total con. The con is that these cunts are gonna supervisor yer...fuck off...and yet still, the thing is we’re forced to walk around with the hope that somebody will go through a charade fo’ yer, there was never a meeting I went through where I did not feel dread, anxious, the worry is appalling, you’re wanting to go through a charade to try and feel involved but the truth is they can’t do it so they have to just leave you or they’ll be exposed for the joke they are pulling off.

The truth is articulated in the following: "when we talk about being taught, it’s a fuckin’ joke...I’ve done it all myself...it would be more honest if they said “I can’t help...and taking money off you to do this PhD is a total sham”...you’re wanting to go through a charade to try and feel involved but the truth is they can’t do it so they have to just leave you or they’ll be exposed for the joke they are pulling off": as this person articulates, academics are not able to offer anything and, in order to avoid exposure, avoidance strategies are adopted which is why evasion and displacement are such key interpersonal aspects of the nature of the fleeting contact one has with supervisors who are the only point of institutional contact. When the only point of contact with the institution reduces to a relationship characterised by evasion and displacement, then the whole process is, as this person puts it, "a total sham", but it is an expensive one in which you lose not only money but your future because once you leave without having had access to the institutional forms that constitute recognised forms of public objectivity, with your little project complete, you are stuck, as unable to interface institutionally as you were ever involved. Isolation begets isolation, and an inability to signify oneself as an effect of subjection to such processes condemns individuals who cannot manifest any sense of properties whose relational-institutional basis they do not experience. Having been judged bereft of properties whose relational basis remain unavailable throughout the process, they are then judged unable to satisfy selection criteria because the conditions of satisfaction of their forms were never available, leaving individuals bereft of any sense, to themselves, of any ability and the absurdity of an education bereft of embedding is followed by the futility of the devalued and unemployed who exist outside of the public, institutional, networks that constitute recognised forms of objectivity and symbolic forms that count in labour markets. The obscure foreboding characteristic of a studenthood devoid of contact, in which individuals feel bereft of the orienting coordinates arising from the disclosure of circumstantial aspects via recognitions which constitute such modalities, is followed by the ensuing
destructuring arising from an inability to elicit recognition and solicit contact which is merely the continuation of a condition that the individual worked hard to repress: "you're wanting to go through a charade to try and feel involved"; in order to accede to a sense of properties and escape the finitude the process merely reconstitutes. What is obvious is that whilst this person is left desperately yearning for someone to constitute a charade that might intersubjectively donate some experience of viability and validity to the process available, what is available is merely the minimal interaction required to constitute the appearance of a process that consists of nothing beyond association with the administrative acts that materialise the appearance of a process. In other words, all that is accessible is a charade that narcissistically actualises the employees who experience the grounds of operative forms of intentionality via the relational embedding that discloses such aspects. If educational processes consist of evasion and displacement, how can individuals connect in order to enable their realisation in relation to forms that inhere in relational aspects relating to embedding and contextualisation? What is available, what is 'there', if this is the nature of the educational experience of some? Individuals, clearly, cannot situate themselves anymore than they can develop appropriate, or relevant forms, without the disclosure of a horizon that makes available such modalities. Not merely can they not intuit, cognitively, forms whose interpersonal grounds remain unavailable, they cannot experience the realisation of a projection that physiognomically materialises an experience of being able to respond appropriately because one acquires such a facility via responsive actualisation and, instead of the dexterity of those who accede to such modalities via involvement in such aspects, we have the uncertainty of postural forms rooted in the negation of non-recognition which annihlates projection and reduces the individual to an individualised stasis in which they cannot conceive of possibilities because they don't experience their availability and this unavailability is a continuously disclosed aspect of a social objectivity perpetuated, concretised and sedimented via its recognition and physiognomic regeneration. Instead of experiencing being realised and discovering oneself capable of manifesting aspects whose objectivity inhere in their relational constitution, one endures a privation whose unrealisation annihilates one's efforts to project because there isn't anything one can choose to do in order to connect so that one never accedes to a condition in which one's will is constituted. Without a capacity to establish satisfaction conditions for intentional states, one doesn't experience their possibility and willing is literally unimaginable and one exists in a confusion arising from the disorientation of the absurdity of a dislocation that is manifest by the repetition of the word "nothing" in: "My supervisor gave me nothin', absolutely nothin', honestly, shi did nothing, she never engaged, it was absolutely absurd". "Nothing" refers to the absence of mediation, the absence of the availability of anything via mediations of involvement so that modalities are realised and development occurs, notice how this person reduces the absurdity to the inability of the institutional agents supposed to be making an educational process available to constitute the experience of a process: "they couldn't even go through the illusion of teachin’ me". It is not merely that no pedagogic process is undergone nor that there is no developmental pathway available but that the individual, facing such conditions, endures the annihilation of their objectivity as a public facet of their being-for-others so that they are rendered by an absence whose
sense they bear as an effect of subjection to processes that, in perceiving their objectivity, render it publicly recognisable because it is immanent to the inscribed traces of this absence of mediation via the poverty of reference inscribed on CVs arising from such processes which manifest an inability to refer to public aspects arising from an absence of contextualisation that concerns the value of the individual subject to such processes. Individuals are exposed to negation as constitutive of absences that arise as tears in the fabric of being as any connective relation to possibilities via which meanings are appropriated is unavailable so that there is no medium for development, no access to the conditions constitutive of experiencing intentional states whose conditions of satisfaction remain unavailable. What is disclosed, via the labour required to access the mediations constitutive of the appearance of one's 'education', is the unavailability of anything and the absence of any capacity to elicit recognition, solicit contact and connect to anything via a process that reduces to an association with a single individual who materialises the appearance of their labour process via that association. How does this absence affect self-constitution? Without a context, contact, embedding with some disclosive horizon, how can individuals constitute themselves viably? If you cannot connect to anything, you cannot experience realisation, you don't experience the physiognomic materialisation of aspects relating to public objectivities that inhere in the relational processes that constitute such aspects and you face a reduction that reconstitutes the sense of a negation physiognomically regenerated by such processes which inscribes a lack of the forms required to accede to recognised forms of public existence and, upon completion, an unemployed, or under-employed, status ensues as the real objectivity repressed via the self-financed reclassification that the individual has mediated, without being able to mediate access to the grounds of forms whose attribution inhere in their relational constitution, is reassumed because it has been relationally reconstituted. Mass higher education doesn’t certify everyone, it reconstitutes differences in objectivity so that only some are really certified, others don't access the conditions which validate their credentials and their credentials arise from differences of status, differences of significance, that are effortlessly reproduced. The processes involve little, little access to resources, little contact, little access to any context, space or technology, there is no access to a developmental pathway, individuals are sources of varieties of resource without themselves accessing anything, such processes turn denial of access into resources via relationships that further objectify those in employment and sustain a distinction between the employed and the unemployed. Without access to the forms of involvement that selection criteria constitute as the recognised forms of competence the individual isn't just eliminated from any future possibilities, they don't access the grounds of developmental forms that constitute experiences of possibility that inhere in experiences of being-realised in relation to such relational aspects. This is why people complete PhDs and then cannot get interviews for roles they have supposedly spent three degrees preparing for. The problem is, they haven't accessed anything at all because of divisions that selection criteria recognise in their effacement of the only thing that is available to lower class people, the certificates, which become completely devalued by the private use of institutions to produce exclusive forms that relate to recognitions of forms of capital that relate to privately acquired forms of existence that are, clearly, unavailable to
many who face an anonymous and impersonal process of abstracted administrative relationships that materialise the appearance of 'public' processes that are devoid of very much beyond the minimal charade required to constitute such aspects. Why would institutional agents wish to deny 'access' to this experience when there is no mediation nor connection of students with anything and yet there is derived the appearance of processes where nothing is occurring beyond the minimal association, usually characterised by evasion and displacement, required to derive a veil of civility and a charade of concern via a relationship that is the source of self-descriptions and usable propositions that constitute the appearance of the competence of the academics who associate their names with the administration of others' labour in order to materialise the appearance of their competence? The real issue is access to the basis of significances and forms of objectivity that count in labour markets and this process is just a way of constituting sources of value derived via the people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of such processes. What is not equitably distributed is access to the interpersonal conditions constitutive of recognised forms of objectivity. It is significances arising from relational forms that are the real stakes: academics process individuals via relations that objectify themselves without the forms students' access functioning as objectifications because credentials are dependent for their value on the relational aspects that constitute their significance. People complete such processes with nothing significant and without accessing the interpersonal grounds of competences and finish to exist in a state that has been perpetuated throughout an education that has failed to address deficits because their recognition constitutes its form. Those who experience 'nothing there' go onto processes that reconstitute this absence of mediation and lack of connection and their credentials are negatively signified because of the absence of any evidence of embedding which is perceived to manifest the grounds of properties that inhere in the exclusivity constituted via the barriers manifest via the absence of these forms for those whose devaluation becomes crystallised and sedimented via subjection to vacuous processes that involve them in nothing until nothingness characterises their objectivity. It is the unavailability of anything that makes the form of the process acceptable: without any access to any sphere of actualisation, individuals become utterly desperate for any kind of realising contact and are forced to accept the fraudulent nature of a process in which they function as narcissistic supply for the actualisation of institutional agents who experience the realisation of their own objectivity via such mediations. The reality of their own objectivity is barely repressed because its grounds are continuously realised via the sense of differences born of divisions rearticulated via the absence of any embedding in relationships that function as mediums of objectification and the reassertion of a classification that has been continued via form of life is merely the materialisation of a reality immanent to the relational forms of a process that is constituted via perception of such differences. The key statement is, "we're forced to walk around with the hope that somebody will go through a charade fo' yer", which alludes to the hopelessness of conditions in which dispositions are not elicited and practical belief in what you are doing is impossible: "forced to" refers to an unreflectively constituted disposition elicited via one's conditions of existence in which forms of thought arise as an effect of one's experience. This statement alludes to the hopelessness of existing outside of conditions that spontaneously realise the individual in relation to the basis of
capacities for belief that arise from realisation and sum up the utter misery of the vacuity of educational processes that ground one’s production in nothing constituting an insignificance that becomes manifest later as inability to satisfy labour market criteria that relate to relational aspects rooted in recognitions that are unavailable to many. Without realisation, the incorporational grounds of dispositions which inhere in disclosures that responsively actualise and, thereby, physiognomically materialise, the sense of aspects which inhere in recognition, are unavailable and the interpersonal basis of capacities that inhere in a projection rooted in realisation does not get constituted so that the interpersonal basis of dispositions that inhere in the involvement structures of belonging are not actualised and individuals feel dispossessed of their own initiative because the basis of neurophysiological structures, absorbed via experiences of being subject to such possibilities, are not realised with attendant cognitive effects. So despairing is the process that you spontaneously retreat to a position where you are forced to hope for an insincere form of actualisation. The problem is the labour market is constituted around the authenticity of those whose beliefs arise from involvement. Clearly very different modalities are constituted in relation to different statuses which are casually, and surreptitiously, reproduced via a system of differences that transfigure status into competence. What dispositions are being constituted for this individual? Without realisation, how can conditions constitutive of projection occur? How can such people experience the fruition of absorption in realising mediations that constitute modalities for belief rooted in such aspects so that they exhibit the good faith of the elites who, experiencing such conditions, appear morally and professionally superior? Being adaptive and dexterous arises via realisations which constitute capacities relating to being-able to intuit forms because one is subject to their disclosure so that realisation makes available such modalities via a sense physiognomically materialised so that such possibilities inhere in "relationships in which concernful circumspection as such already dwells" (Heidegger 1962: 122) such that worldliness, capacities arising from experiences of being-in-the-world, require the disclosure of a medium which constitutes circumstantial aspects appropriated via realisations of form which physiognomically materialise dispositions responsively actualised by experiencing being subject to a 'there' that tacitly summons such aspects so that we absorb sense that is radiated via expressivity and absorb aspects that are crystallisations of social sense radiated and incorporated via subjection to aspects that exist physiognomically. Studenthood for this individual, is more akin to unemployment, in that it does not involve access to involvement in aspects that constitute circumstances and this fundamental condition of emerging into functionality via experience of such conditions is missing so that there is an absence of conditions which satisfy intentional forms and, consequentially, the projective nature of being is annihilated and individuals are dispossessed of initiative and feel unable to function because such capacities inhere in involvement in interpersonal mediations that constitute such modalities. Clearly, there is no concern, no care, no attention, the fundamental basis of human capacities arise from aspects that presume value a condition which is lacking for sections of the population. Mass higher education does not resolve problems rooted in the absence of these conditions for the devalued because the process is constituted via the same processes, the same dispositions, that constitute the problems the devalued have
mediating access to the institutional-relational-forms that constitute recognised forms of objectivity. The education of the poorest just becomes another way of experiencing being positioned in the same ways that create the problems arising from the incorporation of objectivities rooted in the perception of these differences. Are deficits being addressed or are they being constituted? Moreover, deficits take the form of perception of differences that transfigure into absences of the forms of realisation that physiognomically materialise aspects that constitute capacities that inhere in the interpersonal disclosure of such forms via recognitions that constitute such modalities. Lack of value has spatial effects that constitute the sense of aspects that affect access to the interpersonal fabric constitutive of human cognition. Lack of value has developmental effects. Economic differences transpose into different conditions of existence that affect development. When one's experience destructures the very dispositions you are attempting to constitute privately because of a discrepancy between your public objectivity and what you are condemned to attempt to master alone; "I've done it all myself"; how do you appear to authentically, and sincerely, incarnate a commitment to forms whose interpersonal grounds you don't experience being constituted? These experiences are effects of a process in which individuals exist as a function of institutional relationships whose appearance are materialised via institutional acts that take place within closed networks so that the reality of the interpersonal basis via which their appearance is constituted can be occluded and an appearance of beneficence refracted via notional relational processes that, clearly, have little personal reality. When education is supposed to promote development, how could it? It merely becomes another institutional mechanism for the production of distinction and the procurement of income. You exist at the points of mediation that materialise the appearance of a function and this can often be dispensed with electronically in disciplines that lack any consequential sphere of application or research practice. Moreover, in such disciplines, the judgement of texts can be made without recourse to anything empirical because reality exists only as a function of the representational apparatus via which it is appropriated to distinguish those who institute the hierarchy via administrative judgements whose spatial effects are clearly manifest in the sense of the experience of those whose insignificance is transfigured into legitimated expression via the process they are subject to. The reality of processes that extort their appearance via private interactions that cannot address the absence of the conditions required for individuals to accede to capacities whose form are elicited via the realisation of disclosures which require them is manifest in the expression: "My supervisor gave me nothin’, absolutely nothin’, honestly, shi did nothing, she never engaged, it was absolutely absurd...I couldn’t talk to anyone": the isolation in the concluding refrain is an effect of processes that dislocate without embedding so that individuals experience the senselessness of their attempts to project because access to the interpersonal grounds of realisations that absorb one in the effects of successful projection are absent, leading individuals to experience as futile their attempts to master forms they don’t accede to an interpersonally mediated relation to so that when one tries to enunciate categories one’s mouth is so unaccustomed to their vocalisation that one feels an imposter to the alien sounds whose strangeness arise from having no living relation to such incarnational forms. When people undergo these processes across distances that the education should
address, and then become embroiled in objectivities arising via distances whose perception are clearly constitutive aspects of the process available, how can they embed themselves? When what is available doesn't involve you because of significances reconstituted via this uninvolvment, so that attempts to mediate access are embroiled in such signifying processes, what can the individual do? There is a problem underlying this experience. What sense is being constituted via involvement in this experience? What do individuals who face this experience face in dealing with the effects of experiencing being constituted via the absence of involvement or engagement? What dispositions are being constituted? If the process is negating, which it has to be when there cannot be any engagement over a shared phenomenal realm caused by the institution of such differences in existence, then why should individuals undergo processes that subject them to the incorporation of a sense of absence that is an effect of the relationships they are forced to enter in order to undergo an accreditation that doesn't occur because the real meaning of their objectivity is constituted via recognition of a difference physiognomically regenerated via such conditions? When one's relation to the world and to possibilities that inhere in recognitions which make available such aspects reduces to such etiolated interpersonal processes, then, really, is there any wonder that the identification of competence inheres in perception of the effects of recognitions which constitute such aspects? Existing in this way, reduced to such limited possibilities for actualisation, how would one orient oneself? And what would the effects of this reduction be? The sense of foreboding characteristic of the poor is an effect of this absence of disclosure of a medium of attunement and synchronisation that constitutes capacities arising from being subject to such possibilities. But what is authorising about such processes? When there is, really, nobody involved in the institutional network of relationships that constitute the appearance of a process who has any authority, is there any wonder that the credentials that lower class people attain have no value? When accreditation arises via an identification that primarily concerns recognitions which disclose ways of being-there arising from the availability of relational aspects rooted in recognition of a difference constituted in distinction to the experience we see manifest here, then we can see why the credentials of lower class people are worthless. Moreover, how does the sense of this experience arise? What does it manifest and how does what it manifests arise? That it manifests aspects tells us a great deal about the institutional grounds of experiences and about how the sense of properties inheres in relational aspects, involvements, that constitute sensible objectivities, because individuals are subject to sense-bearing processes whose intelligibility arise from relationships of involvement that constitute such aspects. When one's relation to a public world reduces to such limited forms, how would you experience any will to participate? How would you even frame an intention without any sense of possibilities you experienced being mediated via involvement in a sphere of shared existence? Without the mediation of possibilities, how would one develop an inclination to participate when what one experienced is not merely non-participatory but isolating and denuding of the very aspects the process is supposed to elicit? The process clearly does not support the acquisition of dispositions and the idea is that the individual is supposed to mediate access and embed themselves but how can individuals when the form of their significance is materialised via perception of
differences that constitute such limited forms of circumscription? How can attunement and synchronisation occur when the process available reduces to such limiting possibilities? How can individuals orient themselves and project and accede to functionality when the possibilities available to them reduce to the self-generation of products whose administration materialise the appearance of someone else's labour process? When you are struggling to accede to any authentic grounding of forms whose authenticity will be recognised via interpersonal conditions that are clearly not satisfied; "you’re wanting to go through a charade to try and feel involved"; then how can you hope to elicit recognition via the abstracted relationships characteristic of labour market processes when you have no access to the interpersonal or institutional basis of the forms via which competence is recognised? If this was the extent of the forms of your experience, how would you interface successfully? To what would you refer? How would the disclosure of such aspects constitute you? How would you talk-about-yourself? Without access to the interpersonal grounds of institutional objectivities, how can you present yourself appropriately? Moreover, without involvement how would you know how to mediate involvement? What you experience being there, the nature of the 'there' relates to how you are experienced, the sense of properties you bear as an effect of the objectivity you experience being physiognomically regenerated. Precisely what education should do, address these problems, equalising access to recognised forms of public existence, it clearly cannot provide and individuals are left dealing with precisely the same problems of being-negatively-signified as effects of public relational processes that constitute, tacitly, such referentialities. Your significance affects your involvement and involvement constitutes your significance. Precisely what education needs to do, involve the poor in developmental mediations that allow them to transcend ways of being rooted in how they experience being-there, it cannot. Ways of being-perceived affect how you are involved which further affect what is available which, in turn, affects your significance and, worse still, being subject to circumscriptions arising from such aspects inhibits your development. Without any common sphere of experience why would you seek participation and how would you interface? These problems become prominent when you complete the PhD and you cannot solicit contact because everything available to you was worthless anyway and what you were capable of developing, alone, is perceived as discrepant. There is an existential disorientation arising from the ambiguity of being unsure as to one's public objectivity. If one turns to an institutional matrix in order to experience the grounding of forms via realisations that absorb one in forms of potentiality one experiences being actualised so that one experiences being possessed of meanings arising from experiencing such modalities, and if one doesn't experience being-able-to elicit the recognitions which disclose involvements that constitute such aspects, then one exists via an uncertainty characteristic of other sections of the unemployed. Without involvement there isn't the possibility of projection because there is no realisation and without such modalities one experiences an inability to refer that is part of the non-disclosure of intra-worldly aspects whose physiognomic materialisation concern one's essential characteristics so that one feels deprived of initiative because there isn't any sphere of disclosure in relation to which the will becomes constituted and one faces, repeatedly, an inability to interface, an inability to interact appropriately, an inability to elicit recognition,
solicit contact and accede to meaningful forms of public existence. The institutional processes that mediate access to resources and to recognised forms of public existence arise via the circumscriptions that constitute labour market access and these remain constituted via closures whose form are only too apparent in the testimony: exclusivity entails unavailability and disciplines that have no public purpose must manage the illusion of constituting such a purpose whilst effacing access simultaneously so that there must be certain forms available that materialise the appearance of public access in order to extort incomes via the public purse under the guise of a public function and so we have the forms of experience manifest here. Access, without access to the real grounds of recognised objectivities, and the real, interpersonal, grounds of recognised form of existence, and the capacities that inhere in the relationships of involvement that constitute such forms. Without access to the interpersonal grounds of responsive actualisation via which individuals absorb neurophysiological structures rooted in the disclosure of such aspects, individuals cannot be capable of instantiating forms absorbed via experiences of being subject to such modalities and they will be unable to project because they don't experience realisation and the appropriate dispositional mechanism is not constituted, but this is purely individualised via privatised processes that obscure the public, institutional, grounds of such distinctions. The problem is that the nature of the supervisory relation is based on an extortion of sense that is fraudulent and so evasion is at its heart, "the truth is they can't do it so they have to just leave you or they'll be exposed for the joke they are pulling off", like other forms of interpersonal exploitation it leads to the vulnerability of the perpetrator who avoids exposure by avoiding the individual and one ends up with utterly vacuous institutional processes that consist of nothing beyond the charade of directing student labour spun around an administrative process of judgement that narcissistically realises academics themselves who access, relationally, the constitutive interpersonal grounds of forms of objectivisation and objectification. Little wonder they are enamoured with the idea of cooperative practice when students are forced to enter relationships that objectify them whilst disclosing the interpersonal grounds of the sense of forms whose reality are obscured by the very strategies that ensure their invisibility. Because academic competence is a dignity narcissistically realised via association with others, and because the relational basis of these significances are disclosed via others who function as narcissistic enablers, academics project the values they experience being physiognomically materialised via such relationships into the relationship itself as if, being validated, they are somehow enabling others, whereas, in reality, all that is happening is an exploitative transaction that extorts the sense of forms via the objectivity of the institutional relationships students are forced to enter in order to seek an objectification whose grounds remain inaccessible because of the way the relationships validate and objectify the academics who associate themselves with the administration of student labour in order to materialise the appearance of processes that have little public reality. Students become foils for the realisation of significances whose reality inhere in the sense of the relational forms so that academics can projectively realise a sense of properties they bear because they experience being actualised in relation to their relational and attributional grounds and this is why they say "you'd have to be prepared to work cooperatively and collaboratively", because a condition of
interaction is the students engaging, with them, in relationships that materialise the objectivity of their values as real, institutionally grounded, aspects of public identities that they experience being reciprocally constituted so that they experience being existentially endorsed via such relational aspects that allow them access to the conditions constitutive of experiences of being, authentically, subject to moral forms they, clearly, force on others as a condition of what minimal interaction there is. This statement was made outside of any continuities of engagement, outside of any access to the grounds of reciprocal forms that might elicit such modalities as a condition of further engagement, in other words, it was censorious. It is always interesting when interaction involves directives as to appropriate form because someone needs to experience being constituted appropriately, it is also a manifestation of a process in which the moral stylisation of an institutional agent must be realised via expressive forms that physiognomically materialise an experience of the validity of their values as aspects of an authenticity extorted via such processes. It is also a manifestation of a process in which nothing significant is occurring other-than the stylised narcissistic actualisation of institutional agents who are so insecure that they require such censures to be instantiated in order to experience a competence that is disavowed via such expression: if anything necessary were involved it would be the focus of the interaction and yet it isn't. This is a key aspect of educational processes that occur across distances that occlude the irrelevance of a process that cannot disclose its own irrelevance making any effort to do so appear politically problematic in the hermeneutic arising from such conditions. Because the process cannot constitute any necessity relating to reality, forms are required to arise from a distance manifest via stylisation and attendance to appropriate form becomes a key aspect of institutional relationships because there isn't anything true, real or felt that the process can concern beyond the actualisation of those who institute judgements and experience the authenticity of their own values via association with the administration of the labour of others, which is, itself, usually done by secretaries. Whilst the Professor who said "you’d have to be prepared to work cooperatively and collaboratively" accessed the conditions constitutive of the sense of such forms, the problem is that the student accesses nothing but individualised and privatised relational states that do not lead to the materialisation of the attribution of such aspects which is why students are under suspicion for bearing the sense of dispositions arising from the individualisation of their processing: they are perceived to be too idiosyncratic and not to possess such values as effects of the very conditions they endure. The reality of what students experience is only too clear: "My supervisor gave me nothin', absolutely nothin', honestly, she did nothing, she never engaged, it was absolutely absurd...I couldn’t talk to anyone...when we talk about being taught, it’s a fuckin’ joke...I’ve done it all myself": they do not experience the relational basis of forms which realise them in relation to properties recognised via evidence of institutional relationships which manifest such aspects. Which is why, without objectivisation, students do not, themselves, feel competent and experience the absurdity of practices that involve nothing: the lack of mediation, the lack of contact rendering senseless their attempt to project outside of relational forms that constitute the public attribution of such forms. Without access to the grounds of such aspects, neurophysiological mechanisms are not constituted, dispositions not elicited, nor
affirmed, thereby, without the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects, the senselessness of such experiences is a key aspect of their reality and the educational processes fail because they are merely founded on other class modalities. The reason for this is that abstracted, non-actual, relationships are used to materialise the sense of such objectivities and students do not access the network of relationships that materialise such aspects and this is why they fall under suspicion and their competence is not recognised. The interpersonal forms of academic relationships are key stakes in a contestation over competence that academics are able to control because students are forced to enter relationships that materialise the appearance of forms that have little reality and yet whose sense are extorted via the relational processes that materialise the appearance of educational processes that escape view because of their private institutional nature. Access to the relational node arising from employment-position is the condition constitutive of the appearance of competence, whilst also being the basis for experiences of being realised so that one experiences properties that arise relationally via forms students disclose so that one experiences being subject to such possibilities, the student condition is not symmetrical, they do not access the grounds which constitute the attribution of such properties, and this is why they struggle in the labour market. Clearly, what is being realised is another form of the distinction between the employed and the unemployed. It is worth considering, if the singular and private relationship with the supervisor is the person's only connection to a sphere of public existence, how can the individual mediate access? The tragedy is that if you are from a region distant from the metropolitan centres, you are struggling to satisfy the financial criteria that are the basis of your only possible viability to access such relationships. There is contact only over the possible transaction of resources, then the minimal charade required to materialise the appearance of a process so that the fraud being instituted is not too apparent. The real issue is who accesses disclosures which constitute recognised forms of objectivity? What is being mediated, by whom, for what? If this singular relationship is of this nature, how can people mediate access? How can people from distant regions of social space connect when the availability of anything is mediated via such processes? Clearly, they are left to mediate the appearance of the function of the academic who associates their name with the administration of their labour within bureaucratic relationships that constitute access to a sense of properties that inhere in experiencing being situated amidst such a matrix of relationships. Clearly, the student does not access the grounds of such aspects. Notice, if the individual's access to any form of institutional contact is so attenuated, how can they mediate access and what resources of sense do they experience being physiognomically materialised via forms of involvement whose significance escape the exercise of their will? If you face a process that reduces to such mediations, what conscious choices do you have to make when your only point of contact, with anything, reduces to such an attenuated relationship? Furthermore, notice that the individual has no choice over how they are signified as an effect of being subject to such a reduction, a reduction that will be consequential to their future projection as the absence of their access to anything constitutes their objectivity relative to others who access different forms of involvement and, thereby, different significances to say nothing of capacities for intuition and projection that arise from experiences of being realised in relation to possibilities.
Notice how circumscribed the available is and how the horizon thereby disclosed is born of negation and incapacity, the individual is disoriented because there is an absence of the disclosure of a medium that constitutes being and this is manifest via the form of the experience and its sense. Individuals don't have any choice over the properties they are perceived to manifest as an effect of the sense of relational forms that don't involve them in actualisation. What is worse is that they are judged in relation to properties that they exhibit as an effect of being subject to such divisions which merely physiognomically regenerate the sense of differences inscribed in the relationships between the positions individuals are perceived to bear the sense of. Precisely what education is supposed to do, break the link between individuals from dispossessed positions and the conditions which lead to their assimilation of degraded forms, and provide them with access to the grounds of valued forms, it can't because individuals are forced back into the very conditions they have turned to education to escape and are continuously judged for bearing the sense of aspects that are relational aspects of the very conditions they are attempting to escape. Who is mediating access to empowering forms for whom? Who is the source of the disclosure of aspects that constitute the appearance of competence? The employees involved in the relationships that administratively materialise the appearance of a function access the interpersonal grounds of responsive actualisations that realise them in relation to forms that physiognomically materialise aspects absorbed via such realisations that constitute neurophysiological structures and affirm dispositions they experience being affirmed via experiences of being subject to such possibilities, where, in this, does the student access anything akin to the grounds of such an operative intentionality? When people complete such processes and cannot access anything, not even interviews, well, what has occurred and how? What subtends the form of such processes? What are the relations of involvement that constitute significances arising from such processes? What is the reality? Bourdieu says, “the whole working-class population may be sharply separated from the external world” (Bourdieu 1993: 169) and that “the real centre of the existence of the working class is...outside the field” (Bourdieu 1993: 169) and the social boundaries constitutive of the meanings related to being-realised in relation to recognitions of competence required for participation are clearly interpersonally manifest to working class students. When Derrida says, there is ‘nothing outside contexts’ (Derrida 1988: 136), the working class really experience being-in-space constituted via the absence of any access to disclosures which materialise the possibility of appropriating forms so that they experience being actually able to appropriate the possibilities that inhere in the way space is interpersonally disclosed so as to make available modalities that constitute experiences. The nothingness that exists outside of contexts is what constitutes the difficulties the devalued have in appropriating being because fundamental conditions of accession to cognitive states rooted in absorbed coping with aspects whose disclosure constitute forms appropriated via experiencing being contextualised, and realised, via such mediations, are absent so that the projective nature of being is affected and individuals face conditions which are inimical to fruition and development. The nothingness characteristic of the absence of mediation characteristic of the unrealisation and disorientation of those who are unable to contextualise themselves is only too apparent to lower class students who
experience the truth of Derrida's statement because they experience the nothing of being outside of any public spheres of existence. Recognition discloses forms whose physiognomic materialisation realise us responsively so that we experience circumstantial aspects that constitute an experience of being-there, part of a fabric, interpersonally constituted, that discloses contextual forms that embed being in aspects that constitute modalities, capacities arising from experiences of being subject to such processes. Without recognition, without disclosure, there is no contextualisation and individuals experience being bereft of embedding mediations and experience an impoverishment that is an essential aspect of properties that inhere in recognition so that, lacking such aspects, individuals experience there being "nothing there", the absence of recognition, the absence of mediation, constitutes a nothing that constitutes an experience of inability to function in relation to the world because there is no interpersonal constitution of contexts and individuals have no way to incorporate epistemic aspects that arise as adaptive responses to interpersonal disclosures that constitute neurophysiological mechanisms. Their capacities, their experience of being, their humanity, is impoverished because their relation to the world is affected. The reality Derrida alludes to, the nothingness that exists outside of contexts, the maelstrom of absence that constitutes a disorienting malaise leaving people bewildered by the non-possibility arising from the absence of the mediations required to accede to recognised forms of existence, is only too apparent to the devalued who experience an antipathy to the world born of dislocation from any anchorage in it. Without involvement they experience the constitution of an inability born of the absence of the conditions which satisfy intentional forms and so experience an impairment that is a fundamental aspect of the meaning of being forms that they experience being constitutive aspects of their being-for-others. Events constitute meanings via the forms whose disclosure constitute involvements in the sense of forms emerging via the practice that is constituted via the use of space to instantiate forms so that the experience of modalities arises as an aspect of being-there: contextualisation and realisation physiognomically materialise capacities that are effects of such processes. The socially devalued are generally weakly integrated and an effect of barriers arising from the processes whereby the valued use public space to establish possibilities mediated via such forms is that the poor face the disabsorption of unrealisation and incarnate the effects of the reiteration of forms rooted in the recognition of their difference so that they bear the sense of the absence of access to contexts as an experience of incapacity rooted in the inability to refer to anything that might interpersonally validate them so that they experience being-unable to function socially as a mediation of the nothing that is a real stake of public fields: outside of contexts there really is nothing and this absence is really experienced by those who experience being circumscribed via the incorporated effects of a life characterised by the absence of opportunity that is a real stake of economic fields. The paradox is that lower class students turn to education because of the cultural disembedding of lower class culture arising from the economic divisions whose form arise via differences in ways of being rooted in the materialisation of forms rooted in such divisions and they end up facing the same processes constitutive of their objectivity via different institutional mediations of the same system of differences because of the casual practice of such differences constitutive of public culture. Those who lack
any access to determinative possibilities because of the social distances constitutive of the space whose disclosure circumscribes their practical sense of availabilities rooted in the limits of form they inscribe via being located via such processes, make the most ambiguous educational choices because they lack access to educational fields that constitute significant distinctions so that they choose from a social malaise that the education merely reproduces. The absence of possibilities relating to their higher education is manifest via those who process them into it in the first place, as the words of one vice-principal in a tertiary education college make clear:

What we found was that most of the students who went through the college used to come back for help because there just wasn't any support for them at the university and then when they completed there was nothing they could do so they used to come back looking for teaching so we used to tell them to go and do the PGCE.

As another university lecturer in education articulates the same truth:

From what I see, the working class kids have got to have something vocational in their degree, it’s working class kids who do degrees in social science who are stuffed, if they’ve not got this vocational orientation, lots of them just end up training to teach. It’s all a bit cyclical, they come onto our degrees, do that and then end up coming back to do teaching because there’s nothing they can do.

As someone described:

Humanities subjects earn less than construction and engineering. HE business in Doncaster needs a masters degree to teach f.e students who stay in f.e colleges to do HE. So students stay in f.e to do a degree go to SHU to do masters and come back to teach in the college. Thing I realised is that even though they do a masters they still are weak academically but it doesn’t matter as so are many of their students.

As someone else described the phenomena:

In a bourdieusian perspective, I’d say that that’s something depending on the amounts and structure of capitals the sociology students possesses...Of course if you're talking of decapitalized low-end students, I agree that coursing sociology or any other similar matter won’t probably help them much, and probably will reinforce feelings of frustration, anguish and self-depreciation. Last Wednesday I was talking to some of my students (social workers that are doing a specialization master degree) and one of them was incredibly happy because she was unemployed and now was able to find a job in a call centre and she was able to finally pay her bills and stop depending on her parents; many of these students are just hoping to get a job, whatever it can be, and become increasingly detached from the disciplines they studied and they once wished were the path to employment and fulfilment.

As someone else explained:

I think quite a few in the humanities do doctorates and don’t get that much, that’s the reason why we get so many applications for the Clare Hall Research Fellowship in the Arts and Social Sciences, we get hundreds of applications for the one stipendiary fellowship because there is very little for a lot to do.

In other words, the whole process just reproduces the underlying mediation of nothing that people have tried to escape via turning to a truncated and tortuous
pathway in education that is, more or less, completely exploitative and dependent on the perpetuation of the devaluation that constitutes the need to function as a consuming-producer of vacuous institutional processes that consist of nothing and lead nowhere, "there is very little for a lot to do". Because of the absence of working class presence within institutions, the extortion of the sense of a process that narcissistically realises institutional agents renders invisible the reality that many face. As you are processed, it is as if institutional agents are utterly oblivious to the condition you face being reproduced and the experience you experience being physiognomically regenerated via the exploitative and vacuous relationships that constitute the reality you experience. Since you function as a source of varieties of supply via value-constituting relationships that disclose access to the grounds of operative forms of intentionality for institutional agents they experience being projectively realised so that they feel they are actually doing something significant because they experience significant forms of actualisation via you, you are a source of narcissistic supply. The social distances inscribed in differences of position become transmuted into different forms of realisation relating to different ways of being circumscribed as an effect of significances incorporated via such processes so that the ability to refer, and function, arises from moments constituted via recognitions that involve individuals in a context that is merely absent for many who experience being the incarnation of the absence of the forms constitutive of the ability so that they merely experience the negation constitutive of an objectivity that is part of the symbolic mediation of forms of power rooted in distributions of income that institutions exist to constitute. What is being perceived here is the effects of an absence that arises from the incapacity of those who constitute autonomous administrative processes via the financing procured via the processing of poorer students who face an irrelevant education disembedded from any sphere of practice whose sole effect is merely to entrench a credential inflation which, paradoxically, devalues further what they procure making them prey to an extension of the same process because of the fundamental logic constitutive of their position. What they see the interpersonal grounds of is a process of consecration that Bourdieu describes:

...it can be accepted that the technically competent are those who are socially designated as competent, and that it is sufficient to designate someone as competent in order to impose on him or her a propensity to acquire the technical competence which in return is the basis of her social competence. (Bourdieu 1993: 161)

Moreover, recognition is a requirement of access to the interpersonal forms that disclose aspects that are a condition of acquiring the publicly recognised form of the competence by being realised in relation to public realisations that relationally materialise individuals in relation to aspects constitutive of competence as an experiencable attribute of one’s being-for-others. This is why recognition is a key mediation of the sense of being competent because the experience of the ability requires the appropriation of forms whose disclosure constitute one as subject of the ability manifest via the forms which constitute the sense of the property one experiences being manifest via one’s instantiation of the modality appropriated via the recognition. Individuals need to be perceived to be appropriate in order to be given access to the relationships of involvement, the contextualizing mediations,
That constitute determinate possibilities and experience being capable of manifesting such aspects. Recognition is a key mediating aspect of the grounds of properties whose experience require involvement in relationships that disclose such possibilities: actualization is a key modality of the absorption in forms that constitute capacities appropriated via the sense of such realizations. This is why Bourdieu says, “the propensity to acquire what is called technical competence rises with social competence, that is, as a function of social recognition of being worthy and therefore called upon to acquire that competence” (Bourdieu 1993: 160). This is why so much of the anonymous administrative processing characteristic of the education of the poor fails and merely reproduces the personalised effects of divisions whose informal constitution exploit the administrative nature of the education made available to the poor. What educationalists do is use the administrative-bureaucracies that channel finances to procure resources through a charade involving association with students who produce the forms whose administration creates artefacts supposed to objectify students whose value is stringently regulated by the interpersonal processes constitutive of existing in relation to forms of actualisation that constitute the actual, recognised, forms in which competence is perceived because these forms are produced to constitute such significances whose grounds remain unavailable to the multitude forced to pass through a meaningless administration rooted in the distances arising from the exploitation of people condemned to a devaluation arising from an exclusion that secures the economic conditions of reproduction of the institutions. What the poverty of the process does is constitute the visibility of the staff and secure their economic viability for very little labour but because the process reduces to private association surrounding the management of student production, there is little, if anything, for students to be involved in so that they face the same relation to their academic production as the unemployed do in relation to their attempts to access objectivisation and this is manifest in the fact that students have nowhere to go, and experience no immediate reason-for their production: they don’t need the education anytime soon in relation to anything and the labour of most is akin to a correspondence course because of the way the administrative bureaucracies are exploited by those who institute the appearance of their processes and, thereby, their own visibility via forms which materialise the sense, and experience of being, competent. For students, especially those from distant regions, the education is merely a reproduction of the same form of life which physiognomically regenerates the same sense so that students remained enmired in a circumscription which reproduces the same way of being situated so that students don’t accede to the sense of anything and manifest this via a disillusionment that is a necessary effect of the conditions constitutive of the illusion of the reality of fields whose significance reduce to the interpersonal significances constitutive of disclosures which physiognomically regenerate a sense of being significant for those recognised so that those valued elicit relations of involvement which reconstitute the sense of significances reproduced via the field as a key stake. A contactless educational process of a few hours lectures per week and then solitary production in order to secure financing for a certification process that finances the institutions clearly cannot address the privatised and individuated constitution of value that an individual from a distant region is constituted in relation to. It appears that the
education the lower class get merely reproduces the conditions from which the problems they have in attributing competence to themselves arise and they end up feeling the same sense of fraudulence characteristic of others who exist outside of cultural spheres. The problem is, for some, there is no access to the grounds of competence, no access to labour market practices. Credentials are supposed to be a surrogate analogue of these forms but they aren't valued because they are accessible! As someone else described the effects of such conditions, “I feel too old and knackered to compete. Everything’s bullshit”. Negation constitutes a weariness arising from awareness of forms which constitute modalities born of absences of possibility so that individuals face a negative actualization, or unrealisation, that constitutes an objectivity that, privately, they can do nothing to countermand because it precludes any real public existence. More importantly, the significance of the ‘experience’ arises from the involvements that disclose the forms appropriated via being-there so that one incorporates capacities whose conditions of possibility are realized via such processes. It is the logically necessary relation between such conditions and possession of capacities that inhere in such possibilities that leads employers to attend so fully to the details of how individuals have been situated, or contextualized, because such processes, while effects of valuationary processes, are the basis of accession to cognitions which inhere in the individual as an effect of existing via the background constituted via such processes. As one employer put it, “We are writing to let you know that we have found candidates with stronger/more relevant backgrounds for this specific role”. This is why the production of differences, using space, is part of the constitution of capacities that arise from being subject to the recognitions that materialize capacities that inhere in existing via disclosures which constitute capacities appropriated via experiencing being subject to such spatial processes. The problem for the devalued is that they exist outside of such constitutive moments, and this is why so many of the reclassified unemployed, experience their education as a meaningless process, they share a kinship with the unemployed in that what is available to them has no significance and cannot be used to elicit involvement so that the process available to them tends to sustain a form of objectivisation relating to an objectivity that they incorporate via the absence of access to consequential forms of disclosure which constitute recognized forms that function as stakes, as sublimated economic forms, only because they are unavailable to the majority. This is why the everyday politics of recriminations and discriminations constitutive of presence via vacuous educational processes is so profoundly marking, educational fields become merely, for the poor, another sphere of subjection to differences manifest via treatments born of recognition of a difference being constituted via recognitions which disclose ways of being arising from existing via the absence constituted via the recognition of the difference so that, experiencing being-perceived, inconsequentially, they access nothing consequential, nothing of significance, and experience an incapacity born of the lack of engagement, and lack of opportunity, for realization, that inconsequential educational spheres constitute, as the inconsequential nature of the educational process exploits the dispossessed, creating an autonomy that ensures the vacuous redundancy of the process, something then recognized by employers who perceive them as possessed of no relevant experience. As one teacher puts it, “The students I teach, I look at them and think ‘what skills have they got apart from being able to
reference using the Harvard system, what can they do?” People’s value is a manifest effect of the involvements they are capable of eliciting and their capacities are effects of experiences of being-realised in relation to a fabric of everyday discriminations that constitute the forms incorporated via being subject to experiences of being circumscribed via such processes. Those with economic power use it to constitute themselves spatially, publicly, via effective experiences of being so that their presence is consequential and forms appropriated whose efficacy are an effect of the way they experience being validated via forms whose significance constitute capacities born of ways of experiencing being realised in relation to such aspects. What this means is that the poor’s existence in educational spheres merely mirrors the processes they are subject to generally so that the form of their existence arises from the same processes that constitute their uninvolvment more generally and their educational experience is constituted via the same processes that characterize their public objectivity generally. The forms constitutive of their way of being-there are the same as their way of being generally and their educational processing is characterized by a general uninvolvment that characterizes the absence that its inscribed forms evoke as recognition of the nature of a worthlessness born of a devaluation characteristic of their institutional processing. Subjection to the forms of these processes constitutes an inability to represent oneself because one is not subject to the physiognomic regeneration that allows one to instantiate the forms constitutive of competence. Without access to publicly situated relational aspects how does one even experience the sense of relational possibilities one doesn't experience being interpersonally constituted and, thereby, how can one begin to represent oneself or interface with institutional agents? The institutional-relational forms that subtend accession to recognised forms of objectivity transfigure into an anonymous experience for the devalued who find themselves unable to interface in any way with criteria whose symbolic forms arise from relationships of involvement that disclose capacities experienced via being subject to such modalities for those recognised. Those who exist outside of the relational bases that constitute recognised forms of objectivity find it impossible to interface. Being-able to interface appropriately requires a history of realisations arising from disclosures which involve one in a reality whose sense is inseparable from the physiognomic materialisation of elements absorbed via realisations that constitute an active behavioural fluency incorporated via experiences of being subject to relationships that ensure those subject to recognition undergo a process of osmosis whereby imperceptible adjustments arise from experiences of being-subject to such contextualising mediations so that they absorb an expressive physiognomy, a demeanour, whose aspects are rooted in evaluative processes that subtend access to identities whose forms inhere in the enactment of such processes so that the composition of the reality of a field of practice inhere in expressive physiognomies which radiate existential structures, or implicit configurations of sense, that constitute forms of life that mutually implicate, and tacitly refer, to the positional processes from which they arise. This is why aspects of a CV can be immediately perceived as sensible and qualitative differences rooted in the class structure function as absolutes. As individuals are subject to evaluations, so they are subject to positional differences that inscribe the sense of the structure in which the difference inhere. Meanings are sedimented via realisations that involve us in
forms that physiognomically materialise capacities which make sense because we experience reality via involvement in forms that constitute such modalities. The sedimentation and incorporation of possibilities requires involvement, they involve trajectory and require continuity because they presume the affirmation via which they become inscribed as aspects of the behavioural actuality appropriated via experiences of such modalities. This is why the ability to interface with employers requires involvement in relational conditions that constitute the possibility of experiencing intentional aspects identified via manifestation of access to such conditions because, logically, meaning-bearing components, the ability to instantiate appropriate forms, is an effect of experiences of being subject to relational conditions that are ontologically coincidental with the identification, and attribution, of intentional aspects that inhere in experiences of being subject to such possibilities (Marcoulatos 2001). Without access to the grounds of such forms, individuals will not be able to interface with the anonymous processes of the labour market and the anonymity of their experience of the relationships that subtend such states will probably leave them bereft of any experience of any horizon within which they might even conceive of themselves as functional. The forms required to interface with the labour market arise from aggregative forms of involvement constituted via closures which guarantee the exclusivity of the significance of the objectivity arising from access to such conditions. In order to interface via processes that are completely anonymous for the devalued, you have to have been subject to an organisation rooted in the recognition of possibilities as potentialities whose attribution constitute such aspects so that one can accede to the public grounds of such objectivities. The ability to show up appropriately relates to experiences of being perceived to bear the sense of forms appropriated via experiences of being realised in relation to such possibilities so that the experience of potentiality relates to experiences of being recognised which disclose a fabric appropriated via being subject to the sense of such aspects. This accounts for the hopelessness of the devalued who experience not their potentiality, but a reduction whose reference inheres in experiences of being subject to such limiting and debilitating aspects. Without access to the interpersonal grounds of objectivities, individuals cannot discover themselves as capable of bearing the sense of forms whose interpersonal grounds remain unavailable. Because neurophysiological structures are absorbed not as rules, or intentional contents, but via adaptive responses to ways of being-there, such that the shape of dispositions arises from realisations of form which constitute capacities appropriated via being subject to such processes, individuals must be subject to the involvements which constitute the significances perceived to manifest the actualisation of ways of being that constitute capacities perceived via access to the grounds of objectivities which allow individuals to represent themselves because they access the institutional conditions which constitute representational forms of intentionality. It is because meaning-bearing components are coincidental with involvement in relational forms that constitute an experience of being-able-to-satisfy conditions that constitute representational forms of intentionality that such aspects function as significances, as aspects of selection processes: the interpersonal and institutional relations of involvement are perceived to manifest the sense of capacities that inhere in experiences of being subject to such modalities. Without access to the grounds of such aspects, individuals can neither interface correctly nor
experience their own possibility, instead of experiencing capacities, they experience
inabilities that are effects of differences of status transposed into differences of
ability via interpersonal barriers that transpose differences in objectivity into what
appear to be differences of intelligence. The problem for the devalued is that they
do not access the social and associational, public, institutional, conditions that
constitute capacities for reference and instantiation that inhere in biographical
realisation in relation to a trajectory that sustains contact with the sense of forms
that inhere in their physiognomic materialisation: without co-presence and
contextualisation, individuals cannot possess attributes that are ontologically
coincident with realisation. Individuals can be made to bear the sense of the truth
of institutional and social relationships as a sense they bear that delimits their
capacities for reference and precisely what education should address, it simply
reproduces. Exclusion from the private spaces of the public sphere leads, not
merely, to an inability to represent oneself adequately because one experiences a
lack arising from structural divisions that mean that one doesn’t exist in relation to
the interpersonal forms that foreground representational forms of intentionality,
but, also, to an inability to be able to deal with situations because one cannot
constitute oneself adequately because one's experience is constituted via the flux of
an absence of the interpersonal forms which constitute capacities for reference born
of experiences of being publicly situated. Avoidance of further demeaning
experiences of ineptness, means not projecting and not attempting to try because,
the mediations constitutive of the form, that effort takes when one is realized, are
absent so that one merely accedes to a significance whose public grounds one has
no choice but to accept and the internal defeat of many takes place as a silent
isolation as they experience being constituted via the public grounds of a status-
linked incompetence that educational fields merely reproduce. With the middle
classes exercising their capacities to elicit recognition to use space to constitute
differences which immiserate even those from the lower class that access the same
level of credential, social ageing starts as soon as a difference in trajectory is
constituted, meaning that those from the lowest sectors of tertiary education face a
continuous instantiation of difference which merely negates everything they do so
that they become merely the lowest objectivity within each successive educational
cut so that their CV, and manner, are the perceivable boundary manifesting the last-
in and their trajectory becomes constituted via, and as, an "empty CV", manifesting
the effects of an exclusion that has taken place:

...steadily and impalpably...through hidden forms of elimination such as repeated years
(equivalent to a deferred elimination); relegation into second-class courses, entailing a stigma
that tends to induce proleptic recognition of scholastic and social destiny; and, finally, the
awarding of devalued certificates... It is true that the new system fobs off a good number of its
users with devalued qualifications, playing on the faulty perceptions that are encouraged by the
anarchic profusion of courses and diplomas which are difficult to compare and yet subtly ranked
in prestige...The allodoxia which the new system encourages in unnumerable ways is the reason
why relegated agents collaborate in their own relegation by overestimating the studies on which
they embark, overvaluing their qualifications, and banking on possible futures which do not
really exist for them; but it is also why they do not truly accept the objective reality of their
position and qualifications. (Bourdieu 1984: 154-155)
What this means is that certain people cannot signify themselves as competent because there is nothing they can effectively do that is accepted as manifesting that they can do anything in relation to the circumscriptions of public space that constitute spatial involvements that constitute the objectivity of particular practices whose criteria arise via the grounds of closures which constitute competencies relating to valuations that are transmuted into significances via ways of being situated via such spatial divisions. The nature, and effects of these closures, are manifest in the words of one individual:

I have received no feedback. The thing is the feedback will be fiction and I know that I am just a victim of widening participation. Jobs have gone to selected candidates for whom the job description and person specification are constructed. Now the thing is if anyone questions this they say well we selected external candidates but at interview they did not meet the right criteria that was essentially identified in the person spec and job description. They pretend they advertise through an open labour market but it’s a con: the person-spec is written with the candidate they want in mind, so all they do is make the specification fit the candidate that they want and worse than that, they give people what they want so they can then be selected, and then "oh look, they met the right criteria but that is because the criteria have been written with that candidate in mind". Uni is the same con. Identify the graduates you want (person description achieved) then create job description for person description and this excludes the many even they go into it wanting a chance. This ensures work is of their choice. Choose favoured candidates. It is closed for those they like who are like each other. I saw it for a job where there was this man who had a PhD and he was really good but the didn’t choose him, they chose this woman who was already working there who was in with the people doing the interviewing who distributed the employment in the college so really it is all stitched up. Better than that. Public funded position so must advertise outside the organisation to ensure widespread participation box ticked. They then create a job description based on a preferred internal candidate so even those called for interview are doomed. Public sector roles are cancerous with this approach and are staffed by individuals behaving like mutating cells. Now these reasons are so vague that when you ring for feedback they know they can’t say anything because they never wanted you in the first place. That’s why they hate feedback and avoid it. The woman’s far too busy to give me feedback and anyway why should she, she’s far too important for that and I mean so little I just met a widening participation requirement and can now be discarded. Gas em.

What is described here is how institutional conditions can be used to constitute representational forms of intentionality that inhere in the sense inscribed via the relationships that constitute such possibilities so that the conditions of satisfaction of such possibilities inhere in recognitions which disclose such aspects so that fields can be used to constitute the sense of properties that inhere in closures that function as emblems of characteristics appropriated via being subject to such modalities. Some accede to the appearance of functionality via involvement in relational processes that constitute such aspects as possibilities they experience being physiognomically materialised via recognitions that disclose such modalities. Involvement is an effect of forms constituted via recognition of properties that are physiognomically regenerated via experiences of being subject to such modalities. Clearly, institutional relationships can be used to constitute representational forms whose conditions of possibility arise from closures which constitute the sense of such aspects. Institutional space is used to constitute such aspects which function as statuses whose interpersonal disclosure constitute some as viable, able, as possessed of capacities born of properties they experience being physiognomically
regenerated via experiences of being subject to such possibilities, whereas others face a negation implied in associations which constitute an objectivity born of the revelation of such aspects, a rejection implied in the differences which constitute the sense of forms inscribed via the sedimentations of a continuous rejection implied in the meaning of being arising from such closures: "piss off because you don't meet the criteria". The devalued come to bear the sense of aspects which are inscribed in the constitution of public space and the labour market is merely a formalisation of such classificatory practices whose existential reality is belied by its way of being constituted. Institutional distinctions have determining efficacy in that once the difference they instantiate has been materialised they possess objectivity and become part of a manifestation of relational aspects that become consequential. This is why differences in status are always manifest by differences of involvement and blank CVs are the mark of those who lacked the significance to accede to recognitions which disclose the rare forms that manifest recognitions which disclose aspects which constitute intentional forms that inhere in experiences of being subject to involvements that orient by enveloping the individual in the sense arising from experiencing being subject to actually activated connections, direct mediations, that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in co-presence and capacities for vision and sense-bearing that arise from mobilisation, from being-there. For the devalued, their educational processes are as bereft of such processes as the labour market position they attempt to escape via mistakenly choosing bankrupt education. For them, their educational experience is just another rearticulation of meanings they experience being physiognomically regenerated via subjection to such processes. The absence of mediation characteristic of an insignificance they experience being reconstituted via public fields is just part of a negation that is reconstituted across social fields which is why the inverse care law is such a pervasive aspect of social reality. Speaking to this person again, a few weeks later, the following was described:

Well, thi’ never got back t’ me, an’ eventually I rang them an’ the woman who interviewed me said “we felt you didn’t talk about what you had to offer”. I ask myself how are you supposed to describe what you have to offer when you’re not working in the organisation? The wife says, “lie, everyone else does” but lie about what? If you work, maybe you can lie a bit and they might accept it but, if you’re out of work, what can yer se’? So, I said to her, “the reason you didn’t ask me what I could bring to the organisation was because I was only there to manifest widening participation”. And she said “well that’s not strictly true” and I said, “how am I supposed to say anything about what I might offer when I can’t actually do anything beyond wake and get out of bed?” Ah said to this woman, “Your ineptitude is matched only by your complacency” and that was the end of that conversation.

This raises a significant issue, how can individuals who experience there being no possibilities available to them, who exist outside of the interpersonal relationships constitutive of human contexts, represent themselves? Without value, without recognitions that disclose forms that constitute representational forms of intentionality, how can this person arrive at self-descriptions whose grounds of ascription he does not experience? The neurophysiological potential to be the subject of conscious mental states relates to ways of being-there that subtend such conditions. If the conditions are not satisfied for this potential to be realised then it has no mental reality, it is merely a disposition, and potentialities are latent, arising
from unformulated aspects, exchanges of existential sense via forms of expressivity, or manner, that radiate existential structures that constitute implicit configurations of sense that sub tend the emergence of neurophysiological potentialities if conditions are satisfied for individuals to experience realisation and engagement in relation to disclosures that constitute such modalities. Given the relation between the latent expressivity of a human presence that excretes a sense of its conditions, manifesting a coherent expressive continuum arising from embedding in a condition whose objectivity is apparent via such aspects, and more explicit forms of expressivity that require engagement, recognition and disclosure, we have to recognise the efficacy of exchanges of existential sense that constitute latent identities and appreciate the interpersonal conditions required to move individuals between modalities so that their faculties, potentialities and capacities, are engaged and they can experience the actuality of their potentialities via realisations that constitute them via mediums whose reality are easily occluded. Our cognitive faculties require the realisation of engagement that make projection an actuality so that, via the realisation of actualisation we experience projection via possibilities whose mediation physiognomically materialise the substrate of sense appropriated via experiences of being subject to such modalities so that we escape finitude, and insignificance, and experience being meaningfully constituted, that is, constituted, interpersonally, in relation to meanings we experience being-there, being subject to forms incorporated via the contextualisation of the recognitions which disclose such aspects. It is how we experience being-perceived that discloses the intraworldly aspects, the circumstantial forms, that absorb us in being-there, in the world we experience. Projection, involving realisation, involves the temporalisation of experiences so that realisation constitutes the hope founded via appropriation of possibilities that constitute an escape from the reduction of negation that forecloses on such modalities. This is why the devalued endure such hopelessness attendant on their unrealisation, the perception of their difference precludes their experience of possibility, which means that they exist on a terrain of unrealisation that physiognomically materialises a sense of hopelessness because, without mediation, their existence is futile, they cannot contest worthwhile aspects, aspects that are dependent upon experience of valuation. The situating of being, via recognition, involves individuals in possibilities which are signified via such aspects. This is how the labour market operates: it is exclusive forms of involvement that manifest difference, positively constituted, that are perceived to manifest competencies because such aspects constitute the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states elicited via the physiognomic materialisation of ways of being-there that presume relational actualisation. Whilst some accede to credentials, their acquisition is devoid of the relational forms that subtend the constitution of capacities that inhere in closures whose sense are inscribed in the differences perceived via a process whose anonymity obscures its reality. Via such privately constituted mediations, differences in status can be effortlessly transposed into what appear to be differences of competence via attenuated differences of condition that cannot easily be traced without a work that would be impossible to do because of the privatised atomisation of victims. The mute expressivity of those condemned to non-representational forms of intentionality is a demanding intellectual terrain as well as a pressing economic issue. The interview question presumes an answer from the
position of a subject who has experienced being realised so that they experience capacities arising from potentialities because individuals experience the actualisation of the neurophysiological dispositions arising from involvement in the diffuse aspects that constitute contexts. Without access to the spatial, relational, processes which constitute the grounds of abilities, then how can individuals present themselves as capable of satisfying conditions that they aren’t privy to experiencing being realised in relation to so that they can’t satisfy the conditions of attribution of intentional states which require states of existence that their position, condition, and state, preclude? Their inability to exhibit appropriate responses is merely an effect of the absence of intentional states whose grounds remain unavailable, which is why employers diligently scan for discrepancies because competence is an effect of involvement which is an effect of recognition which is an effect of social value which is why those who can't elicit recognition, cannot solicit contact and remain possessed of inabilities to refer to forms whose interpersonal constitution they don't experience so that their inability to refer is a physiognomically regenerated effect of statuses materialised via such differences. Distinctions are relational processes which disclose constitutive aspects which realise individuals in relation to ways of being whose cognitive reach are incorporated via realisations that physiognomically materialise sense intuited via subjection to such modalities. Without being able to access the conditions required to satisfy such conditions individuals are unable to physiognomically regenerate the sense of forms incorporated that are constituted via an incorporation arising from the individuated involvement in relationships which disclose the grounds of possibilities that individuals experience being via so that people who exist outside such public fields face a reality born of the fraudulence of relational forms which denude them of any capacity to project toward any possibilities immanent to the present and they face the protensionally sustained continuation of a barrier they incorporate via subjection to such processes. Even the capacity to lie would require an authority, a fluidity and dexterity, arising from being-realised in relation to interpersonal forms which physiognomically regenerate an experience of being competent that enabled the practice of fabrication, the derivation of the appearance of a determinate social identity via the grounds of another, but without access to such physiognomically regenerated aspects, how does one even instantiate enunciations that derive a sense of competence via manifesting the effects of being socially viable? Even attempts to lie would reveal a poverty of reference that would betray the individual, necessitating an honesty that can do nothing but reveal the extent of dispossession as it arises from social polarities that reproduce themselves at the heart of our culture. Language-use arises from ways of being socially realized so that one becomes subject to possibilities actualized via experiences of being realized in relation to a world constituted via involvement. Moreover, the capacity to represent oneself as “having something to offer” requires access to relational disclosures which render one subject to a capacity objectivised via the relationship so that the individual feels instituted to attribute, to themselves, possibilities that arise from an actualisation whose conditions of attribution are socially and institutionally rare so that the grounds of such abilities are inequitably distributed. The conditions required to satisfy certain intentional states aren’t available so that the individual cannot, individually, attribute such possibilities to themselves because of the way that they
experience being socially realised and interaction breaks down with it appearing that
the individual has an “attitude problem”. The neurophysiological readiness to enact
relational forms is annihilated via the negation arising from the incapacity being
socially realised via the social identity being reconstituted via the background that
the class structure represents. The conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state
cannot be fixed by means of understanding its literal meaning, one must be subject
to the relational processes which physiognomically materialise the mimetically
acquired capacity to instantiate such forms by being subject to experiences of being
capable of bearing the truth arising via such conditions so that one is involved in a
context which discloses the interpersonal means required to generate further
intentional states by experiencing being absorbed in a background whose relational
processes inform one’s existence because one experiences intelligibilities arising via
being-situated via such processes. This is because intelligence is more than the
encoding of information, and, instead, involves aspects that underpin meaning which
are not themselves significances so that ability involves more than merely being
brought to awareness of representationally constituted forms, rather, one needs to
access the modalities constitutive of representational forms of intentionality and the
ability to instantiate and enunciate appropriate forms requires continuous
involvement so that one progressively incorporates an intuitive facility arising from a
long process of familiarisation with forms whose intimacy arise from one’s
experience of being recognised via relationships which disclose, and
physiognomically regenerate, such forms as attributes experienced as part of being-
in-the-world. The condition of being unemployed casts light on fundamental aspects
of being a person. Those who aren’t recognised can’t elicit the recognition to solicit
the contact to ever exist via forms whose circumscription constitute the capacity to
instantiate configurations of uncodified forms arising from existing relationally so
that they experience being able to carry on appropriately so that they experience an
incapacity born of a really materialised process that constitutes an inability born of
the impossibility of acceding to the grounds of actualities that arise from closures
which constitute the significances arising from relationships which produce symbolic
forms. As one person put it, “The thing is, employers only care about yer experience,
thi’ not bothered abaht anythin’ else”. And one might ask why this is? It’s because
what is called “experience”, that is, forms relating to public disclosures arising from
circumscribed realms of legitimate encounter that relate to relational forms which
materialise possibilities actualised via access to such grounds, are the ontological
condition of appropriating forms, so that employers continually look for forms which
are the logical conditions for the acquisition of the dispositions they require
individuals to be habituated via. Criteria are drawn up with properties in mind that
arise from involvement in the spaces individuals who bear the traces of being-in such
spaces use to materialise their difference via the social properties arising from the
efficacy of the forms constitutive of the space. Particularly, the efficacy of the forms
arises from experiences of repeated exposure to disclosures which constitute the
capacity appropriated via being situated against such a background and this is why
closures constitute, not merely, the significance of the schema used to recognise the
competence but, also, the actual ability appropriated via the actualisation of the
possibility arising from existing against a background constituted via such relations of
involvement. This is why employers use categories related to closures which
constitute the forms appropriated via being-contextualised, for example: “We had a large amount of interest for this role and have short-listed the candidates with the most specific experience relating to the person specification”. The centrality of spatial relations to the forms constitutive of actual abilities are why we see criteria of the following kind:

What experience do you have in relation to writing and editing copy – please state when and where this experience was gained. In relation to your experience of producing written material, please provide a brief outline of the type of material you have produced, the audience it was aimed at, the format of the material and when this was.

Field-related experience is privileged continuously because relations of involvement, in spheres, produce abilities whose forms are disclosed via the relationships constitutive of abilities to sustain the incorporated effects of being situated against such a background so that temporal considerations are key as a guard against obsolescence because the physiognomic regeneration of the competence, as a materialised effect of relations of involvement, guarantees competence (it is as if employers act with a thorough practical awareness of the ontology of competence which is why educations that involve no involvement don’t produce objectified individuals):

We are looking for someone with at least three years’ recent experience in an editorial/publishing environment, so not just with a proven track record of writing engaging copy and editing features to tight deadlines, but with a firm understanding of the production process involved in putting together regular magazine titles.

What these criteria recognise are properties which are materialised via access to relations of involvement which constitute forms appropriated via being-recognised such that individuals accede to competencies relating to modes of realisation that are not equitably distributed. The reason competencies are perceived via access to fields is that relations of involvement are ontologically constitutive of abilities relating to circumscriptions whose form are incorporated as reactive effects of being-involved in spheres whose possibilities are appropriated via such processes so that such conditions of existence assure employers of capacities because they are their logical conditions. The labour market operates in relation to actualities that are manifest via involvements in circumscribed spheres that constitute the possibility of incorporating the competence required because these are the conditions constitutive of recognised forms of competence: they are publicly founded modalities embedded in relational processes whose closures constitute what is recognised via schema whose sense arise via such states of affairs. Education doesn’t even operate in terms of possibilities because there is nothing, socially and publicly, that much of it relates to beyond the capacity to purchase an administrative relationship with someone who associates their name with an administrative labour done by others. The working class exist outside of particular fields and tend to be subject to an educational process that is enmired in the generality arising from the lack of specificity of fields which their processing supports so that the insulation arising from the autonomy secured by their administration means that they learn nothing very much about anything specific and, even worse, bear the sense of an
absence of contextualisation in an expressive physiognomy that arises from their
not-being-situated so that they bear the sense only of whatever they can access via
their families and domestic resource-base which the education relies upon because
it grants access to few, if any, resources. This is why 'experience' is always the
category used to locate candidates because its sense arises from the grounds
constitutive of public space, and education is always located, for its real significance,
in relation to the experience that manifests the real conditions that individuals
existence arises from because this is what matters to employers, they need people
with the social skills arising from experiences of being publicly mobilised and socially
realised, something the urban poor, especially the youngest, aren’t. It is because of
this relation between the production of fields and the production of value in relation
to competencies relating to forms whose rarity arise from closures which function to
constitute the value of labour power that the poorest undergo social-relational
processes that involve the least involvement; the least circumscription, the least
recognition, the least realisation so that they endure a condition which constitutes
the sense of forms of unrealisation that produce an actual inability to present
themselves in relation to public forms whose grounds remain unavailable to them.
These criteria relate to modalities whose disclosure are unavailable to many so that
forms of personhood rooted in realisation remain unavailable for those who can’t
access the real basis of forms via relations of involvement constituted via recognition
and education becomes a substitute for the absence of such possibilities yet, for
many, education is constituted via the same valuationary and spatial processes that
constitute the inability forcing many to function as consumers of such administered
forms. The hidden unemployment that is a structural condition of the functioning
of the neoliberal economic system generates excess competition which produces
educational clientele because the condition of the devalued constitutes a sense that
appears to demand educational action. The beneficiaries are educationalists in
weaker fields who experience the economic viability of their practices because of a
credential inflation that is an effect of such conditions. Excess competition leads to a
credential inflation that restricts labour supply without the unemployed being visible
but for those displaced via abstracted processes that involve little co-presence what
is the identity of the experience and from what does it emerge? As the identity of
the competence of some is recognised via grounds constituted via involvements in
relational matrix that ensure the legibility of a distinction born of the sense of
closures instituted via tacit reference to those whose invisibility it ensures because
they lack access to the involvements that arise from recognitions that constitute
recognised forms of social objectivity, others experience an invisibility attendant on
an insignificance manifest by their inability to solicit contact and experience reasons-
for-being-anywhere. The use of institutional space to constitute rare, distinguishing,
forms, has determining efficacy in that once constituted, their public
operationalisation affect the sense via which aspects are perceived. Clearly, such
processes involve different ways of being-there, different experiences of presence,
so that individuals experience different modalities arising from different ways of
being-realised that physiognomically materialise a sense of difference that inheres in
the shapes arising from involvements that constitute such modalities. The real issue
is the use of space to institute differences inscribed via ways of being treated that
sediment meanings experienced via being subject to such processes. Such
institutional aspects constitute sense inscribed via disclosures that determine possibilities. Space is used to inscribe the sense of properties but not everyone accesses involvement in relational spheres that locate them spatially at all, their experience of being-there is as limited as the significances they experience being physiognomically materialised via such modalities. The devalued are world-impoverished because a fundamental condition of referentiality and the inscription of meaning is affected by their social condition and their experience of being-a-person is affected. Recognition discloses interpersonal aspects that constitute access to a fabric experienced via being subject to modalities whose physiognomic materialisation envelop us in visibilities that cloak us in possibilities we experience being available via experiencing being subject to such processes. The absence of mediation physiognomically materialises an experience of being bereft because, without recognition there is no disclosure and no access to a medium which constitutes representational forms of intentionality. Moreover, this absence of positioning, such a fundamental aspect of negation, reconstitutes a sense of absence that inheres in being perceived to be merely part of a generic aggregate who warrant merely the minimal attention due to those reduced to paying for credentials bereft of any interpersonal, or existential, parameters which constitute contextualising mediations. The nature of the educational processing that lower class students go through is such that they don’t experience producing for any particular audience, their production isn’t grounded in any public practice beyond that of the assessment process that materialises the appearance of the function of those who personnel the bureaucracies financed via the administrative processing of their labour. The problem for lower class students is that they cannot be-perceived to incarnate properties whose sense inhere in relational forms they cannot access. Moreover, this lack of access to objectivising relational forms infects their self-understanding which becomes infused with the sense of an absence that is inherent to the nature of the process they undergo. It is not merely that they can’t be perceived to incarnate the sense of particular forms but that they, really, cannot instantiate the sense arising via experiences of being realised in relation to such forms so that they bear the sense of such absences, not merely, in relation to their CVs, but, also, really, in responses attuned to an absence that constitutes a real inability to refer to very-much in relation to anything because their cultural experience arises from the void of a negotiation that is problematic for those who deal with them because it emerges from the actual conditions that subtend their being. They cannot be perceived to manifest properties whose form they do not access. This is recognised by one teacher in further education when he says, "There is nothing there for them, just invented processes. They create programmes devoid of reality because there never is or was anything there for them. Today the proliferation of the process has made it much worse because kids are just stuck in the sector until moved to another variation of it". We can appreciate the effects of absences that constitute a sense of inability arising from experiences of being-realised in relation to conditions that preclude access to developmental mediations in the following:

I felt like I was thick since comprehensive though I mean I never really contemplated going to uni until a few years after I'd been working and the work seemed like a dead end. I’d already been stuck into lower Groups for maths and stuff so i just gave up on some subjects.

S: Did university alleviate your feelings of being thick or exacerbate them?
Excacerbate them. I felt more stupid there.
S: So, it made your feelings of inadequacy worse?
Ye', a lot worse. It made me retreat to places and People who i felt i could relate to. Uni was the worst stage for me. It was in the second year that I started getting bad Panic attacks and ended up back in Rotherham ill for some weeks. At RCAT I was fine. Never had any problems there. University made me feel stupid and it made me ill and I was never the same after.
S: Did it make you feel pessimistic?
Utterly hopeless. It was a dead end for me and my mates. We ended up with a lot of debt for something that did us no good. I just felt like I was being taken for a ride after a while really first i was stressed and near the end i was angry. I refused to turn up to my graduation because i realised it was all a fraud my mate did the same but he was at a different uni.

One can well appreciate the congruity between this and what Bourdieu describes:

Now, there exists, in the social world, a category, that of the subproletarians, which highlights these conditions by showing what happens when life is turned into a 'game of chance'...and when the limited desire for power which is habitus in a sense capitulates before the more or less long-lasting experience of powerlessness...the annihilation of chances associated with crisis situations leads to the collapse of psychological defences...a kind of generalized and lasting disorganisation of behavior...linked to the disappearance of any coherent vision of the future...The...disorganized and...incoherent behaviours, constantly contradicted by their discourse, of these people without a future, living at the mercy of what each day brings and condemned to oscillate between...flight into the imaginary and fatalistic surrender to the verdicts of the given, are evidence that, below a certain threshold of objective chances, the strategic disposition itself, which presupposes practical reference to a forth-coming...cannot be constituted. The real ambition to control the future...varies with the real power to control that future, which means first of all having a grasp on the present itself...When listening to subproletarians...one discovers how the powerlessness that, by destroying potentialities, prevents investment in social stakes...In losing their work, the unemployed have also lost the countless tokens of a socially known and recognized function, in other words the whole set of goals posited in advance, independently of any conscious project, in the form of demands and commitments...Deprived of this objective universe of incitements and indications which orientate and stimulate action and, through it, social life, they can only experience the free time that is left to them as dead time, purposeless and meaningless. If time seems to be annihilated, this is because employment is the support, if not the source, of the most interests, expectations, demands, hopes and investments in the present, and also in the future or the past that it implies, in short one of the major foundations of illusio in the sense of involvement in the game of life, in the present, the primordial investment which—as traditional wisdom has always taught, in identifying detachment from time with detachment from the world—creates time and indeed is time itself. (Bourdieu 2000: 223)

The key formulation is "this objective universe of incitements and indications which orientate and stimulate action and, through it, social life". It is the absence of this that causes the disorientation manifest in the illness and retreat described. Disorientation is an effect of a purposelessness arising from the meaninglessness of the failed projection of educational processes that cannot ground individuals in anything constitutive because the public sphere financed via such processes is closed. Mass higher education is a way of creating spurious management functions whose outcomes can be easily manipulated so that the redundancy, and bankruptcy, of the processes are obscured. The personal effects are identical to other forms of unemployment. The absence of mediation; the absence of realisation; the absence of connection or contextualisation; rooted in recognition of a difference; have the effect of physiognomically regenerating a sense of inability that is an effect of subjection to the same processes across different institutional fields, hence the
implied linkage of 'phases' with the part at tertiary college being a respite, a refuge, before the onset of a prior condition that becomes crystallised via existential manners arising from subjection to such processes. Meaning is constituted via ways of being-there, via forms of existence, and what is clear is that the absence of mediation physiognomically materialises an experience of being unable that is a real effect of the absence of contextualising mediations. Without access to the realising forms that constitute experience of involvement, how can individuals appropriate forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute sense appropriated via being realised in relation to such possibilities as moments one experiences being actually realised in relation to? Hence, feeling stupid is an effect of an unrealisation rooted in a dislocation arising from a negation that such processes merely perpetuate. Without connection to some context, or sphere of practice, what is there for individuals to develop in relation to? How can they experience representational forms of intentionality arising from experiences of being situated when their process is so dislocating? It is because of this that we see the retreat back to the hometown to recover from the effects of impugning injunctions arising as part of the informal sanctions arising from an experience of a real inability to function as a reciprocating protensional aspect of a social world whose reality emerges via such constitutive processes that individuals have, themselves, to escape an experience of reduction and inability so they can socially breathe and physiognomically regenerate an experience of being able to function as a protentional medium capable of realising others because one's forms are reciprocal and allow one to accede to a level of copresence, mutuality and capability born of such modalities. The analogy of breathing alludes to the effusion of being arising from realisation and the experience of possibility arising from recognitions which disclose forms appropriated via experiencing being realised in relation to them so that one experiences transivities of sense that subtend meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities.

Closure, absence and negation

The situation most lower class students exist in relation to is such that they don’t produce for any particular audience and there production isn’t actually related to anything, or anyone, beyond themselves so that they cannot satisfy selection criteria because they don’t exist in relation to literate communities. I recently saw a post in which the organisation boasted that it was "an equal opportunity employer dedicated to building a diverse community of faculty, staff and students who are committed to excellence and respectful of gender, sexuality, disability, age, socioeconomic status, nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, and culture", so they don’t discriminate on the grounds of anything, but then look at the selection criteria:

This position requires a Ph.D. and significant experience with writing in the disciplines, writing centres, and multilingual writing. Strong candidates will demonstrate experience in developing faculty networks and support for writing tailored to the unique needs of their institutions. They will also have experience with writing centres that support writing in all disciplines. Interest and experience in working with multilingual writers is preferred.

For lower class students in worthless disciplines doing a PhD removes them from locality without contextualising them because there are too many students
competing for what few opportunities there are. Choices of credential that might get you into teaching are limited by the poverty that limits your capacity to determine any future and then, as we can see, credentials are conditional for their value on a range of capacities for embedding that are mediated by other financial conditions: how would one someone from a non-literate community connect to anything when they need credentials but the process of acquisition of the credentials removes them from one context without embedding them in any other and in which their capacity to elicit recognition is limited by the insignificance of even the best they can aspire to? How can individuals even know what they will need to access anything outside of access to anything? How can they develop capacities when their education is perpetually separate from ever doing anything? How can individuals from working populations, separated without connecting, who undergo a devaluation of credentials inseparable from an isolation of themselves, connect to the institutional conditions constitutive of these aspects such that they experience capacities emerging as part of their acquisition of intentional forms rooted in experiences of being relationally actualised when their certification arises from an administered assessment arising, fundamentally, from their decontextualized self-education? Moreover, the proliferation of certificates mean that many, especially those of the poor, are rendered worthless anyway and access to any kind of context is almost impossible. With so many different certificates, without access to a context how can individuals avoid misinvesting in worthless certificates? The problem lower class students have is not merely how to acquire competencies outside of access to their interpersonal conditions but also of acceding to their signification or objectification. The reality is that the conditional nature of attributions of competence, on these associational forms, eliminates members from communities that don’t have communal structures: without resources, how and why, would individuals function collectively, especially in a labour market whose mediations individualise and isolate? It isn’t merely that the social and interpersonal grounds of objectivities are unavailable to them, but, also, that they lack access to the development of dispositions rooted in modalities that remain unavailable to them because of the conditional nature of attributions of competence that relate to social and institutional forms that they do not experience being realised in relation to. Without the conditions of satisfaction that subtend such intentional aspects, it is hardly surprising that they can neither satisfy such criteria, that is, manifest, as objective facets of their being-for-others that they have experienced the grounds of such objectivities but, also, feel able to ever be capable of instantiating such forms. Without realisation, without opportunity, without access to aggregative, associational forms that subtend collective forms of intentionality, how can they feel able to describe themselves in relation to possibilities whose relational conditions are not satisfied for them? The reality of the difficulties that students from working communities have in acceding to such forms is manifest in the following:

It was all bad, Ah just went into it and did not want to see any of it again, Ah went in, it was “Fuck off and find yourself some teaching experience”, so yer dependent on where yer did yer A levels an’ they don’t wanna see yer, Ah learned nothin’ on mi degree, Ah got by teachin’ from what Ah’d learned at A level, Ah left Ah’d learned nothin’ and I thought “fuck off, yer’ve done nothin’, Ah’ve ‘ad fuck all contact, you don’t giy a fuck”, it’s like any con artist, they don’t want to hear from you again as long as you live, they’re the same. The skills are so tenuous that
yer’ve now’t to fall back on, Ah went in a electrical shop an’ Ah wo’ stood next t’ this bloke, an’ he wo’ talkin’ as if hi wo’ strugglin’, no communicational skills, yet he’s more marketable than Ah am.

The only way the process could function effectively is if institutional agents acted to mediate contact with different conditions of existence, that is, with ways of being-realised in relation to interpersonally constitutive mediations that tacitly summoned physiognomically materialised aspects that constituted the sense of possibilities appropriated via experiencing being-realised in relation to such modalities and yet, clearly, none of this occurs. The reality of the state of affairs arising via the sense inscribed across distances is clearly articulated, "Ah’ve ‘ad fuck all contact”. The process fails because of the relational basis via which the appearance of functions is materialised. Institutional agents operate outside of parameters of contact and merely attend to the institutional relationships via which they materialise the sense of the properties arising from interactions within closed networks (and the contextualisation and institutional mobilisation subtending these networks is the real coup of the social structure). There is no contradiction between people who appear to be the very incarnation of professional commitment being utterly negligent because incompetence is invisible when the appearance of competence is merely an effect of commitments avowed within networks in which any contestation, or reality, can be avoided as part of self-presentational strategies that exploit the institutional and economic distances that constitute the very meanings that subent experiences of being competent. What is perfectly clear is the reality that the poor face: there is no contact and no mediation and they are forced back to their own limited spheres of existence to attempt to mediate an objectivity whose significance arises from such processes. The real problem for people in such a situation is how can they mediate access to determining forms of objectivity when there are no mediations of possibilities for them to mediate? Without the disclosure of a horizon, interpersonally, that constitutes possibilities appropriated via experiencing being subject to such forms, how can people, in such conditions, intuit anything to attempt to mediate? This is why this kind of 'education' causes such misery and merely increases the pain of frustrated projection because individuals are required to project from outside of any conditions constitutive of realisations that make available modalities whose sense are the medium of human development. This is why this individual draws the conclusion, "The skills are so tenuous that yer’ve now’t to fall back on". Without some sphere of application that might function as a disclosive medium eliciting cultural forms whose acquisition are sedimented via synchronisations arising via the incorporation of the forms of objectivisation that constitute such modalities, attempts to master cultural forms remain enmired in the distances that are only too apparent via the fact that one is never exposed to contexts that elicit them which ensure that the problem of one’s status and the attendant problem of the status constitutive of access to the contexts that constitute access to prestigious forms is only too apparent via the absurdity of the experience of the process one endures. Non-viability transposes into inability because there is no exposure to the interpersonal grounds that physiognomically materialise forms appropriated via being subject to their actualisation so that the insignificance of degradation always has existential aspects so that the unavailability of modalities of realisation always transfigures into an experience of being incapable. Without
involvement, without embedding, there is no realisation and without realisation there cannot be successful projection and these are just expressive effects of the absence of any disclosive medium, the nothing experienced as being constitutive of one's actuality as a publicly manifest aspect of one's objectivity, one's being-for-others. There is no context available to validate the acquisition of skills which is why these skills are not recognised in the labour market because their validation is inseparable from the closures that constitute the value of those who manage the trick of securing the conditions of satisfaction of their own intentional forms, ensuring an experience of recognition that discloses the possibility of acceding to recognised forms of objectivity, via experiences of objectivisation that the education of the poor precludes. Self-meditiation and self-education preclude self-actualisation and merely reproduce an experience of redundancy that remains a key aspect of the social structure. If people's 'education' embeds them in nothing, provides nothing, and if they have to mediate access, somehow, alone, that is, mediate the appearance of forms which inhere in organisational and relational processes that are so poorly instantiated; “Fuck off and find yourself some teaching experience”; reducing people to going back to where they studied prior to university; “so yer dependent on where yer did yer A levels”; then how can we not see the labour market criteria as discriminatory? Take the following, "please list and describe any activities in which you have been involved (i.e. community, academic, etc.) that may contribute to your ability to teach sociology courses". People in poor communities don't tend to organise because given the nature of the way they are institutionally treated how would they ever realise such possibilities? And, given the nature of this experience of higher education; "yer’ve done nothin’, Ah’ve ‘ad fuck all contact, you don’t giy a fuck"; how could we expect, individuals subject to a treatment that physiognomically regenerates a sense of absence that is an effect of subjection to such forms, to be able to "list and describe any activities in which you have been involved (i.e. community, academic, etc.) that may contribute to your ability to teach sociology courses"? Sociology itself doesn't involve such modalities, except for the elite who appropriate institutional space through a democratisation all the more necessary to secure the conditions of its financial reproduction when it is such a worthless subject, unable to contribute even a worthwhile representation of the nature of its own constitutive processes. I did two higher degrees in sociology and beyond the mediations that I was required to generate, via my own unsituated labour, there was absolutely no mediation beyond contact I had to seek in order to materialise the illusion of an educational process. Most of the students who start sociology degrees cannot even aspire to ever embarrass themselves or ever manifest how poor their education is because they won't access associational academic events anyway. Even those who go on to postgraduate study don't access the institutional paraphernalia, the representational apparatus, used to constitute objectifications that distinguish the employees from the reclassified unemployed whose labour has no significance even in the field financed by their attempts to turn their own labour into institutional resources for those who control the space of positions via objectifications refracted via relationships of limited actuality. Many struggle to secure financing that purchases a minimalist administrative process akin to the bureaucratised relationships that constitute claiming benefits. Experiences of contact or co-presence are rare via processes that require the student to labour in
order to produce mediations that materialise the appearance of a process in which they function as a medium of disclosure for other institutional agents. Talking to one local person about their experience of university, I asked:

S: What contact is there on yer degree?
There is no contact, thi' put it all on net so yer dun’t ‘ave t’ gu in, yer can do it all from ‘ome just bi guin’ on net, even lectures. Thi’s no contact.

Selection criteria of the order, "list and describe any activities in which you have been involved (i.e. community, academic, etc.) that may contribute to your ability to teach sociology courses", raise serious questions about discrimination because, clearly, we need to be mindful of the nature of the effects of competition on the poorest and aware of the nature of their social experience. Clearly, association and community, even any sphere of activity relating to what little there is available to them, are problematic given an essential effect of devaluation: dislocation. The valued access circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter because they produce institutional forms that constitute objectivities based in closures that refract a visibility that tacitly refers to the anonymous associational processes characteristic of 'public' institutions, even within elite institutions, there is a surreptitiously realised privileging of the private capital of fee-paying students over those financed via the state apparatus, and such criteria merely privilege those who are products of associational forms that are uncharacteristic of the poor. Academic communities are not associational spaces for lower class students, as the following makes clear:

Wi’ mi it wo’ like, “you went to a technical college”, “what’s one of those”, “is that like where you, you know do engineerin’, plumbin’, electronics, all those ruffian pass times?” Not quite, although people who do things like engineerin’ or plumbin’, are like loaded nahr. An Ah actually wish Ah’d done that now because those went into it are makin’ loads, An’ Ah actually think, “What a waste time uni’ wo? Why did Ah waste mi time?” Ah could ‘ave started off doin’ plumbin’ wi’ no qualifications, which is not to tek anythin’ away from plumbers, because it actually takes a lot to do their qualifications. Because at the end of the day they will be quite comfortable compared to me. (S: Well ye’, that’s what Ah’ve seen all ma mates who wo’ manual workers ‘ave been successful, lads who went to uni’ an’t.) Ah mean, Ah ‘ave to get a job that depends on people who look dahn the nose at us. If yer a plumber or a plasterer yer build a life rahnd people like yerself. Ah mean, today Ah’ve ‘ad to ring up an’ listen to a load of shit abaat selection criteria an’ other stuff, “well this people more highly qualified, which means a Master’s degree; people wi’ more relevant experience which means that some people ‘ave already got into it” so yer do think, why have to put up wi’ all the crap ‘r socialisin’, talkin’ bollocks, yer know. To be honest, at the end of the day, if yer a plasterer, a plumber, a bricky, yer’ve got something to show. What ‘ave Ah got to show fo’ it? Mi works crap, Ah’ve a certificate wain’t get mi an interview fo’ a twelve grahnd a year job. Ah’ve nothing to show when what yer want is a big wad’r cash to show fo’ yer efforts. (S: No, we’ve been through is an illusion, like yer se’, commutin’, yer never there, thi’s no contact with ‘em, what’s the point’r that?) I didn’t make, Ah don’t know whether this was just me not wanting to get side-tracked from trying to do the best Ah could, but, Ah mean, Ah ‘ad odd person Ah could stop an’ talk abaat football to, but apart from that, I didn’t make any friends at uni’. But, now, it isn’t like Ah could text anybody an’ Ah se’, “fancy a beer”; “Ah’ve got a week off, fancy doin’ somethin’”, Ah just didn’t mek any friends. Ah dun’t know why Ah just didn’t make any friends. Do yer know what it was? …Ah’ve ‘ad to think a lot abaat it, but du yer know what Ah thought it wo’? …Ah think what it cem dahn, bottom line wo’, du yer know what it wo’, actually? …Ah felt that when it got into askin’ “Where are you from?” “What ‘ave you done?” yer know, “did you do ‘A’ levels?” things like this. Well, “No, Ah din’t”. “Do you really want to know abaat me?” “Right, well Ah got two C’s at GCSE and
rest wo’ D’s and E’s, no shit! An’ Ah did some bullshit travel service thing NVQ level three, an’ then crappy vocational A levels: shit grades, then scraped through mi HNC and blitzed it at fuckin’ degree an’ fuckin’ nailed it”. But the thing is they start askin’ you because automatically Ah’m lookin’ at them being better, almost as if they’ve won already, Ah’m knowin’ all this, ‘cos when yer come from an FE college, yer not prepared to go into that environment and take it in yer stride, Ah wo’ completely a fish aht’r water. But generally Ah din’t want to go to uni’ (S: Same as me.), an’ obviously first few years at college Ah din’t know what Ah wanted to du, Ah just kept doin’ courses ‘cos it wo’ cheap an’ it wo’ the’er to do. An’ once Ah’d got onto that college route, thi’ kept mekin’ stuff available so yer stay in it, even though yer don’t know what yer gunna do with it.

This student got a first-class degree and yet no academic discussed future opportunities, so, how, would people subject to such conditions experience dispositions founded in modalities whose interpersonal grounds they don’t experience? How can individuals exhibit properties whose interpersonal grounds remain unavailable? They cannot attribute to themselves forms whose grounds they don’t experience being interpersonally constituted so that the absence of possibility leads to an uncertainty born of a dislocation that makes the framing of intentions to participate impossible because their interpersonal conditions are not satisfied. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that many lower class people are attempting to use education to escape the very relational states that characterise an experience whose objectivity is merely reconstituted via the type of education available to them. In this cultural and social climate, we should not be surprised that there is a quite practical understanding, among working class people, about the link between income, style, manner and the solicitation of contacts that bequeath opportunities in an institutionalised economy:

Unless I can provide fo’ them [children] they won’t go [to university] because I know there is no point them going without the resources, they just won’t be able to fit in an’ they’ll get nothin’ but complexes fo’ the rest of their lives, the’re better here, working wi’ ma networks than goin’ through uni’ to do a poxy degree. Yer know, everyone that Ah know who is intelligent suffers some form of depression, thi’ see the shit, like P [friend], fackin’ bright kid, but hi’ sees it fo’ what it is an’ hi lives below his understandin’. It’s wo’se fo’ lads like that ‘cos thi’ve gone, it’s w’se t’ gu an’ see it an’ w’k fuckin’ ‘ard t’ bi part of it an’ then to bi sent back to this because yer dun’t belong, Ah’ve seen it so many times, ahr fuckin’ many rahnd ‘ere ‘ave gone t’ uni’? (S: Loads…) Then ahr many do yer know who’ve got on in life?

There is clear understanding, here, of the extent to which increased understanding increases misery and of the marking nature of the process endured, the way significances become coopted into presence via sedimentations that become consequential via subjection to such processes. What education does, for the devalued, is increase their misery of position and deepen their capacity to suffer by introducing individuals to new sources of privation by developing needs that it cannot satisfy, because it cannot ground the education in anything, invalidating the education as it perpetuates the displacement of the devalued, reconstituting the objectivities it was supposed to address. What is worse, is that the effects of the institutional conditions that such people face lead to the formulation of judgements that are effects of the meanings sedimented and incorporated via subjection to such conditions. The absence of mediation leads, first, to a pessimism born of an obscure foreboding arising from the lack of realisation that is an effect of a negation whose
significance is physiognomically materialised via neglect and a lack of concern manifest via an absence of engagement that constitutes an experience of being subject to an insignificance arising from the anonymity of this form of actualisation and, in turn, to the sedimentation of forms, via their actualisation, and the temporal sustaining of conditions inscribed via the objectivity of the sense of such relational states:

If thi’ find themselves in shit like mi...no job, livin’ on forty-four pound fifty a week. I always thought I would find myself in this position, whether Ah left after the HNC or left after gettin’ the degree...Ah do feel that it’s bin a lot’r money dahm the drain, ‘cos Ah ’ave a feelin’ this degree is worth fuck all...

"Our future is not made up exclusively of guesswork and daydreams" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 416) and clearly this person's experience of being never inspired hope, certainty or security, "I always thought I would find myself in this position, whether Ah left after the HNC or left after gettin’ the degree", university has resolved nothing existentially, nor socially, and has, really, merely repressed a status that has been rearticulated via the process. It is hard to express the internal defeat visited on those exploited by the encouragement of aspirations disavowed by institutional processes that, in sedimenting meanings coopted via experiences of being subject to the absence of possibilities arising from judgements rooted in the system of differences circumscribed via the recognition of such aspects, leads to the affirmation of judgements whose grounds have been constituted via subjection to such processes. Intentional forms are attributed to those subject to such processes as-if they have been subject to possibilities that, in reality, are disavowed by institutional-relational processes whose operation are obscured by the anonymity of processes used to constitute their invisibility. The mass process constitutes the sense of a legitimacy whose grounds escape examination because who has an interest in representing this truth? Judgements are implied in disclosures which recognise differences of status which sediment meanings via experience of being subject to forms which constitute the sense of divisions whose legibility materialise destining effects. Selection criteria imply judgements concerning those whose CVs can manifest no constitutive relational states that the devalued cannot fabricate anymore than they can tacitly summon the effects of experiences of being-realised that belong to ways of being whose grounds remain unavailable. Properties are effects of sedimentations of meaning coopted into presence via experiences of being subject to disclosures which realise us in relation to forms which involve us in modalities arising from such experiences. This is why selection criteria are constituted around circumscribed experiential forms that constitute access to representational forms of intentionality that are conditional upon valuationary institutional processes, statuses born of closures, which establish the conditions which satisfy intentional possibilities which inhere in being subject to such possibilities. Yet, the devalued, clearly, do not experience being situated in relation to such processes, they don't experience being situated or embedded, socially and institutionally, in relation to the interpersonal grounds which make such possibilities actual which is why they struggle to project or identify with competencies they don't experience being realised in relation to. The interpersonal grounds of constitutive moments are absent and their projection frustrated. They don't access the
interpersonal grounds of constitutive aspects. In order for the sedimentation of forms to become coopted via presence we need to experience disclosures which realise us so that we experience the permutations of possibilities whose actualisation constitute modalities, meanings appropriated via being subject to the disclosures that make such intentional states possible, so that we are subject to a prefiguration that allows us to anticipate responses because we are realised in relation to practical schema that emerge as a provisional aspect of the future that emerges from dispositions that individuals experience being physiognomically regenerated via moments that allow individuals to retain aspects via a realisation born of a projection that inheres in belonging to the world that individuals make emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of their form of life. Without access to such modalities, individuals experience their education as meaningless and bereft of possibilities because they don't experience realisation, they experience the uselessness of their education as part of a status that the education merely reproduces. Clearly, the devalued are not anchored or embedded in an environment and they do not experience being pulled, via actualisation, toward possibilities whose physiognomic materialisation constitute an experience of certainty born of experiencing an assurance arising from being different because of a boundary enveloped via flesh attuned via its realisation to a future immanent to experiences of presence that make available such modalities. They are not experiencing the anchoring of their way of being in disclosures which constitute possibilities that realise them so that they experience capacities to anticipate aspects whose permutations are appropriated via being subject to involvement in actualisations that allow them to retain forms whose sense inheres in physiognomically materialised aspects that make them extensions of, and reciprocating protensions towards, a world they make emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of a form of life they experience being part of. They are not experiencing the permutations of possibilities whose existential forms are described here:

Ahead of what I see and perceive, there is, it is true, nothing more actually visible, but my world is carried forward by lines of intentionality which trace out in advance at least the style of what is to come...Husserl uses the terms protensions and retentions for the intentionalities which anchor me to an environment. They do not run from a central I, but from my perceptual field, so to speak, which draws along in its wake its own horizon of retentions, and bites into the future with its protensions...With the arrival of every moment, its predecessor undergoes a change: I still have it in hand and it is still there, but already it is sinking away below the level of presents; in order to retain it, I need to reach through a thin layer of time. It is still the preceding moment, and I have the power to rejoin it as it was just now; I am not cut off from it, but still it would not belong to the past unless something had altered it, unless it were beginning to outline itself against or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment ago it was my present. When a third moment arrives, it becomes the retention of a retention, and the layer of time between it and me thickens. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 416)

Notice that Merleau-Ponty argues that the "intentionalities which anchor me to an environment...do not run from a central I, but from my perceptual field", they are aspects of my being in the world, they require conditions which satisfy such possibilities, they are aspects of being-there, of being-environed, of contextualisation so that the possibility of their experience require such an experience and yet the education characteristic of the devalued is impersonal,
contactless and decontextualizing, that is, dislocating, as one person describes, "Staff attend but hope students don't. Students stay in bed and now don't even attend to submit work as this is submitted on line. Why this goes on is because know one can think of a replacement as there is no work". Education cannot contextualise and involves little contact. Contact appears to be a major problem in the university system and it is possible to publish without direct contact, there is, little, if any, direct contact throughout one's efforts to connect because the mediations that materialise the appearance of a process can be constituted without contact: provided an objective institutional relationship exists, via which the sense of a process can be extorted, then institutional agents are objectified. Contact with those who are objectified via associating their names with the administered judgement of the products of your labour is a problem in fields that lack any sphere of research practice, and, thereby, co-presence, often those objectified via the administration of the products of your labour have no contact with you beyond the bureaucratic acts that produce the administered artefacts that extort the sense of their competence and materialise the appearance of your education. Contact throughout is a major difficulty constituting the problems of de-realisation arising from a dislocation that transfigures distances into differences of objectivity that inhere in the recognition of such differences that transmute these differences into symbolised forms or forms of significance incorporated via subjection to such a process and order. We see how problematic the idea of mediation really is and how education merely fosters the dependency of individuals from the periphery who become dependent on agents who appear to be, resolutely, unable to fulfil obligations that arise from their control of forms of value that are generated via the sense of such relational processes. Not only have I had problems getting referees because my educational process neither introduced me to educational contexts involving other human beings nor introduced me to any sphere of public practice whose relational forms might elicit properties arising from the forms of realisation experienced via being subject to such possibilities that might, then, be described, but I have also had problems with academics not providing references but because of the distances that constitute the sense of an inability that is an effect of such relational processes, these things never come to public light and you simply remain workless. What mediation is there when individuals exist outside of anything and are dependent on people who must speak-for-them but who cannot even manage to keep up with the number of applications that a person without hope of employment has to do? For the unemployed, who exist outside of the relationships that constitute objectivities rooted in recognitions that constitute valued forms, they have no real hope of satisfying labour market criteria and who, we might ask, of the university educated, are likely to be in this condition? Yet the burden of worthlessness, reiterated via their inability to satisfy labour market criteria, leads them to be dependent on institutional agents who cannot themselves cope with the effects of their devaluation, let alone help them in any way. So, we might ask, can the attenuation arising from the control of resources via closures that constitute dependencies that education is supposed to address, ever resolve such difficulties? Can mediation occur when the field continuously rearticulates boundaries via the sense of relationships that extort value for some whilst devaluing others? If you cannot satisfy the selection criteria so you cannot elicit recognition, nor solicit
contact, leaving your CV empty, so that you have to apply for so many things, hopelessly, that your referees are too overwhelmed to be able to write you references, then what chance do you have? The dependence on agents who are so woefully unable to satisfy such functions leaves the devalued in the same position they started in. If academics cannot write references, how are they mediating access or helping people face dislocation? Moreover, the futility of dealing with the negated is only transferred to the academics themselves who have little to say about you because they have little contact with you and can’t mediate access to a shared sphere via which you might exhibit properties relating to such a contextualisation. There is contact only when one can enter an objectifying relationship in which one functions as a foil for the narcissistic realisation of the academic and once such relational possibilities are unavailable, contact ceases. The form that contact takes relates to the extortion of the sense of forms via relationships that refract the appearance of properties via closures, which is why once you cannot function as the source of such actualising mediations, communication ceases. The paradox is that they usually cannot even mediate possibilities for you to serve such a function, they cannot generate a stake in the field without you mediating this so that they can then associate themselves with the process of mediation, whose labour is usually dealt with by you, and materialise the appearance of a process. Which is why, when you accede to the PhD, contact ceases, since you lose any capacity to function as source of revenue. When you are dependent on academics to generate a stake and a capacity, to function as a resource, via facilitating access to forms that realise you, and they can’t manage to write references, whilst you are on benefits, then you are in a desperate situation. Because of the closures via which academics refract the appearance of their function, you will not even know that references are not being provided, you will just continue to fail, a process that is merely the continuation of an underlying condition born of the forms economic distances take and merely manifests how such distances become institutionally transfigured into sense-relational aspects of a social structure that constitutes such objectivities. The idea is that academics represent people and mediate access but do they? In reality, the distances merely render people invisible and make dealing with applications procedures impossible because academics rarely respond to communication. Contact, throughout, is a huge problem because academics are able to refract the appearance of their function via closures that render invisible the nature of relationships which, nevertheless, are possessed of bureaucratic objectivity. What this means is that the basis of developmental relationships, the basis of experiences of being-there, of being-part-of-some sphere of human reality, subject to recognitions which disclose forms that constitute capacities for adaptation born of an integration rooted in experiences of being subject to such moments, are absent, there is, ‘now’t the’er’; nothing is experienced via being situated in relation to the perception of an absence that physiognomically regenerates a sense of inability that is a referential aspect of subjection to such processes. If you are subject to the recognition of a difference, to being-negatively-perceived, then you exist outside of the relational processes that constitute capacities for reference whose disclosure physiognomically materialise abilities to allude to intra-worldly aspects which inhere in being part of the disclosure of such modalities. Capacities for reference are enacted properties of sociality that relate to statuses that fields constitute and we
would be better to attend to the mediations, and the qualities of relationship, that sub tend institutional processes if we want to rescue people from finitude and in abilities born of a poverty that is an effect of a stigma that is an essential effect of the use of space to dignify and consecrate the culture of the middle classes. As another academic confided “I have to confess that I find it hard to read, and very time-consuming. I’m afraid I’m not a very fast or patient reader, and I rarely get to the end of long emails” and as another put it, “people are generally not very keen on long talks”. When you think that, for most who study the humanities, their work will be, more or less, a hobby, with no public existence because of the difficulty of mediating access to any sphere of practice or co-presence, then you have to wonder what the point of labouring to acquire literacy-based skills are. If you are trying to acquire the capacity to engage with academics, well, it appears a waste of time since they are usually otherwise disposed which is why the whole educational process is so bereft of contact and context. The reality is that many academics don’t really want to attend to anything that doesn’t function as a manifestation of their own distinction and most don’t really want to engage because it takes time and effort. What this state of affairs does is create the reality that there is really very little experience of being-able to-do anything via sociology which constitutes the sense of inability arising from doing-it because, instead of escaping the finitude of redundancy, one experiences condemnation to the same conditions because of valuationary processes that circumscribe one so that one knows one cannot do anything because one is perpetually aware of the irrelevance of one’s work and of the reality of these structural conditions in which, really, nobody is interested. For many lower class people, being a postgraduate student is all they can aspire to in relation to fields in which presence is so mediated that they can’t hope to be objectified in relation to anything and being a postgraduate student will reduce to teaching themselves, as best-they-can, to produce literary-philosophical forms in order to attempt to contest cultural practices they have no personally mediated access to so that attempting to solicit contact via writing long emails will be the extent of their ability to mediate contact and yet one gets responses like this from academics whose reading practices arise from the situated contexts within which they use texts to formulate judgements about individuals whose relation to the corps reproducing itself is obscured by the private mediations constitutive of these publics. When the people constituting public fields operate via such modalities, what precisely could be available? The assessment process has no function apart from as a means of objectification of the academics who associate themselves with the administrative traces that materialise the appearance of a function derived from the labour of others. Just as student labour can’t be situated, nor can their assessment serve any function beyond the objectification of the academics who institute such processes. The assessment doesn’t relate to any practice grounded in anything publicly and that is manifest by the private processing of forms that students produce from outside of access to anything. The autonomy of the process mirrors the dislocation being exploited to constitute the appearance of a process for which resources can be garnered that finance segregated elites who rely on fields whose autonomy are mirrored in the practices that materialise the appearance of public fields. The redundancy of the process is an effect of the way the sense of a process is extorted from people who face no access to anything beyond such
vacuous processes. The problems underlying competence, of context, contact and realisation, and how these are inflected via valuationary processes arising from divisions, are not addressed through the type of education characteristic of the poor, leading the poor to exhibit distinct characteristics as an effect, as the process founds dispositions born of the nature of the process. Letters of reference end up being inadequate because the educational process itself isn't sufficient to elicit qualities acquired via being involved in a sphere that constitutes such aspects. All letters of reference can refer to is the work you have carried out in order to materialize the appearance of a function whose appearance is constituted via the administration of your labour that functions as a medium of objectivization and objectification for those who associate their names with its administration. The process cannot manifest differences of quality rooted in differences of existence and all it does is validate those who are valued via private processes of legitimation that constitute public distinctions whose generative grounds are invisible. Is there really much of a difference between rotting on the dole and living the same form of life in a city under the guise of being educated? Generally, what those from non-standard trajectories get is non-specific education bereft of contextualisation which directly reproduces the meanings they experience being via an aimless, pointless, existence that education simply reproduces. Any detailed elucidation of labour market criteria that they will confront via education is ignored, as the words of one academic make clear:

Well don’t say Sociology is shit - they don’t need to hear it. They’re starting a social science degree of some kind - sociology, education etc - and that will just demoralise them. And they won’t have any way to connect to ideas about social science research funding. Most of them don’t even know what class is - they don’t recognise it. Of course, it is a dead end for the majority. I know it’s not open and equal - you only have to look at the majority of people in lectures to know that. What kind of subjects would be better? They can’t all take maths or medicine.

What is interesting here is the spontaneous connection of the link between social science and a general education degree: “a social science degree of some kind - sociology, education etc”, the “etc” manifests how interchangeable the areas are since they are financed via the general malaise that feeds those without determinate educational choices onto general degrees which entrench the dislocation manifest by the acknowledgement that “they won’t have any way to connect to ideas about social science research funding”. What are they being educated for? What this shows is the pervasive decontextualisation that the education exploits: students don’t access a circumscribed sphere of existence in which they experience being realized in relation to uses of language arising via relationships constitutive of meanings intuited via experiences of being-there which are part of the materialization of forms that render individuals functional so that they lack “any way to connect to ideas” because they don’t experience existing in relation to a sphere which discloses their sense, meaning or relevance. Asking one person with a PhD in Sociology whether he would recommend studying it, he responded:

God no, I’d tell them to get a trade, I’d say, you can earn two hundred pound a week for being an apprentice, what’s the point in doing Sociology just to become another graduate working in a call center.
Talking with a working class graduate in Sociology I asked the following question:

S: If Ah said to you, given what you’ve seen, workin’, what relevance or possible benefit does Sociology offer the people you meet, what would you say?

Fuck all, it offers them nothing, the more I see, the more ridiculous what Ah studied at university seems.

It seems that understanding arising from different relations of involvement and ways of being affected by realities constituted via such processes ensures the irrelevance of much of it. As one lower class student expressed it:

I was askin’ maself, “when was the last time I read anything worthwhile”, yer know, Ah can’t remember, there’s nothing worth reading it’s all like reading something from another planet, most of it, it’s more like science fiction than social science.

As elites constitute the conditions of their knowledgeability, via processes that consecrate via a delegitimation that ensures none of these people could get academic employment, the barriers that render the charade sensible render their production absurd for those who exist outside of the circumscribed sphere of legitimate encounter they constitute via private uses of institutional space. The lack of access to experiences of co-presence constitutes an inability to refer to spatial, intra-worldly, aspects arising via involvement in relationships that disclose such forms so that a sense of inability is a really materialised effect of experiencing being subject to such processes. At the end, individuals endure this absence and cannot represent themselves because they cannot appropriate forms relating to the interpersonal grounds of modalities whose sense they do not elicit so that they experience the physiognomic regeneration of a sense of absence that is a key aspect of public culture in class-divided societies in which competition leads to the effacement of those without resources to attend, or otherwise purchase, access to academic and other associational forms: to accede to visibility and co-presence in an era in which credentials are worthless unless they are the preserve of the elite and constituted via closures that guarantee their recognition. When the educational process available involves so little mediation, so little involvement, such that the illusion of doing something worthwhile is not constituted and people leave without any of the forms required to contest a labour market their study has partly financed, can we constitute them as having "no" experience? The devalued are educationally reclassified but their educational experience becomes reconstituted via an absence that is an effect of a negation that is part of the production of value via closures that make available, to some, the rare, distinguishing, experiences that the institutional field is used to produce. Institutional space is used to constitute a circumscribed sphere of legitimate encounter that objectifies those recognised so that recognition is inscribed in presence which can become constituted as a spatial and temporal fact, part of events that space is used to provide and yet many do not experience such forms. It is not that some, like many of the unemployed, do not have experience, nor that their negation does not have cognitive reach that might bequeath worthwhile categorical forms, but of the use of institutional space to produce dignifying, authorising, validating, legitimating forms via the practice of recognitions which circumscribe spheres of legitimate encounter in relation to experience of
being-there that physiognomically materialise capacities that inhere in the actualisation attendant on being subject to such modalities. In other words, the real differences concern personhood and the use of institutional space to realise distinctions that concern the political status of aggregates who occupy a different relation to the corps reproducing themselves via the institution of such distinctions. Precisely what the devalued most need, and what is most difficult to access: connection, realisation, contextualisation, co-presence, appears to be extremely difficult to provide and this produces all kinds of existential problems for those displaced who are forced to attempt to self-mediate processes in order to materialise the provision of analogues for what they become ever more tenuously related to, context, as competition increases. The provision of access to the conditions required for people to accede to recognised forms of existence and competence, becomes more contested the more competition there is, with increased mediation meaning increased de-realisation for all but the elite whose education is always context specific, immersive, continuous and realising. The poor don’t count in academic institutions whose processes reduce solely to the purchase of credentials via administrative processes and, even if they manage to secure the finances, via abstracted administrative processes that pay for their certification, they do not elicit elective affinities based in congruity and they experience the atrophied and attenuated relational forms characteristic of distant elites who find contact with the poor discomforting. As Bourdieu puts it:

> Everything happens as if each agent were objectively situated by the position of his properties within this universe of hierarchized qualities that the teaching corps recognizes as its own by recognizing them in the best of its own. (Bourdieu 1996: 45)

Hence the minimalist nature of educational processes that use abstracted, de-realising, administrative processes to materialise the appearance of 'public' processes in order to materialise the illusion of there being something there for the poor. In reality, the experience of the poor is revealing. What is there, 'there'? What is 'there' relates to forms of actualisation that relate to private uses of public institutions to constitute traces of forms that manifest differences that ensure the success of those with the capital to accede to recognised forms of existence, to public existence, in a space whose signifying atmosphere is constituted via such processes. The issue of what is 'there', of the nature of the 'there' that individuals experience being via, is a key aspect of understanding social differentiation and the way individuals are implicated in a fabric whose interpersonal disclosure constitutes capacities for reference that inhere in ways of being situated that constitute modalities that affect cognition because they arise from the interpersonal fabric constitutive of being-there. When you have a process materialised via one-to-one interaction then there are real issues about experiences of institutional reality, what is experienced via being-there? What do you experience being 'there' when your educational process doesn’t contextualise you in any way and reduces to one-to-one interactions? In such a situation your contextualisation really does reduce to ways of being-perceived that disclose the medium via which you experience being and the problem with this is that it does not allow you to appropriate forms that address such deficits, it merely perpetuates the effects of being-perceived to bear the sense of sedimentations arising from meanings coopted via experiences of presence.
infused with the sense of forms arising from disclosures which physiognomically regenerate such aspects. You really don't have the chance to exhibit properties acquired via experiences that ground your existence in something and this is why, at the end, you cannot get a job because employers cannot perceive the presence of properties that require experience of being-situated so that aspects become coopted via a presence infused with meanings sedimented via repeated exposure to their interpersonal grounds so that employers can be assured of possession of the property by manifestation of the involvements that circumscribe its possibility so that someone who has experienced being subject to such modalities will bear the sense of the property inscribed via experiencing being realised in relation to its constitutive interpersonal conditions. Given that the identity of competences are established via the conditions perceived to satisfy the possibility of acceding to intentional states defined by closures, and associational forms that are perceived to constitute possession of properties that inhere in such objectivities, how are individuals whose education dislocates them, without embedding them, supposed to manifest attributes whose conditions of attribution inhere in recognitions which remain unavailable? Those from 'communities' decimated by successive cross-generational economic restructuring, supposed to address the supply side of the economic equation, don't access the conditions constitutive of establishing the identity of competences and this is why people from such areas struggle with a self-doubt and inability to attribute competence to themselves, "Ah learned nothin' on mi degree...Ah left Ah'd learned nothin'", that is a status effect of the circumscriptions which constitute the selectively disclosed grounds of competences that must be judiciously protected by institutional mechanisms that efface the reality. Given the way competence is identified, there is a real problem for the dispossessed that is manifest in their experience of being incompetent and the self-doubt and insecurity of lower class students is a real effect of the processes of closure that constitute the sense of properties arising from differences whose relational materialisation constitute forms individuals experience being realised as part of the production of the reality they face. There is a contradiction arising from the divisions that constitute the grounds of forms perceived to constitute properties whose sense are inscribed effects of the differences, the closures, constitutive of such aspects and the way the poor are located that reverberates throughout economic space. If the institutions that subend access to recognised forms of social existence, and to the objectivities rooted in social and associational closures that constitute such forms, are geared toward possession of capital, is this surprising? If access to academic, and other forms of community, is conditional on the recognition of properties that presume access to privately acquired forms of capital that 'public', institutional, processes do not grant access to, is there any wonder that individuals from poorer, working, communities, cannot satisfy criteria that relate to a form of life whose grounds remain unavailable? How would someone from a non-literate community access "significant experience with writing in the disciplines, writing centres, and multilingual writing" when the only process available to them involves them in little beyond bureaucratic mediations relating to the financing of certification processes that involve little contact beyond that required to sustain the objectification of the academic staff who materialise the appearance of their labour
process via fleeting association of their names with the administration of students labour? Another post asks:

Do you have recent substantial experience in English for Academic Purposes?
Are you actively engaged in scholarship?
Are you committed to innovation in teaching?

Notice the modifier, "recent", to further limit those who would be capable of exhibiting properties whose grounds relate to a relatively new institutional function which will limit those perceived to exhibit properties that are constituted via recognitions which constitute aspects relating to associational boundaries, how would one be able to satisfy such criteria given the rigid application of the criteria? How could an individual, without initiation, possibly satisfy such criteria? Given that literacy remains a class phenomena, how could people from working communities, with worthless degrees rooted in abstracted, de-realising, administrative processes ever satisfy such criteria? Another university invites candidates to:

Please reflect on two or three examples of how you have or would create, modify, and/or perform one or more of the following to meet the needs of a diverse student population: (1) curricula; (2) learning activities; (3) teaching/counseling practices; (4) library reference services or collection development; (5) literary efforts (e.g., original scholarly works); or (6) budgetary or planning processes.

How on earth can one begin to conceive of possible answers to these questions and be subject to the possibility of envisioning being able to satisfy such criteria without involvement in the sphere of practice that subdend their reality? How could one begin to conceive of ways to represent oneself as able to satisfy these criteria without an experience of being subject to the relational forms that constitute such possibilities? Without access to a relational sphere that disclosed such possibilities, how would one represent oneself as able to satisfy such criteria? Similarly, "actively engaged in scholarship": the word "actively" is the key modifier. The paradox is that the certification process that is available to the least valued does not involve engagement by academics and so individuals endure a purely passive, largely administrative, process that they must labour, alone, to satisfy. Would developing projects in non-literate communities, in isolation, in order to use one state-bureaucracy to pay another count as "actively engaged in scholarship"? When that is the only process publicly available to certain categories, we can see how discriminatory such criteria are. Another post asks for "relevant and practical work experience", when one's education reduces to self-financed, self-certification, outside of access to anything institutionally beyond the bureaucratic mediations that materialise the appearance of the process, how can people accede to such forms? The determinacy of the properties relate to a mode of givenness whose interpersonal grounds are unavailable which is why the real grounds, governing both the acquisition and the attribution of the competence, are selectively disclosed. Such criteria judiciously institutes a distinction that is immanent to the constitution of academic space itself, there are those who are "involved" and "engaged" who are, thereby, "committed" to practices whose interpersonal grounds they experience being physiognomically materialised, so that their realisation constitutes an
experience of being energised via meanings they experience being capable of manifesting as an effect of experiencing such modalities and there are those who exist outside of the networks constituting such possibilities who cannot exhibit such properties and, thereby, consequentially, don't experience themselves being capable of manifesting such attributes. The identity of the competence, like experiences of being competent, are status functions, they are aspects of collective intentionality whose interpersonal and associational grounds are not equitably distributed. Clearly, contextualisation affects presence because it constitutes experiences of being. Bourdieu speaks of "the magical action of consecration...that consists in effecting a series of more or less arbitrary breaks in the social continuum and in legitimating these breaks through symbolic acts that sanction and ratify them, establishing them as consistent with the nature of things and the hierarchy of beings by making them official through public" (Boudieu 1996: 116) and it is clear that these are constituted via recognitions which disclose exclusive forms via the institution of a boundary between the valued, or the sacred (or significant), and the devalued, or the profane (or insignificant), and these oppositional discontinuities are encountered via ways of being situated, in relation to aspects of presence born of attention, or the absence of any interpersonally constitutive aspects that relate to modalities born of the presence of objectivising experiences, or their absence, so that how individuals exist, institutionally and spatially, does not grant all, not even all those 'educated', access to the grounds of differences that constitute status functions that education effortlessly reproduces. Those who are perceived to be legitimate interlocutors are given access to the interpersonal grounds of aspects, born of the spatial effects of such attention, and are, thereby, able to accede to capacities to project via the disclosures that constitute an experience of bearing the sense of properties that are relationally constituted via experiences of being-able to manifest such aspects because they experience their physiognomic materialisation and are thereby able to appropriate meanings whose manifestation are effects of such realisations so that experiences of being-able require involvement in a fabric of recognitions which disclose such aspects. One can appreciate why Bourdieu says:

Social magic manages to transform agents in a real way by getting everyone -- hence the interested parties themselves, who cannot but be affected by the consequences of this proclamation -- to be aware of and to recognize an expectation or, better still, a prediction about their identity that, invested as it is with the prophetic authority of the group, becomes their destiny. "Become who you are." The certificate, which assigns an essence, produces what it certifies as much as it ratifies it. In a reversal of cause and effect characteristic of social alchemy...The magic of the academic title rests on a power held and exploited by all groups, the power to act upon bodies through the symbolic efficacy of signs. Whether dignifying or dubious distinctions, public criticism or praise, the solemn verdicts of socially recognized authorities, as predictions vested with the authority of officialdom, tend to produce what they predict, both benedictions and maledictions being equally fatal. (Bourdieu 1996: 118)

Recognitions involve disclosures which realise individuals in relation to forms that physiognomically materialise a sense experienced via experiencing such intra-worldly aspects so that the space becomes infused with an experience of being subject to the meanings experienced via being contextualised via such mediations. In this
sense, individuals are subject to materialised distinctions that manifest judgements evoked by experiencing being subject to the disclosive fabric that makes objective such aspects. Bourdieu speaks of academic classifications imposing "principles of division that are both objectivated into structures and embodied into dispositions" (Bourdieu 1996: 117) and it is clear that how people are treated realises them in relation to a sense they bear as an effect of experiences of being-perceived in relation to differences that evoke judgements that are effects of the signifying atmosphere of an institutional culture whose patterns constitute legibilities that allow details to be immediately, not really decoded, which presumes a conscious effort of interpretation, but merely sensed, mirroring the practical strategies used to displace those perceived to lack the forms required to function as objectifications and sources of narcissistic supply. What this means is that individuals are subject to recognitions which embroil them in processes which sediment significances rooted in unthought evaluations which are physiognomically materialised via an anonymous and impersonal culture that is a mode of realisation of differences via practical disavowals that are strategically ambiguous so that the devalued endure a culture of tacit sanctions in which they experience an inability to function as an accessory and reciprocating protension towards a world they don't experience being available to them and these processes constitute shapes, forms of existence that constitute elements arising from the impersonal demeanour of objectivities physiognomically materialised via such a culture. This is why Bourdieu speaks of the "reversal of cause and effect characteristic of social alchemy" (Bourdieu 1996: 118), because people become possessed by a sense whose orientation is part of the very fabric of being, part of the subject-comportment structure of being-there (Heidegger 1962). Those recognised are subject to involvements which relationally constitute objectivities appropriated via the sense born as an effect of such processes, whilst others endure an impersonal, anonymous, dislocated experience arising from the surreptitious practice of distinctions that constitute different ways of being-there, different modalities relating to significances that are a key stake of public fields. It is important to note that, effectively, space is being disclosed via relational forms that constitute capacities that inhere in experiencing being involved in a world whose aspects arise from modalities rooted in experiences of being realised via such processes. Those recognised experience being in a world by experiencing possession of capacities that are disclosive aspects of such modalities where the devalued experience the absence of mediation, the absence of possibilities, the absence of an interpersonally disclosed medium constitutive of capacities for reference because their way of being arises from an experience of lack that is an effect of negation: being negatively perceived, being perceived to lack required forms, they experience the physiognomic materialisation of this absence as a fundamental modality of their way of being-there and, therefore, experience both dispossession and the absence of en-worlding aspects, the world-hood of their being is impoverished, they are world-impoverished, they experience there being "now't the'er", they experience nothing via being in a 'there' constituted via the perception of a lack that transfigures into the sense of relational aspects that leave them bereft. If you are provided with access to a function, to teaching, for example, then you are involved in a world and via such modalities you appropriate forms whose disclosure constitute capacities whose sense inhere in the objectivity arising from being situated via such
mediations, space is being disclosed so that you can accede to possibilities via experiencing possession of their actuality as a realised interpersonal modality, whereas those whose credentials are worthless, can't undergo a validation that is a status effect of such differences and cannot, thereby, accede to forms, cannot bear the sense of what remains, existentially and experientially, unavailable. This is why selection criteria attend to the conditions of satisfaction of intentional forms because they are the logical ground of competencies. Education devoid of contextualisation expects the poor to be gods, it expects them to command forms without experience of their interpersonal conditions and, consequentially, fails. These processes concern the individualised manifestation of the incorporated effects of realisations that inhere in membership of aggregates so that individuals' quasi-naturally sense aspects inscribed in the shape of a reality that emerges via tacit reference to such constitutive processes so that they experience being inscribed in the functional shapes that they experience being oriented via. This is why individuals can sense a future immanent to aspects which disclose possibilities whose actuality are inscribed in experiences of being realised that manifest properties experienced via the circumscriptions arising from such processes. Being inheres in orientational disclosures that constitute the meaning of being-there and inequalities affect our relation to the medium constitutive of our capacity to appropriate existence, to experience our humanity. Forms of life are effects of ways of being realised in relation to unreflectively lived shapes whose functionality are effects of involvements in the disclosures which reciprocally constitute such aspects. What needs to be recognised is that these aspects have conditions of possibility which must be satisfied in order for individuals to accede to representational forms of intentionality. They presume actualisation, which constitutes intervolving forms that subtend experiences of capacity arising from intersubjective donations of significance whose physiognomic materialisation constitute the sense appropriated via being-realised in relation to disclosures which constitute reciprocating protensions towards the world so that individuals experience meanings via being subject to such aspects. Capacities presume conditions which make available such possibilities. If such conditions are not satisfied, individuals will not accede to such possibilities because their grounds remain unavailable. A sense of the coherence of a cultural world, and the acquisition of a sense of intimacy with its forms, arises from involvements which realise one in relation to aspects whose interpersonal disclosure constitute forms we incorporate via such realisations so that we are capable of responding to the sense of aspects whose immanence are part of the disclosure of a fabric we perceive as part of the sense inherent in being-part-of making the world for which we are disposed emerge around us as part of the reciprocal constitution of such possibilities. Possession of capacities inheres in experiences of being realised in relation to disclosures which constitute aspects of ways of being-there that make available forms appropriated via such modalities so that one experiences meanings appropriated via being situated via such mediations. Capacities arise via forms of actualisation that relate to involvement in a world whose coherence arises from involvement in disclosures which allow for the appropriation of forms via immersion and osmosis, via interactive coexistence or cohabitation and divisions affect access to such modalities. The nature of embedding is a key aspect of differences of position and the intersection between fields is a key aspect of contestation that
constitutes value and capacities inherent in its constitution. Clearly, differentiation and closure, are significant aspects of status functions that sublend the everyday class struggle, the struggle to accede to possibilities born of a viability that fosters development and human modalities born of membership. The key struggle in the economy is not want-satisfaction but self-actualisation, and, clearly, certain categories do not access the latter and, thereby, struggle with the former. The reason for an experience of being, not merely, incompetent but bereft of capacities to acquire the most basic of human skills is because of the reduction of negation and the effects of stigma, individuals don't experience possibilities and they can't experience realisation via the dislocated educational processes they endure so how can they mediate access to forms whose grounds remain beyond them, necessarily and essentially? How would someone whose only opportunity was to finance a process of self-education outside of access to any cultural sphere begin to mediate access so that they could satisfy such criteria? If cultural practices remain unavailable because of divisions education effortlessly reproduces, how can those from regions distant from metropolitan centres mediate access to cultural forms whose grounds are economic? It is impossible for individuals to represent themselves when the interpersonal conditions required to accede to experiences of being capable of instantiating forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute an experience appropriated via experiences of being realised in relation to such mediations, are unavailable. The sense of distinctions whose interpersonal grounds constitute such objectivities is acquired via subjection to the negation implied by the determining efficacy of those able to constitute such criteria as part of an experience of being that is part of the constitution of public space. The production of such criteria is part of the constitution of the institutional forms that subtend capacities that inhere in experiences of being-realised in relation to distinctions whose interpersonal recognition manifest forms individuals experience being physiognomically materialised so that they accede to the sense of forms they experience being via. When all you can do is study and that study reduces to abstracted, non-actual, relationships that involve little co-presence and the sphere of practice available to you reduces to form-filling and then solitary production within the protocols governing the assessment formats garnered from departmental documents provided to postgraduate students, then 'getting out' of something vacuous is as absurd as your attempt to use such mediations in order to 'get into' something and when your sphere of existence is not merely solitary, and privatised, but reduced by a dislocation born of a negation that constitutes such modalities, how can you act so as to resolve the problems arising from such mediations? People are caught acceding to objectivities whose sense dispossess them, absolutely, because whilst they are wasting their lives on abortive projects because they are measured against their aspirations in the absence of determinative possibilities, they become progressively negated relative to those on the 'inside tracks' who know where to apply themselves because they access mediations of involvement that disclose an understanding arising from a capacity that inheres in recognition, involvement and contact: the key modalities absent in lower class people's education. Now, living in an ex-pit-village, possessed of worthless credentials, without access to any form of teaching, how could I satisfy such criteria? Living in a working population, unable to get interviews, how does one mediate access to any
cultural forms that might satisfy such criteria? For lower class students, on educational processes that don't involve involvement in any sphere of cultural practice, sign-usage becomes a real problem because the education gives them no real need to enunciate or inscribe traces of a culture they barely incorporate because of the unrealisation characteristic of the redundancy arising from statuses reproduced effortlessly via such processes. Opportunities to use ideas physiognomically materialises the forms sustained via projection in relation to the disclosures constitutive of being-academic, so that individuals can sustain forms incorporated via the dialectic of recognition constitutive of the incorporation of cultural forms via such processes. What this means is that if you are from a non-literate community and you undergo an educational process that does not situate your labour in relation to anything that dignifies it, then you suffer a mutilated objectivity that affects the status of your competence. This is absolutely correct, and fully objective, mirroring precisely the mutilation that occurs to lower class people who endure humanities processes, without any involvement in anything, without realisation, their capacities to appropriate forms and their capacities for projection are deeply affected and they bear the sense of this mutilation in an expressive physiognomy rooted in the annihilation of everything they are condemned to attempt to appropriate in isolation, outside of any interpersonal conditions that realise them so that they experience the physiognomic regeneration of a capacity rooted in such mediations. The redundancy of the process is manifest via the absence of relationships which physiognomically regenerate any experience of being competent and one experiences a dormant or latent competence because one never experiences actualisation. One never needs anything one teaches oneself and one never needs to speak about anything, leaving one insecure in relation to the enunciation of words one only ever reads. Little wonder insecurity haunts those who exist outside of the performative conditions which satisfy the conditions of attribution that constitute capacities for reference that are themselves effects of existing via ways of being realised that inhere in recognition. Experiencing being constituted via the implied negations of criteria whose cultural grounds are unavailable, judged by capacities to manifest attributes whose interpersonal grounds remain unavailable, how can lower class people ascribe to themselves competencies whose disclosive grounds, and conditions of attribution, they do not experience? This is why their education takes place amidst a futility that its cultural conditions constitute. As one person described, “I was speaking to a girl who had just finished her PhD and she was talking about the transition to a job and how there was no help whatsoever or advice in getting an academic job and how the academics at Cardiff simply don’t interface with them as soon they finish their PhD. I think she was suggesting this is because everyone knows its extremely competitive and they won’t interface with anyone”. The absence of interface is an effect of the contested and conditional nature of the grounds of attribution of competencies which are surreptitiously reproduced via the private use of institutional space to materialise differences and possibilities that inhere in different ways of being-situated against this background. The conditional nature of the value of credentials is manifest via different forms of mediation. The absence of interface is part of the non-disclosure of possibilities so that there is an absence of a connective fabric that mediates transitions that sustain a hold on capacities that inhere in such modalities. Without
interface there is no mediation, there is no experience of a potential future and this means that the potentiality of experiencing the possibility of aspects that emerge via the disclosure of their availability are absent and so the genetic conditions constitutive of a sense arising from such structural dynamics, and from acceding to an equilibrium born of its physiognomic materialisation, are absent. The ability to bear the sense of such aspects inheres in being subject to such interpersonally constituted conditions, acquiring representational vocabularies doesn't constitute such modalities. The sense of the capacity inheres in manifesting a practical responsiveness arising from being-there, from involvement in a network of relationships that realise one so that one accedes to an operative form of intentionality arising from being realised via disclosures which constitute its availability. Because the sense of such forms arises from such aspects, without the disclosure of such modalities individuals feel bereft of possibility, hopeless and fearful because they don't experience the security of ways of being that make available representational forms of intentionality: without interface in relation to such aspects, how can they ascribe states to themselves whose conditions are relationally constituted, selectively and, clearly, surreptitiously? If there is no interface, then there is no disclosure of a horizon of possibility and individuals cannot project because there is no interpersonally constituted fabric which realises them so that they experience continuities that sustain forms appropriated via a contextualisation that elicits such forms so that they become possessed via capacities that become sedimented via repeated exposure to such conditions. One becomes possessed by a capacity to respond, that is, one appropriates practical schema that subtend functionality, via exposure to a range of possibilities that constitute the lived actuality of objective conditions so that a sense of structural dynamics arises from the mediations which constitute the possibilities in question. Uncodified exchanges, immediate responses to presence, glances, stances, expressions, materialise acts of perception behaviourally that disclose a sense physiognomically materialised via this practical dynamic that subjects individuals to aspects experienced via presence so that they are continually eliciting and undergoing imperceptible adjustments that are solicited aspects of being-in-the-world that constitute the dynamics of possibilities arising via such mediations which establish a confluence, responsively, relating to evaluations that are disclosed and constitute spatial aspects that determine whether the individual is able to accede to a dynamic equilibrium rooted in an active absorption born of recognitions which disclose the possibility of acceding to representational forms of intentionality or endure the dislocation of negation so that the individual doesn't accede to modalities born of such mediations and doesn't undergo the responsive constitution of states rooted in engagement and can't experience the interpersonal basis of a dynamic equilibrium rooted in involvement in possibilities born of solicitations which disclose forms that realise the individual so that they experience modalities engaged via absorption that have profound comportmental, physiognomic and cognitive effects. The capacity to sense appropriate responses arises from realisations which physiognomically materialise the aspects which constitute it, it is a facility rooted in responsiveness, in involvement in the relational processes that constitute both the sense of an environment and capacities rooted in ways of being-there arising from such processes. That is, one accedes to competence, to capacities to fluidly and
dexterously respond by being exposed to a range of possibilities that make up the lived actuality of conditions because of the genetic connection with these conditions arising from the disclosure of a set of dynamics that constitute the possibilities the individual experiences being constituted so that they become responsively actualised and accede to a functional equilibrium rooted in being-situated so that they experience possibilities for responsiveness from which such modalities arise via experiencing a ‘there’, a context, as opposed to the absence of the lack of mediation. It is experience of a range of possibilities that make up the lived actuality of conditions because it is elicitation that constitutes capacities for response. That is, co-presence constitutes capacities appropriated via realisations which constitute forms that become sedimented via the appropriation arising from realisation so that individuals mimetically incorporate a flexibility and dexterity rooted in actualisation. The fundamental issue to note is that this sense, this capacity, does not consist in an epistemic understanding, it arises from being-there, from a practical responsiveness rooted in involvements that constitute a mode of operation, a capacity born of realisation. One becomes compatible with an environment via compatibilities that arise from involvements that constitute the structural dynamics from which lived equilibria emerge as capacities arising from participation in the contiguous lives of those one experiences being-with. In other words there is a genetic connection between being and the world to the extent that the solicitations, the possibilities, arising from experiences of being-perceived within it, evaluationary processes that constitutes stakes and possibilities, constitute our experience of being-able to operate effectively within the world which is why the devalued face a world lacking mediation, lacking possibility, they don’t undergo experiences of solicitation that inform their experience of being in it and they are, consequently, world-impoverished, their being manifesting the effects of a mutilated being-for-others that impoverishes their relation to themselves because humanity is an effect of being-there, its essential modalities effects of mediated relations to the world. Valuation is a fundamental aspect of being and is constitutive of our relation to the world, and, thereby, humanity. Without interface there is no mediation, no transition, no involvement, no contextualisation, a fundamental condition of functionality is absent that fundamentally affects capacities and without projection there is no sedimentation arising from the realisation of such a condition, no accession to becoming possessed by responsively acceding to an equilibrium arising from the lived actuality of a range of structural dynamics that constitute capacities rooted in a facility arising from such modalities, no accession to a socially operative stance rooted in such mediations. The general anonymity of the absence of interface means that there is an absence of experiences of the recognitions which situate individuals so that they accede to a flexibility born of responsiveness that constitute a somatic compliance, a facility with adaptation, which arises from exposure to the interpersonal grounds which constitute absorption in possibilities for reference that facilitate possession of an equilibrium arising from being possessed of the effects of involvement. Without such existential conditions being satisfied, capacities to represent even such a state of affairs count for nothing and this is why employers focus continuously on what education only selectively constitutes: involvement. What this arises from is an implicit, practical, acknowledgement of the grounds of attributions of competence: they arise via
involvement in an associational sphere whose exclusivity must be protected whilst instituted amidst mass public competition and yet the ways individuals are perceived within this space relates to ways-of-being-there that arise from recognitions which constitute the properties whose sense individuals bear and experience being sedimented via such processes. There is a need to constitute the appearance of non-discrimination via processes that merely ensure the exclusion of many: the appearance of equality reduces to the institution of anonymity which condemns those without private networks to an exclusion all the more severe for its being personally realised. The reason is that association within networks is how the space of positions is disclosed inseparably from valuationary processes that materialise the differences intuited via absorption in the forms individuals experience being physiognomically materialised so that some accede to competence via forms which constitute visibilities whose inscription constitute them viably: the production of discourse, via exchanges within networks, is how opportunities are constituted: applications must be made into-an-artificially created context of significance, a signifying aura, so that the space of positions allows for a pre-configuration of forms via relational processes that surreptitiously constitute abilities that inhere in modalities, interpersonally constituted, via perceptions of differences that are effortlessly reproduced via such processes. Academics look to recruit people who can ‘teach’ what is recognised as significant: in reality being involved discloses a horizon that is constitutive of the capacity: the capacity to intuit appropriate forms requires experiences of the disclosure of this horizon which constitutes reasons to appropriate forms because one experienced their being physiognomically materialised via experiences of a context, a 'there' arising via their disclosure. Also there is little association between staff and students because departments are merely resource-contexts and administrative hubs, theatres of self-actualisation, for those who appropriate contexts by constituting institutional space via relationships that legitimate and authorise them establishing the conditions of a transmissible culture on-the-back of 'public' education. For a lower class student, the only contact in the public world they will have, via a process that reduces to contact with a supervisor, is the individual who materialises the appearance of their labour-process via associating their name with the administration of their labour, if the supervisor does not mediate access, given that the value of credentials arises from such processes, how can the student embed themselves or situate their labour? Individuals cannot culturally embed themselves, just as they cannot, in isolation, control how they appear when the forms constitutive of the recognised competence are effects of relational processes used to produce exclusive forms. If individuals are not situated nor embedded, how can they constitute themselves? How can they represent themselves? Via what? And this problem of absence is an effect of negation, it is an effect of a failure to appear to be an attractive interlocutor which merely physiognomically regenerates the same experience, the same condition. How can they embed themselves in anything realising when their educational process doesn't constitute opportunities for realisation or involvement that address deficits that are sense-relational effects of the perception of differences that the process merely reproduces? If the assessment function does not relate to performative aspects, and, thereby, to realisations which sediment forms experienced via being contextualised via mediations that constitute capacities arising
from experiences of being part of a world relating to such functions, then, how can individuals adapt? Individuals cannot accede to capacities to exhibit aspetual forms that belong to relational processes that are forms of collective intentionality because the capacity to exhibit such aspects requires embedding in public relational processes that materialise the sense of properties that inhere in such aspects. If you look at academics, for example, they extort the sense of such properties and materialise the appearance of their function without actually exhibiting any of the characteristics whose appearance are, nevertheless, materialised via relational forms that are, often, purely abstracted and electronically, and administratively, constituted. The problem with a privatised, individualised, educational process, and why it mirrors unemployment, is that individuals cannot accede to an experience of being capable of manifesting the effects of forms which are primarily relational, they cannot accede to an experience of being-capable of bearing the sense of forms without experiencing being-realised in relation to recognitions which disclose such aspects so that they experience their physiognomic materialisation and experience the sense of such aspects as constitutive modalities of their being-for-others that enable the appropriation of being, reactively and constitutively, so that individuals experience the integration of faculties via the coherence of an experience of engagement that absorbs them in being possibilities they experience being actualised via the contextualisation constitutive of forms that inhere in a collective intentionality arising from membership and belonging. The excrescence of a fabric is part of the constitution of boundaries whose sense enable some, while dispossessing others, and qualities and properties are effects of aspects manifest via being subject to forms whose disclosure constitute statuses arising as part of the institutional mediation of objectivities. Individuals have to be equipped to satisfy labour market criteria because they arise from involvement, and collectivity, and yet, for the devalued, their lives are privatised and individualised. The sickening malaise arising from the isolation of study becomes transfigured into the absurdity experienced via looking at labour market criteria that relate to forms of objectivity that require a value that the process itself precludes because, as the process becomes generic, it loses its capacity to signify competencies that, in reality, inhere in closures realised via selections that mirror social statuses relating to forms of value that are privately, institutionally, constituted via the public use of institutional space to materialise such relational differences, or statuses. The sickening, impugning, judgements of labour market criteria relate to the public practice of differences, institutionally, that constitute the dispossession of some who labour, alone, dragging themselves listlessly through a career they know has no future, fending for themselves, intellectually, and who experience the physiognomic regeneration of a status relating to elemental forms that are aspects of the social structure. In reality, differences constitute discontinuous oppositions that are obscured via a mechanism that can be spuriously universalised to generate revenue whilst obscuring the nature of differences surreptitiously constituted via a social continuum in which difference is effaced via careful, casual, institution of differences. Just because you have a general reclassification does not efface the way valuationary processes constitute discontinuous oppositions which are part of an interpersonally constituted reality effaced via the institution of a 'public' institutional process that can be indefinitely extended because it requires little institutional resources. When your process
reduces to the production of documents so as to materialise the appearance of mediation and when devaluation, and the distances that constitute it, ensure you have no way to actually access cultural contexts, how do you either validate your credentials or accede to capacities relating to forms of cultural existence that your objectivity precludes? Rather than addressing deficits, the institutions merely reconstitute them via relationships that extort the sense of forms that reproduce the logical necessity of the positions legitimating the space of positions. As one person described:

I applied and got an interview recently for a post at LJMU in Policing (mainly because I met the criteria that’s it) went, done their presentation answered their questions, then today a guy called silverspoon … (think of Boris Johnson with black hair!) rang me up and told me “it was close old boy! but you need REF publications” So now they move the goal posts from oh you need a PhD (which I got through 8 grand sponsorship by the police and lived on a shoestring) to now you need REF publications!! Funny but where I gained my PhD the head of department who failed it but was given a Pro Doc to save departmental embarrassment of giving her an M.phil has now become associate professor with just three co-authored non REF publications! Before I went into academia I had a bad taste that taste has got even worse! With four degrees to my name I see some upper class PhD students go from first degree to PhD then a job at the same university but no REF publications needed for them. In the meantime, they sell their degrees as door openers to success when in actual fact the reality for those who come from marginalised environments especially the mature students is far from the picture these people paint! Funny at the job Centre I sit there and my “Job Coach” asks me “Why are you here??” I answer “no local authority support for those who try and do something for themselves believing their is some form of meritocracy” and “No social mobility on a national level” thats what brings me here! I am sorry I touched education! All corrupt as hell elitist.

One person described the deficits arising from investing so much time in something that is so contested that it leads nowhere but a perpetuated displacement that destructures life ever more deeply all the more for being irreversible:

My PhD didn’t do anything for me and I’m in an even worse position than if I’d just gone into the employment available at school. It is a trap. I’m overqualified for work in a local supermarket or that type of retail work so I can’t get local jobs after spending so long at university and I just don’t have regular skills anyway. The PhD is just a piece of paper, university ruined my life. It makes it harder to fit in anywhere and if you cannot get employment in university, what you going to do?

Whilst there is a structural need for those who institute such conditions to simultaneously materialise the appearance of their public function via relationships that garner capital, and generate sources of value and remuneration, whilst maintaining legible differences in value that affect capacity to elicit recognition, solicit contact and accede to worthwhile forms of public existence, deficits arising from the structural roots of such differences are, clearly, perpetuated as differences in conditions of existence that transmute into manifestations of what they arise from, different forms of objectivity arising from the differential public significance of private positions, inscribed as aspects of comportment whose sense are perceived and perpetuated via such mechanisms. What is clear is that the problems of deficits arising from divisions which become transmuted into differences in objectivity are not resolved practically. What can only be addressed via involvement, and direct mediation, is ignored, creating the experience of truncation manifest, here, where the individual, after considerable sacrifice, faces relegation to the condition
abstracted administrative relational mediations have attempted to repress in order to allow some to realise themselves in relation to an appearance born of forms they refract via association with the administration of the labour of such people who find their original position merely reconstituted via the sense arising from the repression and rearticulation of the same underlying conditions. Deficits are just sustained via the tacit reference to original conditions via elite trajectory: early ascent is a mark of a precocity born of seniority of rank arising from originating in conditions reproduced via such institutional processes. Deficits are transfigured into sense-relational differences that inferiorise those who aren't on elite trajectory. Once an individual is in the situation of this person, how can they offer anything? Once a person is on benefits, without any sphere of public existence, how do they constitute themselves as a resource? How do they constitute themselves? In relation to what? In reality, the educational process they go through requires them to turn a limited existence into an institutional resource. How is this individual supposed to compete with those who experience the connection of perpetual realisation of continuous ascent that discloses a horizon of hope born of experience of the interpersonal grounds of differences that constitute this objectivity? Existing in relation to a horizon whose disclosure constitutes the absence of mediations that force this individual to face the destructuring annihilation of benefits, how can this person ever compete? Without access to the disclosive interpersonal mediations that constitute capacities for projection born of experiences of realisation that physiognomically materialise forms incorporated via such modalities, how can this individual project successfully? How can this individual represent himself effectively? Given the relational mediations that constitute the conditions which constitute representational forms of intentionality, how can this individual manifest the effects of being subject to conditions which constitute possibilities which remain, unavailable, throughout abstracted processes that exploit economic divisions to reproduce the sense of competencies as what appear to be inherited aspects of expressivity. They appear to be part of a natural inheritance because they are incorporated via diffuse and complex conditions which constitute the conjunctural singularity of those who appear "just right" because their expressivity is an effect of shared conditions of existence. Without involvement in anything, how can individuals appropriate forms or direct their labour? How can such individuals constitute possible functions for themselves when they experience the realisation of a nullity arising as part of the relational void that constitutes a negation that leads, even their modest achievements, to appear purely negatively? How can individuals leading an existence limited to a stroll to the benefits agency, and questions about their presence as confused by it as the individual who experiences their presence via such mediations, constitute themselves effectively when they exist outside of an interpersonal sphere that discloses forms that realise possibilities? Moreover, what is clear is that individuals experience a progressive reduction that is an effect of meanings which become constituted via the forms they experience being revealed against a background of references that privilege those on elite trajectory: the youngest whose schema of perception and operative intentionality are effects of continuous realisation in relation to the practice of distinctions which disclose the horizon they appropriate via being subject to such modalities. Over time, the temporal difference between those of low-trajectory and the elite becomes
exacerbated via the negative difference arising from the dislocation arising from the absence of any effort to initiate connection and continuity and this becomes transfigured into a sense of difference arising via a horizon whose disclosure constitutes incapacity: how can those who don't access continuity because there is no mediation, that is, no disclosure of an interpersonally constituted horizon of possibility they experience being realised in relation to so that they experience the actuality of being positively different, recognised via mediations that constitute recognised aspects, value, or capital, compete? Their negation constitutes an inability that is an effect of the transfiguration of an economic relation into a sense-relation, personally encountered via being subject to such conditions. This is what happens when you have divisions between people such that discontinuous oppositions are manifest via there being no sphere of co-presence because space itself is constituted via different ways of inhabiting the world. The destructuring of the devalued is a continuously rearticulated effect of divisions. What we see is the revelation of the real criteria of selection, and the real conditions constitutive of competence: involvement in employment, that is, the materialisation of a status via forms that constitute objective judgements via relationships that realise the conditions constitutive of intentional states, "the head of department who failed it but was given a Pro Doc to save departmental embarrassment of giving her an M.phil has now become associate professor", those consecrated accede to capacities via realisations that constitute dispositions arising from their experience of being-realised in relation to processes that obscure the negation the process is surreptitiously constituted in relation to, "they sell their degrees as door openers to success when in actual fact the reality for those who come from marginalised environments especially the mature students is far from the picture these people paint!" and those negated discover their plight through a continuous exclusion that perpetuates inabilities that are continuously implied aspects of their experience of being realised via distinctions that perpetuate the sense of forms arising from the dislocation of an association the process continues. Instead of the discovery of capacities via experiences of being subject to forms which constitute a competence rooted in realisations that constitute viability, what we see is the revelation of non-being via an inability to compete that is an effect of the practice of distinctions whose materialisation condemn some to the sense of an inability that merely perpetuates an original, underlying, condition that the process is used to publicly repress. What we see is how inabilities that are immanent aspects of the way space is interpersonally constituted are progressively revealed as essentialised aspects of being-in-the-world disclosed via such mediations. Distinctions are materialised via statuses whose recognition constitute differences via processes that realise some in relation to disclosures that realise them so that they experience participation in a sphere, being-in-a-world, via possibilities whose actuality they experience being interpersonally constituted so that they accede to capacities via forms whose physiognomic materialisation are key aspects of institutional and economic competition. While some are undergoing the consecration of strategies meant to use institutional relationships to rehabilitate their objectivity; "the head of department who failed it but was given a Pro Doc to save departmental embarrassment of giving her an M.phil has now become associate professor"; others are facing the real reality of statuses vacuous processes barely repress: "at the job
Centre I sit there and my “Job Coach” asks me “Why are you here??” a question arising from the absurdity of the bankruptcy of educational processes that cannot initiate contact, realisation or the appropriation of forms because their real grounds of attribution relate to statuses whose materialisation require the processing of excess numbers so that, as some are legitimated, others are invalidated and these processes of invalidation, or delegitimation, condemn some to the perpetuation of distinctions whose physiognomic materialisation merely perpetuate inabilities that are real aspects of the way economic positions are institutionally reconstituted in societies whose institutional, state, apparatus have been colonised by groups who surreptitiously subvert their processes whilst using the 'public' they fleece in order to materialise the appearance of functioning public institutions: the institutions alleged purpose subverted by the private use of institutions to pursue personal gain through aggregative, collective, that is, class, processes that use the sense of relational forms to constitute the appearance of 'professional' processes that are of dubious validity and little benefit, leaving many with "a bad taste that taste has got even worse". The state apparatus is a victim of its universality, the universal is devalued, and selections operate in relation to the recognition of forms that manifest the private use of capital to devalue those who can only access a generic, administrative, process rendered meaningless by the private use of capital to constitute forms that tacitly refer to the 'also-rans' whose CVs remain empty because their education is separate from involvement in anything. The bankruptcy of the process merely exacerbates the problems arising from divisions it perpetuates. Notice that it is via experiences of being unrealised in relation to the constitutive grounds of capacities that inhere in relational forms which disclose the sense appropriated via being subject to such modalities, that the individual discovers, via progressive failure, inabilities that are effects of the social organisation of distinctions that consecrate some and negate others. The fraudulence of the process is used to extort the sense of processes via relationships which validate some while condemning others so that some bear the sense of truths whose intuition arise from subjection to differences of treatment born of recognitions which disclose the sense of characteristics that are constituted via such processes. This is the key difference between elite, and real, education, and the mass competition of the education of the poor, education should guarantee access to a common ground which is only available to the elite. As competition increases, differences are surreptitiously constituted that rob individuals of access to the conditions necessary to acquire the forms constitutive of attributions of competence and, those facing lives bereft of possibilities for self-actualisation, find their dislocation constituting an inability to ascribe competence even to themselves. What chance does someone in this position have to develop, to exhibit potentiality without experiencing the grounds of actualities that remain relationally unavailable, bearing the burden of a negation that arises from limits arising from the significance of being reduced to a state that precludes possibilities, how can he mediate access? As competition increases, some students, those lacking value, are exposed to interpersonal conditions in which they perceive the reality of the conditional nature of attributions of competence via the barriers they experience being part of the fabric of the interpersonal constitution of these forms and they realise, because they are subject to distinctions constitutive of, the grounds of sense of the competence which they thereby experience as senseless because they lack
access to the intersubjective donations of sense that constitute viability. Absurdity is a central aspect of the disoriented confusion arising from the dislocation of institutional processes that lack social embedding because the professional groups instituting such conditions can extort the sense of their function via exclusive processes, forging extra-local networks via abstracted mediations, that grant them access to the grounds of human competence that they deny others. In this way individuals can be brought to a condition where they appear to eliminate themselves because they appear discordant and “full of attitude”, the sense of their expressive physiognomy arises from exposure to a domain of mediation constituted via their difference in which they do not experience the physiognomic materialisation of responsive forms of actualisation that share a frame of reference that arises from the disclosure of such aspects. Lacking habituation to responsive mediations arising from the disclosure of forms which constitute the sense arising from domains of mediation that disclose such aspects, they appear unable to project successfully, they appear discrepant and discordant and as if they “do not try” to “fit in”, whereas, in reality, all of the mediations constituting such possibilities are absent in their experience of the public sphere. Without an experience of the actualisation of possibilities so that the poor experience the reality arising from experiences of being constituted, interpersonally, in relation to the institutional grounds of possibilities inscribed in their difference, positively constituted, how can they have any sense of possibility? How can individuals, without mediation, without access to any domain of possibility, direct themselves or instantiate the forms that might satisfy the attribution-conditions of particular forms of social objectivity whose institutional grounds become ever more contested the more people compete to finance the elites who continuously constitute such forms via a difference that institutional space is used to continuously elaborate? Once negations are socially in-play, which they are because of the way institutional space arises from the continuous rearticulation of differences whose determinative efficacy ensure those negated only fall further behind, or, become further negated, what can an individual do? Once you cannot satisfy selection criteria, then you bear the sense of an objectivity that reconstitutes itself. Of course, there is no class discrimination here, they don't bear the sense of a particular negation, their position arises from a complete absence of possibility that confronts them every time they attempt to mediate access to anything consequential. What is the point of this type of education? If education cannot introduce individuals to the grounds of attribution of competence, to the relationships that constitute viability, then what is it? Is it education at all?

**Negation, invalidation and inability**

Clearly, the interpersonal forms characteristic of the experience of many do not involve involvement and the status of their competence is affected as a result. Clearly, the grounds of competence relate to statuses that are surreptitiously reproduced via such processes. Because students are used as foils for the elaboration of character, mediums for the materialisation of the sense of a process whose relational forms constitute capacities for self-ascription rooted in the relational processes that constitute the visibility of academics in relation to closures that constitute their experience of being compassionate people of integrity, deficits
are not dealt with practically because that requires the use of resources of time, space, income and effort which are unnecessary when the appearance of an educational function can be materialised via assessment processes that narcissistically realise academics in relation to operative forms of intentionality via administrative-relationships that reduce to using electronic mediums of communication and appropriately presenting fronts materialised via such relational processes. This is why differences are perpetuated via ignoring them because the whole reality of the differences constitutive of different ways of being that constitute different objectivities must be ignored whilst they are reproduced and this is usually done by ignoring the people who are different who experience an anonymous educational process based in distances that lead to their negation so that they cannot access the interpersonal grounds of forms that dignify their CVs and, consequently, CVs bereft of conspicuous forms constituted via the closures that produce distinguishing experiences are absent and they do not bear the traces of constitutive conditions that remain unavailable, they do not accede to representational forms of intentionality, and bear the sense of a form of life they have remained enmired in because of the failure of educational processes rooted in such divisions as sense-relational aspects of a reality constituted via such mediations. Individuals cannot embed themselves, this is why they have to undergo the mediation of educational processes which, in reality, don't mediate access to anything because they cannot embed students in anything and, instead, use the student as a resource with the student left to do what they cannot: embed themselves. This is why 'within' the institutions, there isn't contact and why the significance of the education arises from such mediations which merely reconstitute a sense of the absence of a competence because competencies are effects of closures that circumscribe spheres via which individuals accede to capacities via experiences of being subject to particulate modalities whose real interpersonal grounds remain unavailable because of the way social valuation constitutes such objectivities and subtend public processes. Such conditions cause a decomposition arising from a failure to connect oneself with the cultural conditions that might facilitate the emergence of coherent identities founded on experiences of being different rooted in the actualisation of possibilities and, instead, individuals face the reconstitution of ways of being rooted in the absence of any capacity to satisfy such criteria so that they can never accede to the interpersonal conditions required to bear the sense of forms they experience being manifest aspects of their public objectivity. How can people in such conditions represent themselves in any dimensions, mediated or immediate? How can they construct literary representations of their experience when their education reduces to doing-nothing and going-nowhere until, over time, this fully constitutes an inability born of such conditions of existence? Equally, how could they present themselves conversationally in order to mediate opportunities? Once individuals exist in such a state, how can they cope with abstracted mediations born of ways of being relating to cultural conditions that remain unavailable? Very high levels of education in a population are meant to hide such conditions but can education really situate the poor once it becomes too competitive? Without opportunities arising from interpersonal disclosures which constitute properties arising from public fields arising via closures which produce circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter,
individuals are possessed by a temporal immanentism characteristic of the unemployed and they perpetually forget everything they struggle to learn outside of any sphere of involvement, disclosure or use of such forms. What this indicates is that cognitive properties have interpersonal conditions and the sense individuals bear is an effect of incorporations which involve their contextualisation and realisation. Able people, without opportunity, will appear indolent because they cannot be possessed of forms they don’t experience being subject to being realised via. Educational processes enmired in unemployment fail because they cannot embed assessment in anything. The meaninglessness of the process is an effect of the unrealisation arising from the inconsequential nature of what is accessed: assessment relates to privately acquired forms and is itself a private, decontextualized, process without any sphere of immediate disclosure relating to the use of forms acquired via self-teaching in order to produce documents for assessment, so that the process lacks any sphere of consequential application that involves the student in a sphere in which they experience the disclosure of forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute the ability to enunciate appropriately. Indeed, one perceives the effects of this in the false-notes lower class students manifest when they mis-pronounce the names of thinkers whose names they never hear pronounced because they are subject to so little education. The command of form relates to the incorporated effects of repeated exposure to interpersonal contexts in which recognition discloses forms appropriated via being-there so that how stimuli are rendered meaningful arises from an absorption that involves a complete realisation which physiognomically materialises abilities relating to the forms mimetically acquired via experiencing being subject to such processes: enunciation of appropriate forms requires a mastery of phonological traits that relate to uses of the tongue, throat and mouth to shape sounds that are mastered mimetically via processes of immersion and incorporation and these modalities relate to forms of recognition and to the interpersonal situating of practice: modalities that constitute the prereflective mimesis via which elements composing an active behavioural fluency rooted in such processes arise as part of the way latent identities arise via unformulated exchanges of existential sense via expressivities that compose the reality of practice. Practice arises via exchanges of uncodified forms which are constituent aspects of latent identities, unformulated, which allude to possibilities exchanged via existential and expressive aspects whose actualisation constitute the coherence of a cultural world whose sense is incorporated via osmosis, a familiarisation physiognomically materialised via mimesis as part of the imperceptible emergence of a social condition. Experiencing being contextualised via disclosures which materialise the sense of forms you experience being actualised expressively is part of your command of cognitive processes. Capacities for cognition are subtended by forms that disclose such possibilities. Cognitive processes relate to ways of being-there that constitute possibilities appropriated via being contextualised so that aspects, disclosed, mobilise a totality of physiognomic processes arising from the unitary nature of being. Absorption via aspects constitutes cognitive processes via modalities arising via involvement so that individuals experience the sense of realisation constituted via the fluid intersection of forms that constitute a weave timelessly linking the future via moments of projection which sustain the past so that incorporation, via realisation, renders
competence at hand as an available modality of one’s being-for-others. The ability to practice a practice relates to personal modalities arising from interpersonal conditions required for the appropriation of forms which inhere in the fabric humanity weaves in conditions when it shares the need to exist via forms whose determinacy arise from a need external to the need to stylise presence. Without any involvement in any sphere of realisation that discloses the means appropriated, the purpose, for the form, there is no experience of any need to instantiate, or enunciate, forms in relation to a situation of use that synchronises the form of one’s projection so that the circumscription constitutes reasons-for-producing in relevant ways because appropriate forms are tacitly summoned so that the availability of forms, situationally, constitutes one’s capacity to remember what one laboured, alone, to acquire, via the physiognomic regeneration of an experience of being competent that arises from a status whose recognition situates one spatially so that one’s cognitions arise in relation to an experience of immersion that is a spatial process of legitimation constitutive of capacities that inhere in being-there. The ability to remember is itself an effect of undergoing realisations which disclose what is to-hand via being-there so that realisations which constitute forms constitute the cognitive capacity arising from the relationship established via ways of being rooted in co-presence. This is why abilities are effects of relational processes which disclose propensities rooted in appropriations of possibilities whose actualisation constitute an experience of being-realised so that one accedes to a purposive relation to being and a sense of being-able-to instantiate forms whose dynamism realise one in relation to capacities sustained via a projection arising from the recognitions constitutive of disclosure so that the physiognomic regeneration of forms constitutes intersubjective donations which ground being so that one feels possessed of a determinate social identity, a difference positively constituted. Energy relates to an experience of possibility born of realisation so that one experiences the plenitude arising from forms which constitute possibilities. The experience of possibility arises from actualisations of form which constitute experiences of being able to command the possibilities materialised via such processes. Without mediation, and realisation, in relation to disclosures which constitute such possibilities one experiences the absence of possibility, the nothingness, of being-there circumscribed via the absence of the forms required to exist as a viable interlocutor. Being devalued robs individuals of energy because they don’t experience being-realised so that they can project via forms whose disclosure constitute the conditions which ensure the success of their projection because they are the condition of them being available so that it physiognomically materialises a frustration, a banal misery, rooted in this unrealisation. Recognition of the absence of the forms required to function as a viable interlocutor is a really materialised effect of the way spatial divisions are materialised and is a physiognomically regenerated effect of the practical references perceived via agents whose schema of perception arise from understanding the immanent logic manifest via the way individuals experience being realised via instantiations of form which constitute the reference arising from the practical relationships that sense inheres in. Negation and absence are real mediations of the ways of being that constitute the horizon via which the devalued experience existing. The experience of absence, inadequacy and incapacity are effects of the forms, disclosed, which constitute modalities materialised via such processes so that the
inability of the devalued is a real effect of experiencing the circumscriptions which constitute the differences that manifest such objectivities. Without involvement the conditions of possibility of intentional aspects are missing and there is no sphere of reference relating to the individual who is subject to existence as a void of non-possibility that is constitutive of the objectivity that they experience being because of the way their objectivity is perceived and their difference sustained. Without involvement in actualising mediations, without the recognition and disclosure of forms, there aren’t common ways of being-there, physiognomically materialised, so that there is a shared sphere because the way of being-there of different categories is radically different, giving rise to different kinds of sense born of the perception of differences born of different relations to the world born of different relations to objectivities that are constituted to have national and international efficacy. For those whose insignificance is born of recognition of a discrepancy reproduced via the physiognomically regenerated effects of such perceptions, their relation to national institutions reproduces their entrapment in a locality that reduces them to the private sphere of unemployment and this reproduces the very mediations constitutive of their objectivity so that undergoing institutional processing via institutions whose agents operationalise networks via disclosures that constitute schema relating to a bureaucratic vision doesn’t serve any mediating function for many who merely re-experience the mediations constitutive of their entrapment in locality via a confrontation with an objectivity that merely physiognomically regenerates the sense of relational processes that characterise the unemployed more generally. Negation denudes individuals of any sense of potentiality, it enmires people in an actuality that their objectivity perpetuates. Without involvement in forms whose consequential nature are experienced via their constitutive effects, realising one in relation to a fabric disclosed via progressive immersion in a sphere of existence and it’s forms of life, then where is the opportunity? Without involvement in a sphere whose interpersonal disclosure constitute you viably via forms whose disclosure constitute capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being-there informed via the sense of such realisations, then where is the opportunity to accede to forms of objectivity born of recognition? Moreover, in fields whose public appearance reduce, largely, to private institutional mediations, without contact, there is no access to any public sphere because of the way that sphere is privately constituted whilst others are reclassified via abstracted administrative acts that function as screens that obscure the nature of the reality via the institution of a mass system that reduces, for many, to anonymous, impersonal, processes. Without involvement, individuals do not experience being constituted via aspects that inhere in relationships which disclose the sense of forms individuals experience being physiognomically materialised via recognitions which disclose such aspects and they experience a meaninglessness arising from an inability to project because there aren’t mediations constitutive of experiences of being competent and they experience an instituted inability, arising from their education. As one person described, "Do you think I feel anything but rage and disappointment at this instituted helplessness, what do you think I feel when I trawl through post after post saying, 'wanted: some bourgeois cunt'". This is what happens when selection criteria relate to privately instituted processes whereby some are surreptitiously consecrated and others sacrificed via a boundary quietly separating the sacred from
the profane. It is the problematic nature of economic divides mediated via fields whose closures efface differences in modalities of realisation that constitute real differences in capacity. These spatial divides sub tend the nature of educational processes. Moreover, the derivative education characteristic of those who are processed, educationally, to provide ring-fenced economic spaces for those who materialise the appearance of a process out of administrating the production of others, doesn’t signify individuals as competent even in relation to the academic spheres whose production students teach themselves in order to satisfy the administrative criteria that arise from spatially dislocated practices whose autonomy de-realises the efforts of many who access nothing constitutive via their education. Instead of the education being a process consisting of the directing of your labour, what you have is an interpersonal charade that discloses the means to constitute the appearance of this via your own directing of your labour so that it becomes part of the contextualisation of someone else who undergoes the physiognomic regeneration of the experience of the significance of their labour via the intersubjective donations of significance which arise from their realisation. The process doesn’t consist of anything constitutive of the form of your labour and, rather, the form of your labour becomes part of the disclosure of forms within associative frameworks that don’t involve your presence but which realise others via modalities disclosed via the use of your production to materialise forms which function as resources for those who sustain the charade of their function via the association which materialises the appearance of their function. This is what needs to be attended to: who is accessing the basis of responsive actualisation? Who is accessing the relational basis of experiences of being competent? Who is accessing the relational basis of the materialisation of the appearance of consequential forms that inhere in experiences of being subject to such mediations? And who is merely condemned to a contactless process in which they are subject to the administrative mediations that constitute such aspects? Who experiences forms of presence that disclose meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities and who faces the de-realisation of abstracted relationships that extort the sense and appearance of a process where nothing, actually, exists: who experiences actualisation and who de-realisation? The exclusion of individuals from public contexts makes them vulnerable to educational processes that use administrative processes, that students must pay to access, as the means to materialise the appearance of a process that consists of nothing beyond the administration of student labour. As a student you exist merely via the cursory moments of administered forms produced across a distance involving no co-presence relative to the field you are supposedly being educated to participate in. This is because the appearance of a field is constituted via such administrative processes that function to allow academics to procure resources without outlays of time or labour, what they need to do they can do from the private sphere, and it is this fundamental dynamic that constitutes the nature of the process. Generally, there is nothing that being-at university involves beyond the satisfaction of administrative criteria that require your production to generate the forms whose processing materialise the appearance of the labour of those who procure a status via associating themselves with the administration of the labour of others. There is only contact over the possibility of bringing money into an institution via a relationship that objectifies someone else and then, usually, there is
little contact because the appearance of a function is materialised via closed relational processes that refract the appearance of processes where little exists beyond the bureaucratic processing of the products of an individual's labour. There isn't connection nor mediation and the mediations that appear to take place are of a form that materialises the appearance of competencies and aspects that function as sources of value usually via relationships that narcissistically realise academics. It is the absence of mediation that causes the disorientation and the inability to adapt. There is no context of actualisation so that individuals experience being-able to appropriate potentialities whose form inhere in belonging to a fabric whose disclosure constitutes ways of being that realise potentialities sustained via incorporation of their constitutive forms. The mediations relate to the objectivities of the academics who experience the relational constitution of the sense of forms that inhere in such relational processes but, for students, these relationships are so abstracted and fleeting that they never address deficits rooted in distributions of capital mediated via such processes. Students exist in relation to fundamental spatial processes that are rooted in the significance of forms which the process reproduces. The problem with these mediations is the individual functions as the source of objectification and value for others, the relational processes disclosing forms which physiognomically materialise an experience of being-competent for the academics who are objectified via the relationships, but for the student, these relational processes are abstracted, involving minimal contact and often, no co-presence, so that the individual is subject to a de-realisation arising from their existing in a liminal space, dislocated, their attempts to appropriate cultural forms devoid of access to disclosures which physiognomically regenerate capacities for enunciation and instantiation that are born of the mimetic acquisition of such aspects as part of the relational constitution of such forms so that they bear the sense of an insecurity that is an essential aspect of the way these objectivities are publicly reconstituted. For the student, mediations are abstracted and de-realising, they lack actuality because they relate, perpetually, to a future which is deferred, so that any possibilities are suspended, any accession to relationships of co-presence and actualisation are conditional, pending, and possibilities relate to a deferred state and are thus indeterminate. Because the mediations that constitute the possibilities available reduce to the satisfaction of abstracted administrative criteria, students are forced to “focus” on dispelling the mediations constitutive of the appearance of the process, rather on actually doing anything. Which is to say, they are forced to do nothing beyond read-and-write, in isolation, because, neither they nor, their labour, can be situated. Is there any wonder students are so disillusioned when the texts they produce have no real function except to validate others by materialising the appearance of their competence? The truth is that you produce texts that have no function and no readership and you pour your heart and soul into producing texts that are never read. Your production is purposeless and its inconsequential nature is manifest by the absence of absorption in any kind of constitutive interpersonal context: recognition would involve disclosure and yet there isn't recognition nor the disclosure of forms that initiate transitions between states so that the absence of engagement leaves individuals dispossessed of initiative because there cognitive faculties are not engaged because there is no absorption in contextualising mediations that constitute a recognised form of competence: the extortion of the
sense of a process that objectifies others, the validation of assessors who do little beyond formulate administered judgements, disempowers those de-realised via the extortion of the sense of forms via relationships that narcissistically realise educationalists whilst robbing producers of an authority that could only arise from grounds their labour cannot be embedded in because the process available to them materialises the appearance of functions where nothing exists, hence, the pervasive sense, perpetuated via such relationships of there being, "nothing there". How could this not affect projection and capacity when any relation to 'what they do' is so ambiguous? What is there for individuals who exist in such conditions 'to do'? What does "doing sociology' reduce to when one has to endure such conditions for seven years in the hope of 'qualifying' in order to face exactly the same conditions perpetuated as one attempts to mediate access with all capacity to function as a resource gone because one is now 'qualified'? All being 'qualified' does is mean an absolute reduction to the condition that was displaced by the charade of the 'education' because, with all capacities to function as a resource gone, because one has exhausted the finances available to one in order to 'qualify', one can no longer mediate access because there is no longer any reason for interaction, because there are no possibilities available, and one faces the real grounds of the inability the process perpetuated: one cannot connect or mediate access because the real grounds of competence, of significance and disclosure, are economic, and these educational processes are merely transfigurations of economic statuses into competences via processes of valuation that the institutional autonomy secured via the charade of a mass process obscures via complex mediations that exploit complexity to obscure a reality which can never really be signified without destroying any stake in the field itself. Actualisation and the experience of potentialities physiognomically materialised via disclosures which constitute contextualising mediations that render individuals able to perceive aspects they intuit because they are privy to the constitution of forms that materialise a fabric experienced via membership, are key aspects of statuses that become ever more conditional, and surreptitiously realised, the more massified education becomes to produce a charade of involvement to obscure the massive structural problems arising from a competition in which the power to constitute significant forms via experiences of being socially effective are the preserve of those with income and the institutional leverage it facilitates. We would be better to attend to the conditions required for individuals to develop via an assurance that necessitates different forms of economic organisation, different types of institutional-relational processes. Deficits would be better addressed via involvement because involvement would reconstitute the sense of forms and resignify the individual but that would require direct, as opposed to abstracted, mediation, it would require practical help but practical help needs engagement, time, effort, concentration, it needs something to be done, it needs space to be made available and resources to be used to create objectifying opportunities and it is easier just to get people to pay for the liberty of producing their own process which reduces to the administration of their labour and then judge them and the agents involved in the processing experience being objectified instead. What is great about this is that they don't actually need to do anything, provided the administrative documents are correctly formatted, then a process appears to have been instituted. You aren't taught to deal with anything, not
even given access to a representational apparatus that might begin to deal with aspects of social reality, you are required to find a way, via your own dislocated labour, to satisfy the administrative criteria that materialise the appearance of an educational process. The mediation is self-produced and yet materialises the appearance of public forms where, in reality, there is an absence which, later, affects the objectivity of the student and the value of their labour-power. For the student, it is a process whose appearance is materialised via administrative-bureaucratic relationships akin to claiming benefits. The problem is what can you do when there is nothing-there? What can you do when you actually cannot access anything? When what is supposed to be there for you is a vacuous administrative charade and all you can access is faked phone calls where you function as a conduit of someone else's realisation then what can you do? When your PhD process reduces to fake conversations where supervisors lie, displace and evade, carefully avoiding obligating themselves or ever saying anything that might disclose the lie that anything is, in fact, available, thereby avoiding disclosing the reality of the absence of anything, then you are in the same kind of de-realising hell characteristic of other forms of unemployment: flailing around outside of any mediations that might realise you so that you might accede to capacities that inhere in such modalities. The absence of anything is obscured by the pretence of a process extorted via associations that surround the management of your labour whilst your labour, itself, is constituted via the absence of any relational processes that might embed it in disclosing dynamics that might constitute its form. If all you can access is someone using you as a medium of their own self-actualisation and the moments and mediations constitutive of the appearance of institutional processes don't involve co-presence so that you are undergoing the physiognomic materialisation of an experience whose identity arises from spatial dynamics of valuation that parallel unemployment, then what can you do? Whilst institutional agents are materialising the appearance of their function via administrative acts which involve little beyond association with students whose labour is not situated, with the administrative labour done by secretaries, then what can you do? There is never anything you can actually do, because the extent of the possibilities available to you reduce to you producing text in order to satisfy administrative criteria whose relational forms objectivise others. The process is devoid of actualisation because the conditions of attribution of competencies relate to recognitions which are as surreptitious as the institutional process is private and experiences of being situated in relation to the institutional conditions that constitute the recognised forms of competence arise from involvements that are exclusive and difficult to access when one's labour is distorted via such institutional processes so that the capacity to intuit appropriate forms relates to experiencing disclosures which constitute an experience of their necessity because one shares a horizon whose intelligibility arises from the realisation of a boundary experienced via being-there, via being subject to its interpersonal constitution. The ability to adapt is an effect of experiences of realisation that constitute schema whose behavioural manifestation inscribe a sense appropriated via being subject to mediations that physiognomically materialise forms whose sense inhere in continuous involvement in a boundary whose intelligibility arises from its interpersonal disclosure, from the practice of differences given life via the sense of such aspects. There is, nothing there, nothing you
experience via being situated in relation to such processes beyond a reality that arises from the perpetuation of divisions which constitute the day-by-day reality of an existence rooted in distances that extort value via using the devalued as a foil for the extortion of the sense of forms via relationships which disclose an experience of being capable that is an effect of relational processes that extort the sense of competence without situating the devalued who undergo the re-signification of an inferiority that is a tacit aspect of the relational processes that constitute the objectivity of what is available to them. The significance of positions is experienced via relational processes that constitute modalities that enable some and disenfranchise others. The devalued are dispropriated of access to the constitutive moments that their labour relationally discloses for others. Is it any wonder that lower class students, lacking any sphere of co-presence or public existence that might foreground forms of intelligibility arising from a shared horizon of disclosure, find it difficult to communicate and feel overwhelmed by an inability to constitute appropriate forms when there is no shared sphere of actualisation in relation to which intra-worldly aspects might be constituted? Your only point of contact, the supervisor, arises over the distances that cause the communicational voids because the relationships lack any shared sphere that might function as a basis for reference and, as a lower class student, there is no sphere of involvement beyond that which you mediate yourself: the charade of supervision which reproduces the problems of the work itself. Without any shared sphere of disclosure in relation to the immediacies of the practical forms of social existence, you have to make available to them aspects, you have to disclose forms, that constitute them viably, you have to offer them a representational apparatus so that you disclose an ability arising via your labour so that you constitute modalities that enable references arising from the forms you relationally disclose so that your labour, via the supervisory relationship, functions as a medium of self-actualisation for the academic so that they experience competencies disclosed via the associational charade surrounding the administration of student labour, that is, via relationships that extort the sense of a function in which the pedagogic relationship is reversed. What student labour does is constitute the grammar of concepts, elucidating clusters of concepts that circumscribe the constellation of semantic relationships that constitute the appropriate use of categories so that academics access a transmissible culture that discloses forms via relationships that physiognomically materialise capacities arising from involvement in a fabric that is, relationally, asymmetrical in that the academic occupies a diffuse web of such constitutive relationships, experiences attributions of competence rooted in such processes, whereas the student lacks access to such aspects. Whilst it's defined as collaborative, with one Research Professor boasting about how she "enjoys working collaboratively with PhD students" and writing, "you’d have to be prepared to work cooperatively and collaboratively", it is the employees who are objectified and who access the interpersonal grounds of objectivising relationships that materialise forms that function as sources of value and self-actualisation, not the students whose labour has no, unmediated, objectivity or significance: the inability of recently completed PhD students to get interviews manifests the worthlessness arising from the conditional nature of attributions of competence that are effects of the way differences in value are surreptitiously reconstituted via the use of institutions to operationalise networks operating "cooperatively and
collaboratively" to materialise the distinction of those within them. Academics might want to 'collaborate' with the consumption, that is, use, of others labour via relationships that objectify them but the labour of producing forms they usually leave to students. Such expressions manifest the aspects academics want to experience being realised in relation to; they are ways of acceding to representational forms of intentionality via the sense of relational processes that constitute a meaning extorted as a relational condition of the interaction: in other words, the interlocutor must realise the academic via the sense of such forms in which they associate with the administrative processing of labour produced privately and secure accreditation, institutionally, via relational processes that constitute capacities to ascribe intentional states whose conditions of satisfaction are secured via relationships students are forced to enter. The frightening thing is that educationalists actually believe they are making something available. This is because students realise them in relation to an experience of being significant via mediations that constitute their experience of the forms whose sense they bear as an effect of being subject to such modalities so that they experience the actuality of possibilities, or capacities, being constituted via experiences of being subject to such relational forms. They experience being significances that are publicly consequential whereas the devalued experience a de-realisation that is an effect of the way differences of significance are constituted via different ways of being situated via this institutional background constituted via the sense of barriers which transpose positions into significances and capacities so that cognition is rooted in aspects of the social structure that need to be attended to. The mediations constitutive of the traces of a process do not relate to any sphere of practice beyond the isolated production of texts whose administrative processing materialise the appearance of a process. What mediations there are only relate to the objectivisation of others with your labour functioning as a foil that enables others to constitute themselves so that you function as the producer of a disclosive medium that enables others to appropriate forms and experience the sense of capacities that inhere in experiencing a contextualisation and functionality that the relational charade surrounding the administered judgement of your labour constitutes so that you function as an enabler of fronts and forms of public identity that narcissistically realises the agents who experience capacities arising from such processes. It is significant that the student is judged outside of any contextualisation or function or performative conditions. In other words, the student must project without access to the interpersonal grounds constitutive of the realisations that sustain forms incorporated via disclosures that constitute the capacity to appear appropriately because they bear the traces of forms that arise from involvement, so that lower class students are condemned to failure because they cannot exhibit intentional aspects whose grounds they are not subject to being disclosed. They are required to function as a resource without themselves accessing resources, required to function as a mediating enabler, making forms available, without themselves accessing such modalities. A key aspect of worthless educational processes is that they arise at a distance from any sphere of involvement because they often consist of people whose educational decisions have arisen from a horizon constituted via such distances so that the absence of the students ability to perceive appropriate, or worthwhile, educational processes is an effect of a structural blindness that is an
effect of institutional-economic conditions that the educational processes they sustain, perpetuate. Any labour arising from outside of a context which discloses forms that synchronise labour and development and involve going somewhere and doing something is worthless, even in the disciplines that perpetuate such conditions because they cannot resolve the problem of contextualising students except via a charade that uses students self-generated labour to materialise the appearance of a process in relation to which academics can experience a function and a purposive relation to being that is unavailable to the victims of such de-realising processes. We see, that the space of positions determines modalities and that differences of actualisation relate to the relational underpinnings that constitute the conditions which satisfy the intentional forms arising from the sense of relational processes that reproduce, precisely, the forms of life relating to such objectivities so that the conditions of existence that students face merely perpetuate a sense inflected by a visibility whose perception physiognomically regenerates forms which subtend judgements that can exploit the decontextualisation of students to formulate euphemised expressions of differences that are re-mediations of valuations that degrade the devalued, robbing them of every possibility that the process derives a sense of, without ever providing, because of the extortion of the sense of forms that subtend economic relationships which disavow the reality through the use of distances and institutional processes expressly designed to obscure such realities. It is clear that de-realisation is a real effect of an invalidation arising from the interpersonal grounds constitutive of the appearance of functions that cannot ground any interpersonally realising purpose for students to be-somewhere, or be-there, which is why the education of the poorest is so bereft of actualisation, so bereft of any interpersonally disclosed reason for being anywhere: competition for access to resources whose scarcity has to be sustained in order to maintain divisions symbolised via relational processes that reconstitute capacities and inabilities rooted in the sense of relational forms arising as effects of such distributions merely transposes class relationships into sense relationships transfiguring valuations into what appear to be differences of competence. Education, for many, amounts to the artificial production of fake positions via relationships that, whilst validating some, de-legitimate others, who undergo a real experience of a decomposition rooted in a de-realisation arising from the absence of any access to any sphere of actualisation so that they really experience instituted incapacities that are effects of recognitions of difference that disclose the basis of barriers whose sense are incorporated as real inabilities to refer to the social grounds arising via the sense of forms whose disclosure constitute the appearance of a legitimacy that constitutes the forms via which it is perceived as interpersonally realised moments so that actualisation and de-realisation are key modalities of valuations that subtend what appear to be purely personal aspects of a social structure constituted via the interpersonal forms that subtend such terms. What academics need is access to the interpersonal grounds of self-ascriptions whose sense inhere in relational states that satisfy the attribution of such forms so that once the relational forms are instituted they are objectified irrespective of their actual practice. This is why academics respond to you as-if interacting with you is doing something for you because, for them, this is how the bulk of their experience of being capable academics arises, via relational processes that disclose the sense they appropriate via being subject to the relational
charade that constitutes the sense of their authenticity. This is why access to the public grounds of the illusion of a university are such significant aspects of the institutional consecration of individuals and why differences of belief concerned with the nature of education are such prominent effects of the class structure. What this means is that abstracted bureaucratic relationships can be used to refract the appearance of institutional processes that require little labour (most of which is done by secretaries) and can be used to materialise the appearance of properties whose sense inhere in forms that have little actuality and students can undergo abstracted processes, involving, largely, relationships mediated across distances, because the symbolic forms arising from such repressed economic differences transmute economic distances into sense-relational forms that refract the appearance of role-performance, function and competence whilst condemning others to objectivities arising from the extortion of the sense of such forms. Because the appearance of these processes can be materialised without much by way of contact, the appearance of a process can be materialised without much by way of time or effort and so the appearance of professionalism can coalesce with complete neglect and exclusion. Indeed, assessments reduce to individuals functioning as foils for an experience of commitment and integrity that belies the nature of the process. What the process does is constitute valuationary forms that physiognomically materialise purposive states for some while allowing for the extortion of a sense of competence via groups whose inferiorisation is part of the fabric of this reality so that it becomes an attractive way for elites to reconstitute historically entrenched significances via institutional forms that appear contemporary, which is why areas like south Yorkshire have very high levels of exploitation, debt and under-employed people and these conditions support a university sector whose positions are dominated by members of the international elites supported by an extortion of resources via relational forms that reconstitute economic differences transposing them into forms of sense whose interpersonal forms reconstitute the terms of such objectivities. Furthermore, because the appearance of a process can be instituted without much by way of time or effort, the relational forms constitutive of the appearance of a process can easily be monopolised and a 'system' whose appearance is materialised chiefly via abstracted administrative relationships can be used to extort incomes for processes that are of little benefit to the individuals who are supposed to be its beneficiaries. In reality, the process reduces to solitary, dislocated, production and then administered judgement in which academics take the easiest route to the materialisation of the appearance of their function: criticism. The problem of the involvement of individuals is a problem of connection that means that processes of recognition, disclosure and actualisation are absent because there is limited contextualisation of individuals because the problem of the embedding of individuals, in economically consequential forms, remains. Competition, even within institutions, means that individuals face the same valuationary processes that constitute their objectivity when they are educationally reclassified as they do whilst unemployed, it becomes just another institutional mediation of differences in objectivity that become publicly reconstituted via such class processes. Without connection and disclosure individuals experience their preintentional capacities via modalities relating to a physiological sense arising from unrealisation in which their neurophysiological potentialities are stifled because they
are not realised via interpersonal mediations that connect them so that they experience an engagement that constitutes faculties arising via such modalities. The problem of connecting individuals with the social grounds of neurophysiological potentialities requires realising individuals in relation to aspects that inhere in being-in-the-world and yet competition erodes the relation between individuals and the public grounds of forms which constitute such modalities. The problems that individuals face, relative to their public value, and the mediation of access to developmental conditions which allow them to experience transitions through states that facilitate their development, allowing them to escape the finitude of a devaluation that socially dislocates them, robbing them of access to the interpersonal grounds constitutive of competence, are not resolved via education, they are merely rearticulated. What this means is that instead of developing in relation to actually using ideas in relation to a sphere of public practice, students, as an effect of the excess competition that makes such a process viable, are forced to adopt a mode of practice based in spatial distances that privatise their production so that the form of their production is essentially distorted via the nature of an assessment process that is distant from any sphere of involvement or validation. Whilst the appearance of their process is materialised via private institutional relationships, the forms of value constituted via the relationships are public. In other words, the relational processes extort a sense of value via relationships that de-legitimize the supposed beneficiaries of the 'education'. Because the education merely exploits primal distances, as opposed to addressing them, it merely de-legitimates those who undergo a progressive de-realisation arising from an inability to access anything that physiognomically regenerates the sense of an objectivity rooted in doing-nothing characteristic of the urban poor. Lower class students exist in relation to spatial divides that ensure there is no co-presence and they face a life of doing-nothing as an effect of the absence of anything that makes them vulnerable to such processes which mirror the real condition constitutive of vulnerability to such processes: unemployment. The spatial and interpersonal processes constitutive of devaluation are merely objectively reconstituted via educational processes that exploit people’s position to provide a process that offers status and income for little labour. There is no product, no costs, no distribution, just deny people access and then make them pay for administrative processes that require minimal institutional labour. Just add a little charade that narcissistically realises the middle classes in relation to public statuses whose meaning are historically sedimented via the sense of such relational forms and you have a viable form of social structure whose economic underpinnings subvert the reproduction of meanings whose relational forms constitute viable objectivities. The absence of anything constitutes the nature of a process that makes interpersonal relations difficult: the inability of academics to contextualise students affects the relationships via which the sense of a process is extorted so that the student can experience no real reason for interaction with academics who themselves cannot contextualise students because they are contextualised via the sense of a process disclosed in relation to the notion of interactions with students that are as impoverished as the process is vacuous. As one postgraduate student expressed the nature of the relationships, “nothing has any urgency for them, they don’t seem to feel the need to actually do anything”, the reason for this is that relationships with students
autonomously disclose the sense of a competence realising academics in relation to the appearance of a process that, usually, involves very little beyond the idea of a process disclosed via student labour so that all the academic has to do is use the administrative regulation of the process in order to constitute the sense of doing-something. Without any context of practice, then academics can exploit the decontextualisation of students in order to displace obligations and obscure the nature of the process available to students and pursue strategies of dissimulation that simultaneously realise them in relation to the sense of doing-something while avoiding doing-anything beyond appropriating forms that students disclose and instantiating responses rooted in the embedding and synchronising effects of being-realised via such practices. Without any involvement in a common sphere of disclosure, the decontextualisation of student production becomes part of an exploitation of their exclusion, both to displace any obligations that might arise from processing them and, as a means of obscuring from them their own exclusion so that, uninvolved in anything, they cannot perceive possibilities in order to initiate mediations that might constitute their involvement so that their exclusion renders invisible to them the falsity of a process whose relational forms merely constitute the appearance of their process via interactions with them that relate-to-nothing but the resources produced via their own labour which are used by academics both to institute the sense of their process as well as an academic competence whose sense is extorted via relationships that the student is forced to enter because that is all they can access. Because the mediations arising from distances preclude involvement in anything beyond the mediations which constitute the appearance of the educational process available to students, students cannot communicate about anything-in-particular because the process available to them doesn’t involve actualisation so it doesn’t involve immediacies of realisation and this affects communication. Because possibilities only involve further mediations requiring nothing beyond the attempt to mediate access via approaches over distances, everything is temporally displaced, so that students have-nothing to communicate about beyond the private condition they are condemned to which they share with the unemployed, and academics can exploit the effects of this condition by displacing any potential obligations by using the mediated nature of the process to simultaneously constitute the appearance of mediating mediations whilst doing-nothing. This affects the nature of communication with evasion being a key aspect of these relationships as academics casually avoid any potential obligation leaving students in a situation where their only resource is their own labour. The problem is this is itself mutilated by its non-contextualisation and the de-realisation characteristic of the condition it arises from erodes any capacity to project. The form of the process can be explained by the lack of labour it involves for academics but the problem is that the supervisor is the only source of public contact for the student. The form of the process affects the nature of communication, everything becomes a joke that can be dealt with via reassurance or light-heartedness. The student situation is occluded by the nature of the mediations constitutive of the distances that make available such a mode of practice. Students are reduced to attempting to continuously mediate access without any means to do so, so that their lives involve doing-nothing as they wait to satisfy mediations which, over time, merely signify differences of condition which become transposed into differences in
academic classification whose grounds can be obscured. Supervisors are dependent on descriptions that students provide that, because of their own decontextualisation, rely upon theoretical propositions whose use disclose forms that academics themselves appropriate via the physiognomic regeneration of a competence rooted in relations of production that students are forced to enter in order to attempt to validate themselves. When students are the source of realisations that physiognomically materialise the sense of prestigious forms, academics can sustain belief in access to forms that, as far as the student is concerned, are almost vacuous apart-from the singular, private, relationship with a supervisor who they realise via the charade of guiding their labour via indulging their sense of competence via interacting with them as-if they are doing-something by ratifying decisions made in relation to projects whose grounds arise from divisions which force devalued objectivities on students. It’s a process whose appearance is materialised via exclusion and it is only because students cannot access any sphere of public practice that they have to then deal with the mediations of nothing arising from the absence of anything that then constitutes the appearance of a process that arises via the administration of student labour. What the administrative relations characteristic of the institutions do, is allow academics to derive the sense of aspects whose instantiation are part of their contextualisation: their contextualisation is an effect of their ability to instantiate forms whose disclosure arise from the institutional-relationships that constitute the resources they appropriate via being-situated so that the appearance of their labour process is materialised via such associational forms. This is why many of them see ‘working’ as a matter of interacting and why they feel that associating is work because it is via relationships with students that they undergo the physiognomic regeneration of the appearance of their labour process and derive the sense of their work so that they derive the sense of a function via the intersubjective donation of significances via relationships that students are forced to enter to attempt to certify themselves. Students cannot go to the field because there is no direct access to anything because what is available is conditional upon forms arising via their processing so that, for many, their educational process consists purely of their financing sectors whose practices relate to nothing beyond that of the academics who materialise the appearance of their practice via the forms of relationship which constitute the sense of administrative processes which materialise the appearance of their labour process. One of the great differences, individuated via distributions of value in relation to materialised forms arising via recognitions which constitute involvement in segregated worlds financed via the administrative processing of the labour of large numbers, is access to an experience of being competent. The ring-fencing of academic worlds, ensured via the financial autonomy arising from the processing of large numbers, ensures control of access to the forms recognised in relation to a labour market whose opportunities are disclosed via forms of recognition which produce the tokens arising via relations of involvement which disclose what is appropriated via experiencing being situated against a background whose anonymity obscures the private use of institutional space to produce public tokens whose labour market function arises via the closures which constitute the meaning of being forms arising via such processes. Differences in competence are real effects of the closures which constitute the forms required to access environments via relations of involvement
which disclose the forms required to accede to the recognised form of the competence. Individuals find themselves dislocated from any valuationary sources even in relation to what is available to them because of the reproduction of an objectivity that delimits particular possibilities so that certain groups can function as sources of income because of an appearance of incapacity which the process available to them reproduces as they imbibe meanings via experiences of being situated against a backdrop of forms which constitute an objectivity that is merely reproduced via what they experience being-there, existing via the forms which circumscribe their public existence. In this sense, the education available to them merely rearticulates the sense of forms rooted in the meaning of being which make them prey to such processes in the first place and, once embarked, the lack of opportunity merely rearticulates a devaluation rooted in a circumscription that keeps them on track because there is nothing that has any value so that they aren't able to access anything, publicly, anyway, even in relation to the public mediations that constitute their educational process. What the circumscription of the forms of their existence do is constitute significances that are materialised effects of barriers which define the form of the process available to them so that they imbibe significances via the process that are really physiognomically materialised effects incorporated via the unavailability of anything via the process available to them so that they don't accede to the sense of forms whose interpersonal disclosure constitute the ability to command forms whose sense arise via the circumscription of the actualisation of forms constitutive of relations of involvement with the grounds of distinct objectivities. Dislocation is an effect of spatial forms which circumscribe conditions of existence so that individuals face the significance of being particular forms whose incorporation arise via the disclosure of such possibilities as necessary references which are imbibed via the barriers that forms of existence become when their forms constitute actualities that are part of the fabric of public reference mediated via the forms constitutive of fields of practice. What you have are people who cannot even manifest skills that they might have, they simply don't count in any public field because their grounds arise via different relations of involvement so that their form is different and hence their significance. Incommensurabilities arise via absences of access so that individuals cannot negotiate with those whose location in public fields constitutes their ability to function in the world. The public world is not a personal or human sphere, it is a sphere of class forms rooted in the economics which constitute the particularities that are recognised as existing because of public grounds which manifest capital expenditures which accompany modalities whose forms constitute recognisable forms rooted in this order. It is apparent, that the labour market operates in relation to objectivisations rooted in fields which constitute the ability to bear the sense of forms individuals can experience being-realised-in-relation-to only to the extent that they can negotiate these classificatory forms via access to forms of social action whose public grounds are unavailable. Looking at the criteria for the role of “Document Writer”, one sees the following: “Professional writing experience as a Document Writer, Copy Writer, Sub Editor etc or similar; Previous experience writing Guidelines or Processes to set standards; Financial industry experience (desirable)”. Similarly, looking at the criteria for a “Medical Writer”, the criteria are context-specific, the competence is located via its public contextualisation which constitute its identity: “Do you have 2-3 years'
experience as medical writer? Do you have experience creating medical content/copy/data analysis? Experience of writing for pharmaceutical industry and medical communications?” Attempting to mediate access to an application process, for a role as a “bid writer”, I was told, this “role would be for an experienced Bid Writer only so it may be the wrong position for you at this stage based on the requirements of my client, they ask that any submissions can provide supporting evidence of securing ‘substantial’ funding from previous bids”. The underlying competence is writing yet even with a publication in a British Medical Bulletin collection, there is no way to elicit recognition and solicit contact. The identity of the competence is located via the public grounds constitutive of its specificity. The certification that most purchase is irrelevant, as one person put it, “they give you a certificate when you need an education”: I assume this person means, “training”. If you have a general humanities education, this is not even going to lead you to be considered. This is why science and maths are privileged because it is a mark of those on elite trajectories who go to university young. It seems that if you have elite mathematical or scientific skills then your skills are transferrable and you access the grounds of an adaptiveness that is an effect of repeated, and successive contextualisation, whereas if you have humanities credentials it is almost impossible to validate your skills because it is impossible to acquire any given the privatised and isolated nature of the mediations that materialise the appearance of your process. As one academic put it, "it is not difficult to get into university, it is more an issue of where you go and what you study". Indeed, it is as if labour market criteria are designed to eliminate the mass being educated by privileging those with rare, elite, skills. I saw a post concerned with psychosocial impacts on community health, for example, which required statistical skills. With the bulk of the poor doing varieties of social science in guises meant to mask what it really is, media, criminology, sport, tourism, labour market criteria simply privilege those with science and maths. What is noticeable is that it isn’t the demonstrable competence that might arise from the administration of the privately-based labour of students on degrees that counts because this condition is common to young people, what counts is the significance of the context and the way in which labour is located via a particular kind of social relationship: employment, which is difficult to access and relies upon access arising from the recognition of rare forms that are unavailable because they, themselves, relate to an ability to solicit contact with the private spheres of the public sphere that consecrate and objectivise some so that they are able to appropriate abilities relating to a circumscription arising via forms whose disclosure arise from recognitions that many never experience. For many, all that is available is a generic administrative process that they are free to finance and which objectifies those who process their documentation. This process, however, universal to the cohorts who purchase access to the process, has little value. The differences relate to forms of relationship arising from the spontaneous recognition of the incorporated effects of existing in relation to the grounds arising from reciprocally constituted differences which become transmuted, via this medium of disclosure, into legible differences in status. One might ask, how an education that never situates students even in relation to any practices relating to the administrative hubs they finance, in order to have their labour processed, can address deficits rooted in spatial divides that are themselves rooted in the reproduction of forms incorporated via repeated
subjection to differences arising from recognition of the incorporated effects of such processes? A hidden dynamic in relation to the processing of the poor is that, just as it costs the company to locate your labour, the same dynamics apply in educational fields, and the poor tend to get education that involves them in very little because what they access is accessible only when they are a source of revenue for others. There is engagement only when one might function as a means of objectification and a source of objectivisation and, once you lose the capacity to function as a resource-bearing entity, contact ceases. Indeed, because the appearance of a process reduces to an assessment function that students labour, alone, to produce, there is little for contact to concern which is why what contact there is, is insubstantial and relies, as much as the process itself does, on the students capacity to function as a foil for the realisation of the academics who associate their names with the administration of their labour. There is contact only in relation to the administrative mediations that materialise the appearance of a process. It is not merely that their labour cannot be situated in relation to a consequential sphere of application but neither can their production. What is clear is that not only do these conditions affect the form of their production, they affect, its significance. The light of the public sphere arises from the forms whose significance individuals experience being, via the realisations they experience being disclosed, via relations of involvement that constitute abilities to discern differences they intuit via disclosures whose realisation constitute contextual mediations which produce such objectivities. Individuals are validated via the meaning of being-in-space which is itself constituted via forms whose meaning are inscribed via being subject to disclosures whose interpersonal instantiation physiognomically materialise aspects that constitute the meaning-sedimentations co-opted via presence informed via experiences of the possibilities that such distinctions allude to via their interpersonal disclosure. This is why there is a continuous dialectic of recognition at work in selection criteria where employers demand evidence of abilities arising from being-in-contexts. The thing is that selection criteria relate to modes of objectivisation because employers have to use criteria that relate to the grounds of objectivities, to the interpersonal relationships that constitute the sense of properties, that inhere in experiences of being subject to the disclosure of the forms that constitute the ability to appropriate the sense of such forms, because one experiences the possibility of their actuality so that one accedes to representational forms of intentionality and modalities materialised via the recognition of properties that inhere in such processes. Labour market criteria arise from forms of involvement that constitute modalities appropriated via being subject to the forms whose disclosure constitute the sense appropriated via being subject to such possibilities as aspects of an objectivity whose public materialisation are part of statuses that differences in forms of social existence perpetuate. Unless you access forms of involvement that arise from recognitions which constitute the sense appropriated via being subject to disclosures which realise you in relation to forms that constitute properties whose significance inhere in such modalities, then you will neither be able to project appropriately, nor refer to aspects of being-a-person that inhere in actually experiencing such aspects as facets of your being-for-others, and you will neither feel competent nor ever be able to satisfy labour market criteria and this is the problem that the devalued and unemployed face. Much education surreptitiously reconstitutes such differences because of the divides that
subtend education. The realisation of social barriers is an essential aspect of the social structure creating competent valued, and incompetent devalued, people as an effect. Whilst some experience recognition, disclosure, realisation and contextualisation, others experience an absence of such modalities constituted via their inability to elicit recognition and solicit contact so that they experience unrealisation and dislocation so that different statuses reproduce different existential modalities and the devalued experience an essential inability whose physiognomic materialisation is a real cognitive effect of their inability to participate in a fabric that being weaves for those valued. Education itself reconstitutes such modalities quite naturally obscuring differences in objectivity personalised via mass processes whose anonymity obscure the reality of differences of involvement relating to the recognition of differences physiognomically regenerated via the use of institutional space to consecrate some and invalidate others as natural aspects of the perception of differences reconstituted via their physiognomic materialisation. Selection criteria are derived via consideration of the conditions required for aspects of an environment to become ontically constitutive of subjectivities which inhere in the physiognomically materialised aspects of subjection to forms appropriated via being lived-through so that the agent appropriates possibilities by discovering their potentiality as aspects of their relational disclosure so that their presence becomes infused with components of a context of living whose sense are actively, relationally, constituted as ways of being-realised against a background of relational processes. Through forms of realisation that physiognomically materialise aspects appropriated via being subject to the recognitions which disclose such modalities, individuals become involved with others via subjectivities that emerge from experiencing not merely ways of being but sensibilities and forms of affectedness that are part of the way presence emerges as an active component of a context or form of life. It is because neurophysiological structures emerge via absorption in forms, via immersion in networks, that constitute capacities arising from experiences of realisation rooted in such contextualising mediations that they have a collective asceptual identity which is why employers are so attendant to the presence of context, on CVs, because an appropriate way of being, manifest via the effects on presence of realisations which constitute the incorporated effects of a social logic immanent to progression, involvement, actualisation and competence, are an effect of being subject to such modalities. That is, individuals become ontically involved in a world whose disclosure is a modality of being-there which is why contextualisation, forms of involvement in public mediums whose intelligibility arise from divisions, is such a key differentiator because it is the basis of real differences in capacity that relate to what is really constitutive of presence and competence: value. The problem for the devalued is that labour market criteria presume embedding in relational forms that disclose contextualising mediations that constitute a sense incorporated via experiences of being realised in relation to forms which circumscribe so intimately because they inhere in belonging to a fabric experienced via being subject to modalities whose materialisation constitute capacities to refer to intra-worldly aspects manifest via experiencing being ontically involved with those who inhabit a terrain constituted via non-representational forms that subtend intentionality, aspects that are lived-through as sensible components of a form of life that escape representation because they subtend it. An environment becomes
involved with inhabiting subjectivities who experience the disclosure of forms whose orientation arise from absorption in ways of being-there that are lived-through as a fundamental aspect of the contextualisation of being such that the epistemic subject arises as an effect of such modalities. In other words, you have to exist in relation to forms whose appropriation arise from experiences of being appropriate that constitute a fit, and adaptive capacities arising from recognitions which constitute such modalities, or your frame of reference, and way of being, will be discrepant and you will fail, continually, to be able to satisfy criteria arising from a relation to the world whose conditions you cannot satisfy, leaving you marginal. Individuals have to exist in appropriate ways via experiences of recognition which disclose conditions which constitute intentional aspects arising from experiences of being realised in relation to such modalities, otherwise, every response they make will manifest inabilities that are the physiognomically materialised effects of different ways of being-there, different ways of being-situated, whose efficacy are effects of the significances arising from the relations between such differences. This is why individual biographies manifest completely different experiences of presence relating to differences in trajectory because differences of position, and value, constitute different ways of being-there. Differences of treatment disclose different modalities, different ways of being-there, and selection criteria are designed to screen for those who have accessed the actual grounds of competencies: that is, those who have experienced being realised in relation to actualisations that constitute recognised objectivities, that is, objectivities whose rarity emerge from recognition of their difference, which is why the CVs of lower class students manifest the absence of distinguishing (that is, rare) forms, mirroring the anonymity of a generic process that has to exist to materialise the appearance of public functions whose interpersonal reality are constituted differentially, surreptitiously, via perceptions of differences which physiognomically regenerate the sense of objectivities reproduced via such processes. This is why considerations of background are at the heart of selection criteria and why the issue of legitimacy has to be carefully institutionally manufactured via selective disclosure of differences via a mass process of competition that materialises the appearance of a system open for all which is, in reality, constituted via discontinuous oppositions born of recognition of differences arising from the way expressivity arises from condemnation to a private sphere constituted via the recognition and reproduction of such differences. It is not accidental that the education the poor tend to be subject to involves the least access to public space because this state of affairs arises from recognition of significances reconstituted via their processing and materialised via the state of affairs, the barriers manifest via the interpersonal recognition of differences that circumscribe the lives of the poor, across social fields, such that they experience there being 'nothing there', they experience an absence via their way of being, constituted via reference to their objectivity that constitutes the absence of possibilities made actual via aspects which constitute such references as aspects of their being-in-the-world. It is because of the underlying logic of these processes that individuals are legible, publicly, and such distinctions are articulated in relation to a medium whose disclosure constitutes the forms whose sense individuals incorporate via the circumscription of the forms that constitute their experience of being. Lower class students don't access relations of involvement that disclose forms that they
experience being realised in relation to so that they manifest the effects of an incorporation arising from distances which condemn them to the unrealisation of unemployment. They do not undergo the physiognomic regeneration of forms which realise them in relation to a sense they are able to appropriate via being situated against a diffuse web of relations of involvement which constitute their ability to refer to forms they intuit via being subject to their materialisation so that they appear to have little to say that is not negative because the institutional relational forms constitutive of their process don’t involve involvement in anything and the process available to them consists of little beyond assessment that, at higher levels, they have to finance via their own labour. What lower class students face are the same disclosures which constitute their real objectivity which is why entry to university, rather than providing an escape from particular conditions, produces a more intimate and devastating continuation of the same condition, it deepens a fundamental class condition by introducing lower class students to the interpersonal disclosures which constitute a public objectivity that circumscribes individuals so that they have few opportunities for realisation and appear via the forms physiognomically regenerated against a background of such reciprocally referential forms which constitute different forms of legibility in relation to actual differences that are part of the class hierarchy: middle class students access a purposive terrain of actualisation via education whereas lower class students face a negation that constitutes a real inability that they face in their daily life, nothing to do, nowhere to go, no way to dignify what they are doing, nothing to tell family, no way to describe anything very much because what they do consists of almost nothing. These mediations are just different ways of constituting objectivities and the real issue is access to the interpersonal terrain constitutive of functionality and this is available only for an elite. This is why university perpetuates objectivities immanent to forms of life. Unless individuals are involved in a sphere, unless there is a common process, which elicits a sense appropriated via being subject to modalities rooted in a horizon whose disclosure constitutes properties materialised via a boundary materialised via such contextualisation, then there will always be a sense of difference relating to different ways of being situated and this is why the mass, anonymous, administration characteristic of much of the education of the poor fails to address deficits that its relational forms merely reconstitutes. Objectification is an effect of involvement which manifests what it constitutes and certification just finances the space used to materialise such distinctions. The labour market is constituted via discontinuous oppositions that relate to social closures which mediate access to the grounds of objectivities and educational processes, unless they are elite, merely perpetuate the sense of such objectivities which is why the education of the poor tends to be poor education as lacking in value as it is useless at producing competent individuals. The labour market failure of so many varieties of lower class graduate merely attests to such conditions. People are not enabled, they are reduced by the revelation of social meanings that become constituted via objective differences that subtend their processing and render them legible. Individuals go from facing the absence of anything, beyond the financing of a process they must develop themselves, to being unable to fill-in application forms and, thereby, experience the implied negation of valuationary forms constituted via closures that constitute differences of objectivity arising from access to conditions that actually constitute
capacities. Without access to the interpersonal conditions required to satisfy intentional forms, individuals face the hopelessness of an inability that leaves them unable to even imagine being-able to function because the aspects constitutive of the sense of such forms remain unavailable, making unintelligible such possibilities. Without access to the interpersonal disclosure of aspects which physiognomically materialise a sense of capacity born of realisation, hopelessness ensues and individuals experience the same sense of inability characteristic of the unemployed. Without an experience of being-able to instantiate forms through experiencing being-recognised in relation to the aspects whose disclosure physiognomically materialise the sense experienced via being-subject to such mediations, how can individuals experience such possibilities as aspects of their objectivity? Without actualisation possibility lingers in the abstraction of de-realisation and individuals experience a confused disorientation, a malaise, at the heart of devaluation. Individuals remain enmired in a negation they confront whenever they attempt to represent themselves and confront the absence of conditions required to accede to representational forms of intentionality so that they can only experience an inability whose public grounds selection criteria manifest, "I feel so judged by the criteria whenever I look at a job, before I even try to apply it’s like a mount Everest of hurdles that my education didn’t equip me to get over. I wasn’t given any of the things I needed to fill in the forms. I look in bemusement and think ‘What the fuck?’, makes yer fuckin’ sick”. The sense of the effects of an ineffable power that is the flux of possibilities arising from the infusion of valuationary processes via the forms of life members of aggregates face as the futility of their attempts to accede to worthwhile forms of existence comes through in the following, “We are deactivated people somebody's fuckin switched us off, mate, meks me fuckin’ sick”. What makes you sick is the production of barriers via the constitution of absence so that individuals face, fundamentally, an ostracism arising from the way discontinuities are constituted from continuities, magnifying differences and ensuring some undergo the negation of injunctions rooted in the public practice of distinctions that become transmuted into differences of competence arising from the production of status-differences from the very grounds of the social medium itself. The presence of trauma in the face of inscribed injunctions that arise from the public practice of distinctions which circumscribe some so that they exist outside of the conditions constitutive of competence is manifest by the description of trigger-responses, “I feel so judged by the criteria...I look in bemusement and think ‘What the fuck?’” and it also emerges in the following where another person says, “I flip out when I see the requirements”:

What do I do? I have been without a job for years, terrible times. Lots of rejections before and eventually burned out so it’s really hard to look because I flip out when I see the requirements. I see only chaos when I look now because I feel useless when I see things I’ve never had the chance to do. So, now I come to a point where I just get by as best I can. It caused me such stress I got migraines and had to calm myself down so I had to stop looking really. I don’t want that again. It's best to try to find something to do yourself because you cannot trust colleges, schooling, jobs, it's a decaying system, there’s nothing there. I went to college but when I tried to apply nothing I’d done mattered so I started looking and feeling shit so I felt shit all the time and in the end just had to stop trying. So, the answer to what do I do is, I do nothing, just occupy myself the best I can.
Notice the key expression, "lots of rejections before and eventually burned out". The inability to satisfy labour market criteria is an effect of a negation that the devalued endure, and relive, when they look at labour market criteria which force them to confront an existence constituted via their inability to access anything that might allow them to satisfy such criteria. Absences of contact, and the unrealisation of negation, constitute incapacities, both, to satisfy labour market criteria and to accede to possibilities whose actuality remain unavailable so that individuals experience real incapabilities to conceive of themselves as ever being able to satisfy the interpersonal conditions constitutive of competencies because they are unable to access the interpersonal grounds of representational forms of intentionality leaving them dominated by fear and an experience of an inability born of the circumscriptions of a negation they experience being physiognomically regenerated via such processes. Notice the feelings of being ineffectual and how an experience of dislocation, linked to an experience of inability, born of devaluation, causes an anguish that is an effect of incapacities born of not-being able to accede to capacities that inhere in realisations born of disclosures that physiognomically materialise capacities for reference born of experiences of being situated via such processes so that those lacking opportunities "feel useless when I see things I've never had the chance to do". Devaluation involves a continuous experience of social failure born of a non-viability that excessive competition reconstitutes so that individuals are left numb, unable to mediate relationships or connect to a public sphere born of discriminations whose sense infuse any attempt at sociality. For the devalued the world becomes a site of continuous rejection which constitutes the sense of a negation that labour market processes merely reconstitute. Because our capacities are effects of engagements that realise us via forms that disclose aspects that constitute our experience of capacities and qualities whose sense we experience via such modalities, devaluation denudes individuals of experiences of potentiality and makes the world an aversive, as opposed to realising, place. It is not difficult to see why the devalued are prey to a socially constituted agoraphobia when the meaning of their being renders ineffectual attempts to project: without mediation, without realisation, how can they successfully project? When you don't access relationships that elicit purposive states via your education, you exist, like many of the unemployed, in conditions that constitute insecurity because you are being subject to the physiognomic materialisation of significances whose sense you incorporate relationally: insignificance is manifest via the absence of a capacity to elicit recognition and solicit contact which transmutes into an inability to refer to forms you experience being realised in relation to, so that you, thereby, experience capacities for sense and reference. Without intersubjective donations of significance you experience the absence of capacities which inhere in social and relational conditions that are unavailable to you, affecting your objectivity. The destructuring of those whose existence is publicly constituted via an absence of the forms required to accede to meaningful forms of existence that constitute meanings experienced via being subject to forms appropriated via experiencing being subject to such modalities, takes place on a purposive terrain and, without reasons-for-being-anywhere, they exist reclusively, hiding from the manifestations of their poverty which merely physiognomically regenerate their own inability to function in relation to a public fabric of being that their form of life precludes. Poverty is stigmatising,
mutilating and debilitating because it erodes projection and precludes access to the conditions that human development requires. It is because of the relation between cognitive states and the materialisation of differences via public space that the elite segregate and forge exclusive institutional relationships in order to ensure access to the conditions that constitute their viability: the symbolic is economically invested and part of the effaced conflict between aggregates that are constituted via significances that arise from the use of institutional space to constitute such forms. A fundamental modality of being-in-the-world is affected by excessive divisions whose symbolisation constitute inequalities born of the meaning of being forms whose reference arise from tacit transactions that constitute the grounds of references incorporated via subjection to such aspects. When post-traumatic stress disorder is rooted in feelings of fear and helplessness and when distinctions are personalised and transmuted into what appear to be differences of quality whose grounds constitute social properties experienced via being subject to such modalities, it is not surprising that the devalued are prey to complex post-traumatic stress disorder when they face a social world full of silent injunctions and materialised forms whose grounds they cannot contest. Withdrawal is necessitated by the aversive nature of being-in-the-world in conditions that preclude enhancing or enriching experiences, if you are devalued, you undergo a continuous de-realisation that negatively objectifies you so that you cannot escape the absence which constitutes your being-for-others, the nothing experienced via being situated via the sense of such objectivities. What is clear is that devaluation effectively decouples individuals from what becomes a world resonating with anguishing disclosures of inferiority that preclude accession to realising mediations that constitute human capacities. It is significant that starting to look initiated negative feelings: "I started looking and feeling shit", why would starting to look for employment initiate "feeling shit"? Because it is when the individual looks for employment that they face the criterial grounds of forms of existence that are unavailable to them, "I went to college but when I tried to apply nothing I'd done mattered". The forms of objectivisation constitutive of the objectified criteria are absent so that an existential condition concerned with the ontological grounds of differences in public value are absent so that the individual faces a feeling of inadequacy that is a really physiognomically materialised effect of valuationary forms that transpose inferiority into incapacity. Looking for employment confronts the individual with the absurdity of a negation that annihilates them because they cannot project via forms whose interpersonal grounds are unavailable and they cannot access anything because of the spatial, structural, logic that constitutes a way of being arising from divisions which merely reconstitute a negation implied by the realisation of differences that constitute space and their way of being, their form of life. It is clear that discontinuous oppositions arise from spatial divisions which amount to continuous dislocations whose interpersonal form affect cognition and subject individuals to implied negations whose sense they, not only, bear but continuously experience so that the only resolution of the pain implied in competing in a game that is rigged is to refuse to play and try, as far as they can, to avoid the public sphere that constitutes their inability via forms whose disclosure they cannot countermand, such that avoidance behaviours constitute a reclusive inexistence that leaves individuals bereft and suffering a silent misery born of injunctions that articulate public space with huge
repercussions for well-being and capacities. It is clear that the distinctions that subtend the constitution of space have considerable psychological impact and that inequalities erode, not only, well-being but competence because the devalued are condemned to a poverty, and absence of opportunity, that erodes their relation to the very fabric that constitutes their ability to appropriate being itself, they are world-impoverished as an effect of an inability to accede to the interpersonal modalities that constitute capacities that inhere in belonging. If we remember that one of the biological functions of attachment is the regulation of physiological arousal, we can appreciate why this experience of silent injunctions and classificatory imputations of inferiority arising from the grounds of objectivities experienced via being subject to the effects of such forms has such deleterious effects. The meaning of being subject to such injunctions function as traumatic stressors because our existence is publicly mediated and the effects of devaluation are to rob individuals of the mediations that constitute the conditions required to satisfy intentional states which remain unavailable so that the individual faces the implosion of faculties whose disintegration are an effect of the way they experience being curtailed via such conditions. How can such people accede to the expressive conditions required to accede to the development of actualisations that constitute capacities appropriated via discovering themselves subject to such possibilities as aspects of their being-for-others. The mode of givenness of the forms their faculties cohere around is mutilated and trauma is the effect. Notice the summation of this form of existence, "terrible times" and how it affects physiognomy, "I see only chaos". What is described is triggering from a trauma response arising from ostracism which activates the anterior cingulate cortex, the same part of the brain that detects physical pain. It isn't that people are excluded, they aren't situated sufficiently to be able to manifest what is constitutive of the existence they are forced to live for want of any alternative, the devalued are simply never recognised so that they never access the interpersonal conditions constitutive of capacities, they are never embedded and, consequently, see no possibility on the horizon because there is no sphere of disclosure, interpersonally, in relation to which they experience being the difference that actuality constitutes for those who are consecrated and assured of their being-for-others because their form of life emerges from synchronisations arising from the attunement of recognitions which make available forms whose disclosure realise them so that they experience being actually significantly different because their way of being arises from perceptions of form that disclose the meanings they experience being. It isn't really a matter of what people do because it is very hard to access any sphere in which competence might be elicited or manifest anyway, it is more about properties that are exhibited because of the absence of involvement in relational forms that constitute properties which arise from closures whose interpersonal constitution are part of their being what they are as ways of experiencing presence in relation to forms that constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to such realisations. The perception of difference leads individuals to exist outside of the conditions which satisfy intentional states because they don't experience the behavioural substrate that discloses a medium that constitutes capacities for development and this is experienced as anxiety arising from a disabsorption that is not merely disorienting but impugning because the devalued tend to endure anonymous, unrealising,
institutional processes as part of the constitution of expressivities physiognomically materialised via subjection to such processes. The devalued are circumscribed so that their development is hindered because they don't experience the grounds of incorporation of forms which materialise capacities arising from absorption in their disclosure so that individuals experience being-able to project and achieve a synthesis arising from their realisation so that the individual escapes the immediate moment via the anticipation of a potentiality whose immanence inheres in the realisations that absorb them in the possibilities they experience via experiencing such modalities. In this sense, the devalued don't experience the transcendence of potentiality engendered via actualisations that physiognomically materialise the sense appropriated via being subject to such modalities. The labour market is unfair because individuals cannot tacitly summon properties whose grounds they don't experience and so they remain judged for an actuality that emerges from the non-posibility of a negation arising from existing outside of public fields. Lower class people face dislocation from the public bases of valuation that constitute recognised objectivities, rare forms, whose circumscription consecrate those who instantiate a boundary corporeally imbibed, somatised via relations of domination that take place on a terrain of the meaning of being so that the devalued face the inscription of a boundary in their flesh, they face a public world in which their legibility is part of the fabric of the reality whose sense they incorporate via responses arising from the meaning of being forms they experience being interpersonally constituted so that they face a reduction to incapacities that are effects of the meaning of being-there, facing a world disclosed via processes that constitute them publicly, objectively. The problem for those excluded from any of the interpersonal conditions required to accede to recognised forms of social existence is that they are being judged for the effects of a condition whose sense they bear such that, that sense is part of the reality they face so that they don't access the grounds of possibilities. Without being given access to any of the interpersonal conditions constitutive of being-able to refer to realities that remain opaque because they are constituted via closures, how can they accede to possibilities? In this sense they face a reduction born of a stigma arising from the way public fields are constituted. Because competence is an effect of being publicly valued, the devalued face a public sphere via a personal reduction mirroring the significances their forms elicit so that they experience being-realised in relation to forms that physiognomically regenerate an experience of being arising as an effect of a contestation that is part of the meaning of being what they are. The devalued are, effectively, ostracised from the grounds of social objectivities that function as signifiers of value so that they can't mediate access to any of the transitional experiences required to access employment. What is described are fear responses based on the pain of ostracism, which activate lower, more primitive, areas of the brain relating to anxiety so that individuals endure chronic stress, hypervigilance, irritation, permanent insecurity and exhaustion and individuals, being triggered by exclusion, have difficulties with concentration and attention, manifest in the expression, “I see only chaos when I look now”, mirroring the perceptual implosion of reduction that negation constitutes. Our experience of being socially dexterous, or skilled, is an aspect of ourselves that emerges from realisation in relation to disclosures that constitute circumstantial forms that constitute what we appropriate via acceding to such modalities via our responsive actualisation via
experiences of being-perceived appropriately, that is, recognised, so that we emerge from the indifference and insignificance of an existence without justification via experiences of being valued that are valuationary processes that take place on the terrain of significance so that, via experiences of disclosures which constitute the meaning of being, we accede to a sense of the unity of our capacities via an integration of them via realisations that absorb us in moments that interknit past and future via moments that assure us of our being-for-others and, thereby, manifest a public efficacy rooted in acceding to a competence rooted in the interpersonal forms constitutive of capacities arising from the way meanings are publicly, interpersonally, constituted. It is via recognitions which disclose possibilities for absorption in forms that engage us practically in the substrate of meanings that cognitively realise us that we experience the unity of being, as body-subjects, and experience the abundance of our capacities for development via meanings appropriated via being subject to their possibility as distinct aspects of our being-for-others and thereby escape the finitude of devaluation. The problem is that the constitution of distinctions condemns some to negation, to experiences of reduction, that render them passively, as objects of others’ spatio-temporal fields whose sense they experience being manifest, so that they don’t experience subject-hood, and cannot accede to modalities born of recognition, and, thereby, experience a fragmentation and incoherence, the “chaos” alluded to, as they experience an inability to project and an inability to accede to experiences of existing meaningfully. Given that experiences of our humanity inhere in experiences of being realised in relation to forms that constitute our capacities via meanings we experience being interpersonally constituted so that we accede to a unity arising from engagement that constitutes us as capable of appropriating such forms via modalities arising from such processes, dislocation involves an implosion, negation involves an annihilation of the body-subject as possibility and this experience of reduction and incapacity involves a curtailment of the individual cognitively, it involves frustration and trauma, because those negated face a limitation that is sustained by the meanings they experience being; they remain trapped in forms that have essential effects, they incorporate a sense of inability that they experience being physiognomically regenerated by an objectivity arising from the meaning of being incorporated via such processes. Recognition discloses forms which engage us and it is through engagement that we accede to representational forms of intentionality. It is through the engagement of recognition, through the disclosure of forms, that we experience the conditions necessary for the satisfaction of intentional states because, through such modalities, we accede to possibilities via their actualisation. Recognition discloses forms which realise us so that our cognitive faculties are engaged via the physiognomic materialisation of the forms we experience being regenerated via the interaction and we accede to meanings via experiences of being capable of eliciting their form and, thereby responsively instantiating them. Via engagement we are absorbed so that we accede to a unity that realises us cognitively in the forms of the meanings we experience being able to function in relation to via involvement in their disclosure. In this sense we have to attend to the qualities of relationships within the social structure to ensure everyone accedes to the possibilities inherent in their human faculties, instead of some facing the trauma of the “chaos” that the reduction of negation involves. Moreover, notice how this person describes having difficulty
soothing herself: “It caused me such stress I got migraines and had to calm myself down so I had to stop looking really”: without realisation, there isn’t the anchoring of engagement and the fruition of meanings acceded to via experiencing being-able to incarnate their form as an effect of being-responsively constituted via interactions that disclose such modalities and the individual faces the frustration of their human faculties and the trauma of a negation they endure via inscriptions in the public sphere that indirect, and condemn, so that individuals who are enduring traumatising experiences struggle to rationalise, or think, clearly because the thinking centre of the brain is underactivated as an effect of the brain’s response to the stressors arising from a labour market whose circumscriptions arise from discontinuous oppositions in which differences inscribed in the physical order of bodies become transmuted into the symbolic order of significant distinctions that function as qualitative absolutes, debarring some from opportunities. Public significances not merely privately immobilise, they cause a personalised privation that assaults the basis of not merely identity, via the physiognomic materialisation of a negation incorporated via living forms that preclude opportunity, but the totality of everything constitutive of being-a-person. Negation causes a reduction that immobilises so that individuals face the annihilation of their human faculties in an uninvolvment whose disabsorption denudes individuals of an experience of possibility and actuality. The dissipation of any sense of capacity arising from subjection to circumscriptions constituted via negation is evident in the words of another person:

Considering I have never done anything with my life, I don’t know why I have so many symptoms of being burned out and I think how can I be burned out when I never did anything and half of the people I associate with are the same...Europe seems to be full of people who were encouraged to go to university but who got nothing from it. I went, didn’t fit in. I worked, got nothing. Now I just go from crap job to crap job.

What we see is the circumscription arising from disclosures which constitute sensibilities to forms arising from being subject to differences whose meaning arise from being subject to moments which physiognomically materialise a form of life born of reduction: “I went, didn’t fit in. I worked, got nothing. Now I just go from crap job to crap job”. As someone else described:

Ah 'ate lookin' fo' work, every rejection, it leaves you with just a bag of assumptions, and that is the tragedy because I sit and think "what did I do wrong? Was it this? Was it that? Was it because I said the wrong thing? Was it because I came across wrong? Was my accent too strong?" and you are just worrying all the time. It makes me feel ill, it is a constant strain.

One can appreciate why Bourdieu says, "The social world is an immense reservoir of accumulated violence" (Bourdieu 1993: 87) in that people face conditions that thwart and frustrate their human fruition, mutilating their objectivity, impairing their capacities to accede to forms which inhere in possibilities that require relational conditions that are only conditionally satisfied affecting the form of life of many who cannot accede to recognised form of objectivity. Procrastination is an effect of involvement in disclosures which constitute your negation as a physiognomically regenerated aspect of your involvement in forms that constitute such aspects. Individuals experience this interpersonal projection of aspects of expressivity that manifest the conditions
of reciprocity or compatibility required for its fulfilment, so that expressive physiognomy alludes to an existential condition that it manifests which concern conditions required to realise those who incarnate forms arising from shared conditions which issue into shapes acquired as gestalts required to function reciprocally via forms of reference that inhere in belonging to circumscriptions that concern ways of being-there rooted in such processes which transpose material conditions into symbolised aspects, aspectual forms, of life. The practical forms of these processes are described in the following:

Honesty is a form of exclusion because they just turn their back on you. I have been to interviews and I know I have no chance, I look at their faces and I know they will never choose me. I look at them and you can just sense they will never choose you. I see in their eyes the sense of "no, not one of us, won't fit in", then they write and tell you, "others were a better fit", you got to ask yourself, why?

Insecurity and self-doubt are natural effects of forms of existence which preclude access to the grounds of recognised forms of social existence which constitute intentional aspects that inhere in belonging: in interpersonal aspects that require recognition, disclosure, realisation, embedding; aspects that the institutional conditions that subtend inequalities reproduced via interpersonal forms that transpose position into what appear to be essential differences of competence; different properties; erode, leaving individuals bereft, their existence curtailed so that they come to incorporate sedimentations of meaning that are effects of barriers whose sense inhere in the relational aspects constitutive of the class structure. What is clear is that those who exist outside of the relational forms that constitute recognised forms of objectivity endure a questioning of their existence that is part of a negation implied in ways of being arising from divisions which physiognomically materialise differences as incarnational effects of experiences of being different inflected via experiences of judgement that are endured as aspects of the way employment processes involve aspects of valuation relating to aspects of the way the existential manner of members of circumscribed spheres project their structural analogue, intuitively classifying other uncodified configurations of sense incarnated as effects of such circumscriptions so that issues of compatibility are always relevant to a judgement that concerns a capacity that itself inhere in belonging, as rejection letters always formulate this, "other candidates were a better fit" or as one letter explained, "I am afraid our client is looking for different skills and experience for this role", adding, "but please do keep an eye on our website for anything more suitable": as if there would ever be a labour market criteria relating to the isolated self-generation of projects relating to the limited sphere of existence of someone on state benefits struggling to find a way to turn the absence of anything into institutional income from outside of access to anything. Rutgers advertised a post for a lecturer in "Sociology, Anthropology & Criminal Justice position" and then informed me, "we are pursuing candidates with skills and experience which more closely match the position": how would someone who had to develop a project outside of access to any sphere of involvement ever satisfy such criteria? There was a post at Berkeley, “Lecturer: Global Poverty and Practice”, now, whilst my PhD concerned poverty, I knew I would have no chance and almost gave up, but, nevertheless, pushed myself to apply. When I tried to apply, I was then presented
with a box on the online application form where I had to choose a specialism from a drop-down menu, the options were: “Global Poverty and Practice Capstone”; “Ethics, Methods and Pragmatics of Global Practice”; “Social Innovator OnRamp”; “Designs for Impact”; “Social Entrepreneurship”; “Scaling Social Ventures”; “Design, Evaluate and Scale Development Technologies”. How would you possibly develop these competencies given the nature of the educational process available to in the UK? If you were a PhD student in the UK, how would you possibly solicit contact with anyone so as to accede to such an objectivity? How would you project via such possibilities without mediators that disclosed their possibility? Unless you were institutionally embedded how would you conceive of such possibilities so that you might experience the possibility of an intention to appropriate such possibilities? How could you direct yourself to such a form of expertise and, even if you somehow managed this, how would you ever be perceived as competent? How would you be perceived as competent unless were part of the networks that produce the relational-institutional forms of objectivity that constitute the public identity, and identification, of the competence? The competence is inseparable from the institutional grounds that constitute its possibility. If your process reduces to your developing a project within the parameters of an idleness and dislocation the process perpetuates by an insignificance reconstituted via inabilities to solicit contact characteristic of the devalued, how would you ever be perceived as offering anything? As someone else put it, "we don't think that your profile is what we are looking for in terms of skills and experience. Unfortunately there are a significant number of applicants whose details match our selection criteria". Who would the "significant number of applications" be? Possibly those who incarnate the significance required to match the selection criteria because they experience their social grounds and, thereby, accede to capacities to intuit forms and attend appropriately because they experience being situated via the constitutive effects of involvements that constitute such aspects. As another described, "the hiring department selected candidates whose qualifications appear to most closely match the requirements of the position", which really makes evident the grounds of objectivity that credentials mask: involvement: credentials have to arise from relationships of involvement that manifest a value constituted via such relationships. Or, as another worded it, "we have chosen another individual whose qualifications more closely meet the current needs of the department": those whose "qualifications...meet the current needs of the department" are those whose qualifications emerge from embedding in the relationships that make necessary the use of categories that relate to optics arising from practices constituted via such processes so that synchronisation and involvement are also aspects of legitimation and validation that constitute circumscriptions that disclose capacities arising from such modalities. Those whose "qualifications...meet the current needs of the department" are those whose academic practice arises from involvement in the spheres of relationships that constitute such modalities and make available objectivities that are the real grounds of attribution of competence. Another one makes the relationship between 'background' and departmental "needs" explicit: "we have selected other applicants whose background more closely meet our current needs" and, still, another: "The search committee has carefully reviewed your experience and background against the position requirements, we found the
qualifications of other applicants to more closely fit our needs at this time". Notice how the relation of fit is discerned via "your experience and background" in comparison with other candidates, via a difference relating to their "fit", how could this be constituted? What is the nature of this phenomenon? Obviously, some exist in relation to disclosures which absorb them in forms that orient and synchronise them constituting a capacity: the ability to produce and instantiate appropriate forms that are immediately identifiable via their conditions of possibility which satisfy the conditions required to accede to such modalities: those embedded develop capacities via experiences of being-realised so that they experience being subject to such modalities because they exist in relation to a horizon whose disclosure constitutes such possibilities. The others experience the immediate perception of a difference that mirrors precisely the processes that locate, and dislocate, lower class people in institutions 'fitted' to the needs of those with economic capital. How is the ability to satisfy the institutional necessity identified? Via the diffuse forms of involvement alluded to via "background", and how would this relation be constituted as a recognisable fit except via involvements that disclose capacities arising via forms appropriated via a horizon constituted via such modalities? What we see from the way in which capacity to satisfy departmental needs is perceived via the category "background" is that it is the manifestation of involvement in a diffuse network of relationships that constitute a capacity whose conditions of possibility are satisfied so that manifestation of existing via the realisations constituted via such conditions constitutes meanings that are concurrent and ontologically coincidental with such conditions. The allusion to "background" is a repression of a condition of the acquisition of the competence: embedding. Manifestation of involvement functions as an assurance of competence because it is a condition of its acquisition. As another institution put it, "we are pursuing candidates with skills and experience which more closely match the position", notice how the criteria establishing the identity of the competence relate to attributes constituted via closure, via definite forms of objectivity that are founded in exclusivity and institutional placement: "skills and experience" are perceived via another suppressed criteria: relevance, which is itself an effect of access to a disclosive sphere that realises individuals so that they are subject to the possibility of such capacities because their cognitive faculties are attuned via a horizon constituted via the closures which make recognisable such aspects as sensible properties of their being-for-others. In other words, the key issue in relation to the actuality of competence is embedding. It is not surprising that public fields financed via the illusion of inclusivity, using anonymous administrative processes, in order to materialise the appearance of institutional processes open to all would generate such forms: it is the labour market criteria that crystallise the distinctions being interpersonally constituted within institutional space and what lower class students face are the forms of a face-to-face culture based on the perception of differences that, over time, become transfigured into the sense of differences in objectivity sedimented via subjection to anonymous processes of closure that constitute their discrepancy. These closures are manifest as inabilitys to progress consecutively, belying an absence of recognition, an absence of collective mediation, leaving the poor facing a 'system' that reduces to abstracted, anonymous processes arising over a distance where they struggle to finance degrees via projects rooted in a domestic
sphere that is part of a reduction that such criteria render inescapable because the products of their labour, and their limited efforts at projection via the mediations that constitute the restricted sphere of possibility available to them, are, essentially, negatively perceived because they are judged in relation to relational aspects that remain inaccessible. Moreover, notice, that "skills and experience" are identified via embedding: being able to "match the position" arises from being able to manifest characteristics whose sense inhere in involvement in the closures that constitute such forms as marking capacities to instantiate responses arising from access to a sphere whose disclosure constitutes such capacities. This means that the educationally devalued, whilst they can labour to finance certification, do not exist in conditions which constitute them viably. As far as these criteria are concerned, the poor are negated so that their institutional invisibility merely transposes into the invalidity of their efforts in the labour market. The poor endure an anonymous, abstracted, dislocating experience of educational 'ascent' and yet labour market criteria relate to modalities whose grounds are the opposite of those they experience. When you have, basically, the poor financing the rich via educational institutions, this contradiction is not surprising. The fakeness that lower class people intuit via the process available to them, the absence of any feeling of competence, the insecurity born of the way the appearance of institutional functions are materialised via academic association with the administration of the products of their labour, is a real aspect of processes of de-legitimation that are part of the class contestation at the heart of institutions that serve the needs of particular class groups for objectification. The real criteria of competence relate to forms of actualisation, to existential modalities, that are unequally distributed. The identification of "skills and experience" via being able to "match the position", that is, manifest inscribed traces of objectifications arising from exclusive involvement in spheres of co-presence constituted via closures, is unsurprising because it operates with a practically shrewd awareness of the conditions constitutive of neurophysiological mechanisms that arise as adaptive responses to representational or intentional contents that are absorbed, or immersively and reactively acquired, via disclosures which actualise modalities immanent to such conditions. The fact that the manifestation of competence arises via the inscribed traces of membership of exclusive institutional conditions indicates how dispositions are identified via the conditions which constitute their possibility. Being subject to such conditions is constitutive of the neurophysiological structures that are materialised via adaptive responsiveness to structures of constitutive rules that are absorbed not as intentional contents but as ways of being arising from disclosures of form that constitute capacities to appropriate meanings because one experiences being subject to their actualisation so that there is a correspondence between the shape of required dispositions and the constitutive rules characteristic of institutions that arise from existing in relation to such conditions which require recognition and involvement: this is why selection criteria allude to such conditions because they are ontologically coincidental with the required capacity because they are constitutive of it. What has to be recognised is that the identity of these competencies, their location, relate to manifest aspects that relate to public-institutional-relational conditions that, clearly, function to validate those recognised via congruencies that disclose possibilities for synchronisation and development that are not equitably
distributed. When selection criteria can privilege aspects of aggregative relational forms, as is the case with the following: "CES gives priority to those applicants who already have connections to research networks" and when institutions can ask questions of the following kind on their application forms: "Please give examples of your ability to build networks and good working relationships with colleagues in different organisations", when most lower class students can't even solicit contact within the departments which administrate the products of their labour in order to materialise the appearance of educational processes, then we see how exclusive selection criteria are. Again, we see how the experiences of the socially validated, objectified and valued are presumed: precisely conditions that the education provided doesn't satisfy. For most lower class people, university is an anonymous administrative process that concerns interaction only surrounding the possible mediation of the institutional finance that one has to be able to access in order to even interface with the institutions: without financial backing, conversations cannot occur. All conversations reduce to conversations about income and, if you cannot access finance, then academics will not engage because the interaction serves no purpose which is why, once you complete a PhD, you are pretty much stuck because you have undergone a process consisting of very little that has merely exhausted your utility as you move from 'uneducated' to 'educated' status. When applications privilege capacities to solicit connection: precisely what the whole experience of education lacks for the poor, we see how the existential conditions of the valued are presumed as a mark of functionality, which is hardly surprising when the valued use institutions to establish the distinctions that constitute such modalities. Such criteria manifest a practical awareness of the effects of the conditions those effaced via such processes face. Another application stipulated a candidate "who has published...in the area of culture, has obvious promise and potential as well as relevant teaching experience. It would seem...that your research might fall under the heading of culture, but that remains unclear. I should stress, however, that preference would be given to an active researcher (preferably with grants) above someone who is simply a scholar/writer". The reason it "remains unclear" is because the category itself is so ambiguous, which is why it is so useful as an aid for discriminations that concern euphemised aspects that exploit the multiplicity of differences that are casually practiced via such mediums. Notice that the identity of my competence "remains unclear": how would a further determination of its identity be made when these judgements preclude potential candidates from accessing the real grounds via which competencies are established: embedding in capital-generating institutional networks? Is the lack of clarity alluded to an attribute of my person or my labour or an effect of the schema used to construct discriminations concerning "the area of culture"? Furthermore, notice how these problems afflict the dislocated because the identity of competence is established through the embedding of the agent, an embedding that is a condition constitutive of the capacity to direct one's labour and attend to its form because one is part of relationships that disclose a horizon within which such modalities are realised. The best become what they are by accessing the conditions which satisfy such possibilities and the rest face discriminations which spatially ensure their inability to access the relational conditions which satisfy the conditions of attribution of competencies which remain unavailable. Whilst those consecrated face a world of mutual actualisation, those denigrated via the barriers
that constitute such objectivities face a de-realisation that leads them to become what they are perceived to be: without access to the interpersonal conditions which satisfy the attribution of competencies constituted via closures, how could they ever feel competent? The feelings of incompetence and a lack of authority, the feelings of knowing-nothing and being unable to contribute that such educational processes produce belie a reality effaced by the anonymous institution of a charade that narcissistically realises institutional agents whilst rendering invisible the reality. What is important to recognise is that competence is identified not merely via relational states that are not satisfied via the educational processes of many but that competence is identified via aspects that concern the position of the individual that are not open to the individual to change: these very conditions denude the devalued of any means of access to any other mode of disclosure or determination, they cannot accede to relational states that the form of their life precludes given recognition of forms that concern sources of value whose interpersonal and institutional conditions are unavailable. The focus should be on embedding people so that they develop required capacities via modalities that constitute such possibilities rather than 'educating' people without such conditions being satisfied. Clearly the formal labour market financed via their 'education' is closed and if everything valued relates to labour embedded in employment, then what can the devalued do? This is why one lower class person with a PhD can say, "we never get that meaning, doesn't matter what we do, we never get the same meanings they do". If neurophysiological structures are absorbed not as rules but via adaptive responses arising from disclosures which realise individuals so they experience presence via meanings revealed via experiences of being subject to such relational aspects, such that the shape of the dispositions arises via their developmental conditions, from the relationships of involvement that sustain forms incorporated via experiences of being subject to such possibilities, then we can appreciate why someone can say "we never get that meaning, doesn't matter what we do, we never get the same meanings they do". Meaning-bearing components are ontologically coincidental with experiences of being-realised that intersubjectively donate such aspects via recognitions which disclose such modalities. This is why non-recognition and neglect are prominent aspects of the biographies of working class students. They aren't perceived as significant and so can be left to fend for themselves, if they can manage to satisfy financial criteria, then they can 'access' further administrative processes that materialise the appearance of 'education' that doesn't really count for anything and doesn't equip them with either the symbolic forms required to accede to the forms of presence that constitute actual capacities, or any ability to function because the interpersonal conditions that satisfy such possibilities are not available. This is also why insignificance transfigures poverty into an absence of forms required to contest employment, with education merely functioning as a mechanism of misrecognition that legitimates such a state of affairs. The poor are those whose CVs are devoid of the forms required to accede to such conditions because they were never significant enough to show up as worthy interlocutors and, thereby, accede to forms of involvement that are discretionary, relating to how one is perceived, in a process that reduces to the self-financing of a process that reduces to a single individual: the supervisor, who associates their name with the administration of your production so as to materialise the appearance of their own function via
relationships that extort the sense of a process where nothing exists beyond the self-financed, self-education of those struggling to accede to conditions that remain unavailable, hence the formulation, "we never get that meaning, doesn't matter what we do, we never get the same meanings they do". What this amounts to is the repression of a lifestyle arising from the perception of a difference that inscribes a boundary at the heart of the institutional culture that condemns some to forms of life that are, clearly, effectively stigmatised by the practice of a boundary whose legibility inheres in its interpersonal constitution. How you are perceived situates you so that you are subject to barriers whose sense you inscribe via experiencing being subject to forms of realisation that constitute practical schema arising from the forms incorporated via being realised via such processes so that you are subject to ontogenetic processes that are constitutive of your actuality, an objectivity arising from the physiognomic materialisation of forms that constitute immanent regularities arising from being subject to such processes. This is why one can sense a future inscribed in the immediacy of the present because forms of realisation engender a relation to a future immanent to the sense experienced via being subject to such aspects. Agents practically anticipate a future inscribed in a present state via the potentiality that they experience via interpersonal disclosures that constitute intra-worldly aspects whose sense relate to such relational forms. What we encounter spatially, via relationships that disclose circumstantial forms, is sense that we respond to via being, our responses are expressive and manifestative, constitutive aspects of our being-for-others. How one experiences being-realised implies a practical reference to a future implied in the past you experience being consequential for the sense inscribed via the way you experience being realised that temporalizes objectivities sustained via the inscription of significances that constitute ways of being situated. Practical schema arise from immersion in realisations whose form physiognomically materialise a sense appropriated via being subject to such modalities so that via such processes individuals experience potentialities inscribed in their actuality. Practical schema arise via the medium of our embodiment, they are corporeal schema arising from experiences of being subject to forms that inscribe a sense of tendencies and regularities that arise from an anticipation born of subjection to such aspects. Individuals can practically anticipate the future inscribed in the present state of potentiality that they experience being constituted, interpersonally, as the following makes clear:

Ah didn’t go on any further ‘cos Ah knew Ah would have to change, Ah’d have to do...that’s why Ah didn’t develop it, didn’t try harder with it, ‘cos Ah knew how unhappy it would make me, Ah hated it so much, Ah knew the further Ah went along the road, the further Ah’d get away from the people Ah had to get along with it if Ah wasn’t to be totally fucked by it all an’ Ah did, Ah saw Armageddon, Ah saw the black hole opening, Ah thought “Ah don’t want the misery that goes along with it even if it leads to a good job” so Ah got aht...but I could come back and accept that Ah’m workin’ class, always will be workin’ class...

It is noticeable that this sense is tied to relationships with other people and how there is a practical anticipation of the consequences of development, misery, when the process cannot ground forms in realisations that arise from a necessity that is an effect of recognition and contextualisation: the effects of educational processes that anticipate an experience of culture that is missing and reconstituted via the absence
of access to the conditions constitutive of an experience of any need for the forms it is attempting to elicit is frustration caused by unsatisfied needs that confront individuals with the nature of boundaries inscribed in bodies which elicit the sense of forms arising from experiencing being subject to such processes. What we also see is that the experience of being-different constitutes a sense of a future arising from the curtailment that makes struggling to develop a source of potential pain as the individual sacrifices the grounds of a way of being whose dispositionnal forms arise from their physiognomic materialisation, themselves rooted in divisions that tie form to ways of being that are elementary aspects of the latently adversarial character of social existence: an adversarial character that becomes more prominent with increased competition. As there is increased competition within the mediating, legitimatory, channels supposed to address dislocations rooted in the structural effects of such processes, the conflictual character of interactional forms rooted in the elementary functions of human presence become more prominent aspects of a competition in which being-perceived to bear-the-sense-of properties that are key stakes of a struggle that is structurally rigged via command of the tokens, generated within the field, required to accede to such objectivities, worsens, leaving those who are discrepant facing an anxiety born of an experience of a dislocation that constitutes their public worthlessness and incompetence. Notice how the individual's anticipation of the future, "if Ah wasn't to be totally fucked by it all", arises from a sense rooted in exposure to interpersonal forms that constitute immanent aspects, a practical logic, arising from the field, that disclose a catastrophic sense of a future immanent to a state experienced via presence which implies a future itself implicated in forms incorporated by a past whose temporalisation is physiognomically regenerated by the absence of possibilities to escape the finitude of modalities rooted in unrealisation and accede to a security arising from an assurance rooted in being-positively perceived, and, thereby, disposed via that realisation, to capacities arising from experiencing being subject to such aspects. Through realisations of form individuals inscribe a sense that emerges as a constitutive aspect of the regularities immanent to the social world because they experience being, responsively articulated, meanings inscribed via being subject to recognitions which constitute such aspects. Such shapes arise from a functionality arising from their recognition, from relationships that disclose aspects appropriated via being subject to their actualisation, so that individuals experience being relationally constituted via forms whose significance are aspects of their being-in-the-world so that they become possessed of a know-how arising from being-part-of the world. Fundamental aspects that subtend meaning are affected by valuationary processes that inflect and inscribe sense via relational processes that constitute space. Recognition is part of the physiognomic materialisation of modalities that arise from experiencing being subject, via co-presence, to transitivities of sense that inhere in value so that experiencing the plenitude of being, the actualisation of possibilities via involvement in a fabric born of the constitution of meanings that absorb us in a fabric that intersubjectively donates an experience of qualities that inhere in experiencing being subject to such aspects, requires being valued, whereas the devalued face an immiseration arising as a reduction that robs them of access to the interpersonal grounds of relational forms that constitute capacities arising from being-part-of-the-world. Capacities for reference inhere in experiencing the
availability of forms that inhere in belonging, so that the physiognomic
materialisation of form, and capacities for reference arising from such processes,
constitute modalities that inhere in the reality that meaning-bearing components,
realised via behavioural configurations that are relationally instantiated, constitute
as concurrent and ontologically coincidental aspects of expressivities that inhere in
different ways of being socially realised, different ways of being-there. This is why
divisions constitute what appear to be different competencies that are natural
effects of closures that inscribe value and constitute reference. The devalued are
not privy to the constitutive grounds of capacities that inhere in belonging, from
closures which inscribe such objectivities as what appear to be differences of
capacity, different forms of knowing relating to different ways of being. When the
poorest students are charged with a penury that condemns them to attempt to
attain the resources required to finance the administration of their solitary
production, in which they must turn themselves into an institutional resource that
exists as far as they can satisfy financial criteria that purchase a purely abstracted
administrative relationship with academics who refract the appearance of their
function via association of their names with an administrative labour usually carried
out by secretaries, then we see how latently discriminatory such criteria are.
Selection criteria relate to collective forms of intentionality arising from associational
forms that, for the devalued, are unavailable. What can be purchased does not
position the poorest so that they accede to the relational forms constitutive of such
objectivities. Discriminations constitute lifestyles because differences materialise
capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being subject to parameters
arising from relations of involvement that constitute possibilities relating to forms of
actualisation that constitute the meaning of being. The allusion to 'background'
shows that lifestyles relating to forms of life that are institutionally supported are
politically effective and that the institutional mobilisation of groups constitute
schema arising from modalities born of discriminations that relate to ways of being,
experiences of presence, arising from subjection to ways of being-perceived relating
to schema that have the effect of physiognomically regenerating conditions that
validate some and delegitimate others. Because labour market criteria reflect
conditions of existence arising from circumscribed sphere of legitimate encounter,
the isolated, dislocated self-generation of products used to finance their
administration have no value because the conditions of existence forced on the
reclassified poor merely reproduce the sense of barriers which are, in effect,
different versions of the same distinctions which constitute that between the
employed and the unemployed throughout the labour market which is why those
whose education is merely reclassified unemployment, those without the
significance to show up as worthy interlocutors manifest an absence of forms that
are effects of significances manifest via relations of involvement that materialise
such aspects. In other words, for the poor, the conditions of satisfaction of
intentional states that inhere in recognition, disclosure and realisation, in
aggregative processes that constitute neurophysiological mechanisms arising as
adaptive responses to ways of being rooted in involvement, are absent, meaning
they are construed to manifest dispositions that arise from a different way of being
realised that are a physiognomically materialised effect of such conditions of
existence. In other words, what are judged in the labour market are the inscribed
traces of lifestyles, of forms of existence, that are not purely personal but, instead, relate to the existence of aggregates and the modes of closure via which some constitute value and capacities that are modalities of such processes. Ways of being arise from ways of being-perceived that position individuals in relation to forms which materialise the sense constitutive of objectivities that are inscribed in the relationships their significance arises via so that individuals have little say in how they are perceived via the sense of forms that elicit judgements that naturalise processes of actualisation that are unfair and, for the devalued, debilitating. The education of many anticipates an experience of culture that is missing and attempts to elicit dispositions that cannot be formed because their conditions of realisation inhere in forms of involvement that constitute modalities that are unavailable and what selection criteria do is perceive the effects of the sedimentations of meanings that are the crystallised effects of exposure to boundaries whose sense are inscribed via a recognition which materialises such differences. The absurdity of the experience of studying humanities, for those from non-literate populations, arises from the dislocation such cultural forms assume. Without involvement in a sphere of co-presence in which there is available the possibility of enunciating ideas that you tend only to read from books, alone, there is no way to absorb, responsively, neurophysiological structures relating to ways of being-realised that constitute the shape of dispositions whose realisation sediment forms incorporated via immersion in contextual aspects that render sensible, and purposeful, forms one attempts to acquire alone because of the unavailability of anything via the type of education available. Given that neurophysiological structures are absorbed, not as intentional contents, but via adaptive responses arising from co-presence, it is easy to see why education founded on divisions which are part of the extortion of the sense of value and the appearance of processes that consist of very little beyond abstracted administrative relationships would lead the devalued to experience the absence of intentional forms because they don't undergo contextualisation via recognitions which constitute such modalities. Divisions constitute ways of being-there, they circumscribe differences of form that constitute different forms of contextualisation which is why labour market criteria require evidence of realisation in relation to meaning-bearing components that are ontologically coincidental with being-realised via involvement in relations that manifest such aspects and, thereby, allow the individuals to experience the physiognomic materialisation of properties that inhere in the satisfaction of such conditions which, thereby, constitute possibilities that the individual experiences being actualised via the recognitions that constitute access to such a medium. The identification of competence involves involvement in a diffuse web of relationships that involve a trajectory born of recognitions which constitute access to the grounds of interpersonal forms that constitute capacities for identity that inhere in being positioned to accede to such possibilities. It means that the real criteria for the identification of competence arise from involvements in networks in relation to public practices constituted via closures that render them unavailable so that all that is really perceived, when a person applies for a job, is the position that makes the particular objectivity manifest via their CV actual. Competition makes access to dignifying networks harder and harder. Competence is identified via evidence of involvement in relationships that constitute the labour market function, it is the relationships that constitute access to employment that are perceived to
matter, yet the education itself continuously rearticulates a tacitly realised
difference between different statuses of student, the devalued and reclassified
unemployed are perceived to manifest differences that are effects of the way this
boundary is transfigured into the sense of expressivities arising from subjection to its
spatial effects. Competence is identified via involvement in relationships that
constitute the employment form, yet the educational process available to the
devalued does not grant access to such forms and differences in status are
continuously rearticulated via the recognition of differences of status that are merely
transfigured into relationships which inscribe the sense of such differences as legible
effects of the recognition of differences that inhere in the distribution of
employment via relational forms that constitute value. In disciplines like Sociology,
there isn’t really anything one qualifies in because attributions of competence relate
to forms of value that relate to channels of legitimation that institutional space is
used to constitute via networks that constitute academic specialisms with their own
forms of capital arising from the use of the institutional apparatus of objectification
to produce such forms. The reason the appearance of the labour market function is
hard to access is that its appearance is materialised via relationships that involve
little co-presence. Identification of the significance of the form arises relationally
from embedding of the form in the relationships that disclose its possibility as a
particularity appropriated via the realisation of the form arising from experiences of
being subject to a horizon whose interpersonal disclosure constitute such a modality.
The particularity, the identity, of the competence, arises from its embedding which is
a constitutive aspect of its form and yet this is not the same for all categories of
student, reproducing the sense of a difference that is at the heart of the experience
of being-there in that how one is perceived affects how one is situated in fields in
which any accession to co-presence requires invitation: there is nothing beyond the
generic administrative processes whose criterial forms one labours, alone, to satisfy
without invitation so that recognition is a key medium of the materialisation of the
"the site which being requires in order to disclose itself" (Heidegger 1962: 171).
Recognition of difference is at the heart of the constitution of competence because
perception of difference discloses the medium via which being is constituted. The
legibilities of form that subtend labour market criteria relate to recognitional
processes that inscribe sense via ways of being-there that constitute forms of life.
The dislocation characteristic of abstracted administrative processes that materialise
the appearance of the 'education' of those whose devaluation is manifest via the
actual nature of their experience of education is manifest in the following:

I don’t have anymore to say. I feel very distressful - I have to wait 5 months to present my Master
thesis (the average time is 2 months). The people in the academia don’t even answer to my
emails and calls. I had to wait in the university door until I saw someone from the department
and had personally talked with her. That’s nothing really new, but it fucks me bad.

How can individuals who endure this kind of process found modalities that require
synchronisations rooted in the continuous disclosure of embedding? Without
embedding in a sphere of practice, how can founded modes like category-use and
projection via realisations that physiognomically materialise actualities whose
possibility arise from recognitions which constitute such modalities, arise? How can
individuals be subject to modalisations that are effects of realisations in relation to
disclosures that constitute modifications of unmodalized forms rooted in the unrealisation of dislocation when the nature of the process supposed to rescue them from the misery of an existence without justification condemns them to the same type of mediations that characterise unemployment? Without embedding you have no chance to develop appropriate forms. You cannot begin to assimilate to anything because you have no reason to develop forms in relation to the disclosure of a horizon that constitutes the capacity to intuit appropriate forms: without involvement how can synchronisation and modalisation occur? This is one of the key reasons why selection criteria look for the effects of embedding because it is constitutive of functionality. If neurophysiological mechanisms are constituted as adaptive responses to forms absorbed not as intentional contents but as neurophysiological structures, aspects of ways of being realised as forms of existence, rather than represented or objectified as mental contents, then qualities arising from involvement in relational forms that constitute the nonintentional, or preintentional, grounds from which intentional states emerge become the medium of entry to possibilities whose upswing arise from involvement. Without involvement in a disclosive medium, there is no world-entry and individuals experience the absence of such aspects, they experience the 'nothing-being-there' arising from an experience of insignificance whose manifestative grounds constitute an absence of value that becomes relationally transfigured via the disclosure of such aspects into inabilities to refer to intra-worldly, or circumstantial, aspects that are part of the constitution of spheres of existence. Moreover, those whose labour arises from involvement have access to the constitutive grounds of modalisations that inhere in capacity to shape form to context that inhere in the disclosure of a horizon that can only be materialised via involvement. The capacity of some to offer forms that appear appropriate, to incarnate competencies whose identity inhere in closures which circumscribe such objectivities, is an effect of a need that is institutionally constituted via a particular type of relationship: employment and, clearly, 'education' in-itself cannot reproduce the grounds constitutive of such forms. Is all education, therefore, education? Or is it an institutional process of screening that obscures the way distinctions are materialised that transfigure differences of value into what appear to be differences of competence? The problem is the repression of a condition rooted in valuation, that education perpetuates by stealth, because of competition over forms relating to employment and to access to resources mediated via relationships that have to remain exclusive yet which need to legitimate themselves via a mass competition that appears to offers opportunities to anyone who can pay fees. This is why the capacity to pay-fees has had to be universalised via credit in order to secure the economic conditions that appear to grant access to opportunities for all. This is why the identity of the experience is such a significant terrain of contestation. Clearly, what is recognised via labour market selection criteria, is a distinction that education effaces, between those whose education involves involvement in forms that mirror the relationships constitutive of the employment form and those who are just competing blindly whilst enduring a structural dislocation that the form of their certification merely transfigures into a sense arising from the relationships that constitute such a difference. Academic competence is statutory, not technical, it requires associational grounds that constitute collective forms of intentionality that arise
from closures which are the real grounds of its attribution. These processes themselves arise from recognitions which disclose such modalities and the purchase of an administrative reclassification does little to make access to the grounds of competences effaced via this mass process available. Access to the constitutive grounds of competence, to actualisation, remains a key stake of a competition whose institutional displacement obscures its reality. Statutory attribution, requires recognition and involvement and this is what labour market selection criteria manifest. The real issue is access to the interpersonal grounds of objectivities that remain exclusive because education is merely a way of financing access to such conditions for those who require an elaborated apparatus of institutional self-actualisation and objectivisation that perpetually rearticulates a division between employees and the unemployed, the active and the passive, those actualised via involvements that constitute capacities arising from involvement and those who remain conspicuous because of a discrepancy at the heart of divisions that realise such distinctions and condemn the devalued to a perpetuation of a condition whose institutional occlusion belies a reality that has to be effaced in order to constitute its legitimacy. Why would there be some "candidates whose qualifications appear to most closely match the requirements of the position" except as an effect of their qualifications arising from experiences of being positioned that constituted such an objectivity? And, moreover, how would the identity of this state of affairs be recognised? How would the difference between those whose qualifications "appear to most closely match the requirements of the position" be perceived? Via manifestations of embedding, that is, via rare forms of involvement that arise from the practice of a boundary that the labour market rearticulates because it is a constitutive aspect of academic space. Those who appear to 'fit' are those who bear the traces of having been fitted-in who experience the disclosure of a horizon that constitutes the form of their labour in relation to involvements that physiognomically materialise the sense of capacities born via relations to form arising from access to such modalities, whereas the credentials of others manifest a discrepancy that is an effect of an invalidation that is part of an invisibility that is transfigured into a sense-relation via the grounds via which such objectivities are inscribed. Those who aren't recognised, aren't involved and this becomes transfigured into the sense of a discrepancy that is a fundamental aspect of the constitution of academic space shared by other public fields. The situating of an individual's labour is a key aspect of its recognition because it is a manifestation of social value. Class is transposed into sensible aspects of an individual's objectivity via an inscription arising from perception of their difference which is merely transfigured into other legible forms via subjection to a circumscription arising from the way differences in objectivity are reconstituted via such mediations. Being subject to different ways of being-there, differences in objectivity are transfigured into sensible properties inscribed in the details of CVs which elicit judgements that are euphemised expressions, perceptions of an underlying logic, effaced by a miscognition that institutional reclassification facilitates. Institutional reclassification allows for the materialisation of differences, the legitimation of differences transposed into what appear to be different properties, arising from different ways of being situated. The devalued are invisible and their inability to elicit recognition and solicit contact becomes sedimented via these modalities into a perpetuation of
this condition so that they are unable to satisfy labour market criteria that are themselves effects of experiencing being subject to such modalities. Devaluation becomes transfigured, through public institutions, as a fundamental aspect of the social experience of the poor because public valuation is a key function of the institutions which subtend the production of valued and competent people via the practice of distinctions whose effects are manifest in the inequalities inscribed in the forms of the world. The problem for those unable to elicit recognition and solicit contact is, how are they ever to transition? How can they access the modalisation of dispositions arising from disclosures which realise them so that they accede to capacities that inhere in circumscriptions that physiognomically materialise capacities arising from experiencing forms via experiencing a reality disclosed via them? For those who lack the value to elicit recognition, whatever they do will never arise from mediations that signify them consequentially. Moreover, the absence of such mediations constitutes an absence whose sense they bear as an effect of existing outside of a sphere that discloses a horizon of possibility so that they will manifest an insecurity arising from a disorientation that is an effect of lacking access to the interpersonal grounds of objectivities whose consequential nature they experience via the interpersonal processes that inscribe this boundary as a publicly effective aspect of social organisation. For the unemployed, as if there experience will ever count in relation to public spheres constituted in distinction to the very conditions they are forced to endure because of the sedimentation of meanings arising from a way of being rooted in the recognition and inscription of such forms of life. The problem for the unemployed is their relational insignificance that constitutes the negation characteristic of their experience. As one person put it shortly before killing himself, "The irony is that I am regarded as neither a debit nor a credit to society, I am a zero, and that 'nothing at all' value is a destroying experience. I am neither light nor shadow, because I am invisible". What is it about devaluation that causes injury? Why does the inability of some to secure recognition, feel so devastating, given that it is experienced purely passively? How can a condition endured passively be invasive? Notice the formulation, "I am neither light nor shadow, because I am invisible", this person alludes to being neither condition of illumination as if the very source of perception, the very medium of its possibility, is absent: "neither light nor shadow", a traceless state of non-being, "I am invisible". Without a context of actualisation the individual does not accede to meanings inscribed via being subject to disclosures which constitute capacities for reference that inhere in belonging to a world whose aspects arise relationally so that circumstantial aspects which subtend possibilities inscribed via being subject to such modalities rob the individual of capacities that exist purely relationally, via forms of existence that are interpersonally constituted. Non-being is a problem for the negated because the forms of meanings inscribed via recognitions which disclose such modalities are what constitute our access to the medium of experience, possibility and actuality. Insignificance physiognomically materialises an absence that haunts the flesh of the devalued so that their impoverishment is manifest as an essential aspect of their public objectivity so that they are robbed of access to mediations that realise them in relation to potentialities they appropriate via the actualisation of engagements which absorb them in forms whose physiognomic materialisation constitute the sense of ways of being that subtend an appropriation
arising from experiences of being subject to such aspects. Unworthiness is a key stake of labour markets whose institutional mediations transmute economic value into competences whose modes of closure obscure the boundaries that statuses arise via as a way of legitimating distinctions whose practice must be surreptitiously, publicly, constituted via complex institutional mediations. The fact that violation is experienced on an intentional terrain, indicates something significant about the nature of being and the way it is inflected via valuationary processes that affect its ground. The fact that insignificance is experienced via the absence of interpersonal forms required to accede to meaningful forms of existence and the fact that such conditions are experienced as constitutive of a privation that, eventually, drove this person to suicide, is indicative of the political status of conditions of existence that must be satisfied for individuals to accede to recognised forms of public existence and competences which require parity and reciprocity, forms eroded by excess competition which effaces those without the resources to contest public space and accede to forms of existence that arise from mediations rooted in valuation and recognition. It is only because human being requires interpersonal conditions that satisfy intentional states that are constituted via such mediations that we need the fruition of realisations which intersubjectively donate the basis of forms which constitute capacities that inhere in a fabric arising from recognitions which disclose forms appropriated via experiencing the sense physiognomically materialised via such processes. Because our experience of our capacities and, indeed, properties, inhere in relational aspects, we need to experience realisation in order to experience the determinacy of states whose identity can only arise relationally, via circumscriptions arising from recognitions which disclose the grounds of such objectivities. Devaluation is manifest via behavioural routines that exhibit an insignificance that is instantiated via responses that reveal an absence of significance so that one experiences circumstances via a way of being arising from such aspects. As this person went on, "In my head I am stood at a thick plate glass window, watching everybody else on the other side. I can hear them, but they can't hear me, and although they can see me, they don't need to glance my way, and so I never get eye contact". Notice the formulation: "although they can see me…I never get eye contact", visibility is experienced via an insignificance manifest via immediacies of response to embodied significance that is simultaneously a manifestation of value. Embodied significance arises from a relation to reality, interpersonally mediated, via the inscription of the sense of forms that inhere in the dual reality of this significance as significance and worth so that worth, or value, is a fundamental constitutive aspect of the reality of embodied significance, of ways of being arising from experiences of contextualisation that involve us primally via experiences of being-there, of presence. When someone can say, "I never get eye contact", we might ask what the circumstantial aspects constitutive of their experience of being-in-the-world are, and notice how this circumstantial reduction, arising from negation, is experienced via ways of being-there, via presence. Without the disclosures that constitute the circumstantial aspects that ground being interpersonally, how is the individual realised? Given that dispositional mechanisms arise developmentally via adaptive responses to neurophysiological structures that are absorbed via their physiognomic materialisation, what developmental mediations are constituted via experiencing being situated in such ways? Situated, interpersonally, in such a way
that, "I never get eye contact", the basis of projection is annihilated, the grounds of purposive behaviour are absent, the individual is not realised in relation to interpersonal forms that make wilful behaviour sensible. Without a disclosive horizon that makes projection sensible, the individual exists in a condition in which they experience willing as being as mutilated as their being-for-others and they lack access to a disclosive medium that makes representational forms of intentionality sensible. The devalued experience a curtailment born of the mutilation of their public efficacy that erodes their capacities because it robs them of access to the medium constitutive of being: recognition and realisation in relation to absorptions that physiognomically materialise the sense of forms appropriated via being subject to such modalities. Excess inequalities erode the basis of labour power, they dehumanise and curtail human capacities and lead to destructive coping strategies born of attempts to deal with the frustration of curtailment. Moreover, what this individual yearns for is co-presence, presence infused with the animating effects of realisations born of disclosures that physiognomically materialise a sense arising from recognition that infuses being with the spirit of significances born of capacities arising via such modalities. Certain forms of human presence, absorb and engage us, such that in our lost-ness in the everyday, we are snatched from the inertness that makes irritability a problem. Rather than inertly sensing the bare stimuli of the condition of our presence vis-à-vis others, the capacity to sense of the sympathetic nervous system and sensory-motor capacities, our engagement by others through forms that realise us as persons, who are “expected, solicited, overwhelmed with obligations and commitments” (Bourdieu 2000: 240), alters the nature of our experience of being, as our perceptual field absorbs humanly meaningful, circumspectively absorbing forms of awareness that alter the status of our relation to our being-for-ourselves. Being overwhelmed with obligations and commitments, “is…to be snatched from solitude or insignificance” and to “experience, in the most continuous and concrete way, the feeling of counting for others, being important for them, and therefore in oneself…a kind of continuous justification for existing” (Bourdieu 2000: 240). This is why Heidegger sees “Being-there-too” as characterised by a “sameness of Being as circumspectively concernful Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 1962: 154), a mode of being, vis-à-vis others, in which the being of individuals is not “discriminated beforehand and then apprehended” (Heidegger 1962: 155) so that the person experiences a disengagement and a lack of engagement that leaves them inertly responding to a perceptual field in which they are situated as objects, their being-disclosed as “…present-at-hand-along ‘with’ them within a world” (Heidegger 1962: 154), unrealised as human beings, left, merely, feeling the full welling of their capacity to sense stimuli: feel with all the physiological consequence that such passivity in regard of the sensible instils as their being physiologically draws their body toward a responsive attunement manifest in the biochemical sub-systems of the sympathetic nervous system as anxiety which magnifies the affective, resulting in coping behaviours that address the physiological medium in its essence, as a biochemical system. Anxiety relates to the impossibility of being-realised in one’s person-hood as subject to interpersonal disclosures that ground being in sense, in disclosures that constitute forms of access to affective conditions and cognitive processes born of engagement, involvement and realisation. Social value affects all forms that the interpersonal takes: it therefore
effects people’s experience of being: with many people’s access to being-a-person being thoroughly immiserated by their lack of value. Existing, interpersonally, via recognition, enmeshes individuals in webs whose intelligibility arise from involvements that disclose a sense arising from realisation, from responsive absorption in a reality one can cope with because one is actualised via forms that constitute nascent shapes that emerge as ways of being-there, contextualised via such processes. If we remember that neurophysiological structures are rooted in responses to forms absorbed, not as rules or intentional contents, but as ways of being-there, then we can see the reach that negation has to debilitating and mutilate, leaving individuals bereft of the anchoring of their being in possibilities arising from absorption in a world disclosed via others. Without value, the poor endure an impoverishment that robs them of capacities because they are locked outside of a fabric of possibility and, facing annihilation and the reality of a hopelessness that concerns the very well-spring of being from which any potentiality may emerge, they face the absence of the conditions required to accede to such forms and their de-realisation physiognomically materialises a violation that robs them of capacities for action or change because they have no way to be other than they are publicly perceived to be. For the devalued, their public insignificance is a key aspect of their experience of being. They lack access to personalising mediations that rescue them from the distress of an existence without justification. Public invisibility is a key aspect of the constitution of the sense of forms arising from the constitution of public space so that some can escape finitude and the distress of an existence without justification and accede to recognised states whose conditions constitute capacities for reference and projection that inhere in the practice of distinctions which disclose such aspects so that some accede to recognised forms of objectivity that function as emblems because of the closures that ensure they experience capacities that inhere in the recognitions that constitute such possibilities. The invisibility is inscribed in the absence constitutive of the sense of this objectivity as it is materialised via sedimentations of significance arising from experiencing being situated via such processes. Whatever they are capable of doing, they must somehow find that capacity in isolation, privately, without mediation and the problem, then, is the signification of their competence, how can the identity of their competence be established when it arises from outside of closures that constitute a value arising from the exclusivity of a form of reference implied in differences of condition that are physiognomically regenerated via subjection to such actualities? As he formulates the reality, "that 'nothing at all' value is a destroying experience", the absence of the forms required to elicit recognition constitute an incapacity that is endured as the misery of an existence without justification, without access to the intersubjective donations which inscribe meanings via being subject to their interpersonal disclosure, so that the individual faces a reality immanent to a constitutive condition: negation which shapes their form of life. Clearly, negation is experienced as a constitutive aspect of presence that is invasive because it robs individuals of the interpersonal conditions required to accede to elaborated, interpersonal, states born of disclosures that absorb us in forms that physiognomically materialise an experience of capacity born of experiences of significance appropriated via involvement in an interpersonal fabric that carries forth potentiality via realisations that sustain forms constituted via experiences of
actualisation that anchor being in the certainty of a facility arising from membership that sediments meanings as part of an experience of their consequential nature. Existing in this way precludes anyone ever being able to satisfy selection criteria because the identity of their competence can never be established because they exist outside of the conditions that constitute recognised forms of social existence. And this is the same for lower-class students who undergo the same experience within educational institutions. Clearly, insignificance constitutes inabilities born of the conditional nature of intentional states: without access to a fabric whose disclosure arises from conditions that are not equitably distributed, the devalued lack access to the conditions constitutive of intentional states whose grounds remain unavailable and they cannot accede to the conditions constitutive of development. Without access to the grounds constitutive of the identification of competence, how can they accede to an experience born of an appropriation of forms that inhere in relational modalities that they don't experience being constituted so that they can experience the possibility of actualities arising from such processes? Without the certitude arising from realisations that constitute an experience of being arising from experiences of being situated, in relation to recognitions which disclose such possibilities as aspects of one's being-for-others, individuals experience a doubt arising from the absence of access to any interpersonal sphere that physiognomically regenerates an experience of being born of intersubjective donations of significance that concern public statuses arising from valuationary forms. What is clear is that because an experience of capacity arises from the sense of relational aspects whose conditions of satisfaction require disclosures whose recognition constitute an experience of being-able to bear a sense appropriated via such processes, those who exist via the perception of a difference that their negation perpetuates, experience a questioning of their existence that is an effect of the absence of any capacity to contest experiences of their intelligibility that are effects of the sense of boundaries inscribed in the organisation of the culture that subtends economic functionality. What we see is the circumscription arising from disclosures which constitute sensitivities to forms arising from being subject to differences whose meaning arise from being subject to moments which physiognomically materialise a form of life born of reduction: “I went, didn’t fit in. I worked, got nothing. Now I just go from crap job to crap job”. We sense, via this summation, the parameters of an existence arising from an experience of being-perceived that constitutes capacities for existence born of the modalities experienced via being subject to such processes: without viability this individual cannot accede to experiences of being competent, they can't experience constitutive moments and they face a reduction that is spatially realised via a form of life rooted in reduction, “I worked, got nothing. Now I just go from crap job to crap job”. Subjection to such processes constitute a subjectivity born of the physiognomic regeneration of an objectivity whose materialisation subjects individuals to the sense of forms that render them sensitive to stimuli so that they are subject to triggers, or calls to order, they are predisposed to perceive because they are, interpersonally subject, to imbibing their sense as aspects of their being-for-others so that they come to bear the sense of an objectivity crystallised via processes that constitute the grounds of such objectivities so that, looking for work, becomes another traumatising experience of subjection to a negation whose grounds they cannot countermand because they have no access to
developmental, or humanising, mediations. The pain of ostracism, and the effects of trauma, are aspects of the contestation of reality that ensure some become possessed of an inability that is a real effect of the reality of the forms they experience being interpersonally constituted so that they feel dispossessed of initiative because of their experience of being subject to distinctions whose meaning they confront as part of an objectivity arising from the spatial effects of the physiognomic materialisation of such objectivities. Encountering being involves aspects whose interpersonal constitution circumscribe via an intimacy that denudes individuals of possibility so that they experience the intrusion of meaning as part of the very fabric of being and the very intimacy of this encounter precludes their resistance to what are rendered absolutes because of the way discontinuity is constituted out of relative continuity by the need to institute qualitative differences whose form constitute some viably, and others negatively, as part of the mundane practice of differences that subtend economic space. People face experiences of being reduced by excess competition so that they face a prolonging of immiserated conditions of existence where they constantly reprocess the same information in debilitating conditions in which their humanity simply implodes. As one person described, “I think burnout comes more from boredom and constant frustration than actually doing something. That is why education makes it worse. Studying makes it a lot worse. There is a lot of frustration involved. The one step forward, two steps back position it puts you in. You try but can’t do anything so just get frustrated and burned out”. The problem is the distinctions constitute discontinuous oppositions perpetually so that the devalued are locked out and endure an immiseration born of a significance they can’t really countermand. The discontinuities are experienced as absolute forms of negation, the sense of barriers is manifest via perception of differences that are conditions for the objectivities individuals experience being constituted via the interpersonal processes that mediate access to valued forms. The disclosure of discontinuities from the social continuum is a key aspect of the symbolisation of borders as sense-relational barriers which constitute a signifying aura, practically instantiated, whose realisation physiognomically materialises capacities for reference born of subjection to experiences of being located via forms whose interpersonal disclosure constitute ways of being that are part of the referentialities incarnated via subjection to such processes. As one person described:

Most people in university are the ‘life liars’ described by Alfred Adler. Like These southerners who go to university to further their careers and climb the social ladder. Their whole being is a built on a lie and the use of manipulation. Then they meet a working class person (who I would said are generally honest, which often works to their own detriment in this society) and they don't like you because they know they are a fraud -- and they know that you know they are a fraud and they try to sabotage you socially because they see it as a threat. They whole way of operating is artifice their 'someone living a life-lie is attempting to manipulate reality with perception, thought and action, so that only some narrowly pre-defined outcome is allowed to exist'. They make it so you look like you can't fit in and it makes you into a different 'type' altogether. You can't fit in there and you are outside of everything. You can’t fit in back where you are from. This is what the whole social atmosphere was based upon at university. It's all seen as harmless and normal, it's a way of operating that they grow up with.
What is clear is how the impersonal demeanour of objectivities affects individuals who experience being realised in relation to an appearance whose spatial constitution is anonymous yet relational and clearly, individuals experience a moulding of their subjectivity that arises from the sense they experience being physiognomically materialised via disclosures that constitute such aspects; "they make it so you look like you can’t fit in and it makes you into a different ‘type’ altogether". Clearly, the interactive character of the way objectivities are impersonally constituted in relation to reciprocal forms that make the world for which individuals are disposed emerge around them, affects the devalued who concede aspects of their identity and lose capacities for projection whose relational conditions are not satisfied because they cannot function as accessories for the establishment of this form of life and cannot function as reciprocating protensions towards the world they experience being constituted in distinction to them. Moreover, subjection to the interpersonal grounds of these processes means that they experience being informally sanctioned and experience being unable to function as an accessory in the constitution of aspects that individuals disclose as part of the realisation of differences of significance that establish such existential modalities as ways of being-there. Such aspects realise some but inhibit others which is why employers look to select those who can manifest aspects arising from involvement, those who accede to a personal experience of being-there, as opposed to the anonymous, impersonal, dislocated, experience of the devalued, whose empty CVs condemn them to a stigma that is a continuously reconstituted aspect of their public objectivity. The extent to which individuals accede to collective aspects rooted in recognitions which disclose conditions which make available representational forms of intentionality, to capacities to represent themselves; utilise self-descriptions; rooted in involvements in public space that physiognomically materialise the sense of personal attributes experienced via being subject to such possibilities, is a key stake of the closures that constitute such aspects, and explains many of the difficulties lower class students face, "you can’t fit in there and you are outside of everything. You can’t fit in back where you are from". Closures operate, anonymously, via interpersonal forms that constitute a fabric whose disclosure manifest aspects whose sense inhere in the public culture of the institutions that determinate the conditions of attribution of personal properties that, remain, unavailable to many. The way we experience being realised constitutes an expressivity, a range of behavioural forms, embodied reason, that function as a provisional schema orienting one’s capacity to appropriate social situations responsively that are inscribed via involvement and yet these aspects of our physiognomy require the absorption of realisations born of recognitions which disclose such modalities so that we experience accession to meanings via aspects that subtend how we experience being. How we experience significance is via presence and clearly devaluation and invalidation are modalities that affect behavioural fluency and capacities for functionality born of engagement. We accede to capacities via a fluency arising from absorption in forms whose disclosure constitute such aspects so that we experience capacities arising from interpersonal modalities that make available such possibilities. Via realisation we experience a fusion of elements that compose aspects whose appropriation constitute capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being situated via such mediations.
Without engagement, the provisional schema appropriated via actualisations that constitute such aspects, atrophies because the conditions constitutive of the physiognomic regeneration of the elemental components arising via absorbed coping are missing because the experience of being subject to such possibilities is unavailable and individuals feel incapacitated: "they make it so you look like you can’t fit in", unthought evaluations that compose the fabric of a social environment, that are the basis of the actualising mediations via which individuals incorporate significances, practically distribute experiences of being-capable of bearing the sense of properties that emerge from disclosures that constitute such aspects and yet "it’s all seen as harmless and normal". Clearly, the establishment of differences which disclose a fabric that alludes to the relative unworthiness of others via behavioural patterns that constitute unthought evaluations that compose a signifying atmosphere, "this is what the whole social atmosphere was based upon at university", involves considerable misery for those who function as the tacit references for the derivation of the sense of such a boundary whose practical instantiation condemns them to dislocation and dis-absorption from a fabric that constitutes capacities. Clearly, the interpersonal forms that subtend the acquisition of competence have cognitive effects condemning many to appear via aspects whose physiognomic materialisation curtail their own access to possibilities, for access to themselves, that require the mediations of others. Imputations of inferiority are so aversive because they affect the meanings we experience via being, they affect the very qualities we experience and the possibilities for self-actualisation and for appropriating possibilities that we are subject to. The devalued are world impoverished and their humanity curtailed. What is clear is that the devalued don’t access viable sources via which they can sustain ways of being that found possibilities and they, consequentially, experience a reduction and mutilation that circumscribes in such ways that the disclosures they experience reconstitute such aspects so that they are, essentially, trapped within parameters that become inescapable as the meanings they experience being are sedimented via the forms they experience being physiognomically materialised as aspects of their public objectivity. Depersonalisation is a key stake in fields which must be interpersonally constituted to allow some to inhabit space via realisations born of recognitions of qualities whose grounds arise from differentiations at the heart of the constitution of a signifying atmosphere via the instantiated patterns arising from the impersonal demeanour of objectivities that constitute the reciprocal objectification of those who can function as mediums of self-actualisation because of congruencies that are a key medium of the social power arising from mobilisations that ensure accession to representational forms of intentionality whose grounds are obscured by the private use of institutional space to materialise such distinctions. The erosion of identity is part of the constitution of the interpersonal fabric via which capacities for, not merely, reference, arise, but the ways of being physiognomically materialised via the interpersonal production of such a medium via recognitions which disclose forms which constitute capacities for cognition arising from ways of being-there, so that symbolic violence is the inverse of the way space is used to constitute capacities born of recognition for those valued, with detrimental effects on identity, or character, for those who face a world disclosed via the silent injunctions that instantiate boundaries whose sense are imbibed via subjection to such forms:
Ah packed uni' in' (S: Ahr long did yer stick it?) two terms. (S: Why'd yer pack it in?) Thi' wo' tranna change mi personality. Just get looked dahn on, it wo' changin' mi personality. (S: Ahr wo it affectin' yer?) Ah cun't fit in at uni' but wo' findin' it 'arder t' fit in back 'ome, mi mates thought Ah wo different, Ah wo mo'ore inter miseln', thi' said, "yer not same", so Ah jacked it in. Fuck it.

What is manifest in many of the testimonies is the impact of meanings that become manifest via the inscription of their realisation so that individuals come to bear the sense of aspects via experiencing being subject to their disclosure: their revelation manifesting an order physiognomically materialised via injunctions whose form orient individuals pre-consciously, non-representationally, so that they experience the substance of the world via their vulnerability to meanings that inhere in an interpersonal fabric that constitutes such aspects. Changes in ways of being-realised, physiognomically materialise a sense of differences that constitute meanings experienced via being subject to such modalities so that the incorporation of sense via forms whose disclosure materialise such aspects, as consequential aspects of one's being-for-others, constitute experiences of being. Shifts in identity are effects of subjection to ways of being whose disclosure physiognomically materialise aspects sensed via such modalities so that individuals endure, via the impersonal demeanour of objectivities, a process of reciprocal objectification that moulds elements of their subjectivity, which they experience being revealed as public aspects of their being-for-others, and hence experience informal sanctions to exist in certain ways: "thi' wo' tranna change mi personality"; leading individuals to concede aspects of themselves that were formally physiognomically regenerated such that, given that dispositions are implicated in ways of being realised, holistically, individuals feel themselves losing aspects of themselves, they feel, not enriched, but debilitated. Because experiences of being a person require disclosures which physiognomically materialise aspects appropriated via such modalities, poverty involves an impoverished relation to the fabric of being and those subject to such aspects find themselves world-impoverished, the coordinates of their existence fatally affected by the meanings they experience being interpersonally disclosed so that they experience a reduction based on concessions that are part of the public forms of their existence. Competition involves nigrification, or uglification, and this encounter with mutilated ways of being-there affects the very seat of identity, causing complex trauma that is only exacerbated by the isolation characteristic of a negation that is manifest via public processes that render individuals legible and condemned:

I was different after uni thats for sure. I changed. Like my personality changed. I was never the same after it. It changes you. It isn't healthy. I think i've found my way back a bit though by keeping busy and not trying to follow all that false status just fuck em.  
S: Would you say your experience of connection with others was diminished by going to university? 
X: Yes i would. Definitely. You move in ever decreasing circles as you lose contact with people you can never connect. You can’t go back so when it doesn’t lead anywhere you’re stuck.

What this manifests is the extent to which the configurations of behaviours, that constitute the circumstantial aspects that constitute a historically sedimented
signifying autonomy, constitute part of our unexamined actuality that affects our intentional life. Because neurophysiological structures are absorbed via responsive actualisation to such circumstantial aspects, such states arise as part of a lived equilibria constitutive of a sense of, both, our significance and value that constitute who we are and they arise from an experience of the endorsement of recognition, an assurance of being-perceived appropriately that discloses forms appropriated via involvement in forms constituted via such modalities that physiognomically regenerate capacities for reference instantiated via recognitions which disclose intra-worldly aspects that are shared via the disclosure of such possibilities. Dislocation erodes identity because it robs individuals of access to the interpersonal basis of endorsements that physiognomically regenerate an experience of participation in a fabric that constitutes a sense of properties that we feel assured of instantiating because they arise as ways of being-there, as forms of existence arising as adaptive responses to disclosures that constitute circumstantial aspects that endorse a way of being, constituting a lived equilibria that is part of who we are that is unreflective in that it constitutes the 'there' we experience ratiocination via. The experience of change in identity is an effect of subjection to forms that sediment meanings inscribed via subjection to such processes, which is why this testimony spontaneously relates personality change, "my personality changed", to a diminishing interpersonally mediated relation to the world, "you move in ever decreasing circles", and, sadly, these changes affect a closure, "you can never connect. You can't go back". The sedimentation of meaning, via experiencing being subject to such processes changes experience of being-a-person, because the revelation of a new, degraded, status, without embedding, robs the individual of access to a sphere of realisation that constituted their viability before starting university. The sedimentation of meaning is part of the physiognomic materialisation of aspects that, clearly, affect neurophysiological structures. The issue is really what meanings are being inscribed via the process that individuals are undergoing? The problem is that the devalued have little control over their objectification because they have limited capacity to affect how they exist spatially, how they experience being-there, little capacity to affect the unavailability of anything that constitutes an objectivity whose physiognomic regeneration only leads to further marginality as they fail to access the grounds of objectification that constitute recognised forms of objectivity arising from recognised forms of social existence that constitute representational forms of intentionality, access to the interpersonal grounds of collective forms of intentionality, involvement in which constitute capacities for self-description that require such contextualisation in order to experience being capable of bearing the sense of such aspects, authentically, via experiences that allow the individual to experience emergence via a developed actuality born of recognition and the embedding it constitutes. For the valued, the conditions necessary for their realisation are present so they can absorb the rudiments of capacities arising from involvement in an environment absorbed via the disclosure of its circumstantial aspects. The devalued face an effacement that robs them of access to a disclosive medium that constitutes access to intentional possibilities and they face a necessary reduction, "you can never connect", that only entrenches with its sedimentation. How could such conditions not affect cognition or capacity? As some are being transitioned, realised in relation to recognitions
which constitute possibilities they experience being spatially and temporally materialised so that they are assured of properties whose identity inhere in differences that are relationally actualised, others are undergoing the destructuring of dispositions which were their tenuous hold on the limited possibilities available to them, their lives further impoverished by the loss of the assurance and support of a circumscribed existence born of a negation that can only become more deeply articulated by the form of their education. Those who lack the value to accede to recognised forms of objectivity face, not merely, a struggle to access the disclosive conditions required to accede to competencies whose grounds inhere in closures that constitute an identity born of recognitions which disclose such possibilities via experiences of actualisation that inhere in co-presence, others face a destructuring of their existence that sees them "move in ever decreasing circles" and undergo the inscription of sedimentations that erode their identity. It is paradoxical that those who turn to education to escape a dislocation rooted in an economic marginality born of the meaning of being-from impoverished regions, experience increased dislocation and a misery heightened by a failure of aspiration that is part of their public consignment. Notice the sense of disorientation manifest by "I've found my way back a bit" and notice it is only a partial founding, implying an inability that cannot be overcome through avoiding an underlying condition escaped through absorption in distracting forms. Why would someone say "I've found my way back a bit" unless they had been lost via the very process they turned to, to embed them in possibilities via which they might discover themselves capable of satisfying intentional forms whose conditions they experience being unavailable, leading them to experience a loss born of sanctions whose interpersonal forms constitute an absence of absorption that precludes constitutive aspects, locking the individual out of a fabric that infuses being with orientational aspects that constitute the basis of an operative intentionality. But once we realise that groups symbolise the boundary more vehemently the more closer they are, then it is clear that any attempt by the devalued to contest cultural spheres will only confront them with a more personal experience of the meaning of being inferiorised via the use of resources to continuously disclose a difference effaced via the use of institutional mediations to transpose income into symbolic forms that appear to concern properties of the person whose conditions of possibility inhere in the institutional conditions that transfigure economic relationships into what appear to be personal and cultural forms. Delegitimation has to be constituted legitimately and so the devalued must be subject to interpersonal processes that denude them of access to the conditions required to accede to recognised forms of social existence. The symbolisation of the boundary, the constitution of the difference, concerns the meaning of being-there and affects the qualities experienced as potentialities attributed through relational conditions that constitute intentional forms. As Bourdieu puts it, "they set up a magic boundary between the elect and the excluded while contriving to repress the differences of condition that are the condition of the difference that they produce and consecrate. This socially guaranteed difference is...at the root of the difference of 'nature' or 'essence'" (Bourdieu 2000: 25). What is described here, "my personality changed. I was never the same after it. It changes you" is an effect of the sedimentation of meanings arising from intersubjective acts of attribution that constitute the signifying autonomy of forms of objectivity that are effects of
subjection to the perception of differences whose recognition disclose such aspects. The sedimentation of meaning, the inscription of form, is an aspect of experiences of being informally sanctioned by the world, one's sovereignty compromised by experiencing limitations imposed via the very fabric constitutive of meanings experienced via being subject to such processes that sediment forms coopted into presence by subjection to disclosures burdened with allusions that constitute the circumstantial aspects individuals negotiate via being subject to such realising mediations that constitute persistent aspects of their expressivity or physiognomy. Notice that this person concedes something, there is a sense of loss arising from the moulding of elements of subjectivity via the impersonal demeanour of objectivities experienced as impugning, "not trying to follow all that false status just fuck em", clearly, individuals endure aspects of the world whose forms they experience being informally sanctioning, impelling them to become reciprocating protensions of, or accessories in, so that individuals experience an inability to mould themselves that is a fundamental aspect of negation that causes injury because it arises from a withdrawal from a fabric that constitutes the meaning of being-a-person, subject of potentialities which require actualisation, so that negation involves an essential injury that condemns many to marginal lives of penury, poverty, struggle and varieties of misery rooted in the "objective contradictions, constraints and double binds inscribed in the structures of the labor and housing markets, in the merciless sanctions of the school system, or in mechanisms of economic and social inheritance" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 201). Negation constitutes an unrealisation whose physiognomic materialisation exposes the individual to a mutilation attendant on their dislocation so that they lack access to any of the interpersonal aspects constitutive of emerging from indifference and insignificance via mediations that constitute higher states that require embedding in relational conditions that provide the means to experience such possibilities. The duress of negation arises from the sanctions which constitute incapacities born of experiencing the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects. Repeated exposure to such mediations mutilates identity and leads to a life lived via avoidance of the stressors that manifest an objectivity rooted in such processes. Complex trauma isolates but it also emerges from conditions which involve subjection to such a state. Once individuals have experienced a realignment of their identities with a form of life arising from the meaning of being forms whose public materialisation constitute their negation, it is difficult for them to connect. Enduring a world of informal sanctions whose judgements take the form of a restricted sphere of actualisation, what resources of sense can individuals appropriate when the relational underpinnings of such aspects are absent? Once the devalued cannot function as reciprocating protensions towards a world, that the sense of their lives arises from, they are limited in their capacities to function socially. The background of this reality is further elaborated in the following:

Coal board had stopped employing, steel works weren't recruitin', thi' wo' no apprenticeships anywh're, we wo' placed on tracks that were a waste'r time. Having an insight from school could have been so important but it never existed as parent's had no knowledge or power to help. Other lads in our region were meant to go down a hole in the ground and we arrived in time for Thatcher to end that and offer pathways that were even more vacuous. Thatcher who wanted to change us less reliant on manufacturing (where socialist movement fermented) and
move to a service economy. We were to be sacrificed along the way. We were life's losers and we lost. Thatcher wo' first generation where thi' said "we don't want young people". If she could 'ave done shi'd 'ave just destroyed us which she did, just put 'em on dole, we wo a lost generation, we did not get good training, we did not get education, it was irrelevant to what we needed because most'r us could not du anythin' wi' the education available to us, it wo' made available because it became viable when we cu'n't get jobs. It got worse as you went higher because thi' wo' less education an' no opportunities, yer ended up at Huddersfield an' they provided nothin'. They were just facilitators of a process yer did not get an education it was just a certificate. What they wanted to obscure was how worthless it all is. They were paid well and marketed the process effectively. They sold it to non-traditional customers. Working class 'first in the family' to go slogan. Massive expansion and easy money. It's so much easier after the event to realise it was a fraud. All the academics and the institutions were compliant and yet effective at selling the lie to a group who were happy to absorb the lie in the hope, and it was hope of achieving something better than what we came from. But if there had been the realistic jobs and vocational training and reward when we were young, most of us, if not all of us would never have embarked on the pointless, futile journey we did. We chose education because we saw it as a process that was easy for us to access. It was easy and still is but therein lies the reason...it's fraudulent. The blind and naïve followers followed in droves and still do and as more and more go through this it has got worse and lots more young people are self harming and even killing themselves. They talked of "facilitation" instead of teaching because teaching is hard work, so you get all this directing of learning so the students do it, "self-directed learning" they call it and all the people in higher education is 'supervise' or 'assess', everyone wants to assess. Further education colleges are shit holes fo' this, full 'r people assessing. Woman Ah taught is now an assessor, shi's on sixty grand a y'r fo' assessin' teachin'. All system's gone dahn toilet. Nobody learns fuck all and people have no real skills apart from talking bollocks. Ah look back on my education. I hate it, I hated every minute of it I just thought this is fuckin' stupid and Ah left an' thought "what the fuck do Ah do with this" I went into FE [Further Education] but that's fallen apart nah. Education is just artificially creatin' a need fo' processes. Ventura's full 'r people wi humanities degrees. Call centres are full of post grads with M.As and PhDs. They have no technical skills, not even bricklaying skills, that would ensure employment. Ah'm sick 'r thinkin' abaat ahr bad it was, wi wo fucked befo'ore wi went into RCAT [Rotherham College of Arts and Technology]. Most kids Ah went to school wi' din't know ahr t' eat at a table ni mind ow't else. What did Ah need to study humanities fo'? Just 'cos Ah cun't get a job an' it wo' available an' Ah wo' too stupid to know any better. Ah look at lots of people and there not gettin' an education they are just going through a process. Ah look at it and all Ah did was familiarise myself with a process Ah never got an education. People jump through hoops to find out that the credential is out of date anyway. Most of these credentials will be out of date by the time you finish it! That's education. At university on humanities you learn nothing, if it's not science-based its all worthless hobby knowledge. The rest is death to us and our pathways. If you are a woman or ethnic you may have a chance but white working class male we had no right to be there and they showed us. We were funding for the universities, and overseas students are cash cows, we are classed as dogs because we have no money but still bring in thousands on funding for the courses. Most left and took mundane routes in life. Listening to radio this morning. Two graduates in a coffee shop selling coffee. Done A level, humanities degree, PGCE, hated teaching now selling coffee. More people doing humanities programs paying for the 'privilege' and there are no more pathways other than jobs thirty five years ago, you did with 'O' Levels at 16. Humanities education post-gcse just job creation and enrichment for the few. They believe in it because they make money from it. Pragmatism is their ethos. God, how many follow this route......to nowhere! What do you do though? I just want to forget it. I learnt nothing and taught nothing and do nothing of value. It was a bad experience. We validated them by initially embracing the process and not really checking the validity. In addition we never had access to other alternatives or the guidance to pursue them. But they can because they have powerful groups who support their position and authorise the shallow progression. As a society we care more for the conditions of greyhounds or horses made to race than students made to fail. The ability to realise that you were being conned was the key. Like the factory workers and miners of eighty years ago there was nowt else. The release then was to join the forces for king and country but most didn't because many were reluctant to leave the village they were born in. Forward
eighty years and replace the army for higher education and that's it with key differences. People leave home but pay for the privilege, don't get anything come back but there are no pits or factories just call centres, zero hour contract jobs that all require limited intelligence to undertake. No different to the semi skilled jobs of old. The key is to understand when you are conned and have the ability, determination, comprehension or skills to avoid this shite or have a sponsor, supporter to avoid it. Or significantly be born to avoid it. Nothing you can do. I am looking for permanent work as the last two teaching roles are temporary and this one is. Just applying now and I hate it, mate of mine is a driving instructor, keeps working and said to me he doesn't want to work for anyone as he wouldn't trust them, even though he doesn't make much money. Perhaps that the problem we wanted so much but were too stupid to realise it was beyond our pathway. God help us to recognise our lives were worthless living dreams beyond us. We were all naive stupid and deserved to be abused by people who made money and enjoyed the process. Learning does cause misery. We should have just been un-ambitious and desiring to stay in Rotherham. We had ambition but still remain having achieved not a lot. I just married a woman with a job that gave us security. I feel guilty because I worked in jobs that were always in decline everywhere I've ever had gainful employment has gone and shut. I never wanted to teach, did business studies to get a job after a degree. Shows how ignorant I was but what could I have done? Couldn't do science or maths so only a worthless pathway presented itself. After University my first job was working in marketing in an engineering company. Apprenticeship got me that. Tried to move but degree was worthless. I got a job as a marketing manager in a company manufacturing engineers cutting tools. And why? Because I was an apprentice trained toolmaker. All that counted was my work history, the education counted for jack-shit. Company shut and I then couldn't get another job as my experience was marketing in engineering and engineering was collapsing. Started teaching because my quals were worthless and only got teaching because I had a good friend at Rother Valley who I ran with when I was a student there. He was running the business section and ensured I had some work so I was luckier than some who had no work history and were stuck. I now realise that you are not going anywhere if you teach in education and I have told my kids to stay clear. Anyway if you are male and working class the women elite in education negatively discriminate against you because they can do and because they enjoy it. They can behave appallingly discriminatory towards working class men as they are not contravening any legislation and it gives them power and they love it. Little groups of evil in education that made life unpleasant when you worked there, evil stupidity in many. We were stupid people who bovinely followed a process without asking questions. Like Hitler in Germany you fool the middle class and aspiring working class. We thought we had more than Rotherham's finest but the only thing we had was time. Time to do courses, RCAT was full of the unemployed with time. HE still is but that has gone now. Unemployment benefit lasts only 6 months. You only get money for one Level Three programme and HE money only lasts four years and you might have to pay it back. We were stupid, we didn't ask the questions and like many before went in as we were told only to be eliminated on our worthless pathway. They knew we were stupid fuckers who brought valuable funding, that was the only value we had that made that available when we had no other use. Don't need academia and we never asked questions we were stupid...we brought funding to the institutions. We were numbers, bums on seats, and when finished they were glad to see us go as the next group brought in more money. Same at HE and then when we left...goodbye good riddance and bring on the next lot of funding. Anyone we like we give part time work to or short term work to. Ironically this work earns less than a plasterer gets who left school a decade earlier. I sometimes think we asked for this as we were so stupid. We were weak as we didn't fight the process. We accepted their advice. It was shyte and we were stupid, naive, and like the yellow star population did as we were told as we were not strong enough to resist or protest, or question it. We were idiots and we didn't question it because we lived in hope. It still continues today. I look at young people and this is still the same. We weren't meant to be there, two years of dole que prevention at RCAT then back on state funding in the form of a grant to go to university. All dole prevention figures, after that back to Rotherham and dole. Exclusion is a reality for most of the men that endured our pathway. We knew there was nothing and reality was hopelessness. We never should have been involved in any of this, we never should have had this pathway open to us because it leads nowhere. Our education at school made us think we were retarded because I did, I came out of school, I had no confidence, I honestly thought I was a retard. And I look back and think how did I ever end up in
university doing something that led nowhere? We were too stupid for worthwhile knowledge. We went down the worthless knowledge route when we failed school and went to RCAT. We did worthless trajectories, worthless subjects because we weren't smart enough to do science or maths. We were worthless on worthless routes and we had no skills or talents, direction or guidance to assist in our pathway. That is why we ended up at Huddersfield with everyone else from those shit holes. PGCE in post 16 worthless qualification. A levels...hard work but worthless. B.A business...Now BA needs to become MA to work even in FE. Students in FE are thicker than ever because the schools hang on to the quality. Jobs are so limited that places like RCAT can demand masters in humanities but will pay more an hour for a qualified plumber if he or she has a teaching certificate. I wonder what I should have done, but I know I didn't have any real positive pathway...like you, but staying in Rotherham was a mistake but we are economic refugees, we can't afford to live in any real areas of possibility. People who worked did better, although so many decent jobs have gone there is no real point in education. I hate every day I go to work and I know like most I am not alone and endure the shyte. Like most I hope I will live long enough to retire, now that is how bad it is. I don't care for visiting the success of others it only hurts, because it is luck or patronage that ensures some are guaranteed to succeed. Do we expect too much should we just expect to survive Reproduce, consume, and survive until death. Should that be our lives, lives like rats. Wish the Germans had won. If the Germans had won do you think we would have faced this problem? They'd be jobs for engineers with the training. They copied our industrial revolution model but underpinned it with effective training and ensured money went into training instead of the fat few. They still do this now and guess what there is a business model to be envious of. Here the fat get fatter on coordinated wealth snatches and the people working see living standards drop, worthwhile jobs dissolve. In my parents day they never enquired as to what was happening and went with the flow. They bought their own house, in a pit village and thought they were aspiring due to being better off than their parents. In two generations it's all gone. My kids will rent from the fat ones and aspire to nowt other than paying for next month's rent. Most will only be a month away from destitution and you wonder why we celebrate the Battle of Britain!

As someone else described:

There is general hopelessness, many young people know they will never achieve the prosperity that, well, not even their parents had, but their grandparents had, they can see the decline. There was a case very recently where two sixteen year olds killed a third one, very brutally, torturing for hours. They had been bullying him for years, it is horrible. I feel sick when I look at the state of youth now. The young have less and less mercy and empathy. I remember seeing kids wandering the streets in the eighties, they were scary to be honest, very violent with no reason to be but it has all got worse.

What is this person being practically sensitised to via exposure to such forms? What is only too apparent is that what Hegel called the ‘ethical life’, or the ‘social or customary morality’ (Hegel 1991) arising from the habitual practices of a group, the ways that they experience being realised in relation to interpersonal aspects that constitute practical forms of morality and practical ways of being sensitive to one-another arising from being sensitised to values immanent to the way we experience being-there, the dispositional ‘values’ realised in comportment, in which the traditional social forms of people inhered, have clearly been affected by the nature of these changes to the mediations that subtend employment access, the institutional mediations that constitute us as viable, competent, by the institutions that subtend economic activity. What the working class perceive, via education, is further mediation of their worthlessness, amidst the redundancy of their understanding to a way of being-there infused with the effects of their worthlessness that merely reproduces the primal purposive relations to being that
class infuses existence with. They experience the redundancy of their understanding via an education that can't situate them contextually so that its forms are elicited aspects of public objectivities that arise via exposure to such forms. What they experience is that they are condemned, educationally, to worthless forms of knowledge, "worthless hobby knowledge" which is easily bought and dominated by as many perspectives as there are groups mobilising, institutionally, to produce their objectivity and the consequential nature of the distinctions they practice by condemning others to an experience in which their understanding is as irrelevant as their labour is worthless. Lower class people who complete higher degree confront the worthlessness of their labour as a continuously reproduced aspect of their labour market position reconstituted via educational processes in which they are never required to be capable of actually doing anything because they aren't invited to participate, existing to the extent that they can manage to attach grants to themselves and satisfy other administrative processes that constitute the reality of bureaucratically derived forms of objectivity whose consequential nature are only too apparent in the sense of irrelevance arising from the uselessness of a status that educational institutions merely reproduce. Academics don't exhibit awareness of conditions that are realised via divisions that are effects of a recognitions whose spontaneity, and immediacy, are key aspects of the realisation of different modalities that are mediated via perception of differences whose perception physiognomically materialises such processes. Institutional agents don't have to articulate, or ever acknowledge, what they do, nor why, because they operate in relation to pre-constitutive forms of valuation that prevent particular objectivities from being realised so that academics never have to deny a reality continuously effaced so that it appears to be purely individuated, and, thereby, deniable. In this sense, there is no need to defend strategies which preclude certain forms of objectivity from being constituted. The reality is manifest via the effects of such practices, different categories of student access different forms of institutional existence. The working class acquire worthless forms of, usually, non-empirical knowledge, that involve no public situating of their process so that they experience developmental possibilities. Instead of the elicitations of public environments that stimulate, there is the substitution of a solitary, anonymous, administrative process that consists of the judgement of the worth of their labour, a labour whose devaluation is already immanent to its constitution: the working class have to develop projects from outside of any institutional embedding and are then judged for the effects of a process that perpetuates such conditions because of a devaluation that is immanent to its conditions. The worthlessness of their knowledge is manifest via the process they undergo to produce it: they produce without access to technology, from poverty, judiciously purchasing what books they can afford and using them to produce work as best they can in a process that reduces to the solitary production of documents that hide the absence of any process apart from the administration of such forms in order to materialise the appearance of forms that validate the institutional agents who associate their names with the bureaucratic process whose traces obscure the reality that there is nothing there. As another product of these institutional conditions described them:
Many of the kids who ended up there came with the staunch conviction that they were inherently stupid and spent much of their time apologizing for it. A self assessment re-enforced almost daily in the college by the economically more well placed students preconditioned socially for places in more sought after universities. Undesirable differences were made glaringly obvious in the effort to push these to the bottom of the pile. If such people then eventually left the further education programmes and couldn’t find gainful employment politicians could at least say that the responsibility lay entirely at the feet of the individual, absolving themselves of the task of re-working or reforming policies designed to keep these perpetual students spinning money for the institutions and the people higher up who had their heads in the trough gorging on the spoils of economic displacement.

As someone of a later generation summed up the same conditions, with the key change of the structuring lever of debt to function as a disciplinary exigency:

Education's just a big Ponzi scheme, uni’s just a racket, Ah've a bairn an' wife to look after, fifty grahnd. Ma mates, Ah did sport at Preston, wi wo' all northern lads, the're 'is a big bias, everyone knows northerners are looked dahn on, wi cun’t get proper jobs, ma degree wo' worthless, Ah'm fifty grahnd in debt an' it wo' mi brother sat o'er the'er [nods over to his left to indicate who] who got mi a job. Hi rang mi ‘an ses, “thi’s a full time job 'ere fo yer if yer wan’ it?” Ah wo' w'kin' in a bar, that's not proper work, it's a now't job, so nahr Ah du drains wi' ‘im. Ma degree wo' worthless. What wo' the', the'er? Now't. Wi' all know thi’s a divide between north and south, wi' all know northerners are looked dahn on. In every walk'r life, it's same rules, shit rolls dahn 'ill, at end'r day we're the shit. We're the ones at the bottom who get shat on, that's ahr it is.

It is because of the mediated nature of the 'there', of intraworldly aspects arising relative to forms of disclosure arising from the perception of our difference, that our experience of the perceptual field arises as a nested form relating to our experience of circumscriptions that situate us so that the nature of the 'there' is a significant aspect of our being. That someone can ask the question "What wo' the' the'er?" manifests the uncertainty relating to significances arising from ways of being-perceived that constitute nested aspects of reality: significance and ways of being-realised determine how social space is experienced and the determination of possibilities relate to what is available, the question "What wo' the' the'er?" manifests the way the experience of possibility is curtailed by restrictions in what is available by institutional forms that preclude accession to recognised forms of objectivity so that the social and institutional grounds of experiences of being-there are curtailed by a determining absence, the "now't" experienced as a potent constitutive aspect of experience. The question "What wo' the' the'er?" is only sensible because of the way significance, intelligibility, constitute being via a differentiation whose spatial constitution make such questions mortal. We see the fundamental question a way of being-there arising from a reality constituted via the absence of the mediations constitutive of worthwhile forms of existence poses for those who experience being-there, senselessly and aimlessly, via processes that transfigure their devaluation into a purposelessness imbibed via subjection to the grounds of objectivity that fuse being with the way of being that constitutes the traces of the fundamental medium constitutive of this mode of access to the real: disclosures born of recognitions which physiognomically regenerate an absence that is part of the interpersonal materialisation of aspects whose sense are incorporated via expressivities rooted in the practice and realisation of such an order. The
fundamental question posed by reality is stark: "What wo' the', the'er?" and then answered: "Now't". Facing such conditions, "Nothing' gets called to this self, but it has been summoned to itself—that is, to its ownmost ability-to-be" (Heidegger 1962: 318) such that this most-personal capacity is fatally affected by the absence that gives life to non-being, and incapacity, so that the forms of realisation some face curtail their capacities, a limitation born of a mutilation manifest via the circumscriptions arising from ways of being-there experienced via such mediations. The same coordinates of a dislocation arising from divisions that constitute the worthlessness of credentials whose insignificance arise from their lack of connection to any realising sphere that merely perpetuates a form of life born of the inscription of the sense of the forms arising from these divisions. What is clear is that bankrupt processes that extort the sense of processes without embedding individuals in the conditions constitutive of human development do not satisfy the conditions required for individuals to accede to experiences of being competent because viability is extorted via relationships that actualise employees whilst offering students very little. People cannot be aware either of their needs or of the absence of objectification until they have undergone a process that leaves them bereft, and socially marooned, because there is dislocation without embedding. How can poor individuals, dislocated, outside of any public sphere, come to awareness of their educational needs? Without a sphere of possibility, how can they know what they need, and, equally, how can they know that the educational processes available to them are worthless, invalidating and bankrupt? Just as they cannot antecedently possess awareness of capacities before their conditions of acquisition have been satisfied, they cannot intuit educational needs without the conditions of their satisfaction being disclosed. Clearly, individuals cannot know the fake charade that will materialise the appearance of their 'education' without working hard across distances that obscure this reality from them until they have worked to materialise the relational mediations that constitute the appearance of a reality that benefits others. Clearly, education that cannot ground learning in anything leads individuals to experience a purposelessness arising from the way relational processes extort the sense of processes that have little reality to people who experience, not the need-to-know, attendant on the elicitation of forms via experiences of being-situated in relation to a context that discloses such aspects, but the unnecessary nature of their learning arising from a purposelessness that is a real effect of the class divisions that constitute its form. Without direct mediation, there is no experience of needing education for-the-sake-of some particular need and neurophysiological structures are not constituted, leading them to experience their education as absurd because they do not experience any need for it. Notice how the absence of purpose links spontaneously to an attribution of status arising from this experience: "What did Ah need to study humanities fo'...We weren't meant to be there...We never should have been involved in any of this". Notice how the experience of absurdity discloses an experience of objectivity: how would someone arrive at a conclusion that "we weren't meant to be there" except via an experience of being-there born of an absurdity arising from the absence of any experience of being-there, the incongruity of the cultural form is manifest via its absence as a disclosive medium. Instead of the individual experiencing an embedding that discloses a sense of possibilities appropriated via their disclosure as actual aspects whose conditions of satisfaction
constitute neurophysiological mechanisms arising via such experiences, they experience the incongruity of themselves in relation to this absence because their education arises from fundamental divisions that subtend the modalities that render the education of some meaningful whilst others experience what is described here. Valuation affects meaning which affects being because meaning is a constitutive aspect of valuation that transfigures value into aspects of being. Notice that the experience of the absurdity of the process arises from an experience of objectivity: via the processes individuals incorporate a sense of discrepancy that is an effect of the dislocation of a negation that reconstitutes a sense of inability that is an effect of the absence of access to anything that might realise individuals so that they intuit possibilities as aspects of their being-for-others and so experience a reduction that is at the heart of the spatial divides constitutive of relational forms that materialises forms of value for some and an absence of anything for others. Valuationary processes materialise differences that constitute inabilities for some arising from the public forms that subtend these significances. Absences of value transpose into absences of opportunity that become transfigured into experiences of meaninglessness arising from the lack of realisation of forms that constitute meanings appropriated via being subject to such possibilities so that economic barriers become incorporated as forms of realisation relating to experiences of being whose objectivity arise from the reciprocal constitution of referential forms that relate to the disclosure of such actualities. Discrepancy is lived as absence of the grounds required to project via forms whose disclosure realise meanings experienced via their actualisation so that the devalued endure a sense of inability that becomes an essential reference haunting their flesh because of the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects as ways of being-located, or forms of presence. It is worth considering why individuals feel so violated by such processes that they only want "to forget it"? When someone can say, "we weren't meant to be there...Exclusion is a reality for most of the men that endured our pathway", you have to ask "what is really being said"? Notice that this is described via a terrain of meaning, "weren't meant to be there", the meaning of non-being is constitutive of the experience of being-there. Notice that the individual experiences not-being via the meaning of being. From where does the meaning of not-being there, constitutive of the experience of an experience of the absurdity of "enduring" such an experience, arise? It arises from the absurdity of failed projected. Those undergoing meaningless, decontextualized processes, arising from an experience of barriers whose sense infuse an experience born of dislocation, experience the futility of their attempts at projection in the face of the absence of any embedding mediations. Such people would never experience what they describe if they had been able to pursue a technical training that embedded them in a context whose disclosures elicited properties they experienced being able to instantiate via experiences of being realised in relation to such possibilities. What is described is an experience of devaluation born of a negation that state financed education merely reproduces. The state apparatus cannot overcome barriers born of the sense of relational forms that subtend the institution of its processes. The personnel financed via the notional functions whose appearance can easily be materialised without individuals being connected can easily usurp the apparatus and undermine the function of institutions, leaving individuals facing precisely the same
interpersonal dynamics that constitute the sense of the objectivity they have turned to education to escape, hence the conclusion, "there is no real point in education". Education merely becomes another field that reconstitutes cultural processes that create the problems that make turning to education a necessity. Within educational fields, the same problems of contextualisation and valuation are merely reconstituted so that the poor face the rearticulation of the mediations that constitute the problems they face, it is just that the state has, at times, financed their access to such processes when it has served other political and economic functions. The problem is with the nature of the institutional processes that constitute the experience of the poor. As one person describes:

We encounter it, five, ten minutes we want to get the fuck out, we’re all sensitive to it in our own ways, but we avoid them, it’s a losin’ battle. The’ll do us, the power they have, we’re always at their mercy, went to the council with Azad, I walked in, Ah’m thinkin’ “I hope they’re sympathetic to us”, thi’ can fuck you, thi’ can just bi arseholes, it’s basically what mood they’re in…the look at yer mockingly, like “yer annoy me, get aht!”. I’、“m talkin’ abaat institutions that are meant to help us. Fuckin’ social, the doctors, colleges, the’re all the fuckin’ same man. These places are supposed to help us, but thi’ fuckin’ don’t.

Institutions exist to serve an economic rationale which constitutes the nature of people’s experience. As one person describes the horizon within which they experience arose:

I left school at sixteen and pissed my life away, wasted it, given no advice at the college, went to university too late, fucking getting angry now. On the one side I saw my older cousin getting ripped off in apprenticeships that led nowhere and on the other being told to do a degree that I knew was a scam. Minimum wage for sixteen to eighteen and minimum wage for eighteen to twenty-one, then laid off to take on someone younger. Left in limbo at twenty-one. Everything is shit. Fuck it all.

As someone else described the same circumstances:

Unless you trained to be an electrician or plumber in Dinnington as a boy you were going to spend your life looking for work or doing jobs you didn’t like for poor return. The jobs we were encouraged to avoid by educating ourselves. I remember having hope and aspirations while at college. Now I realise how stupid I was and what time I wasted. I never had the relevant skills to achieve anything, the college gave me nothing useful. I live in Rotherham within walking distance of the college!! What a progression. The thing is the provision of all that was available was cheap. Fill a room provide a lecturer and screen. At a higher level provide a named person with little access. Unlike science where validity is accessed through work experience and lab activity and vocational specialists. All this is costly so the accountants say ‘expand humanities’ good for the ‘bottom line’. I went nowhere. I did nothing. Now it is expensive and people still pay and endure to end up working at Tesco.

The final point, here, is underlined in the following:

In uni we just moved to a new set of offices, like a call-centre, all crammed in together - meant to be an academic learning environment. Anyway, I overheard a conversation between three university employees, an IT technician, a fire inspector and somebody else from management and they were talking about the university’s finances—very openly talking about the need to recruit foreign students, and how the school of social sciences was flush at the moment compared to other departments like engineering which is struggling. I went to Trinity College a
few weeks ago and I was talking to some of the people in Engineering and they were saying that
now it’s money over everything, they are not bothered what they turn out, it is money over
everything, there is no humanity or human concern whatsoever anymore, it is all just funding,
funding, funding and student’s financing their study, that is all that the university cares about.

Obviously, since the universities care about finances, those with income are
possessed of capacities arising from the institutional leverage arising from being-
perceived-to-be significant, their status transfigures into aspects whose sense in
here in experiences of viability and the possession of economic capital transmutes
into the possession of attributes arising from the recognition of its significance and
an institutional order constitutes what appear to be purely personal attributes
rooted in this system of differences that relate to meanings experienced via being
subject to such forms. For the poor, the contemporary landscape is bereft of
engagement and possibility. Subjection to bankrupt processes that extort
investments that can never be recuperated constitute an affective terrain that
subtends understanding for those whose understanding is inflected via experiences
of being affected by the same conditions so that their way of being (affected)
constitutes affective forms, bonds woven via the fabric of being:

Ah get extremely ‘angry Ah can ‘erm, Ah can disguise that most of the time, so Ah can continue
an’ actually gu an’ do somethin’ else that is actually meaningless to me, an’ disguise mi anger
while Ah’m doin’ that, an’ Ah can continue wi’ mi life an’ in the main, Ah ‘ave flashes abaht other
things, but a lot of it’s to do wi’ a lot of crap an’ a lot of anger that Ah’ve got anyway, which
means Ah ohnny get on wi’ people who Ah can agree wi’ things that wi’ angry abaat, so a lot’r
time, friendships come dahm to motives fo’ which yer angry or the degree of angriness that’s like,
erm, that’s, erm, present...multiplies because Ah’ve got a different anger anyway, yer know what
Ah mean, so Ah can focus mi anger on one thing that’s not the root of mi anger anyway, if yer
know what Ah mean but wi can actually agree on or disagree on, so it appears that Ah’m more
angry abaat this an’ other people are more angry abaat that, but if thi can understand where the
anger comes from, then wi can relate, difference wi’ you is that your anger is pure, in its sense,
because mine’s abaat failure an’ the reason that Ah failed, yours is abaat that yer din’t fail, yer
succeeded but yer wo’ still failed an’ that’s the ultimate betrayal, that’s a difference betrayal that,
which is part of the reason why, it’s part of the reason Ah’ve got a lot of time fo’ you is, is Ah can
understand where that anger comes from, Ah can understand anger anyway, anger’s a good
mate ‘r mine, hi lives in mi gut like a gre’t long tape worm, eatin’ the shit Ah eat an’ feedin’ off
everythin’ Ah ‘ave to fuckin’ tek in from world ahtside, but Ah can see ahr education world just
fuckin’ destroys people.

What exists is exploitative and demoralising, leaving people bearing the sense of
precisely the same conditions that they turned to education to escape. Clearly, the
reasons for the impersonal and vacuous nature of what is available is understood:
institutional agents extort incomes for the least possible cost which leaves individual
bereft of any of the coordinates constitutive of human possibility. Individuals exist
as the source of fronts that narcissistically realise others. As someone else
described, "What I find, wi’ these people who work in colleges, they are nasty, they
are so dismissive when thi talk to yer, yer feel like a nigger, thi’ mek yer want to bi
abusive but Ah just think then thi’ve med you look ahr thi' want yer to look", a
formulation which explicates the elucidation of properties characteristic of abusive
relationships. Clearly, people exist in a beleaguered state as an effect of institutional
processes that do little to alleviate the effects of absences that are effects of existing
in relation to such conditions. What is being experienced is a diminution born of the
tacit sanctions arising from the way individuals use space to constitute valuationary relational processes that constitute experiences of being competent via the forms individuals experience being interpersonally constitutive of them. Individuals experience the impersonal demeanour of objectivities which mould and sediment meanings as aspects or elements of subjectivity because of the way sense is physiognomically materialised via disclosures which constitute ways of being-there that affect capacities for projection, instantiation, and an experience of being capable, or human. Spatially, interpersonally, there is an impersonal, interpersonal, moulding of elements as part of the reciprocal objectification of subjects who, interactively, constitute the reality they experience being related to via the interpersonal relations via which they make the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of the forms that are the condition of functionality in this sphere so that capacities and being-meaningfully realised are effects of such processes. These valuationary transactions mean that the devalued concede aspects of themselves via experiencing the diminution of devaluation, they concede something of their own sovereignty, lose a sense of capacity that requires reciprocal constitution, lose aspects, or parts, of themselves that require recognition and realisation, because they have no real means to function as accessories or facilitators of the life-world of others except as passive negated, implicit references, existing in an unrealised state. What is clear is that the devalued are informally sanctioned via the responses of others, they experience the insidious injunctions, the inert violence, the practical allusions, that mean they experience their personal failure to function as conduits for the realisation of others, accessories of a life-world because they cannot function as reciprocating protensions of a world that individuals make emerge around them via forms that realise them. Individuals experience a mutilation arising from the impersonal demeanor of objectivities, they lose a sense of esteem because they face an experience of an objectivity they experience emerging via this encounter with the forms of significance that constitute functionality in public space. What is clear is that individuals endure a world they face being informally sanctioned in when their expressive physiognomy is not endorsed so that they experience the physiognomic regeneration of forms that constitute an efficacy whose recognition validates and reconstitutes capacities arising from moments that allow them to function as reciprocating protensions towards a world that individuals make emerge around them. This sanctioning takes the form of non-recognition and of ignoring individuals so that that they experience an unrealisation that is an effect of an insignificance they experience being physiognomically regenerated as an absence of meaning: this absence of meaning is constituted relationally via refusals of recognition and co-presence so that relational mediations are absent and individuals experience the absence of qualities born of experiences of being meaningfully constituted because they matter, interpersonally. That is they experience the absence arising from an insignificance that denudes individuals of access to an interpersonally disclosed fabric that constitutes capacities whose conditions require recognition and reciprocation, modalities rooted in parity. So, they experience an absence of qualities, via an absence of relational forms and experience space bereft of possibilities because they experience a lack of qualities that arise via presence positively constituted. Facing a barren world of unrealisation, they experience being
denuded of even the minimal forms of functionality available to the devalued, they feel they are changing, becoming less as an effect of experiencing the emergence of an objectivity moulded via such interpersonal processes so that their subjectivity aligns with a world whose references they imbibe disclosively, via physiognomically materialised forms they experience existing via, so that impugning injunctions violate and inhibit healthy development. This is why ostracism causes trauma because individuals are a developmental condition of our emergence into meaning and our appropriation of forms relates to relational processes that constitute our capacities. Being devalued limits, curtails, and causes anguish. Individuals experience being moulded via the impersonal aspects of demeanour which sediment meanings that become coopted via a presence which incorporates the sense of elements they impersonally incorporate as an effect of subjection to publicly disclosed forms of objectivity so that they experience the diminution of their way of being because devaluation takes place on a terrain of mutual disclosure that attacks the very seat of identity. Because meanings consist of configurations of behavioural forms that subtend what we intuit via experiencing their physiognomic materialisation, our capacity to appropriate forms, fluidly, appropriately, requires projections that protensionally sustain capacities arising via such modalities so that we require recognition and disclosure in order to sustain the confluence of a hold on being that renders us vulnerable to the tacit transactions, the informal sanctions, of the world. Competition erodes identity because it erodes the grounds of our embedding in being and nowhere is that more evident than in the university system, and other formal markets, as successive generations face a progressively more disembedded and dislocated experience. Excess competition subjects people to impugning forms which can, under certain circumstances, lead to complex post-traumatic stress disorder as the grounds of character-formation are eroded by a competition that mutilates individuals as they face a withdrawal from the social grounds of viability as an effect of excessive competition. Excess competition implies negation, it exposes individuals to the interpersonal constitution of imputations of inferiority that affect every area of existence. One can appreciate why Bourdieu suggests:

...many of the most intimate dramas, the deepest malaises, the most singular suffering that women and men can experience find their roots in the objective contradictions, constraints and double binds inscribed in the structures of the labor and housing markets, in the merciless sanctions of the school system, or in mechanisms of economic and social inheritance. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 201)

As someone else describes:

The labour market is too competitive nowadays. You know there was times when i really feel that i couldn't go through with all the stress of working and feeling alone anymore. i feel like giving up everything. many time i felt like im such a failure cos i didn't achieve anything real in life. I see my friends have good career and have own family, i felt very sad. I guess i just need to tell myself to stay strong. When I was in my twenties, my mum use to say, find good man who has a good job, have a big house, have a big car but now she only say, can you please bring whoever you want back home, let us meet him.

What this makes evident is a point that Bourdieu makes:
The pressure of the "reserve army", always strongly felt, is sometimes expressed explicitly...in vague, general judgements..."there are too many people"...In such a context, competition for work is the primary form of the struggle for life, a struggle which, for some, begins anew every morning and has no more rules than a game of chance. (Bourdieu 1979: 33-34)

Competition for work condemns individuals to an isolation that erodes their sense of worth. People’s lives emerge from a position whose sense determines possibilities available to them and individuals face a circumscription that is part of their actualisation in relation to forms whose objectivity constitute their experience of being. The over-mediation of access arising from the closure of public fields de-realises many who lack access to the interpersonal grounds constitutive of capacities born of appropriations of form relating to experiencing being realised in relation to contextualising, interpersonal, mediations, so that individuals end up lacking competencies as an effect of absences sustained via recognition of such absences, they can’t access the public grounds constitutive of the mimetic incorporation of capacities born of experiencing disclosures which constitute capacities appropriated via such processes so they end up unable to satisfy selection criteria that relate to ways of being that their objectivity precludes them from accessing. The social objectivity of these processes is an effect of the public fields which constitute access to the grounds of objectivities, differentially. As someone else describes the same condition, “It’s pointless if you don’t give someone a chance, if you don’t work, you don’t get experience you don’t develop. I send my CV off and I get nothing”. As someone explains their experience of the same conundrum:

I went to the interview, but I wasn’t employed. Maybe my experience is as poor as my age. The owner gave me other idea instead. That is opening my office by myself having loan....anyway weeped a little today thinking my job or life...dentist is hard work for me....Everyone asked me, what do you want in your life? But for me, almost nothing is my choice, I want to ask what is there about my choice? I wonder what means my life? I can agree if I will die tomorrow. I am not so lucky. Everyone needs opportunities, everyone needs experience, many, many kinds of experience, but you cannot get experience so you cannot learn or be good at different things, you cannot get new experiences to learn from and then they judge you that you do not have experience, you are too old for new experiences so you are trapped. They see your experience and you do not get a chance. I wonder what to do to start to get the experience when you cannot get a chance. I have to do something to work. It is like a train if it will be start then it is easy but if you cannot get onto the train you cannot go anywhere.

As labour market access becomes ever more mediated and the proliferation of credentials invalidate those whose trajectories are effaced by processes of objectification that utilise institutional space to constitute rare forms that nullify those without resources, people become trapped in an inability to help themselves arising from the constitution of a medium, publicly, whose signifying forms relate to ways of being-there that relate to interpersonal forms that are exclusive and, experiencing the structuring efficacy of a negation that constitutes the absence of the mediations required to satisfy intentional forms, they experience being unable to do anything, unable to act and executive function impairment is an essentialised effect of processes of valuation that dispropriate those without resources who are condemned to continue with the form of life available to them. These people have an intuitive grasp of a point that Heidegger makes, that ways of being are primarily non-cognitive, “knowing understood as apprehending has sense on the basis of
already-being-involved-with. This already-being-involved-with, in which knowing as such can first ‘live’, is not first ‘produced’ directly by a cognitive performance” (Heidegger 1992: 168). We are oriented via non-epistemic absorption in forms that constitute our engagement and our sphere of movement so that our capacities arise from moments which disclose the possibilities we appropriate via such processes. The forms via which we appropriate being arise from an absorption arising from disclosures which circumscribe ways of being that are materialized effects of being-situated in relation to others so that we sense possibilities via capacities rooted in absorption in disclosures which constitute the sense of the forms we grasp via being subject to such treatments so that we mimetically incorporate aspects which enable us to project via such moments so that we progressively incorporate forms whose recognition constitute the basis of capacities appropriated via being-there. Indeed, it is only via recognition that disclosures constitute the sense of forms that are, in turn, recognized as manifesting significant aspects via comportments that disclose such aspects. The way recognitions constitute objectivities reconstituted via recognitions that locate individuals spatially via a condition rearticulated via such processes is manifest in the following:

People don’t look at me and say “ohr yer’ve got skills”, thi don’t, thi look an se’ “yer’ve not done it before, yer too much of a risk”, an’ most jobs you could pick up in a couple’r weeks but yer can’t because yer’ve no chance. Ah look at ma mate who built his own ‘ouse an’ he can do that because hi’s not just got the skills but he knows people who can roof, hi knows people who can du ground work, Ah don’t know a single person who could make anythin’ because Ah went to college an’ did humanities, nob’d’y Ah know can mek anythin’, thi’ don’t do anything tangible. Nahr, to me, those jobs anybody could do. Ah cun’t bi brick layer or plumber in a fortnight but Ah could do a lot’r graduate jobs. But the other problem wi’ college route is, yer meet nob’d’y who ‘elps yer get ow’t, ma mate used t’ teach’ bricklayin’ an’ he used to allous ‘ave jobs on at weekends an’ he’d allous tek lads wi’ him t’ get job done, nahr, in what Ah did, yer get no opportunities. In what Ah did, yer can’t du ow’t, yer ‘ave t’ wait, then when yer finish yer then in position ‘r waitin’ an’ applyin’, yer just competin’ blind, yer stuck at ‘ome, yer can’t get aht t’ get into ow’t. So, all Ah get ova and ova is “yer’ve no skills”, yer never get t’ the point where yer given a chance t’ show what yer might do.

The reason "People don’t look at me and say “ohr yer’ve got skills”, thi don’t" is because there is a crisis of objectification arising from the way distinctions are constituted that negate sections of the population who find their credentials as worthless as the skills they acquire are unrecognised. The reason this is the case is because of the way competencies are perceived, their identity-conditions relate to the closures constitutive of the conditions which constitute intentional aspects that relate to involvements in rare forms that function as signifiers of competencies: in other words the recognitions which disclose the forms appropriated via being-subject to such aspects constitute ways of being realised that function as guarantors of social capacities that are effects of the actualisation of contextualisation: an awareness of intra-worldly aspects that are interpersonally disclosed as, simultaneously, ways of being and contextualising mediations, aspects that inhere in how individuals make the world for which they are disposed emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of existences corroborated via such mediations. Involvement, recognition, disclosure, contextualisation involve intra-worldly aspects whose physiognomic materialisation are part of the constitution of capacities for
reference that inhere in experiencing being-realised in relation to barriers whose sense individuals bear as an effect of the valuationary roots of such processes. The value of credentials is a function of the relationships of involvement constitutive of their objectivity, this is why the credentials of the valued arise from integration into contexts whose qualities are effects of relational disclosures which constitute properties appropriated via experiences of being subject to such processes. Valuationary processes constitute disclosures which involve individuals in ways of being arising via the recognition of differences, positively constituted, this is why the CVs of the devalued manifest an inability to elicit recognition and solicit contact which is a real dimension of the way they experience their objectivity being crystallised such that they experience inequalities that are effects of a lack of exposure to the interpersonal conditions constitutive of the fabric which ties individuals to the sense of forms they experience being physiognomically materialised via recognitions which disclose such intra-worldly aspects. The sense of absence described in the refrain of the negated, “th’s now’t the’er”, reverberating through minds constituted via the absence of possibilities which denude individuals of capacities for development rooted in participation in an interpersonal fabric constitutive of possession of experiences of potentiality realised via actualising moments that constitute a discovery of a sense whose physiognomic materialisation is the basis of development, refers to this effect of the way public and institutional space is materialised in relation to valuationary processes that render invisible the nature of what is occurring because of the very distances they exploit in order to sustain the dispossession of so many. Employers operate with a shrewd awareness of the ontological conditions of functionality which is why education separate from the doing of something is usually both characteristic of the devalued, whose dislocation allows them to be exploited, and worthless: those structurally dislocated, as an effect of their disembedding are often unable to perceive appropriate pathways because there is no mediation and the education they tend to be prey to merely reproduces exactly the same existential condition that they have turned to education to escape, with the same effects. Involvement is an effect of social value because institutional space is used to ensure objectivising and objectifying relational, developmental, processes for the elite and selection criteria privilege objectifying forms which are effects of recognition because these constitute modalities that inhere in belonging. So, what you have, continuously rearticulated across public space is the anonymous processing of the poor, whose CVs are bereft of objectifying experiences as an effect of the recognition of a difference whose sense is materialised via interpersonal processes that leave them bereft of the interpersonal coordinates of realities that are selectively constituted, and then the experience of the elite whose world is constituted via co-presence, recognition, disclosure and mediation, modalities that constitute human capacities rooted in experiences of being-there-with from which circumspective concern arises. The institutional grounds of objectifications are commanded by groups who exchange resources for symbolic forms whose meaning inhere in closures that constitute the sense of competencies arising from experiences of being objectivised via access to the sense of relational forms that constitute capacities that inhere in experiences of being-realised in relation to circumscriptions that disclose capacities that arise from being-able to perceive the sense of distinctions that inhere in being situated via such
mediations, or intra-worldly aspects. Even within educational institutions there are complex relational conditions to the constitution of the public identity of competencies that must be validated via processes of recognition which transmute social value into access to the interpersonal forms that constitute abilities to bear the sense of forms physiognomically regenerated via the practice of distinctions, informally, that constitute the legitimacy of such aspects. In such ways, the credentials of the poor are denuded of whatever value they ever had and the rare experiences constitutive of the recognised form of public competencies become ever more difficult to access. The recognition of competences, the constitution of their identity, involve complex processes of validation that are effaced as part of the charade whereby the appearance of ‘access’ is constituted. The identity conditions of competencies involve processes of validation that separate objectification from the institutional paraphernalia of ‘public’ education which becomes devalued by the institution of a range of distinctions which relate to the private appropriation of such public mediums with the clearly manifest effects that the ‘public’, the poor, are devalued. The contestation of public space via institutional processes that privilege private, over public, capital, invalidates the poor who find their credentials as worthless as their process of acquisition is meaningless. This is why those recognised undergo experiences of being subject to disclosures that elicit forms arising from the embedding of their perceptions in a horizon that is inseparable from a personal consecration that also directs their labour, affecting personal development and the sense born as an effect of interpersonally constitutive processes that disclose modalities arising from experiences of being realised in relation to such forms. Those consecrated experience the disclosure of forms that materialise the sense of aspects which constitute capacities that inhere in experiences of being-situated via such differences. Differences, the physiognomic materialisation of distinctions, constitute capacities rooted in embedding in the human communities that inscribe the possibility of their forms of life in the ways of being realised that are inscribed in the actualities of differences selectively constituted to enable some to experience the reality of actual capacities that inhere in intra-worldly aspects arising from the practice of a boundary that condemns others to malaise, antipathy, disorientation and confusion. As value becomes conditional, the poor find their ascent to the assurance of recognised forms of public existence ever more mediated, meaning that they endure a destructuring of their existence akin to other members of the unemployed. The problem is those suspended in the limbo of fake education are continuously judged for bearing the sense of experiences of being realised in relation to a negation that is an effect of the unrealisation arising from the absence of access to the public grounds of attributions of competence. A key indicator of fake education is that institutional agents who are themselves objectified via the relationships that students are forced to enter in order to attempt to mediate access to something relating to the field they are certifying in, cannot mediate access to any possibilities for experiences of being publicly realised in relation to the institutional grounds that constitute the objectified forms that, in the labour market, signify competence. This is why the education of the contemporary poor is enmired in the senselessness arising from the absence of any institutional grounding. Students sense the absurdity of a process whose senselessness arises from the fact that they do not access the interpersonal
grounds of intersubjective donations of significance relating to the fields they are financing via doing what they are. What is available does not count because it is generic and what its availability as a mass status does, is constitute the real sources of value that signify competence which grants control of selection to those who operationalise private networks that constitute the ‘public’ apparatus of objectification. This is why the elite undergo contextualisation and actualisation and the poor dislocation and unrealisation. When people complete degrees and can't get interviews, despite having done all they possibly could, it is an effect of the rearticulation of a valuationary process that signifies their value as an effect of processes of recognition that rearticulate primal class differences. The sense of forms arises from a constitutive intentionality rooted in aggregative processes of effaced accumulation that use economic divisions to materialise the appearance of the non-economic nature of processes whose institution must occlude the reality being materialised. This is why evasion and displacement are such key aspects of the mode of practice of agents who institute such distinctions. This is why the CVs, and experience of lower class students, are so indicative of the effaced grounds of competencies that inhere in the private use of 'public' institutions to constitute competencies whose identity conditions are exclusive. The absence of contact characteristic of the certification processes lower class people endure is symptomatic of the use of institutions to constitute the real grounds of competencies in relation to experiences of being-situated that are exclusive. The anonymity characteristic of processes that reduce to form-filling in order to secure institutional finances and in which there is only mediation over processes that reduce to assessment functions whose relational grounds materialise the appearance of processes bereft of co-presence arises from the real sources of value that such processes concern: the exchange of finances and the materialisation of the appearance of the sense of a process so that educationalists can experience the physiognomic materialisation of an experience of being competent extorted via the administrative relationships individuals are forced to enter in order to certify themselves. You have to be able to turn yourself into a perpetual source of income in order to function: you access the grounds of functionality via a capacity to function as a bearer of resources and then, if 'successful' in your procurement of awards that finance the administration of your labour, propositional forms that realise someone else in relation to significances they experience, relationally, being constituted via the relationship with you or else you cannot access anything because these are the conditions constitutive of value. In reality, contact is as minimal as its instrumentalised conditions and you have to be able to satisfy financial conditions in order to be able to constitute yourself: conversations with academics reduce, quickly, to discussions of income. In other words, access to the interpersonal fabric constitutive of competence is an effect of a use and a capacity to disclose forms that validate others. You are not introduced to a sphere of disclosure that constitutes capacities that inhere in belonging to such a sphere, you remain outside such conditions and must constitute yourself via a relational form that constitutes someone else. As a student, you are a source of self-descriptions for academics who experience, via you, being able to refer to aspects that are relationally constituted via the form of the relationship you have to enter in order to accede to a recognised objectivity, this is why you enter such relationships. The problem is that these
processes objectify and objectivise the academics involved: they are objectified via relationships that extort the sense of forms which legitimate processes whose illegitimacy is thereby obscured. The absence of authority and the bankruptcy of the assessments functions are manifest only via the victims who are de-legitimated via the extortions of the sense of an authority and legitimacy that belies the fraudulent nature of what is occurring. Sadly, the real mechanisms of legitimisation concern processes of objectivisation and objectification that are merely financed via such processes. Students cannot situate themselves so that they experience capacities for reference that inhere in ways of being whose relational conditions remain unavailable so how, when the value of credentials are conditional upon exclusive forms, can individuals constitute themselves when the modalities that subtend competence are unavailable? The absence of a sense of being competent and of opportunities to appropriate forms via experiences of a capacity to manifest them via experiencing the recognitions which constitute an assurance arising from their physiognomic materialisation, are key aspects of a devaluation that becomes crystallised via perceptions of difference that incribe the sense of the difference in different ways of being-there that, over time, render such differences recognisable because such processes constitute their objectivity, their, sense-relational, grounds. Experiences of being-subject to circumscriptions that, physiognomically materialised, constitute embodied, or non-representational, forms of intentionality that arise as positioning inscribed via expressivities whose reference inhere in the sense of a flesh whose spirit is an effect of existential parameters experienced via being subject to such aspects, resolve the division between essence and existence. Existence constitutes essence, essence becomes realised via the medium of existing in relation to possibilities whose actualisation are key aspects of social reality. As credentials become devalued by their sale, they signify nothing because their significance arises from a sense of properties which are effects of background which means that perceptions of qualities reduce to the relations of involvement that subtend the attribution of intentional aspects which mean that the devalued will find it difficult to access any of the interpersonal grounds constitutive of attributions of intentional states which their form of life precludes. This, indeed, mirrors how they are perceived within a university hierarchy informed by practical awareness of expressive forms mis-perceived as personal which are, in fact, effects of materialisations of form physiognomically regenerated via the class relationships that subtend public life and the forms of existence individuals experience being materialised via a social fabric suffuse with perceptions which elicit forms constituted via such processes. Without access to the grounds of properties how can individuals accede to the circumscriptions, the disclosures, which constitute an experience of being-able to exhibit such forms such that individuals become possessed of a certainty arising from the assurance of actualisation, an experience of being-able, because one experiences aspects rooted in their physiognomic materialisation? Without access to the conditions which satisfy the attribution of intentional aspects, to oneself, via relational processes involving others, how can the identity of such forms be perceived, by individuals who endure this malaise as well as by potential employers? The perception of intelligence, like other properties, reduces to the grounds of the production of the institutional forms which signify such aspects and this carries us toward a terrain in which income-inequalities
determine access to the interpersonal grounds of such forms. Closures allow for the simultaneous materialisation of the appearance of competence via relational forms that objectify, without requiring much by way of time or effort, with such abstracted administrative mediations requiring little resources. There is, for example, no real context many students access, and no other resources that they access, and this allows for the maximisation of capital accumulated, economic and symbolic, as well as for a monopolisation of the relational processes that constitute the appearance of competence because an individual's processing requires very little outlay of time or effort. Whilst such relational processes allow for the extortion of the sense of a competence via relational forms that constitute capacities that inhere in the administered judgement and classification of students, if you are on benefits whilst this is occurring in what way does it resignify you? Students are judged without access to the grounds of forms which might constitute a sense of properties whose conditions of satisfaction are relationships they cannot access because they are the source of valuationary transactions, functioning as narcissistic enablers of those who associate their names with the administration of the products of their labour so as to materialise the appearance of an educational process. The impersonal, anonymity of the educational processes that lower class students undergo are akin to the bureaucratised relationships with other state agencies that characterise their class experience: they lack access to spheres of actualisation because their education is, usually, a means for the extortion of a sense of value without them accessing the grounds of attributions of competence, which is why unemployment following PhDs is revealing of the real objectivity of their process. The fact people who have achieved minor miracles come face to face with an objectivity whose materialisation constitutes them publicly, after they have functioned as resources for institutional agents, is extremely revealing of the modes of closure that constitute academic capital. The absence of involvement is a mark of relational forms that extort the sense of a process via relationships that validate and objectify those who materialise the appearance of an employment function via excluding individuals so that they are forced to secure financing to 'access' relational processes that provide little opportunity for, either, learning, or development, because the student has to function as a foil for the actualisation of the academics who materialise the appearance of their function via the association of their names with the administered judgement of the products of their labour. This is why you are not involved as a postgraduate student; you are a source of income and that is manifest by the absence of any process which shows you are being used purely as medium of the objectification of the personnel who materialise the appearance of their public function and experience functionality via such relational processes. Really, the issue is development, you need to be realised so that you can develop appropriately and that would occur if you were involved and it is only because involvement cannot be constituted, because there isn't anything there for people to be involved in, that we can support all this fake education which involves very little beyond abstracted administrative processes that disclose the interpersonal grounds constitutive of the competence of institutional agents who experience collective forms of intentionality arising from involvement in such mediations whereas the supposed beneficiaries of the process access nothing but the problem of producing the required forms. The problem with expensive self-certification is that it operates via an institutional
bifurcation based in the social distances the process reproduces, forcing the
dislocated to do the impossible: arrive at a competence without involvement in any
context eliciting such modalities and, even if the individual manages this feat of
summoning something from nothing beyond their own labour, it is unlikely to be
publicly recognised because what matters are employment-related relationships
which reproduce a division that education is used to efface, between the employed
and the reclassified unemployed. The absence of contact is a manifestation of the
absence of mediation which means the devalued are denuded of access to
mediations that constitute capacities whose interpersonal conditions of satisfaction
remain unavailable leaving them with a sense of inability that is an essentialised
aspect of public identities physiognomically regenerated via such processes. People
become paralysed by the way their objectivity constitutes an absence that is
reconstituted via the non-mediation and unrealisation of being negatively perceived
so that they exist outside of the fabric constitutive of ways of being-there arising
from disclosures which circumscribe aspects perceived via being subject to such
modalities as physiognomically materialised ways of being-there. The negated exist
only insofar as they can function as an objectifying medium for others who
narcissistically realise a sense of their own commitments via relationships with them
that preclude contextualisation because mediations and objectifications are
asymmetrical, value is extorted without anyone experiencing being enabled. When
individuals are not involved, it is not merely that they experience the reproduction of
an objectivity that will continue such a state of affairs but also that they undergo the
physiognomic materialisation of a sense of inability that is a real effect of
experiencing being-situated via disclosures that enmire them in such an experience.
The interpersonal terrain of qualities, or social properties, that individuals
experience being available to them is a key stake of institutional processes that must
provide access to particular categories of individuals to distinguishing forms so that
individuals can appropriate an experience whose conditions they experience being
satisfied via recognitions which constitute such possibilities as aspects of their being
for-others. One can appreciate why Bourdieu says:

To account more fully for the differences in lifestyle between the different fractions -- especially
as regards culture -- one would have to take account of their distribution in a socially ranked
geographic space. A group's chances of appropriating any given class of rare assets...depend
partly on its capacity for the specific appropriation, defined by the economic, cultural and social
capital it can deploy in order to appropriate materially or symbolically the assets in question, that
is, its position in social space, and partly on the relationship between its distribution in
geographical space and the distribution of the scarce assets in that space. (Bourdieu 1984: 124)

The capacity for the specific appropriation of assets mediated via ways of being
which require a recognition that discloses the availability of modalities, or personal
qualities, that ensure a right to access the conditions which satisfy the attribution of
the properties concerned so that the individual experiences realisations that
constitute such modalities are key existential stakes determining the very qualities
experienced via being-there and these are key stakes of an economic competition
that must be instituted legitimately, that is, through interpersonal processes that
appear to personalise such issues. A one-to-one educational process devoid of
access to anything beyond the problem of financing the administration of one's
production embedded in social distances, born of valences of capital that become transmuted into differences of competence arising from different ways of being-situated is a perfect mechanism to achieve such outcomes. It is all distances and the relational extortition of the sense of a process where not even a real relationship exists that might disclose validating forms relating to ways of being-situated so that individuals can experience being-perceived in relation to forms elicited via the interpersonal grounds constitutive of the contextualisation their way-of-being arises from. The devalued are weakly socially integrated as an effect of distances which physiognomically regenerate the interpersonal basis of such processes and their lack of integration is a manifestative aspect of differences of treatment that physiognomically regenerate a sense of inability that is an effect of experiencing different intra-worldly aspects arising from differences in contextualisation. The absence of contact characteristic of lower-class people's education is a manifestation of their insignificance, they exist only as effects of an institutional apparatus that can be instituted via little effort and the automation of processes that reduce to the appearance of administrative protocols indicate their existence as foils for the materialisation of the sense of forms that objectify others. The extortion of the sense of forms is part of the constitution of differences as aspects of the extortion of resources as the resource-less experience the reproduction of inabilities that are effects of their envelopment by objectivities immanent to the space of positions which render them subject to such processes. The sense of worthlessness immanent to experiences of being worthless materialises differences of objectivity that reproduce the grounds of such differences so that deficits are merely reinflected via the processes supposed to address them. The lack of value of students' production is merely an effect of a dislocation that much educationalism exploits while perpetuating. Whilst individuals are forced to secure financing outside of conditions of access to forms of practice that legitimate educationalists, how can a process that sustains an effaced divide between the employed and unemployed address forms of objectivity that such distinctions merely perpetuate? This is why, for the poor, the process feels the same as unemployment because attributions of competence are never forthcoming because what constitutes the appearance of competence are the administrative relationships that materialise the appearance of a process out of bureaucratised acts of classification, and judgement, that require little labour and which fail to situate students, perpetuating the sense of a division, symbolically accentuated via the garnering of value via association surrounding the administration of student labour that materialise the appearance of a process. It is noteworthy that when you get your PhD, the identity of your competence is unclear because your labour has not arisen from involvement in a sphere of relationships that might direct labour and disclose form so the devalued undergo non-objectification and non-objectivisation. There are not merely differences in classification and objectivity being constituted but different expressive modalities incorporated via ways of being-there, different ways of being treated, institutionally, that durably inscribe a sense of differences that, continuously perceived, are physiognomically regenerated so that individuals continue to bear the sense of differences they experience being reconstituted via the way they experience being circumscribed, institutionally, via institutional processes that must constitute the appearance of a 'public' system that, in reality, serves particular cliques, the 'publics'
using institutional space to constitute products and consumers of them under the guise of a public function. What you have is deskilling, because of excessive competition, that keeps wages low and sustains the financial institutions loaning students money for 'education', as opposed to claiming benefits, so that, excessive competition serves complex economic functions, empowering the beneficiaries of a devaluation they ensure because it strengthens the cultural and institutional mechanisms of control over the space of positions. The problem is, without position, without the relations of involvement that interpersonally disclose the sense of forms appropriated via subjection to such modalities, individuals experience a meaninglessness and incapacity that is an effect of the conditional nature of attributions of significance that validate credentials. In other words, are credentials, credentials in all cases? If their conditions of validation are private, so that their real function and significance, their identity conditions, are only conditionally disclosed, then are they real?

**Negation and demoralisation**

Looking at one post, they ask for evidence of a "broad academic and/or professional experience in sociology"; another asks for, evidence of "Participation in University/Department/Thesis Committee", yet, this, of a discipline that involves almost no contact or involvement, as the following make clear:

> From my experience, there are far too many PhD students coming through, with at least 10 people per job, most of which go to people in the networks...The contact time on the PhD is so poor. I have become quite numb to how bad it is in the last couple of years. In social science departments like these 'work' is like a mirage.

As someone described the effects of the asocial nature of the anonymous competition characteristic of postgraduate 'education':

> This Phd is selfish and time consuming, I’ve undeveloped so much of myself: it’s fuckin’ asocial, it’s de-socialising, de-humanising, it makes you realize why academics are so fucking shallow...everything just goes, just disappears. I spend so much time just fuckin’ abo’ot aimlessly, fiddlin’ wi’ ma text, it’s so competitive, I don’t talk to anyone in the department ‘cos they’re all off working on their own sectarian realities an’ I’m tranna compete from a bedroom in ma parents hoose.

It is because our experience of being requires an interactive coexistence that grounds a process of synchronisation in which individuals undergo a process of ontic convergence as they experience intersubjective donations of sense as part of existential reciprocations that constitute capacities retained via a perpetual transmutation whose disclosure constitute a projection that physiognomically materialises an experience of capacity arising from intervolving interpenetrations that materialise properties that arise from a process of becoming, that negation produces such a destructuring sense of loss, as the absence of the grounds required to experience possibilities, and appropriate forms, is unavailable, and individuals endure a reduction that assaults the very basis of their humanity. It is because individuals concede aspects of their sovereignty via experiences of being subject to allusions which deny them access to the human fabric constitutive of being-able-to
experience a medium whose cognitive effects are only too clear, that inequalities born of valuationary processes constituted via such mediations, have such devastating effects and why identity erosion is a natural effect of inequalities whose sense mediation constitute the public fabric in relation to which individuals experience being. Without the existential reciprocation of interactive coexistence, without the convergence of synchronous aspects rooted in co-presence, there isn't access to formative interpenetrations that ground development in self-qualifying mediations that absorb the individual in moments that continuously supersede one another so that an assurance arises as an effect of experiences of developmental mediations rooted in the sharing of aspects via which the world for which individuals are disposed is made to emerge around them as the reciprocal completion of an existence that is a constitutive aspect of this process. It is important to note that these modalities arise from co-presence, from experiences of recognition that disclose a fabric whose physiognomic materialisation constitutes forms that realise individuals in relation to absorption in meanings experienced via the realisation of the superseding forms. Actualisation is a constitutive aspect of statuses that have effects on expressivity, those realised, even in repose, project via habituation to a world they are assured of being-there for-them whereas the devalued face the uncertainty of attenuated forms of abstracted mediation devoid of realisation so that their expressivity is haunted by a negation that is an effect of the contestation that characterises public space. Without access to a shared sphere, without a sense of being-in-a world, individuals experience a loss that refers to the absence of a medium that is an aspect of valuationary processes that impoverish those who experience the personalised absence of aspects that arise from association and collectivity, from recognitions which disclose modalities, conditions, which make available intentional forms arising from such processes. Capacity involves adaptation, which presumes a condition of perpetual transmutation that arises from a state of interactive coexistence that involves the individual in a reciprocally disclosed fabric of interpenetrations that materialise properties that are appropriated via a process of their continuous superseding of one another creating a process of convergence arising from reciprocities that disclose such possibilities so that the sense arising via being subject to such modalities constitutes an experience of capacity arising from realisations whose disclosure ensure the successful projection characteristic of actualisation. Recognition is a key modality that subtends processes that subtend capacities to appropriate forms that arise from being subject to attentions that realise individuals in relation to representational forms of intentionality that require such conditions to be satisfied in order for individuals to accede to such possibilities. Devaluation affects the physiognomically materialised substrate that subtends meanings and inhibits self-regulation, precluding cognitive states based in collectivity. The devalued face a world, interpersonally, in which fundamental conditions relating to the forms of their existence in the world are affected, constituting absences that affect the form of their life. Identity erosion is a key aspect of asymmetrical relational processes that extort significances via ways of being physiognomically materialised via such processes. Clearly education rooted in divisions that the bureaucratised processes merely transfigure into differences in value, has devastating effects on those impoverished by their own devaluation, "I don't talk to anyone in the department
‘cos they’re all off working on their own sectarian realities an’ I’m tranna compete from a bedroom in ma parents hoose”. We see, again, the parameters of privatisation, individuation and isolation that seem to constitute the horizon within which lower class people experience education. Once you understand the way relational forms are sources of valuation then you can understand why universities are so toxic for lower class people and why their processes are not merely exploitative but dehumanising. People face the interminable problem that confronts the unemployed: how do you constitute yourself as subject to modalities whose grounds are unavailable? How do you accede to potentialities whose grounds remain unavailable? Simply, how do you acquire competencies from such conditions? When individuals must project from such conditions, without mediation, how can they project? How can they develop projects from such conditions that might have some public significance? It is not hard to see why the localised projects lower class people are forced to produce in order to attempt to turn their labour into institutional income, and sources of validation for the educationalists who associate their names with the administration of their production, fail, and so many complete PhDs to merely assume a classification that was effaced via their process, their repressed conditions of existence, surreptitiously reproduced via the distances that subtend the refraction of the appearance of a process. The way non-contextualisation affects capacities is articulated in the following:

I don’t have any motivation to carry on. The PhD is so shitty. I am now completely isolated, when I meet other research students, it’s like once or twice every two months. It’s just competition. What can I do, get up and read things over the net? In the department there are one hundred and twenty PhD students, I don’t think any of us can contribute anything because we don’t have funding. We don’t access anything. All we can do is interview some random people online, what can we do? Just try to find some way to write and submit the thesis. How can you contribute when the academics themselves have research grants and we are trying to do what we can to get the thesis done?

A mode of practice is forced on students, not through actualisation in relation to disclosures that relate to ways of being contextualised, but out of the absence of any mediations on the part of staff who force parameters of existence on people who are forced to invent themselves using whatever private resources they can use to embellish their own labour and this is where the problems arise because, while academics are objectified via such processes, which reduce students to a mode of existence as a functional prop for the elaboration of character, students become objectified via the impoverished parameters that constitute the form of their labour so that the devalued become perceived via the discrepant, and peripheral, nature of the work they do and via an expressive physiognomy rooted in the unrealisation of the negation that they endure. The student merely incorporates the basis of a negative disposition towards a system that reduces them to inactivity. The purposeless futility that is an effect of the uninvolvement arising from the absence of any mediation characteristic of the redundant labour of those who have no context eliciting the form of their work, is manifest by the words, "What can I do, get up and read things over the net?" Bourdieu speaks of the "The empty time that has to be 'killed'" that is "opposed to the...well-filled...time of the 'busy' person who, as we
say, does not notice time passing—whereas paradoxically, powerlessness, which breaks the relation of immersion in the imminent, makes one conscious of the passage of time, as when waiting" (Bourdieu 2000: 225) and comments that the invisibility of this state is "one of the most constant effects of the scholastic illusion, the bracketing of time—itself correlative with the tendency to transform the privation linked to exclusion from the world of practice into a cognitive privilege, with the myth of the 'impartial spectator'...exclusive beneficiaries of access to the point of view on points of view which opens perspectives on the game as a game" (Bourdieu 2000: 224), maybe because, as the testimony clearly shows, part of the academic retreat that the scholastic point of view entails involves a complete absence of contact or involvement of even those who 'enter' academic spaces as postgraduate students. The absence of access to any constitutive, day-to-day involvements, that might function as a disclosive medium, access to the relational basis of an "objective universe of incitements and indications which orientate and stimulate action and, through it, social life" (Bourdieu 2000: 223) is only too apparent, "The PhD is so shitty. I am now completely isolated, when I meet other research students, it’s like once or twice every two months". The scholastic point of view entails insensitivity to a range of human phenomena because their existence precludes exposure to their interpersonal grounds, particularly to their expressive human traces that ought to constitute the very basis of the orientational content constitutive of the academic field. The extent of a powerlessness that curtails the power to materialise the appearance of an educational process itself, is manifest by the question, "What can I do, get up and read things over the net?" The absence of embedding belies the lack of opportunity that characterises the experience, "It’s just competition". The objective truth is intuited via such grounds, "I don’t think any of us can contribute anything" and the identity of the competence arising from such conditions becomes the problem when individuals face the labour market upon graduation: the real coup is to control access to the conditions of attribution of competencies: the identity of competencies reduce to relational conditions, to networked operations that disclose the forms constitutive of experiences of being capable of intuiting forms because one experiences being responsively actualised via them. The problem of mediating access itself reduces to the recognition of the forms they incorporate via the absence of mediation constitutive of their way of being, so that they incorporate negative dispositions via the unrealisation arising from an insignificance that is an effect of the lack of any consequential sphere of application that might validate them. Without mediation, without connection, there isn’t, actually, anything students can really do except wait and hope that they might, somehow, elicit recognition and solicit contact and finally transcend a condition defined by the absence of the significances required to count. The significance constitutive of the insignificance of such students arises from a process that can be used to materialise the appearance of a value-constitutive aspects where nothing is really being provided. Without embedding, the processes are indeterminate and hence recognition of competence becomes a key problem. Applying for a post, I was told, "your graduate degrees are not in the discipline of sociology, specifically. That is why you do not qualify. Candidate graduate degrees must be in sociology specifically" or as another institution put it: "Your application for the full time sociology instructor recruitment at Moorpark College was disqualified because the
degree in Social and Political Theory is not an exact match with the degrees shown in the minimum qualifications section on the job posting and the document you submitted did not appear to be a transcript and did not show any course work for the degree”. Can individuals be blamed for the nomenclature of disciplinary fields they procure their degrees via and can they be blamed for the form of their educational process? Clearly, what counts are forms of objectivity that are institutionally grounded and when the educational process available doesn't involve involvement then individuals are not objectified, credentials do not function and the whole process they undergo is bankrupt. In a discipline as fragmentary as sociology is, in which syllabi are composed of fragments taken from adjacent fields, how are determinations of competence made? What is worse, is that students are forced to generate their own projects, from outside of any context that might disclose required forms, and then, having used such forms to finance the administration of the products of their labour in order to certify themselves, they are judged in relation to grounds whose criteria arise from involvement in the private networks that constitute access to the relevant modes of representation so that representational apparatus mask differences of status arising from the forms of organisation that transpose the relationships constitutive of the sense inscribed via involvement into what appear to be differences of objectivity. The poor remain enmired in the same problems concerned with their signification via a sense of absence rooted in a dislocation arising from their insignificance and the institutions they have turned to, provide nothing, thereby regenerating a sense of absence that arises from the fundamental grounds constitutive of perceptions of competence: class. As credentials proliferate, their validity becomes questionable because the real grounds of their identity are eroded, making manifest the real basis of attributions of competence: the recognitions which interpersonally constitute some as viable via experiences of being situated that disclose the medium via which they accede to such aspects so that they become capable of intuiting aspects that inhere in a fabric arising from being privy to the involvements that disclose such modalities. What you realise is that the conditions of attribution of the competence are so indeterminate that, when you 'qualify', nobody can perceive your competence. The problem is that my postgraduate degree certificates and official transcripts do not indicate any disciplinary field, they merely certify a degree and institution. This raises a significant issue about how their significance are constituted. How, via what processes, is the identity of competence publicly established? If the degrees and the transcripts do not make explicit the competence, what are the identity-conditions for the attribution of the competence? This is not surprising when my postgraduate degrees involved no pedagogic aspect. Clearly, the identity of the competence arises from a capacity to elicit recognition and, thereby, to solicit contact so that you can be subject to exclusive relational forms that constitute capacities arising from the disclosure of a horizon that constitutes capacities to intuit
forms because you experience being realized in relation to a medium whose forms
physiognomically materialize capacities for reference that inhere in being-able-to-
perceive intra-worldly aspects because you experience their circumstantial forms.
Moreover, what we see is that concerns about the legitimacy of symbolic forms
affect those who are de-legitimated by the processes that constitute legitimate
forms. These are the effects of distances transposed into significances via
differences in mediation, or involvement. The elite undergo processes of direct
mediation and involvement that result in unambiguous certitude in relation to their
significance and the devalued undergo abstracted mediations rooted in the
attenuation arising from distances whose sense becomes transfigured via such
modalities into doubts over their significance, questions over their competence.
What we, also, see is how there is the perpetuation of an anonymity that envelopes
individuals in the cloaking effects of devaluation: there is no break-through to
solicitude or compassion, no attempt to mediate relational forms that might
authenticate the excluded: and this is precisely the medium constitutive of their de-
legitimation. There is no attempt to help an individual, on any institutions part, to
establish the reason for these problems in signification. Significance is an effect of
relations of involvement from which the significance of forms arise. Clearly, it makes
sense for those who lack the significance to elicit recognition and solicit contact to
experience the senselessness of educational processes that reduce to abstracted
administrative mediations that materialize the appearance of functions out-of-
nothing beyond the dislocated labour of people whose insignificance is merely
reconstituted as an absence of competence born of an inability to validate
themselves that is an effect of processes of de-legitimation at the heart of
institutional struggles over valuation. It becomes like an insurmountable problem,
which is what institutional corruption produces, those in need of objectification find
what is available to them undermined by the private use of ‘public’ institutions to
procure resources via relational forms that invalidate the forms available whose
significance arise from differences surreptitiously reproduced via institutions
appropriated via particular aggregates who are able to pursue complex strategies
that efface the reality and render it legible only via its effects. When the grounds of
validation of credentials are being undermined by the public processes that
constitute their procurement, what can individuals, whose process arises from the
anonymity that occludes the real processes that legitimate some, do? If the official
transcripts from the university registry do not validate the authenticity of a
candidate and if the individual has never elicited the engagements that constitute
publicly manifest characteristics whose sense are inscribed via existing in relation to
such aspects, what can they do? Little wonder insecurity and inability engulf those
who endure such conditions, the disarray and malaise characteristic of the devalued
who face ignominious lives bereft of the embedding of engagements which
constitute recognised forms of existence. If all that is available to an individual is to
procure resources in order to pay for the administration of products they must teach
themselves to produce, it is not surprising that the credentials have no value. In
reality, their reference has to be constituted via involvements that are
surreptitiously, institutionally, materialised that constitute the identities of
competencies as aspects of statutory attributions that arise from recognitions which
involve those recognized in meaningful ways of being-realised so that they accede to
recognized forms of existence inscribed in differences that recede into the relations that constitute the referential basis that constitutes such significances. Clearly, validation arises, like the qualities individuals experience being manifest aspects elicited via recognitions which disclose such modalities, from relationships that make available such aspects as statutory attributions arising from recognition of qualities which are sedimentations of meanings incorporated via experiences of being subject to such processes. The problem is, for those who can't elicit recognition nor solicit contact, how can they be-perceived to manifest aspects whose attribution inhere in states that they don't experience being constituted? Moreover, if they don't experience aspects elicited via recognitions which disclose such forms, how can they develop via a projection that allows for the retention of aspects which relate to the sequential, and temporally sustained, disclosure of forms that relate to an embedding that constitutes the identity of complex forms? Clearly, the attribution of competence relates to ways of being arising from contextualizing mediations, from experience of being-there that arise from a 'there' that arises from capacities to elicit recognition, and solicit contact, that constitute an experience of presence arising from such processes. The attribution of competence, therefore, arises from embedding in networks that allow for the public constitution of forms that objectivise some via distinctions based on the effacement of others. Meanings are constituted, interpersonally, via closures that render legible forms arising from involvements that physiognomically materialize such actualities so that the mode of closure constitutive of presence discloses the sense of forms appropriated via experiences of being subject to such modalities. Presence is infused with the sense of forms physiognomically regenerated as aspects of experiences of being subject to distinctions which affect how one exists, spatially, as an effect of forms that elicit judgements whose sense inhere in ways of being-perceived arising from experiencing the physiognomic materiality of aspects that inhere in ways-of-being situated via such processes. Closures constitute a circumscribed realm of legitimate encounter via disclosures of form that constitute an actual experience of being-there, of being privy to involvement in realisations that constitute capacities for reference, arising from ways of being situated in relation to a horizon whose disclosure constitute capacities for reference that inhere in abilities to perceive intra-worldly aspects that arise from the disclosure of circumstantial forms that materialize the sense appropriated via experiences of being subject to such modalities. The positioning of the devalued outside of networks that disclose possibilities that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in different forms of actualization, constitutes the disorientation and inability to refer, adequately or appropriately, to institutional-interpersonal processes mystified by an opacity that is an effect of modes of closure that legitimate some whilst obscuring processes of invalidation that concern public culture. The definitive nature of a judgement like "your graduate degrees are not in the discipline of sociology, specifically", belies the problem of disciplinary forms that exploit ambiguity to occlude processes of determination that concern processes of attribution arising from the identification of competence via closures that concern the generation of forms of competence that inhere in ways of being perceived that concern involvement in worlds constituted from differences that make explicit only the negation of the devalued via a boundary that constitutes those with income as the measure of all things because they
constitute the institutional power to determine the order of things. Meaning bearing components are concurrent with, that is, they ontologically coincide with, experiences of being realized in relation to disclosure that constitute aspects of being-there, of being in an environment as a component of its constitution which is why application forms like those of the University of Southampton ask for evidence of "Professional Development or Training Courses" and "Professional Membership/Registration" as well asking applicants to describe "your research experience, in particular detail your experience of qualitative data collection" and, further, "how do you ensure you work effectively as a team", which require reference to forms of realisation that manifest intentional aspects arising relationally that are concurrent with, and ontologically coincide with, the forms of realisation that constitute such aspects which is why the order of things is so discriminatory because the education available to the poor does not involve these modalities. Application forms require individuals to be capable of describing themselves as subject to forms of involvement that constitute meanings, intentions in action, that are concurrent with experiences of being realised in relation to such aspects and yet the process available to lower class people doesn't involve these modalities which means that they have problems representing themselves because they do not experience being constituted in relation to representational forms of intentionality and so cannot manifest the effects of inscriptions of meaning-bearing aspects that inhere in involvement in aspects that constitute ways of being situated from which the sense of realities, and of capacities arising from such modalities, arise. Southampton University posted an advert asking for a "qualitative researcher" then, the first question was 'Do you have detailed understanding and knowledge of qualitative research design and conduct?' Then, the second question was: 'Do you have experience of conducting qualitative interviews with patients and/or health professionals?' What these criteria do is completely erase any possible significance that the typed education I endured might have. In order to satisfactorily answer the second question you would have to have been involved in carrying our research as part of some kind of employment function because you would never, otherwise, have been able to access the institutional agents and this would have required some kind of officialisation via a network and the dignifying of your work via employment otherwise you would never ever be able to access the health professionals. I have, during the course of my own work, tried to contact local doctors surgeries only to be ignored. Unless your PhD was employment-related you would never be able to access any public fields. This is one of the key barriers that lower class people face in the development of their PhD projects because they have to develop a project from outside of any involvement in anything, which is why so many of the PhDs of lower class people concern the purely privatised sphere they are condemned to inhabit because they aren't institutionally embedded and this, in turn, renders their production insignificant because of the distinctions that subtend the nature of the educational process available to them. Even with a PhD the second question will eliminate most lower class people who purchase a PhD in the UK system of self-financed, self-certification. Again, the objectivity relates to its public grounding, not to certification. The certification does not objectify you, the institutional embedding does. Yet most lower class people go through educational processes that cannot embed them at all and their certificates are, consequently, worthless. Southampton
University advertised a post for a "Research Fellow - Sociology Social Policy & Criminology", thinking it was unusual to see any jobs with the words "Sociology" in the title, I tried to apply, the first question I faced was, "Have you completed or currently working towards a PhD or equivalent experience in Criminology, Psychology, Social Work, Social Policy, Law, or a related subject?" So, what we see is that the identity of the competence is further differentiated by modifiers that, appear, to preclude Sociology. This raises interesting questions about the status of sociological competence. Why, for example, is the competence identified via "Criminology, Psychology, Social Work, Social Policy, Law, or a related subject"? Why not Sociology? What this arises from is the way "Sociology" is used by educationalists who constitute their own academic and social capital via closures concerned with elements, or sub-fields, sub-specialisms which are so fragmentary that the conditions of attribution of the competence arise from closures that constitute the real conditions via which attributions of competence are made. Really, if you do a PhD in Sociology, you are qualified in nothing because, at the end, unless you belong to these value-instituting fields, your credential will not be validated because your competence will not be recognised. When you go through departments of social and political science, as I did, how is your competence determined? How, given the ambiguity of such criteria, can candidates be selected? Each area is divided and the divisions relate to forms of institutional practice so that the recognition of competence reduces to issues concerning the social value of candidates which reduces to their institutional objectification, their embedding. In other words, selection criteria relate to precisely what education involves the least for lower class people: constant and involvement in institutional-relational forms that constitute recognised forms of objectivity. When your labour is not grounded in anything institutionally and you are merely struggling to labour to get one state bureaucracy to finance another so that you accede to a certificate that has constituted the social magic of exchanging income for paper, then money is really being made out of thin-air, the trick of making something out of nothing has been managed by excluding people so that they are forced to struggle to attempt to accede to statuses that are perpetually denied so that they are forced to pay for 'access' to such processes. The reality is manifest in the judgements that potential employers make, the difficulties they have in ascertaining competence, tell us something deeply significant about the relation between credentials and the clientele universities serve. The recognition of inability manifest by the perception of the failure of my postgraduate degrees to signify me as competent is, therefore, a natural effect of the meaning arising from being subject to closures that constitute such differences. Closures inscribe recognition via the sense of the boundary whose practice ensures the exclusivity of the meaning experienced via being subject to involvements which disclose a horizon appropriated via being situated in such ways, whereas, clearly, the indeterminacy of the sense of the credentials acquired via lower class students is an effect of the grounds of disclosures which constitute objectivities born of an indeterminacy that is part of the malaise of the dislocation that constitutes the disorientation arising from the absence of embedding of educational processes that require the poor to turn themselves into institutional resources to acquire a viability as spurious as their credentials are invalidated by the absence of involvement arising from the distances inscribed in the sense arising from
such conditions. Given that attributions of competence arise from recognitions of modalities that tend to be unavailable to the devalued, we begin to see how difficult access to objectifying forms actually is. When forms of value are generated via relationships instantiated via exclusivity, the resistance to contact is difficult to underestimate. Moreover, when what really counts is experience arising from involvement in the labour market, and when access to the labour market is mediated via such processes, we see how difficult it is for those from distant regions to accede to recognised forms of existence. The identification of competence arises from the grounds constitutive of its institutional signification: relational grounds that circumscribe spheres of legitimate encounter via the use of space to constitute differences whose sense are inscribed via relational processes arising from the recognitions which disclose such forms and without access to the consecratory mechanisms of legitimation that use a public paraphernalia of objectification to produce such distinctions, as aspects of the reality individuals experience being situated in relation to, credentials are not signified, not validated, and they occupy a neutral status arising from the production of negation that constitutes the sense of absence that haunts the experience of lower class people. It is because the identity of competencies arise from closures that embed some in circumscribed spheres of legitimate encounter that constitute aspects of the world that orient them in relation to the forms that subtend significances arising from experiences of being realized in such ways that the devalued, spatially distant as an effect of the recognitions which instantiate such aspects, appear constituted via an absence, the identity of their competence as uncertain as the processes whereby they accede to the credentials available to them were ambiguous. This is because of the way objectivities arise from valuationary processes constituted via closures that inscribe the sense of such aspects concurrently so that meaning-bearing components are materialized that subject individuals to the sense of forms they experience being physiognomically regenerated via subjection to the recognitions which disclose such aspects so that individuals experience being able-to-bear the
sense of forms whose existence relate to institutionally private relationships that publicly objectify participants. The credentials appear to have little signifying power as an effect of the institutional, 'public', processes that constitute their significance and, in worthless subjects, usually those with an excess of lower class students required to guarantee the economic viability of the apparatus producing the real objectifications via private use of 'public' institutions, whose presence threatens nobody because they are a source of resources without ever being able to contest them, the processes only validate the employees who are objectified via assessment functions that require little labour. On the two PhDs I have done, there was nobody involved who had any authority and it is unsurprising that I was not, consequentially, validated and remained in the condition my reclassification had repressed without changing, yet the academics who assess are objectified via processes that involve almost no labour for them. Validation is an effect of involvement and involvement bequeaths access to the relational processes that constitute an ability to appear competent as an effect of appropriations of form rooted in experiencing disclosures rooted in associations surrounding the administrative acts that materialise the appearance of processes that consist of nothing beyond self-financed, self-education and an assessment function whose appearance is materialised via such processes. The attribution of competence is ambiguous because the identity of competencies relate to closures that constitute objectivities and mass higher education merely provides more resources for the social groups able to objectify themselves via appropriations of space made possible via such policies. Trying to apply for a post, I received the following:

After careful consideration, we regret to inform you that we won't be progressing your application to work with us any further. Academic Minds prides itself on hiring the very best writers and researchers, many of whom have studied at Russell Group institutions and other globally-recognised universities. Unfortunately, your current credentials don't match those required for our currently available posts. We would like to thank you for your interest in Academic Minds and for taking the time to apply.

This is why, as Bourdieu puts it, “specific qualifications (e.g., a diploma in photography or filmmaking, or a sociology or psychology degree) are a genuine ticket of entry only for those who are able to supplement the official qualifications with the real—social—qualifications.” (Bourdieu 1984: 152) and why “recruitment is generally done by co-option, that is, on the basis of ‘connections’ and affinities of habitus...” (Bourdieu 1984: 151); these affinities are constitutive aspects of the way space is used to materialise forms of value that are experienced via ways of being-there, situated amidst this matrix of differences whose significance are impersonally configured, rather than imposed, via recognitions which function as unthought evaluations that compose the fabric of public space distributing, differentially, access to the interpersonal conditions constitutive of properties whose sense are born as aspects of subjection to such processes. Despite all my degrees being from Russell group institutions, it appears I do not satisfy these criteria. The ambiguity of criteria betray processes of identification that relate to a confusion arising from the mixing of individuals who have different social properties because of the continuous oppositions arising from social divisions that education can only address via situating individuals in relation to a share sphere of interactive coexistence, the form of
closures characteristic of elite education, that cannot be provided by the non-specialised, socially dislocated, educationalism characteristic of the education of the poor. What you have are divides that force individuals to undergo contactless administrative processes that fail to embed them because oppositions are sustained via the extortion of a sense that constitutes an objectivity whose recognition discloses the grounds of operative forms of intentionality rooted in the social mobilisation that subtends the materialisation of such aspects. Yet institutional agents can sustain belief in the fairness of criterial forms whose social grounds remain immune from representation because of their private nature. As one institutional agent insisted, "I can assure you that candidate’s socio-economic backgrounds played no part in the outcome of the shortlisting/appointment decisions made by the panel". Or as Cornell University's application procedure affirms, "Applications from women and minority candidates are strongly encouraged" and Bristol University says: "We welcome applications from all members of our community and are particularly encouraging those from diverse groups, such as members of the LGBT+ and BAME communities". The recognition of such communities is because they relate to differences arising from the class homogeneity of the institutions, ways in which the institutions manifest their magnanimity via the way they occlude their class racism. The channels of legitimation and the attenuated processes of consecration that lead one to be objectified so that one can satisfy labour market criteria are so exclusive that the homogeneity arising as an effect leads academic communities to have to invent differences in order to instantiate and experience their magnanimity. In reality, the disadvantaged can aspire to credentials bereft of involvement which affects their significance and their CVs are constituted in relation to the absence whose sense they are perceived to bear as an effect of lacking the value to show up as legitimate interlocutors so that their invisibility becomes transfigured into absences of forms whose significance arise from invitations to participate in exclusive forms that constitute selection criteria. This is why we get gestures of the following kind: "Applicants that do not have internet access are encouraged to visit your local library, or local Department of Labor. You may also visit the office of Workforce Recruitment and Retention Monday - Friday between the hours of 8:30 a.m. – 4:30 p.m. to use a dedicated workstation to complete an online application": the reality is that unless one can link transcribed testimonials of teaching effectiveness (which are impossible to get if you are too insignificant to solicit sustained engagement); manifest involvement in an un-broken career of teaching, exhibit publications from recognised journals and membership of the networks that constitute the invitations manifest via conference attendance and public talks, you will have absolutely no chance. In the UK system, higher degrees don't involve relational aspects, for some, they are not invited to participate in any way because of the class differences that subtend the constitution of these relational aspects and this is why such criteria are so insincere, as if anyone who was in the position of not having internet access would ever be able to satisfy any of the criteria required to be considered. The application goes on: "If you require an accommodation for a disability in order to complete an employment application or to participate in the recruiting process, you are encouraged to contact Cornell University's Office of Workforce Policy and Labor Relations at voice (607) 255-6866, fax (607) 255-0298, or email
at equalopportunity@cornell.edu”. Cornell presume associational forms that are simply unavailable to particular categories in the UK system, for example, they stipulate, "We require a letter of support from a CPC faculty affiliate to be sent under separate cover to mc129@cornell.edu". Now, I have no idea what this refers to because doing a PhD in the UK involved little by way of contact beyond the use of a phone to overcome the effects of the distances arising from the absence of any provision of anything that meant that accession to any purposive relation to the institution who administered the products of my labour in order to materialise the appearance of my education was tenuous. I have met other PhD students who, upon completion, struggle to fill-in application forms because they never knew two academics and, anyway, even the supervisory relation was a charade, meaning that nobody can actually speak-for-you because nobody, actually, has anything to do with you, you have merely satisfied certain bureaucratic criteria allowing you to produce work administered via relationships that objectified others. I am unable to complete the application form because I have nothing to write in the boxes because I have no access to the interpersonal and institutional grounds of the exclusive relational forms that constitute viability and arise from a viability physiognomically regenerated via such processes. My inability to successfully complete the form has nothing to do with my disability and, really, if I contact the Office of Workforce Policy and Labour Relations, can they help me to compete when all of my experience will merely be constituted as an absence of the forms required to appear as a legitimate interlocutor? But what is this absence based in? What does it arise from and can institutions that are based in the constitution of exclusive forms ever operate fairly? Being poor is the only operative distinction in academic culture, it is the basis of all distinctions which is why its effects are repressed. What this allows is for the inclusion of privileged members of the elites of these groups under the guise of overcoming precisely the barriers outlined here. Behind the veil of anonymity interpersonally instituted in departments, the grounds of attribution of competence relate to forms of value that relate to the use of institutional space to materialise such possibilities. This is why it is possible to secure degrees and be told, "your graduate degrees are not in the discipline of sociology, specifically. That is why you do not qualify. Candidate graduate degrees must be in sociology specifically", or, as a response from another application put it, "it appears you do not meet the minimum requirements, Ph.D. in Sociology" and another, "Based on the information provided on your application, you do not meet the minimum qualifications for this position" and on another, "the hiring committee determined that the materials provided with your application proved insufficient in demonstrating achievement of the state-required minimum qualifications", and another, “after careful review of your application, the search committee has determined that you do not meet the minimum qualifications for the position as stated in the advertisement”. This is despite me competing nationally for one of a small number of awards amidst thousands of applicants to transfer the funding between bureaucracies to transform my own dislocated labor into a PhD certificate. The problem is that these type of responses exhibit no awareness of national differences in the forms of discrimination educational processes are used to legitimate and it reproduces the grounds of inequalities in the same way the education itself does so: by ignoring singularity and assuming a generic set of conditions that constitute particular forms of
objectification that are characteristic of those whose public efficacy is an effect of recognitions which constitute forms of institutional embedding that function as sources of mediation that constitute a shared sphere of reference and capacities that inhere in the disclosure of such modalities. What is clear is that credentials do not function at all because their determinacy, their significance, is not constituted for those from distant regions who lack the social value to elicit recognition and solicit involvement so that they accede to significances whose disclosure constitute capacities arising from involvement in the interpersonal grounds that materialise such aspects. For some, their credentials do not function at all because their competence is not objectified because of the very conditions they endure via an educational process characterised by absence that transfigures class distances into differences in objectivity arising from the institutional grounds that disclose such aspects. Instead of deficits being addressed, they have merely been rearticulated. Moreover, concerns about the authenticity of applicants merely recognise the sense arising from the nature of the processing of those de-legitimated by a sense of fraudulence that is, actually, at the heart of the institutional process that the devalued endure. It is not surprising that, at the end of their education, they are suspected of being inauthentic when the process they endure is, essentially, fraudulent. The tragedy is that their public person has been fused with the sense of the absence characteristic of their educational processing. The meanings sedimented via subjection to recognitions which constitute absences inscribed via experiencing being subject to such mediations regenerate an experience of inability that is clearly part of the public grounds constitutive of the attribution of competence. Clearly, the statutory conditions required for the attribution of competence are not satisfied for individuals of certain trajectories so that their credentials, and their competence, remain unrecognised. When technical competence requires access to the grounds of a statutory attribution from which capacities to bear the sense of forms arise, we can appreciate that the devalued are doomed because, lacking access to the interpersonal conditions which satisfy statutory attribution, they are not subject to the relational forms of involvement that responsively actualise them so that they experience the behavioural actuality of forms that physiognomically materialise the sense, the grounds, of neurophysiological structures, which is why those subject to delegitimation experience the reality of a status their educational process reproduces and feel like frauds: feel disabled. The destructuring of existence that devaluation constitutes is violating because of the prereflective familiarity with the world, via being, that constitutes our cognitive faculties which require, for their development, fruition, realisation: modalities rooted in recognitions which absorb individuals in disclosures which physiognomically materialise the sense inscribed via experiences of being subject to possibilities that constitute our being-in-the world. It is via the absorption of realisation that we experience the extension of our corporeal schema and extend our hold on capacities that inhere in our appropriation of being via our involvement in the world. Clearly the sign-reading processes arising from the anonymity of the closures that constitute the symbolic capital of those able to disclose such aspects as part of a social structure arising from such processes, ensure
further dislocation, an absence of engagement, and an absence of experience of the grounds of the modalities that cognition, development, functionality, humanity, require. This banal dehumanisation of the devalued is carried out via perceptions of difference that constitute an absence of access to the grounds required to accede to functionality and they endure the continuation of a condition that sediments the sense inscribed via experiences of being subject to such a reality. It generally doesn't involve copresence, or limited co-presence, so that its medium of actualisation is obscured, publicly, by the private way meanings are realised via differences of involvement that constitute modalities that inhere in the shapes of differences of involvement that physiognomically materialise differences of capacity that are effects of meanings inscribed via being subject to the disclosure, and constitution, of such aspects. Once devalued by the inscription of forms that de-legitimate and invalidate the only forms available, what can people do? As credentials become conditional for their value as an effect of the devaluation arising from the processes that consecrate some via a boundary informally, selectively, surreptitiously, instituted as part of processes of validation that establish the private spheres of 'public' institutions, those de-legitimated endure problems arising from the mediations that constitute such objectivities and questions over the identity of credentials are natural effects of the use of 'public' space to constitute forms of competence whose identity inhere in the closures arising from the grounds of boundaries whose sense are inscribed via the use of public space to constitute such differences. How competence is identified, is via relationships of involvement because involvement is a mark of the conditions constitutive of competence: recognition arising from value so that involvement manifests what it is constitutive of: social properties whose relational basis inhere in accession to such possibilities. Involvement is both manifestative and constitutive, it is perceived to manifest forms that are constituted via involvement in a fabric whose disclosure interpersonally materialises an experience of capacity that is ontologically coincidental with experiences of being realised via such relational states. Deficits inhere in forms inscribed via being subject to the recognition of differences that materialise different ways of being, spatially and interpersonally, located, so that differences in expressivity arising from subjection to such conditions are physiognomically regenerated as aspects of subjection to such processes. Validation and de-legitimation are key modalities of a social structure whose impersonal realisation are part of its legitimation. Because meaning-bearing components, properties, inhere in experiences of being realised, relationally, situated and contextualised, via disclosures which constitute a horizon whose circumscription constitute capacities for reference that inhere in involvement, exclusion involves an experience of absence, of lack, that is a real effect of statuses transfigured into what appear to be natural differences of capacity. What is clear is that relational processes are transfigured into meanings inscribed via subjection to spatial, interpersonal, forms that constitute differences of capacity that inhere in experiences of being situated via such processes. Those legitimated experience involvements that constitute the identity of their competence that is part of their public accession to such forms via disclosures which inscribe such possibilities as actualities they experience being aspects of their person, whereas others face a recognition which discloses their negation and the absence of a capacity that is perceived via their non-alignment, their
non-attunement, with the institutional conditions of attribution of competence. What is being reconstituted, institutionally, is a distinction between the competent and the incompetent via access to the attenuated grounds of a legimation that grants access to the involvements that constitute competence and labour market access to some and an education that is nothing more than reclassified unemployment for others. What is clear, from these judgements made about administered artifacts crystallised via equally anonymous processes, is that the labour market is utterly anonymous and unforgiving, there is no exemption of deficits as competition allows the valued to use institutional space to constitute public criteria whose determining efficacy are only too visible via the effects of the visibilities that subtend their efficacy and there is no mediation, no attempt to constitute transitional relational conditions that might allow individuals to accede to possibilities via personal engagement, but this is characteristic of the educational processes the poor undergo. The problem for those whose credentials lack identity as an effect of the distances arising as effects of the closures constitutive of such objectivities is that they are unable to operationalise contacts, and solicit engagement, as an effect of the significances that elicit such problems and institutional agents are not capable of establishing relational processes that validate them. It appears that even the academics one comes into contact with find contact, even over things like references, difficult to manage, as one confessed, "Unfortunately, I couldn’t send all the letters you asked me to. You sent a massive number of applications and I can’t follow them all - different bureaucratic procedures demand attention". When you get letters like the following, "Following your recent application for the position of Research Fellow at the University of Southampton, we have contacted the referees provided by you in your application. Please be advised the following referees have not yet completed references for you", what chance do you have? When mediations relating to the satisfaction of labour market criteria force people into dependency on relational networks that they are not privy to, they are neither able to exert their will, because they cannot projectively establish intentions because the conditions of satisfaction of such states cannot be secured, nor can they be subject to the relational forms that constitute a sense of properties rooted in the projection of absorption in forms whose disclosure physiognomically materialise neurophysiological structures arising from such modalities. Under such conditions, individuals become unable to experience being competent and they cannot conceive of ever getting jobs because they are being negatively realised in relation to structural aspects that denude them of possibilities. The result is misery and despair. When you are set up to fail, you are destined to be incapable of exhibiting properties whose sense inhere in relational states that are constituted via closures that guarantee the significance experienced via being privy to such states and so the barrier is inscribed in your flesh as a responsivity arising from the way you experience being-realised so that you will never be able to satisfy criteria that relate to forms of co-presence that your significance does not elicit. For the educationally condemned, they face an inability to conceive of themselves as capable because they do not access the interpersonal grounds of forms, ensuring their inability. Valuationary forms inscribed via realisations born of recognitions rooted in significances arising from trajectory, ensure the devalued can’t elicit the sense of forms they intuit as unavailable. They thereby face an inability to satisfy
relational conditions via the isolation arising from a devaluation that denudes them of any sense of an ability even to get referees to write references as they find themselves locked out of networks and unable to even get referees to respond to them. The over-mediation of the forms that signify competence ensure the monopolisation of opportunities but ensure many face the horrifying absence of possibilities and a life of non-existence implied in the requirement to process ever larger numbers in order to materialise the appearance of functioning public institutions which merely make selection processes more difficult to perceive and more psychologically violent. Institutional processes of consecration, the derivation, institutionally and behaviourally, of a boundary instantiated surreptitiously, between those being validated, and those invalidated, becomes a key aspect of the experience of study. Those recognised undergo an organisation of their ascent, ensuring transitions that realise a commitment born of intersubjective donations of significance rooted in experiences of being subject to a public affirmation that is instituted via tacit reference to those who are left to fend for themselves, who struggle to make each successive payment and source consecutive financial awards in a competition rigged against them, who experience the absence of the conditions required to manifest appropriate forms. Without access to a sphere of responsive actualisation, those who experience an invalidity as a key aspect of their sense of inability, can't imagine being capable, how would one when one can't even solicit the contact of one's referees? When your referees can't respond to emails, then you are confronted with the impossibility of you ever satisfying criteria that are rooted in an embedding contradicted at every turn by the nature of your educational process, how are you to mediate institutional processes that shift your signification? How are you to address your objectivity when it is a public aspect of your being-for-others arising from solicited engagements, when you can't even get the handful of academics you know to respond or mediate access to signifying forms? Distances are transfigured into the absence of aspects required to represent oneself via one's CV and the absence of access to anything beyond a process of self-generated assessment inhibits self-constitution. Moreover, it is clear that many get no help whatsoever, when one has deficits of various kinds, there is no help to address them, no intermediary forms of mediation to provisionally address deficits. What excess competition does is limit the distribution of opportunities and manifest the fundamental forms of capital required to access resources. Those without value experience the physiognomic regeneration of this absence as personal lack: they lack the significance to accede to the interpersonal grounds of forms of reference that inhere in recognitions which disclose ways of being whose physiognomic materialisation constitute capacities to intuit aspects that inhere in sharing a world, in membership. It is clear that there is little overlap of behavioural routines, and existential modes, via the process that students undergo. The distances that the processes exploit in order to make evasion strategies invisible because of the absence of any co-presence that might constitute traces of the nature of the intentional forms that subtend the interpersonal make contact itself difficult to execute, you are reduced to abstracted mediations, varieties of mail since, phone calls are perceived as a nuisance, and the whole destructuring effects of non-presence erode potential identities that cannot be founded leaving individuals farting in bedrooms because they can't accede to any public existence and face the
private, anonymous, and passive, constitution of objectivities that are rooted in divisions that subtend labour market access that, clearly, constitute the form of the student condition: the also-rans, or, as one person described, "the reserves", face an existence delineated via recognition of forms that physiognomically regenerate a sense of absence arising from perception of forms that reconstitute such aspects so that mass higher education cannot address deficits that it merely formalises. This is why application processes are so officialised, and why they are impossible to satisfy: proof of successful teaching, evidence of syllabi delivered, official transcripts and letters of reference become impossible to provide when your education does not introduce you to a living soul so that you remain unknown, publicly, and institutionally, even in departments one financed, because the nature of the process was administrative and financial, involving the transaction of finances between public bodies and the association of names with administered forms, the education had no existential parameters founded on membership, belonging or involvement, which is why such modalities are prioritised in the labour market: they are both constitutive and manifestations of the elite using closures to constitute the clear significance of an exclusivity whose forms they experience being instituted as aspects of social reality that constitute them as able to refer, and project, via realisations that physiognomically materialise such aspects, whilst others endure a disorientation, confusion and malaise, that arises from the absence of any direct access to any shared conditions of existence. When people's access to the mediations constitutive of intentional aspects reduce to attenuated, abstracted, electronically mediated, relationships to others who are supposed to vicariously represent them, or otherwise signify them, via administered forms that constitute objectivities whose intelligibility inhere in the relationships constitutive of the form whose sense is intuited as an effect of such processes, then people are in a state of dependency that reproduce vertical, capital-generating relationships. As Max-Neef puts it:

Deprivation is an effect of an economically organised dependency that reinforces forms of dependence—economic, financial, technological, cultural and political—all these forms of powerlessness reinforce the effects of the underlying inequality. (Max-Neef 1992: 139)

And the extortion of the sense of forms via relationships that materialise the appearance of the competence of some, ensures the dependency and dispossession of others who do not accede to conditions which constitute the grounds of intentional possibilities that inhere in closures that the process reproduces, ensuring the resignification of incompetence, transfigured via valuationary forms, arising from relationships that dispropriate individuals of any experience of possibility or competence. When you are reduced to farting in a bedroom, how do you represent yourself via significances whose grounds are absent? You cannot even fabricate a life: how would you even conceive of possibilities whose circumstantial aspects, whose interpersonal reality, remained unavailable, and, moreover, opaque, because the process available to you reduces to form-filling and a charade of supervision that materialises the appearance of your process, and someone else's competence, and role-performance? When such forms count as symbolic capital because they are relationally exclusive, and without invitation, how would you begin to mediate access? How, when your education reduces to a singular institutional relationship,
would you begin to accede to any kind of visibility? More significantly, how would you appear in relation to aspects arising via their incorporation, via realisations that physiognomically materialise such possibilities, as part of recognitions which constitute the emergence of competent people through an embedding arising via such processes? How could you be-perceived appropriately when the grounds of any experience of such possibilities remained unavailable? Without involvement in forms that mirror the forms of involvement constitutive of the appearance of competence arising from employment can individuals be accepted as competent? Without employment can individuals be perceived to possess competence? According to labour market selection criteria, no. So, isn't employment a better medium to elicit competence than education that precludes access to such conditions? The reality is that the education exploits the unavailability of such conditions whilst perpetuating them, merely regenerating the sense of objectivities that subtend its form. Differences in value are transfigured into different personal conditions that subtend cognitive aspects, the destructuring attendant on devaluation attacks the seat of identity because it affects the fabric of being itself. Lower class people, asked to finance processes, without access to anything, are essentially required to perform the immaculate conception of tacitly summoning forms out-of-the-nothing they experience being constitutive of public meanings they experience being physiognomically regenerated as aspects whose disclosure constitute circumstances they experience being via. Little wonder that expressivity manifests differences in facility with being when the interpersonal forms constitutive of the sense flesh bears are incorporated via such different ways of being-realised, in relation to disclosures that constitute very different forms of objectivity. If this is the nature of the institutional relationships that subtend the appearance of functions materialised via asymmetrical relationships, how can individuals sustain a hold on dispositions they don't experience being founded? This is the abusive nature of education in which individuals are judged in relation to aspects whose interpersonal grounds are not equitably distributed. Selection criteria attend carefully to the actual grounds of dispositions because they arise from relational actualisation and yet, the reality of educational processes for many is that they must attempt the impossible: to appropriate forms from outside of any direct personal mediation of their grounds. How can those attempting to secure incomes to pay for certificates from bedrooms whilst on benefits direct themselves? How can they appropriate, appropriate forms? And feelings of fraudulence are merely the incorporation of a sense arising from the actual reality of divisions, born of recognitions, which institute divisions that relate to ways of being situated so that some are involved, recognised and realised, and others exist outside of direct involvement, unable even to solicit responses from referees. When relation to the institutional conditions constitutive of the attribution of competences that inhere in closures are so attenuated, what chance do many have? Whilst some are validated, others are denuded of accession to the conditions required to experience possibilities of any kind. When the path to actuality is born of the experience of possibility, we can see that the non-relational nature of institutional processes born of the practice of recognitions which constitute those with value as recognised, many face nothing but the rearticulation, and physiognomic regeneration, of aspects that inhere in the reproduction of differences born of precisely such processes, nationally and internationally, so that
for some their education is merely part of an enveloping consignment that characterises their public significance. Where some face the actualisation of a validity which inheres in tacit reference to those negated via the effacement of an insignificance realised as invisibility, others face the degradation of a de-legitimation that is part of a denuding of them that attacks the basis of their expressive physiognomy, aware of being-negatively perceived, they face the physiognomic materialisation of a difference inscribed via subjection to such relational forms and they imbibe a sense of inability as part of their awareness of a reality they experience being realised in relation to references that inhere in the sense deposited via experiences of being subject to such divisions as incorporated aspects of divisions that are all the more devastating for being personally realised. Little wonder referees struggle to represent them positively when there is little contact and little opportunity to manifest properties that inhere in the use of space to constitute such modalities. Moreover, when university application forms ask questions of the following kind, "Please list your references (not related to you) who can verify your work habits and experience", you wonder how people whose education reduces to the charade of contact with a single institutional agent, who their labour narcissistically realises, could ever satisfy such criteria. When you are reduced to farting in a room, outside of contact with any sphere of professional practice or contact, and, moreover, when even contact itself is abstractly mediated, arising across distances, electronically, and only surrounding moments which materialise the appearance of the performance of the role of an academic, then how could anyone verify "your work habits and experience" when the whole process is based on avoidance, evasion and displacement, of any obligations that leave people living lives elsewhere because their labour is not situated because they lack the value to solicit contact? The value of the student is manifest via the relationships of involvement that constitute legible traces of their objectivity. How they are perceived inscribes traces whose sense inhere in the differences arising from ways of being-situated via a background whose intelligibility inheres in its public instantiation so that aspects of CVs can be easily decoded via a language as euphemised as the interpersonal processes constitutive of the sense of such aspects. The properties manifest via CVs are effects of such processes and institutional agents, who constitute the whole of their treatment of individuals in relation to their perception of such differences, are unable to write convincing references concerning spheres of public existence that they fail to make available so that descriptions of students presume relational states that are prejudicial. Referees have the same problem that the individuals themselves have: without the mediation of relational states that are manifestations of forms of valuation constituted via their recognition, they are not perceived. References can't attest to properties whose grounds are not made available and academics cannot situate the poor so that they exist outside of the relational basis of properties whose signification arise from their disclosure as part of the recognition of differences of status that the process, casually, reproduces via the insignificance of the poor who are simply institutionally invisible, the grounds, thereby, of properties whose materialisation inhere in such processes are reproduced, the poor merely being subject to the same problems of self-constitution that they face elsewhere: lacking access to a medium that elicits developmental processes and cognitive forms rooted in recognition and co-presence. Letters of
reference then construct a sense of properties arising from the sole medium used to
materialise the appearance of a process: students writing, and required forms are
conspicuous by their absence, the poor being "doomed to exemplify properties that
are often simply the lowly underside of a dominant property, whose very absence
they evoke" (Bourdieu 1996: 151). What is said on CVs arises from differences of
involvement that disclose what they describe and this is a fundamental medium of
the contestation of properties that are part of the everyday class struggle. Within
departments there is competition over scarce resources, the poor have no leverage
because they don't pay their own fees, they are paid for them, there is a privileging
of fee-paying students because the institutions need their capital. This ensures they
possess a degree of leverage that the poor don't possess, they warrant a little more
effort to make them feel significant and their presence marked. Legitimacy is part of
processes of validation that have their flip-side, the invalidation of those who
confront this reality as manifest via an expressive physiognomy rooted in perception
of their difference, and where there are different forms of involvement, there will be
the manifestation of what appear to be different properties, differences in
objectivity. Feelings of fraudulence and confessions of ignorance among people who
have spent the better part of a decade attempting to transcend such modalities,
should indicate the reach of behavioural routines that subend attributions of
competence determining access to the real grounds of competencies protected via
an exclusivity which merely requires sections of the population to function as a
resource, a standing reserve, relationally functioning as foils for the extortion of the
sense of processes whose reality are questionable. The problem is that any form of
copresence requires expenditures of time and income that are at a premium, so
there is little co-presence because of the distances arising from the monopolisation
of employment via differences perpetuated via their symbolisation: the devalued
exist across the effects of these divides, barely acceding to contact of any kind with
institutions that remain distant and personnel who do very, very little to help
anyone. When students' study cannot be grounded in anything affirming
dispositions realised via a need for cultural forms that mobilise students
neurophysiologically, then what, really is on offer? Isn't this just a perpetuation of
an underlying condition repressed via student reclassification? When students can't
be related to anything they experience the senselessness of a purposelessness
arising from the attenuated relational forms via which the appearance of processes
are extorted, symbolising valuations immanent to the relationships, and they
experience an unrealisation that erodes their faith in themselves because they don't
discover themselves capable of satisfying conditions which relationally disclose
neurophysiological structures constituted via experiences of being subject to such
modalities so that, instead of education being a vista of opportunity to escape
finitude it is merely an annihilation of the projective capacities individuals are
attempting to found via abortive processes in which they merely function as
resources, a standing reserve, that signifies the competence of others, who must
perpetually speak-for-them, validating themselves as they go, as part of networks
that constitute capacities responsively actualised via the relationships that constitute
such objectivities. When you struggle to get referees to write references, and when
referees cannot respond to your email enquiries, how do you mediate access to the
relational basis of properties they are supposed to attest to your capacity to
manifest? The disclosive conditions constitutive of such aspects are absent, which is why letters of reference are as worthless as the individuals whose sense of capacity is distorted via such processes. Clearly, many exist outside of the networks that generate the sense of relational aspects that constitute the grounds of properties perceived through significances produced via occupancy of such positions and the process students undergo does not mediate access to the grounds of such objectivities, leaving individuals unable to mediate access to anything because of the perpetuation to the sense of forms that are manifest effects of such conditions. In such conditions, what references say, will be inadequate because this is what closures are supposed to ensure and this is why the bulk of one’s education concerns absences of involvement. The real issue is public consecration, and the invalidation attendant on excessive numbers, whose labour cannot be situated so that they can accede to possibilities born of the disclosure of a horizon that constitutes the capacity to intuit appropriate forms because one experiences the logical necessity of such forms as aspects of accession to a purposive relation to practices that disclose such modalities. What are these aspects of social organisation beyond relational forms of deriving significances that institute a boundary between the sacred and profane, locking some out of processes that constitute capacities for functionality derived via meanings inscribed via being subject to such possibilities? When people are reduced to the non-existence of begging for letters of reference, outside of any of the relational forms that constitute the satisfaction of labour market criteria designed to ensure competence by ensuring those capable of manifesting the incorporated effects of being subject to disclosures which constitute the appropriate dispositions, then what chance do they have? Positions constitute forms whose perception physiognomically regenerates a sense arising from the grounds of references that inhere in the relational basis of their grounds. Positions mutually implicate one another and derive their intelligibility from the way those with value manoeuvre in order to constitute the very properties implied in the states the devalued are condemned to occupy as an effect of the disclosure of such forms so that the poor are called, relentlessly, to an order they inscribe via being subject to the immediacy of a sense rearticulated via a visibility that is part of the constitution of forms that determine accession to recognised forms of social existence. Those who are invalidated by the institutional machineries that legitimate those consecrated are unable to solicit the engagements required to validate themselves and, thereby, undergo a de-legitimation that affects the very constitution of their competence: without involvements that direct the form of their labour how can they develop appropriately so that they feel an authority arising from involvement in a sphere of relationships that constitute such modalities? Their labour will appear discrepant and the legitimacy of their credentials will fall into doubt. When their credentials are worthless, all they can do is attempt to apply but their invalidation ensures a failure which places a burden on those charged with speaking-for-them in a process in which the whole problem is their reduction, a reduction that education perpetuates. When official transcripts from University Registries are not accepted as establishing competence, that is, when they are not perceived to signify competence, and are not accepted as verifying an individual, what can individuals from non-literate communities, who exist outside of any of the networks that legitimate those recognised, do? How competence is perceived is via the effects of
embedding because embedding arises from recognitions which disclose the conditions which constitute capacities that inhere in experiences of being subject to such processes: precisely what the education of the most devalued lacks. It is telling that selection processes require forms that are unavailable to the poorest. As someone put it: "When you have worthless credentials like us, it doesn’t matter how long you study or how high you go, it’s who you can get to give a fuck about you, it’s who you know". Clearly the authentication of competence involves complex institutional mediations beyond the abstracted, de-realising mediations that materialise the appearance of the 'education' of many who never resolve the problem of a skill-lessness that is a fundamental modality of a poverty education merely reproduces by making level, and the significance of education, relate to income. It is perfectly clear that credentials that are obtained outside of relationships of involvement relating to forms of significance that mirror the forms of involvement of the relationships that constitute employment, are worthless and this worthlessness is manifest via an invalidity that is an effect of the dislocation constitutive of their acquisition which transfigures into the indeterminacy of their identity. Moreover, these conditions condemn the devalued who cannot solicit the contact required to have their competence signified. The identity of competencies arise from precisely what are least accessible: relations of involvement that manifest exclusive forms so that those forms function as signals via the constitution of their significance via the practice of a barrier that constitutes the form of working class experience. The identity of competencies are established via manifestation of the cultural grounds which disclose the forms constitutive of their possibility and what selection criteria relate to are the relations of involvement that constitute the forms which actualise such differences as socially efficacious distinctions arising from closures which guarantee actualisation, that is, guarantee individuals proficient at enacting meanings because their CVs exhibit a biographical embedding that manifests a history of recognitions which disclose the forms manifest as meanings sedimented via experiences of being subject to such exclusive forms. Clearly, the generic administrative status purchased via the poor whose 'education' reduces to the personal, private, problem of securing finances to pay for the administration of the products of their labour, via relationships that objectify others, doesn't count as manifesting competence. That such distinctions are being surreptitiously instituted, via abstracted institutional processes, involving, for the poor, little co-presence, tells us a great deal about the forms of social organisation that subtend competence. Without involvement in a horizon that discloses such modalities, individuals are disoriented and experience a purposelessness, and inability, that is an effect of an invalidity arising from valuationary processes that constitute such aspects, which is why competence is established in distinction to such aspects. The problem is that, for the poor, the fabric of being that subtends the acquisition of competence is absent which is why they experience much of their education as absurd. Clearly, those who endure dislocation as an effect of divisions which are merely transfigured into differences of significance via such processes, face the same processes of invalidation that they would if they were uneducated. Those who lack the significance to elicit recognition cannot solicit contacts that constitute recognised forms of social existence and they endure a negation that is an effect of the way closures constitute boundaries whose sense they inscribe via experiences of being
subject to such differences. The identity of the competence, as well as its attribution, arise from processes of validation that relate to processes of objectivisation arising from closures that publicly consecrate some via a boundary that constitutes forms of objectivity that are exclusive. Whilst mass higher education materialises the appearance of a public system open to all, these selection processes manifest the effects of a reality whose interpersonal constitution is hidden by the nature of its realisation. Academics are able to do what they do as if they are not doing it. The devalued are invisible and do not even show up as worthy interlocutors so they never have anywhere to go, anyway, apart from to the secretaries whose labour materialises the appearance of processes that involve little co-presence and whose mediations are usually carried out across distances, electronically or via postal services. Clearly, selection criteria attend to the real conditions constitutive of intentionality aspects that arise from participation and membership, from closures which constitute the conditions which satisfy the intentional forms perceived via relationships of involvement that establish the identity of competencies that are, clearly, exclusive. Those who work in education require a mass field that secures the finances required to enjoy their privileges but the real processes constitutive of competence relate to exclusions that constitute boundaries that can easily be surreptitiously instituted when education doesn't situate students. Over time, as the supply of graduates outstrips the supply of jobs, access to the grounds of the identity of the competence are eroded, a process that is naturally obscured by the interpersonal constitution of valuationary forms that subtend access for some, to the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states that inhere in exclusive relational forms materialised in order to assure the difference manifest by the recognition of some, relative to others. Excess competition erodes access to the grounds of the identity of competencies which are interpersonally constituted via recognitions which disclose access to experiences of being competent, which lead the devalued to seek refuge in hiding behaviours that obscure, from themselves, the reality of an objectivity that erodes capacities for projection effaced by the mutilation of their being-for-others. When those with PhDs find themselves unable to even establish the authenticity and identity of their competence, then we see how difficult it is to situate oneself or, indeed, establish any formal contact in fields in which competence is so ambiguous and its grounds of attribution so convoluted. Individuals cannot accede to modalities that are relationally constituted, they cannot connect themselves, and they cannot, as an effect of competition, constitute themselves as a resource because their viability is undermined by the valuationary processes arising from excess competition. The ambiguity of the competence allows for a spurious inclusivity whose pluralism obscures the real criteria that constitute competence: sources of social value rooted in a shared lifestyle that subtends processes of dissimulation that render invisible the nature of processes carried out privately, and only manifest via their effects, as a classificatory order obscures the grounds of its constitution via the use of 'public' institutions to materialise the appearance of processes whose reality cannot easily be represented. The indeterminacy of competence, arising from the discernment of the identity of competence from embedding, is a fundamental effect of the way value becomes transmuted into capital via its signification via relationships that are rooted in recognitions that embed some in spheres whose disclosure constitute horizons that constitute forms
experienced via being subject to such modalities. The inability of even those qualified, from regions distant from the metropolitan centres that produce the grounds of objectivities via closures that render distances, distant, via a boundary whose sense inheres in the perception of the effects of such forms, to be-perceivable as competent, shows the way in which divisions become transfigured into sense-relations via economic divisions transmuted into differences of objectivity via the symbolic mediations arising from the way these divisions become configured via the institutional processes that allow particular groups to control access to resources via control of spatial forms that constitute possibilities. The ambiguity of the competence can be used to exploit the devalued whilst institutional networks render determinate objectivities, via relations of involvement, that disclose a horizon within which members accede to competences arising from experiences of realisation that physiognomically regenerate a boundary inherent to ways of being arising from experience of such modalities. The ambiguity of criteria arise from the use of polysemia to constitute a sense of openness when, the processes constitutive of capacities to be-perceived as appropriate, are quite determinate and arise from closures that constitute such objectivities. What this means is that one could only be aligned, or attuned, via involvement and via an explication of the possible relevance of ideas: the synthesis of one's labour would require negotiation, contact, embedding and contextualisation, yet these modalities are absent producing discrepant objectivities arising from divisions that symbolic forms merely obscure as part of processes of legitimation that hide the delegitimation of the devalued. These processes of delegitimation are relationally instantiated and constitute the signifying atmosphere of academic space: academics only engage via objectifying relationships so that you have to be capable of satisfying particular conditions in order to elicit engagement. This is why, for the poor, interactions are chronic or non-existent. Negotiation over potential involvement never occurs because the processes that subtend such forms are contactless and, once you accede to the PhD, you lose all efficacy because you lose any capacity to function as a resource, thereby losing a viability purchased by the state-apparatus that is as exploited as the poor by institutional agents who care for little beyond their own self-actualisation and public objectification. When you undergo a process that consists of nothing beyond your production of projects from outside of relationships of involvement in any public sphere, how are you supposed to produce appropriate forms? This is even more the case when phenomena represented count less than the representational apparatus used to produce such forms because what is really at stake are the conditions governing legitimate membership and legitimate hierarchy. This is why such processes effortlessly reproduce marginality and transfigure differences of condition into differences of academic status. When people come out of this experience and remain in the same condition for several more years but reclassified as, now, unemployed, and are unable to access anything professionally, when this is the nature of the education available to the devalued, we can see how discriminatory criteria like the following are: "Please enter total years of experience related to the career field you are applying for": the absurdity is that education provides no involvement in anything that dignifies the CVs of those who struggle to finance access to it. Empty CVs that lack access to appropriate criteria are just effects of discrimination. How can individuals from working communities access anything
when they find university involves them in nothing that either directs their labour or dignifies certificates whose value are now conditional on cultural forms arising from modes of closure that their experience manifests via the absence arising via processes that individualise the extortation of the sense of value for those who associate their names with the administration of their labour? The irony is that application forms ask for a PhD and then "Other education/training/skills": the paradox is that there is little education or training via costly processes and no real access to anything beyond the minimal charade required to materialise the appearance of processes that objectify and remunerate others. Worse still, as it all becomes devalued, more of a process that is born of the denial of access and the constitution of negative forms is required. So that you get people who lack competence because they lack opportunity, and lack access to developmental conditions, that constitute intentional aspects arising from experiences of being that remain unavailable who are then required to finance more of processes that remain vacuous because the real basis of the identification of competence: employment, is unavailable. The conditions required to accede to recognised forms of public identity are unavailable and individuals have to endure vacuous and bankrupt processes that only exacerbate the problems they face because the nature of the processes arise from social divisions and from the relationships between public fields which merely reinreflect aggregative relational processes that constitute the sense of forms.

**Human possibility denied, development thwarted**

The issue is not merely how do you become objectified when you can’t access any interpersonal sphere beyond form-filling and the submission of written-work but how can you develop? And, moreover, in what way does such a process address deficits relating to absences of realisation and contextualisation? If the devalued undergo a processing that reproduces precisely the parameters constitutive of their objectivity, then it is hardly surprising that they experience the physiognomic regeneration, and social reproduction, of an underlying condition that, whilst repressed via such institutional mediations, reconstitutes the sense of the same, underlying, relational processes that constitute its identity. The process is such that one is required to be able to write, but never to speak, and one never undergoes processes of consecration that relate to the personal contextualisation arising from forms whose disclosure constitute capacities born of experiencing being-realised via such mediations. In a mass system, contextualisation requires recognition, which is why the constitution of exclusive forms manifest via invitation and involvement function as emblems that institutional space is used to produce. The mark of the devalued is an absence of recognition, and contextualisation, whose CVs manifest merely a generic processing identical to others of their cohort. In the contemporary period, the poor are those with credentials and no “experience” who cannot validate their credentials because they can’t solicit contact and cannot, thereby, accede to the interpersonal grounds of competencies constituted via closures that institutional space is used to surreptitiously constitute. The lack of 'experience' is a key aspect of the way the recognition of difference, and of negation, reconstitute an absence of forms that constitute aspects appropriated via experiences of being-positively-
perceived, recognised and, thereby, consecrated, via relational forms that constitute capacities to bear the sense of forms individuals experience being aspects of their-being-for-others and, thereby, assured of how they are perceived and, via such modalities, able to project successfully because they experience realisations born of disclosures that ensure the success of efforts whose intentional grounds arise via such processes. That employers can look at people who have done all that they possibly could and judge them to "lack experience" is revealing of the political and economic basis of distinctions that relate to the nature of our public institutions. If what is publicly available is perceived via a logic of negation, to constitute an absence of required forms that remain unavailable irrespective of expenditures of time and resources in a process itself mutilated and rigged by institutionalised distinctions, then can the poor really afford to invest? Can they trust state institutions? The reality is that the qualities attributed to one are effects of relational processes that constitute such aspects. Moreover, without access to the constitutive human grounds of attention, what is the experience individuals undergo? The problem arises when the sense of properties arises from relationships in which attention is a significant constitutive aspect so that access to the grounds of sense of forms relating to an assurance that can only arise from the realisations of recognitions which disclose such modalities become aspects of inequalities transposed into the sphere of being itself for individuals whose experience of anonymity and insignificance are only too apparent:

You’re always subjected to power relations, if I was ever in this position to say, “now I’m rich and successful, I’d say “you were totally useless, yer not intellectual at all”, yer find yerself ‘avin’ all these revenge fantasies, but yer can’t, yer collude in their identities, she hasn’t even begun to engage with a thing I’ve written, I sit silent, in despair at the level of inattention to detail, she’s telling me to change chapter two and three, an’ this an’ that…it’s like the words are in white, it’s like there’s nothing on the page to her.

The tragic reality of much of the educationalism that lower class people find themselves supporting because of their fundamental lack of education, leaving them unable to make viable educational, or occupational, choices, is that the process is fake in that they are required to delude themselves, struggling to develop intellectual pretensions so that they can serve as a foil that narcissistically realises others who experience the availability of significances that bely the reality of the relational processes that constitute the appearance of institutional functions and statuses that have little reality. The reason it is possible to have this experience is because the education is not embedded in its own process. Without a sphere of research practice, what is there for the process to be embedded in beyond solitary labour? The reason this experience is possible is because it is impossible to get from the texts one teaches oneself, in order to materialise the appearance of functions materialised via such relational processes, to the nature of the administrative processes that actually constitute the educational process. This is why one gets to the end of processes and then has a confrontation with the objectivity of valuationary processes that constitute your own inability to function because you function as a foil in a process that derives the appearance of a process where nothing exists. You are required to muster vanities whose interpersonal reality remain unavailable so that you project in a vacuum, struggling to produce in order to
satisfy administrative processes that materialise the appearance of functions that require little effort or labour, with students production functioning as a foil for the narcissistic realisation of the employees who materialise the appearance of their function via processes of administered judgement that connect with nothing beyond a charade that objectivises the employees who are able to use others as sources of objectification and self-description because they experience the conditions of possibility that, relationally, constitute such aspects. As one of the examiners of my PhD said, "she just wants to make it look to her colleagues that she is very professional". In this sense, the devalued function as sources of resources of various kinds in a game that validates the employees who undergo processes that objectify them without any attention being paid to the nature of the processes individuals endure. Notice, the absence of anything constitutive, "the level of inattention...it's like the words are in white, it's like there's nothing on the page to her", the text cannot speak because it cannot be grounded in any shared sphere of disclosure that make evident the logical necessity of the categories used to constitute the significance it conveys and, in this sense, the process is bankrupt because it cannot authorise, it is just a routinized administrative process extorting the sense of forms of value and experiences of being that benefit the employees who monopolise access to such constitutive relational processes. As someone else narrates:

They don't really read them I think. During the interview, they had my proposal print out in hand and they were like having a quick glance and raise the question, they don't give a shit of it. It’s just money. I never felt they’d read it, just business. My supervisor said to me, I hope you can handle the study by yourself, my role here is just give you some advice. She told me this first time I met her which means she won’t be available to offer any academic suggestions. I know I had to come up with the project to get onto this now I know I have to give them a thesis. I know she won’t do anything. That is how it is. I just do it now. (S: You feel no real interest in it?) No. When I did the work I did. Now not. I lost interest because of this.

It is worth noting that the mediations, so far as they exist, relate to a process the student must labour to materialise, there is no effort to connect students to anything that might function as a disclosive medium and the mediating relation is from the student to the employee, it is the student's labour that functions as a disclosive medium constituting capacities arising from being subject to such relational aspects for the employees who experience the physiognomic regeneration of experiences of being competent via the abstracted associations surrounding the administered judgement of others’ labour. The thing is the process does not value your writing anyway. The absurd aspect of the process is that it involves nothing but the production of texts whose administration materialise the appearance of something they are supposed to be a manifestation of and yet the absence of embedding characteristic of the process transmutes into the meaningless of the texts that is itself manifest via the manner with which they are processed. The process does not validate what it requires the individuals to produce in order to materialise the appearance of a process: texts which can have no function because they are not embedded in anything and are merely used as props, narcissistically, for the elaboration of character via the relationships that students are forced to enter in order to attempt to validate themselves and yet which merely extort forms of sense via the abstracted administrative relationships that surround the institutional
processing of their dislocated labour and constitute the reality they experience. The fact that the texts that students produce in order to materialise the appearance of a process have no value, that is, that the significance of their texts arises from the interpersonal processes where their production is subordinated to the function of their existing as foils for the narcissistic realisation of academics who institute the basis of the divisions which extort value, sustaining the dislocation that renders students production meaningless, is manifest in the manner of their treatment. Student production arises from a dislocation that education, for the devalued, would have to resolve if they were to either accede to recognised forms of objectivity or recognisable competence. The command of the institutional grounds of such modalities is precisely why they are only conditionally available, or, for many categories, unavailable. Because students' produce texts from a dislocated state manifest in every moment of the infrequent points of administrative contact that realise institutional agents, their texts, consequentially have no real significance within this game because they exist merely as foils, as one student put it, "nothing has any urgency for them", mirroring the different forms of experience of temporality that arise from different positions. The texts lack meaning because of the disclosive conditions the divisions that constitute the valuationary forms effect. There is no engagement with them because the process is instituted without care, whilst, simultaneously materialising the objective grounds of attributions of properties associated with concern and engagement. In this way institutional agents can obscure their satisfaction of their own needs as if they are serving public interests whilst, really, the institutions merely serve the interests of those who constitute themselves as the public via appropriating institutional space under the guise of public functions whose reality can only be traced via the personal effects of the individuated relationships that are used to evade and displace so many and otherwise use practical strategies to obscure a reality that can be endlessly disavowed as it secures the institutional conditions constitutive of the perception of its legitimacy. The students' experience of the meaninglessness of their production is merely an internalised effect, incorporated via the unrealisation characteristic of unprofitable forms of labour, of the valuationary relational aspects arising from forms of relationship that extort value for those doing the least who are, irrespective of engagement or quality of attendance, objectified via a displacement rooted in the use of closures to constitute forms of economic viability within a national economic space symbolically mediated via such processes. There is a real problem for the poor of how they access any interpersonal, public, relational sources of viability and competence. The real issue is introducing individuals to contexts and the involvements constitutive of environing aspects that might elicit appropriations of form that inhere in such processes so that individuals accede to capabilities by experiencing involvement in a world. If you look at these departments, they cannot, even as far as individual students are concerned, resolve the problem that education should tackle: the dislocation of people. Whilst individuals, especially those most distant from the metropolitan centres, turn to education in order to access interpersonally disclosed mediations that have an orientational nature providing access to developmental mediations, the reality is that mass economic competition among the middle classes for their historic positions means that there is a veiled order, interpersonally, that must be surreptitiously rearticulated, especially for fee-
paying students who have the priority of the leverage that private, as opposed to public, capital has in institutions which serve capital, so that there is too much competition for exclusive forms, too much competition for spatial forms whose mediation require modalities arising from recognition, from the attention and forms of co-presence that arise from mattering, from being significant, so that one accedes to processes that physiognomically regenerate a spirit born of congruity that restores those realised via experience of the reality of such aspects. The reality is that many departments, and the more worthless and publicly inconsequential the knowledge produced is, the more dependent these departments are on the sale of credentials via the administered assessment of students self-generated projects, cannot even create space, or involvement for students because there aren't the resources available and the only possible function that the students can serve is to be an institutional resource. The vacuity of this objectivity is lived by students as the reality they experience and whose sense they come to bear by being subject to isolated judgement via the moments they accede to the function of narcissistically realising the academics who materialise the appearance of their function by creating institutionalised drama via which they extort supply. It is clear in the testimony:

During the interview, they had my proposal print out in hand and they were like having a quick glance...I never felt they’d read it, just business. My supervisor said to me, I hope you can handle the study by yourself, my role here is just give you some advice. She told me this first time I met her which means she won’t be available to offer any academic suggestions.

The description manifests the interpersonal aspects constitutive of the sense of an objectivity that the individual experiences being physiognomically materialised via their studenthood, the negative actuality of the unrealisation of insignificance that will become crystallised via subjection to such processes which not merely characterise the institutional processing of the devalued but come to characterise them, objectively, constituting properties whose sense they come to bear as an effect of experiencing being subject to such institutional mediations which, after all, are little different to other state agencies. The forms of 'character' required to compete in the labour market are the effect of aggregative, class, processes that concern collective forms of intentionality which have institutional conditions of possibility and the capacity to exhibit the sense of particular aspects requires involvement in exclusive forms which physiognomically materialise the sense of forms rooted in recognitions which constitute qualities of attention that disclose aspects of presence rooted in a shared way of being-there, anchored in a shared, common, public sphere that is clearly absent for the devalued who face educational processes characterised by abstracted relationships, an absence of attention and non-actual relationships bereft of actualisation, leaving individuals experiencing forms of personhood bereft of subjecthood. The absence of realisation arising from the unrealisation characteristic of the dislocating derivation of the appearance of a process out-of-the-thin-air of abstracted administrative relationships leads to a loss of interest because the student is the source of the extortion of the sense of forms of objectivity without themselves experiencing being realised in relation to disclosures which physiognomically regenerate an experience of being competent because their labour is separate from any embedding of them in anything, relationally, and this is because it is relational forms that constitute the real sources
of value that govern consecration and these must remain exclusive to sustain the real interpersonal processes that govern the intersubjective donations of significance that constitute experiences of being competent. Physicists and economists say that you cannot make something out of nothing but you can using institutional hocus pocus: merely deny people education, deny them opportunity, and they will be forced to pay to access channels of legitimization whose processes materialise the appearance of a functioning public system without, actually, accessing very much at all. The disclosures constitutive of possibilities for functionality require actualisation, they require the satisfaction of conditions which are clearly not being constituted and if people are not experiencing connection to realising mediations then how can the education address deficits that become transfigured into incapacities via absences that appear to persist irrespective of education? The problem is that the relational processes constitutive of education have changed as the groups manipulating its processes have retreated into networks that are only empowered by the displacement of increased numbers by excessive labour market competition. As someone else narrates the same details of indifference born of a lifestyle arising from distances that the processing of students finances:

We had to meet our supervisor yesterday and that was our last meeting before the submission of our dissertation. She told us that she has not yet read anything of our draft because she was back from her holiday only the day before yesterday. She said she would send us her comments by e-mail yesterday night but she didn't. I would have been very surprise if she did so because that would have meant that she didn't read very well our drafts. You see, this shows that to which extent the lecturers (so called Dr) are not serious with gender studies and moreover they don't care about certain class of people (African) and it's very frustrated for us. Anyway, we can't do anything but wait till she sends us her comments.

It is via such details of differences that the institutional roots of the sense of objectivities are discerned via their actual reality, by students, who discern the basis of a mode of operation that is based in the extortion of the sense of a process where students face nothing beyond de-realising processes based in waiting to accede to the grounds of disclosures which are, interpersonally, perpetually unavailable, so that they face abstracted administrative processes because their processing merely finances metropolitan, cosmopolitan, elites who are too absorbed in a world constituted via involvements in extra-local networks to provide opportunities for those whose bureaucratic processing materialises the appearance of a labour process for which they can procure finances. What we see is the way in which certain students elicit responses which constitute the sense that they bear as an effect of an objectivity being reconstituted via such relational forms, whilst the academic concerned is able to materialise the appearance of their concern, and commitment, via the association that the student is forced to enter via a rite of passage that reduces to the ability-to-pay. The problem emerges when the absence of contextualisation arising from such processes constitutes an inability born of the absence of shared space because the disciplines are financed via the procurement of resources via the administration of students who access nothing beyond the problem of paying for the administration of their labour and, otherwise, have nothing in common with anyone in the field because they don't access a field of opportunities materialised via relations of involvement constituted in relation to the
use of institutional space, they are told, before being taken on that “I don’t have the
time I would like to spend with my graduate students” and then face an educational
process that reduces to a single relationship which mediates nothing, it’s, as one
student put it, “just a contract, it just comes down to money. They need it and you
have to pay for the credential”. Without access to recognitions which disclose forms
physiognomically materialised via such moments, how can individuals experience
themselves capable of instantiating forms whose sense they experience bearing as
effects of such processes? How can they accede to capacities which inhere in a
fabric human beings constitute being via? When this is the nature of the experience
of higher education, how can it function as an analogue of employment? How can it
involve individuals so that they accede to possibilities that they experience being
interpersonally constituted as aspects of their embedding in a sphere of forms
whose consequential nature they experience being apparent via qualities of
experience that assure them of being-positively-perceived because they experience
being situated via recognitions that disclose aspects arising via involvement in ways
of being that physiognomically materialise modalities appropriated via experiences
of being contextualised via such mediations? Clearly the absence of attendance and
attention exhibit an insignificance elicited via a way of being-perceived arising from
the class distances that such modalities reproduce, which is why so much
educationalism, the self-generated production of educational processes out-of-
whatever-one-is-capable-of-producing-in-order-to-purchase-a-certificate, is akin to
narcissistic abuse because it extorts the sense of valuationary forms via
asymmetrical relational processes that dignify and authorise employees whilst
reproducing the form of life of those who are condemned to function as a foil for,
and producer of, a disclosive medium that validates others. Mass higher education
merely reproduces the valuationary dynamics that constitute labour market position
and becomes merely another medium for the constitution of objectivities relating to
wider forms of social difference. The poverty of processes, and the inability of
individuals to access anything, is evident in the following:

The amount of tuition I received at university was less than that of college; which was free
education for me...I would not pay the current university tuition fees for the same course which
I had attended due to it simply not being worth the money. Likewise I am now on a PGCE course
-- I cannot even bring myself to use the word 'studying' since it is a distance course and attached
to our initial teacher training -- with this set up we are paying the university for basically 3
tutorial visits and marking of assignments. At one point we weren't even going to be given a
student card from the university, and quote 'won't be allowed access to the library services at
the university because you are on a distance course.' To me this is absolutely ridiculous and
really begs the question what am I actually paying for? The certificate. That is all the university
really has to provide; awarded to students who self direct their study, provide their own
placements and research, and are not even allowed to access online university academia. My
first degree is basically worthless without experience... -- usually in London or major cities -- is
not really regarded as applicable experience. To think nowadays I would have to spend 3 times
as much for the same experience is astounding.

The devalued, unable to elicit recognition, can’t solicit contact, and lack access to the
fabric constitutive of being competent and, consequently experience dislocation,
disengagement and de-realisation and these are the fundamental modalities
constituted via institutional processes that derive sources of value through
abstracted administrative processes that materialise the appearance of functions that consist of little beyond association with the administration of the products of others' labour. When you undergo a process that is almost impossible to finance, leaving you bankrupt and, occupationally, negated, that involves neither access to resources, nor involving experiences, or colloquially, "opportunities", and you cannot afford technology beyond the minimum required to sustain your capacity to function as a solitary producer materialising the appearance of the function of others, and then you are asked to "list any skills by type of equipment/software, etc. that make you more qualified for the position"; or for "Current professional licenses/certifications/registrations"; it is utterly galling. Such aspects are effects of embedding and involve a key difference between the type of occupationally indeterminate 'education' the poor tend to be subject to and employment, that is, an employer has to embed you in a sphere of involvements that constitute possibilities appropriated via such modalities, that is, an employer has to ensure that you are capable of performing your role by embedding you in involvements that disclose a horizon that constitutes your capacity to respond by appropriating forms arising from such processes, education doesn't need to do this and students are left to fend for themselves, adapting whatever their domestic resources are in order to attempt to labour to materialise products that obscure, as far as they are capable, the absence of involvement in anything, characteristic of disciplines that involve nothing beyond the problem of resolving such problems of absence that constitute the limited capacities those limited by the circumscriptions of poverty and stigma endure. This key, suppressed, difference, in income and status, was apparent when I was a postgraduate student, academics had access to computers and to university networks, they had offices, space, as a student, my income was too low to be able to afford a personal computer. My capacities arose from the limited sphere of actualisation available to me in a situation defined by the absence of any access to resources: I was not allowed to teach because I was told that I was on a "full maintenance award" (a condition of being-there) and therefore "one of the better-off students" (that is, I was unable to obscure my finances and plead poverty in one of the convoluted ways poverty is transfigured into wealth and wealth into poverty by institutions which must privilege the rich in order to satisfy their institutional prerequisites and service their significant clientele, providing arguments based on social justice to privilege the privileged and aligning the symbolic with the economic, justifying such inequalities, transposing cultural inequalities into personal and natural ones), even though students with grants two-and-a-half-times what my Economic and Social Research Council award was were given teaching in the department. So, any capacity to appropriate technology was as circumscribed as any possibilities for development were by a condition that was merely another version of unemployment: without access to any sphere of involvements that might constitute the properties required, I was judged lacking and unsuitable to teach, and, thereby had to undergo the destructuring experience characteristic of those who lack the social value to show up as significant and worthy interlocutors. These are also key differences between those with valued skills, in science, who access technology-rich environments, and those with worthless skills who can neither access employment nor study anything that involves access to resources. When I was a PhD student, my supervisor would not take on an email address, I assume, because he understood it
would entail increased contact, and thereby make visible the strategies of evasion routinely adopted to avoid contact which might bequeath obligations. As a postgraduate student, what is available flows through your supervisor, which means that you must be able to solicit engagement in order to experience the mediation of a world, which means that the avoidance of contact becomes a key mediation of the way supervisors avoid obligations and avoid the visibility of the strategies they adopt to realise such a state of affairs. The refusal to take on institutional email addresses was part of these dynamics. Because of dislocation, you spend your life attempting to solicit contact and academics are expert at displacing such efforts. So, how does such education address deficits? It merely entrenches deficits arising from poverty and dislocation and transfigures them into abilities to answer such questions but it legitimates such differences, it is assumed that people have had opportunities which legitimates judgements relating to differences that subtend such objectivities. The provision of education, becomes, part of the legitimating of denials of opportunity. Rather than education being part of the embedding, and provision, of realising forms, it becomes part of the legitimisation of the effects of non-opportunity, allowing for misconceptions which blame victims for the sense of properties that are effects of such complex institutional mediations. Moreover, such questions allude to aspects of mobilisation, to relational forms that arise from embedding, from involvement in discrete public spheres. This is precisely what is lacking in education based on the private use of institutional space to establish relationships that extort the sense of a process whilst objectifying the employees who materialise the appearance of their function via association of their name with the administration of the labour of others. These questions probe for public aspects that are conditional upon the recognitions which disclose such aspects so that individuals are subject to environing possibilities that they can appropriate. They allude to aspects of collective intentionality that become conditional upon capacities embedded in the private use of forms of capital that arise from private relationships, and so, the idea that such 'public' processes can address deficits rooted in the systemic reproduction of such differences is absurd. In reality, those whose labour arises from an insignificant position, have very limited capacities to appropriate forms, that subtend recognised forms of competence, because the constitutive effects of recognitions that disclose forms that materialise capacities arising from such aspects are missing. Without being able to connect, without mediation, how can education address deficits? In reality, all it does it perpetuate deficits rooted in a class structure that its own processes emerge from. What is clear is that education merely reproduces the same interpersonal dynamics constitutive of the objectivities that govern resource access which is why it so effortlessly transfigures inequalities into sensible aspects crystallised via subjection to temporalized, and spatialized, aspects that arise from the relational perception of aspects whose sense inhere in such processes. The identification of competence is an effect of practical forms of understanding of the grounds constitutive of competencies and this is why elite education takes the form it does opposed to the anonymous, impersonal, dislocated, mass competition characteristic of the education of the poor. Education involves completely different modalities relating to the status of the clientele which is why it has such different outcomes. Competencies are identified via their public conditions of actualisation, that is, they are identified via manifestations of involvement which disclose the
forms that constitute the properties arising from experiences of being subject to such associational possibilities as actual experiences of being-situated via such circumscribing aspects. Relations of involvement manifest a recognition that is a disclosive aspect of a medium appropriated via being subject to such modalities. It is because of the constitutive nature of such processes that employers use such criteria because properties are temporally sustained forms that require an incorporation that realises the individual, guaranteeing a capacity to project via forms that ensure competence, because the individual has inscribed the sense of such aspects as surely as their CV manifests the inscribed traces of such processes. But this is also why identity erosion is such a prominent aspect of the contestation of labour market positions because the devalued struggle to purchase access, educationally, to anything beyond the minimal administrative, relational, forms required to constitute the traces of a bureaucratised process that can be as devoid of mediation as it is bereft of actualisation. The reality comes through nicely in the following:

You’re not even that significant to them for them to conspire against yer. I look at them and think, why would they be interested in me. If I was a middle class cunt I wouldn’t give a fuck about someone from a place I’d never heard of. I’m under no illusions, I mean fuck all to my supervisor, if I died tomorrow, “oh what a shame, next question, oh yes”...before I even met him I knew he would never give a fuck about me. You just need one to do the doctorate, and they want the money so it’s a marriage of convenience, they smile an’ pretend like they give a fuck an’ you get your work done best yer can, that’s the extent of it.

Notice the expression, "I’m under no illusions": yet this is a field in which being illusioned is a key aspect of intersubjective donations of significance that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in the disclosure of a horizon relating to a boundary inscribed via the sense of aspects that inhere in visibilities that such processes reconfigure. Moreover, being illusioned is a key aspect of the selection of those who have experienced the successful projection arising from the recognitions which constitute the continuities which physiognomically regenerate experiences of capacity and commitment. Without access to realisations that constitute the sense of forms incorporated via subjection to the disclosure of such aspects, the individual cannot project and they undergo the sedimentation of meanings, coopted via a presence attuned via such inter-relational dynamics. How can an individuated relationship deliver individuals to aspects that inhere in a relation to a collective? If the sense of being competent inheres in relational aspects, to collective forms of intentionality, then a privatised, individualised, educational process that reduces to the procurement, alone, via discrete administrative processes, constituted via the dislocated labour of the poor, of incomes transferred to finance an institutional charade, will not satisfy such criteria and the people subject to such processes will face an experience of being incompetent that is part of the objective constitution of such modalities. Moreover, control over objectification requires a capacity to elicit recognition so that one can solicit contact so that one can accede to objectivities rooted in recognitions that constitute the sense of such aspects. The ability to operationalise networks and thereby undergo objectivisation, is an effect of forms of social value that become transposed into sources of self-actualisation, referential aspects rooted in capacities for description that inhere in the disclosure of a horizon whose materialisation is an aspect of relationships to realities that emerge via
processes of closure that obscure the nature of what is occurring. Valuationary processes constitute ways of being-there, experiences of being are inflected via different forms of actualisation, and the anonymity of negation precludes accession to representational forms of intentionality, the circumstantial aspects of the interpersonal mediations that constitute experiences of being are different, the qualities experienced via being-there, are infused with the sense of different aspects. Just as employers identify competencies via the interpersonal conditions that constitute their possibility, so, too, individuals experience different statuses via different qualities arising from subjection to the recognition of differences that transpose distances into different forms of self-actualisation, involving different frames of reference to intra-worldly aspects that arise from the informal constitution of such modalities. The devalued feel bereft of competence because they are bereft of contextualisation, and realisation, and letters of reference mirror this dislocation, referring merely to students literary production, the marks of a process of self-financed, self-education, the minimal institutional labour required to materialise the appearance of a process using an administrative shell that realises institutional agents in relation to the sense of aspects that are bereft of existential cogency for many who function, merely, as a foil for the actualisation of others, narcissistic enablers. This is why the devalued emerge from educational processes bearing the traces of distances transposed into the sense of discrepant properties because their educational process lacks embedding. Competency-based references are a huge problem for those who struggle to purchase access to credentials that do not relate to any public access to anything. The reference-writers have problems referring to the social properties of candidates who, often, they have never really situated publicly anyway because their relationship reduces to the purchase of an anonymous process that itself reduces to the students capacity to generate the documents required to materialise the appearance of a process via association of the academics’ names with the administration of their labour. Weak references that provide little required information are the mark of a mutilating educational process that cannot elicit appropriate characteristics because the real issue underlying competence: contextualisation; remains, despite the reclassification of the poor so as to make an economic function out of redundant populations forced to compete for positions they are ill-equipped to access. Contextualisation requires resources: space has to be made available, an effort of involvement has to be made that organises such possibilities so that there is the disclosure of constitutive interpersonal forms, and, of course, for the precious form of valuation, employment, to be available, money has to be made available via a legitimate institutional relationship and yet what is attractive about humanities education is it can dispense with such aspects altogether, materialising the appearance of a process out of purely abstracted administrative relationships that require no more co-presence than the thrice yearly trip to a supervisor’s office. Whilst institutional agents are objectified via such relationships, students are not. Lives unlived are born of incapacities to experience being forms whose constitutive interpersonal grounds remain unavailable, locking individuals out of a fabric of being that is part of the political contestation of reality that takes place via the very interpersonal shapes that are emergent aspects of that reality. The ability to exist, how we experience being, is a provisional aspect of our being-for-others whose conditions must be satisfied and these conditions need to be
attended to if we are to grant individuals access to their capacities and to abilities to contribute, and emerge from indifference and insignificance, via interpersonal forms that constitute capacities for projection that can only arise from recognition, involvement and realisation. The absence of embedding transfigures distances into the sense of an absence that makes the identification of the competence indeterminate. Problems with the identification of competence remain, despite credentials, because the credentials are purchased separately from embedding in anything and the more institutions sell degrees, the worse the process will become. Moreover, it is important to recognise how powerless the poor are. They exist outside of any possibilities for connection and must attempt to turn themselves into an institutional resource from outside of any involvement in anything. Whatever you are capable of developing will be mutilated in its form via your position so that asking people to transcend their position and purchase a viability via the development of projects, without situating their labour, will fail because the form of their labour will be affected by their lack of involvement. Claiming benefits and studying are just two identical experiences, only the state bureaucracy financing you changes. More importantly, without access to contexts that disclose such possibilities, how can the individual identify "skills...that make you more qualified for the position"? The grounds of determinacy of such aspects, the experiences of being-able to appropriate possibilities via forms whose disclosure realise one in relation to the sense of forms physiognomically materialised via access to the interactive aspects of co-existence that lead one to feel assured of being perceived to bear the sense of such possibilities, requires actualisation, so that self-ascription has public and associational conditions that are the rationale for these questions and yet education itself doesn't provide access to such grounds. Moreover, as the education degrades, with people required to finance more and more of it, it also loses its significance and becomes distant from the conditions of attribution of competencies which become accessible via private networks that anonymous educational processes obscure. Elite education, occupation specific as it tends to always be, is closed to ensure its value and circumscribe, spatially, those privileged with access to it, whilst mass education becomes closed at higher levels via surreptitious processes that exploit the idea of a public function whilst denigrating the supposed beneficiaries. As education loses its significance people require more of it but any possibilities for involvement recede. Instead of the educational institution mediating access, the individual becomes the source of the mediation and disclosure of forms that materialise the appearance of functions whose autonomy are an effect of the closures that constitute the value of institutional agents who extort value, and resources, via being subject to objectifying relational processes that connect individuals with nothing. This is why the issue of embedding is constantly probed for because it manifests the effects of the closures that constitute human capacities and is a manifestation of the constitutive condition of competence: value. Selectors are so attentive to the forms of involvement manifest via the inscribed traces of exclusive relational forms because they are effects of recognitions which disclose the forms incorporated via responsive absorption in such modalities so that they manifest aspects sedimented, and then crystallised, via representational forms that manifest accession to representational forms of intentionality, that is, they attend to how individuals have been contextualised and
embedded because these are effects of the effaced conditions of competence: being valued. Manifestation of being-perceived as significant is constitutive of the significances manifest via the inscribed traces of experiences of being subject to such modalities and, for individuals, without an experience of being significant, without involvement, they don't accede to forms which constitute meanings inscribed via being subject to such modalities, they don't experience the interpersonal grounds of realisation so that they accede to projections and an understanding of properties manifest via such processes, their identities are not aligned because they don't experience the substrate of behavioural forms that physiognomically materialise such aspects. Without experience of aspects being elicited aspects of your objectivity, you don't experience the meaning arising from involvement in disclosures of such possibilities and you exist in doubt as to your capacities. How we are perceived is manifest via qualities of recognition that reveal aspects of our objectivity so that we become aware of aspects of our being-for-others as an orientational medium of being-there, of involvement in forms that compose our presence, realised as forms of significance via experience of such aspects via experiencing involvement in forms arising from how we are perceived, and, thereby, situated so that meaning-bearing components, concurrent with such realisations constitute our objectivity. The efficacy of such processes is manifest via selection criteria and this is why the nature of the institutions that subtend competence and economic, or institutional, functionality are such significant aspects of public contestation. In reality, the inchoate struggle to acquire certificates, acquired without involvement, is a mis-direction arising from the way the poor are further exploited in an economy whose control of access to resources is effaced via anonymous institutional processes embedded in the class relationships that constitute the institutional reality that the poor face because credentials acquired without contextualisation, embedding or involvement, are worthless, they lack reference within the system itself because the institutional agents who institute the fraud understand, intuitively, the meaning of forms because they can immediately sense the effects of intentional aspects whose sense inhere in their own, collective and aggregative, strategies which constitute the clearing within which aspects are signified. Exposure to the interpersonal grounds of such distinctions signifies individuals beyond consciousness, or intent, because the effects of different valences of capital ensure the anonymity of the processes characteristic of the institutional use of the poor who exist as far as they can constitute themselves as a resource, attach income to themselves, and accede to a functionality as spurious as their possibilities are limited. As value becomes more conditional, so, the processes governing its constitution become contested. Having developed a project in isolation in order to finance its administration so that a group of academics can judge it in order to objectify themselves and experience ways of being-there that your own 'education' does not involve, what, exactly, are you going to attain via paying for more of a process that has already been unnecessarily attenuated? And should individuals be forced to enter relationships that are so impoverishing? Can they risk further robbery? This is what occurs when state institutions become colonised, and their purpose subverted, by processes of valorisation that dispossess the very individuals supposed to be the beneficiaries. That state institutions can be commandeered in such ways should warn us about the limits of the possible ways in
which dispossessed groups can be empowered by state institutions which quickly
become mediums for the production of sources of value, and forms of remuneration,
that channel resources via relationships that constitute the appearance of
legitimacy. You have people who are condemned to education whose insignificance
then condemns them to bear the sense of an absence that warrants forcing them to
consume more of vacuous administrative relationships that do little beyond
destructure their existence further and magnify a difference they experience being
constitutive of an absence that leaves them perpetually negated. The problem is
individuals have no control over what is accessible to them. Any rights reduce to
protocols relating to the bureaucratised processing of their labour, they can't
actually access anything, educationally, beyond a charade they must labour, alone,
to materialise, so how can they deliver themselves to an individualised relation to
forms that require relational actualisation, reciprocity and recognition as these
modalities become ever more contested by the devaluation of a system increasing
supply of qualified individuals in order to maximise income? Individuals can neither
know what they will need in the labour market, nor be able to access required forms
when these are constituted via their unavailability. The devalued cannot perceive
courses of action because they cannot mediate possibilities and it is this reduction
that is an effect of structural dislocation that makes them prey to punitive
educational processes. Having been provided with nothing, one discovers the
conditional nature of attributions of significance but, usually, long after one has
exhausted the meagre resources available that, fleetingly, grant you a viability as
spurious as the relationships you enter are instrumental. This is why selection
criteria like, "broad academic and/or professional experience in sociology", are so
discriminatory, they presume interpersonal modalities that remain unavailable to
even the few who manage to survive such an arduous and harrowing process of
informal screening that reduces many to the same inexistence they turned to
education to escape. Individuals cannot connect themselves to the basis of
disclosures which constitute a horizon they experience via being-situated in relation
to materialisations whose form constitute capacities intuited via experiences of
being-there, they cannot contextualise themselves such that their faculties are
engaged via absorptions which constitute integratory forces that allow for an
experience of the coherence of being arising from the transcendence of the finitude
of inexistence via the realisation of recognitions which elicit such modalities.
Looking at the experience of students, how can they accede to a "broad academic
and/or professional experience in sociology" when, for most, what contact there is,
is merely an obligation required to constitute the charade of some kind of process.
The poverty of the process is rooted in the dislocation arising from the function of
students as relational-nodes used to refract the appearance of functions where, in
reality, nothing exists beyond the dislocated self-education of individuals who are
forced to function as resources because of the monopolisation of instruments of
objectification that ensure that the grounds of rare experiences remain unavailable,
and thereby, distinguishing. Given that the major difficulty for the poor is to find any
means to constitute something they can use to purchase higher degrees in the face
of the provision of nothing, we see how discriminatory criteria like the following are:
"List any special skills, qualifications, and other experiences that may qualify you for
employment". Given the experience we have seen characterised, how would
anyone access anything that might constitute such possibilities? Given that all that is available to many is a generic, anonymous, process whose dislocation is born of distances whose form constitute valuationary processes that sustain differences in contextualisation, how can people access the grounds that manifest such forms? Without access to anything, how can individuals even represent themselves? If the extent of the possibilities available to you reduce to using a benefit-level income, and the lifestyle it necessitates, to produce a project, arising from the same social and associational parameters, so that its administration can objectify institutional agents, how would you be able to represent yourself at all? What practices can you allude to in order to generate self-descriptions? What institutional aspects? I lived in a bedroom and struggled to pay for higher degrees that involved almost nothing beyond me satisfying the funding and assessment criteria, in isolation. What skills would you have to represent as an effect? Without access to involvements in exclusive public forms, that are clearly unavailable to the majority who access little more than a generic, anonymous, administrative process, whose appearance is materialized via the labor of administrative agents, how can people describe themselves as subject to relational forms that their educational process does not involve? Even 'within' institutions, individuals are unable to elicit recognition and solicit contact so that their ability to signify themselves via objectivizing relationships whose disclosure realise them in relation to projective forms, that physiognomically sustain aspects, retained via an experience of a coherence that inheres in a continuity born of an experience of symmetry that is an effect of forms whose sense arise from congruity, and the realisation of recognitions which constitute such affirming aspects, is unavailable, and individuals cannot accredit to themselves the identity of forms they do not experience and the impoverished nature of the contextualization arising from a mutilated being-for-others affects their capacity to represent themselves adequately, it affects the authenticity of their projection: how can they, in all truthfulness, accredit to themselves forms whose exclusive nature ensure they don't experience being socially realized? The devalued experience a mutilation whose circumscription inhibits their projection and thereby, the constitutive conditions of their humanity, and this plays out in the labor market as inability to satisfy criteria that relate to closures that constitute forms of objectification whose grounds inhere in exclusivity so that the deprived experience, via being unable to satisfy such criteria, further mediations of insignificance that inhere in relations of involvement that arise from perception of their difference. Experience of being-perceived as different is part of the anonymous nature of public institutions that require access to forms of value inscribed via private experiences of realisation, that are surreptitiously reproduced via recognition of differences incorporated via such mediations that transfigure differences in status into what appear to be attitudinal differences in capacity that arise from the disclosure of such aspects so that identities are affected by access to the public conditions via which attributions of significance, and competence, arise. Feeling unable to satisfy labor market criteria and feeling generally unable as an effect of failure to access the institutional grounds of such objectivities is just part of the reproduction of insignificance arising from a devaluation that transmutes insignificance into incompetence. Without access to exclusive relational forms that disclose what is almost impossible to access: involvement, how could one attribute to oneself
competencies one cannot signify. Exclusion from the grounds of forms that are exclusively, relationally, constituted transmutes devaluation into insignificance because one has no way to represent oneself as subject of the relational basis via which attributions of competence are made because the conditions which satisfy such states are not disclosed and this affects the intentional forms constituted via subjection to an anonymity that precludes self-representation. If your education involves nothing, and certificates arise from processes that don't involve, involvement, then how do you manifest aspects of yourself that you don't really access yourself? Without access to the interpersonal grounds of aspects whose significance arise from closures, individuals cannot represent themselves because they don't access the interpersonal grounds of significances and they are unable to satisfy criteria that relate to relational forms whose grounds remain unavailable, this takes the form of being-unable to fill-in required sections or even be able to get institutional agents to help one culturally produce the forms required to satisfy such criteria. For example, getting letters of reference or getting testimonials of teaching effectiveness are impossible because institutional agents will not attend to the production of the institutional traces that manifest the authenticity of such aspects. In such conditions, what can the devalued do? When you exist outside of access to any institutional relationships, making interaction difficult, how can you get agents to act on your behalf when communication itself is fraught with difficulties? Of course, you cannot elicit the recognition and solicit the qualities of engagement required to get institutional agents to produce the cultural forms required to signify oneself as authentically competent and one is forced to give up for want of access to the relational basis of any capacity to project and access the conditions which satisfy an intention to succeed: participation is impossible, and failure assured, and it is only enlightened self-interest to give up so that hopelessness envelopes the individual who has no access to any of the interpersonal grounds required for projection. Attempting to apply for posts via an online site, I was unable to get the site to accept my profile as complete, and was therefore unable to proceed to the stage that allowed me to apply for posts, a process that only mirrors the process of self-elimination one goes through when one attempts to fill-in-application-forms without any of the forms required to satisfy the criteria manifest via their questions. Trying to create an online profile and apply for jobs I was told: "Your CV strength is weak that is why you are not able to apply for jobs. It is important that you include a detailed description for every position you have held. Even though you may have filled all other fields of your CV, a weak description will prevent you from applying for a job and from appearing in a CV search by an employer". The devalued have weak CVs, their invalidity merely transfigured into inability via institutional processes that constitute forms of objectivity, exclusively. The non-being of devaluation constitutes inabilities to represent oneself as an effect of an insignificance that is transfigured into public non-existence via institutional processes that disclose such aspects as a fundamental effect of a contestation that, surreptitiously, ensures those with value experience a significance whose form is constituted via recognitions that involve them in a fabric interwoven via being subject to such aspects, whereas the poor face an insignificance arising from a lack of leverage that leads them to incorporate a sense of inability as an effect of exclusions which are transmuted into what appear to be personalized forms: they have nothing to speak-of, no experience
to speak-to that does not contest the grounds of such differences. Poverty is inscribed in the flesh of the poor as an absence of projection arising from their experience of an insignificance that is interpersonally constituted via the disclosure of a difference that ensures they do not experience forms constitutive of representational forms of intentionality and, therefore, can neither represent themselves nor exhibit appropriate, or 'good', intentions. What has to be considered is that the study of worthless subjects generally involves poverty and dislocation. In subjects like sociology there are way too many students taken on in order to raise departmental revenue so there are more postgraduates than can be provided with teaching so that 'support' tends to go to those with leverage, those with income who are fee-paying. It is easy to overlook that the irrelevance and worthlessness of sociology make it impossible to situate oneself publicly, one cannot access anything even via the departments one financed by functioning as a resource, so, how can individuals locate themselves in relation to a world whose relational forms constitute possibilities one can describe oneself in relation to? For the poor, education involves dislocation and poverty so how can individuals "List...special skills, qualifications, and other experiences that may qualify you for employment"? For many, access to anything is so challenging that self-financing higher degrees appears the only mediation: given the parameters of the available, how are they to represent themselves? Who accesses a "broad academic and/or professional experience in sociology"? The academics appropriating resources and using institutional space to constitute a world of involvement that can materialise such possibilities as aspects of a public existence in which such possibilities are realised. Using institutional space to constitute a reality whose actuality informs being via differences of involvement that tacitly refer to those whose negation is manifest only too clearly in their dislocation, "they don't care about certain class of people", as one person put it, "they turn a blind eye to you if you are poor. The universities don't care, the Chinese students are paying nine grand in fees so they are looked after. I can see it the way they live"; the elite ensure they accede to representational forms of intentionality whose grounds of possibility are constituted so that they accede to ways of being arising from forms of existence that satisfy the conditions necessary for them to experience intentional aspects rooted in the practice of such distinctions. Those who can "List...special skills, qualifications, and other experiences that may qualify you for employment" are those being consecrated and the processes of cultural valorisation are key aspects of the everyday class struggle. For those who are unable to dignify their work via involvement in some cultural sphere, those who will struggle, given the nature of universities, to access anything at all, personally, how can they satisfy any of these selection criteria? They are in no better position for wasting lots of time and effort and whatever money was available to them than any other member of the unemployed. Without access to involvements which might constitute such modalities, how can they experience being capable of intentional aspects that inhere in relational processes? Without recognition and involvement they cannot even describe themselves via such aspects and when they look at application forms they are condemned to an inability that, throughout their education, condemns them to silence. Whereas, personally, they must censor themselves so as to avoid inciting the negation they endure anyway, and not speak, the private form of this experience is inability to satisfy selection criteria because the person cannot represent
themselves because they have no non-negating experiences because all that is available to them is a generic process supposed to materialise a 'public' process that has, in fact, been deeply degraded by the use of institutions, privately, to valorise, and objectify, particular configurations of capital that become transfigured and legitimated by the private relationships that render invisible the real nature of the usurpation of 'public' space. Is there, really, such a thing as 'public space'? It seems all such space is constituted via class processes concerned with forms of value that materialise distinctions within that space. Many endure educational processes where they do not even know people in the departments they pass through because their presence reduces to the administrative mediations that materialise the traces of a process bereft of interpersonal reality or co-presence. For the poor, education involves restriction, reduction and penury because it forces particular conditions upon them: they are not free to work because employment is hopelessly mediated and they must occupy this limbo between employment and unemployment that obscures unemployment without counting in employment: they are restricted by poverty: many cannot afford to be socially participant: the whole public paraphernalia of institutionalised distinction is actually unavailable because privately financed via this appropriation of resources by withholding access to forms that force such conditions on the poor. This is why criteria like "broad academic and/or professional experience in sociology" and "special skills, qualifications, and other experiences" are so discriminatory: they are effects of distinctions that tacitly refer to those who can do no more than struggle to function as a resource until they confront such criteria and experience the annihilation that was always immanent to their cultural position, meanings experienced via such experiences of being:

...academia is quite a terrible joke. It is a closed shop system for the ones who play by the rules...It is so terrible that I cannot laugh anymore at it. It just sick me. So I avoid the theme at all. I am so hurt with Academia that I refuse to hear and talk about it. I mean it. I cannot stand. I don't even complain. I refuse to talk on academic subjects because it is useless and only does me harm...I know, from personal experience, that they'll never say anything, that they'll smile with contempt, then they'll forget everything. This is a corrupt system, a poisonous one, and people like us could only wait with the hope for the ruin of the academia. Otherwise, we're simply damned. I'm sorry, but I'm living, personally, a quite terrible time. Family falling apart, money constraining more than ever, and I'm feeling without any enthusiasm about nothing after the PhD.

Without participation in a horizon disclosed so that individuals experience the physiognomic materialisation of possibilities whose actuality they experience being, they are not part of the fabric of existence that make such modalities available and they cannot allude to intentional forms because they are not capable of experiencing them, not because they are incapable, congenitally, but because the cultural grounds of the meanings remain unavailable to them. This is why one working class person can say "we never get that meaning, the meaning is not the same for us". In this sense, the idea that education, can in itself, address the effects of dislocations themselves economically born, is simply absurd. Education merely becomes another sphere of cultural mediation in which the poor face valuationary dynamics that limit and immiserate them. The whole problem is the field cannot embed students because the students are subject to individualised relationships which materialise the appearance of a process and function where nothing is occurring beyond the
derivation of forms of value via abstracted administrative relationships. For students to be validated, they have to be embedded, and it is involvement which constitutes, not merely, forms that signify competence but the capacity to intuit appropriate forms because one experiences involvement in a sphere that makes available such modalities. The reason why criteria like "broad academic and/or professional experience in sociology", or "special skills, qualifications, and other experiences", are used is because they are manifestations of significant forms that are relevant to employers: they are effects of a social value emblematised via access to conditions which satisfy intentional forms constituted via such processes. For most, form-filling and solitary labour are the reality of a process whose appearance must be materialised via the student in the hope of somehow objectifying themselves. A process bound to fail given the institution of differences that constitute both valuationary forms and differences of capacity. How would someone from a distant region, who has to develop a competence from a bedroom, outside of access to any involvement in any public sphere constitute a competence they could use to finance the transfiguration of their labour into an administratively signified objectivity? Individuals cannot embed themselves which is why competence is not a purely private or individualised issue and this is also why social science is so sectarian. How could those facing a purely anonymous process constitute themselves outside of access to anything and how could they establish a competence that would be recognised when the grounds of identity of competencies arise from closures? Take for example, the following, criteria, "Ph.D. required in Sociology, or related discipline with specialization in justice and global human rights advocacy". When your degrees involve absolutely no access to any sphere of public existence whatsoever, how on earth would you ever arrive at such a competence? How would you signify it? How would you establish its institutional grounds so that you were actually perceived to bear its sense? And without access to such conditions how would you establish the intention of acquiring such a competence? The conditions which make it available are constitutive of an individual's capacity to project via such mediations: without such relational aspects the individual will not merely be unable to appear competent, they will not be able to develop the competence, they will not even be able to project via the intention of acquiring it, they will not be capable of appropriating the forms constitutive of its actuality. How would you ever be capable of instantiating the validity of this objectivity? One sees posts like the following: "The Duke-DKU Global Fellows Program", and, having a PhD, one's heart skips a beat as a glimmer of hope lightens the world. Then one reads the selection criteria, the "Global Fellows Program is designed to offer an international experience to post-doctoral scholars or advanced doctoral students whose records demonstrate excellence in teaching and an interest in pursuing an academic career". When the process via which you procured a PhD reduced to form-filling, outside of direct contact, in which the very dispositions that you were trying to acquire were annihilated by the absence of any constitutive sources of realisation, when, "doing a PhD" involved nothing but self-education and the submission of work, with you being denied access to teaching experience on the grounds that you were "one of the better-off students" because you were the recipient of a "full maintenance award", a criterion using financial principles to constitute the appearance of a decision based on economic value that constituted an absence of access to the
relational basis of forms of objectivity, forms of institutional significance such as these, then how could you represent yourself adequately in the labour market? Your inability to be able to interface with the labour market is merely an effect of a temporal process that has precluded access to sources whose identity inhere in the differentiation constitutive of university culture. But notice, here, highly educated people suffer an inability born of nothing more than its institutional conditions of possibility. Without access to the institutional grounds of particular forms of objectivity, without access to the satisfaction conditions of particular forms of intentionality, individuals are dispossessed of any capacity for projection because the interpersonal conditions for the realisations of forms that constitute such possibilities are absent and, without actualisation, the individual exists will-less. Once you have been denied access to such conditions what can you refer to? How can you fabricate statements about your person in which you are subject to particular forms of possibilities, forms of objectivity, that you experience being unavailable? So, notice that a relationally-based deprivation results in cognitive inabilities, why? Because cognitive states relate to forms of access, to sources of realisation, that presume social embedding. Without experiencing being situated in relation to relational disclosures which physiognomically materialise a sense of properties arising from recognitions which constitute such modalities, how can an individual experience a sphere of existential forms whose sense inhere in such actualising mediations and without experiencing their realisation, how can the sense of such aspects be available as a cognitive modality? Without access to a terrain that is disclosed existentially, in accord with recognitions of rights which constitute what they appear merely to perceive, how can the individual attribute to themselves forms whose public contestation their experience of being makes manifest. The losers in this symbolic struggle for life are not merely denied access to sources of objectification but to the very terrain of identity, with the effect that their identity is mutilated and they are cast onto a terrain of crisis, antipathy and malaise that is at the heart of a competition for resources that must be organised so as to appear to be fair. The best way to materialise the appearance of a fair process is to ensure that individuals become what they are perceived to be. In this way, against a background whose intelligibility arises from the practice, interpersonally, of forms that physiognomically materialise a fabric of differences incorporated via their realisation, individuals have only to appear in order to manifest what they are and the impoverishment and inability of some is merely a reciprocally constituted term of the dexterity and capacity of others. This is why the symbolisation of valuation via its interpersonal disclosure is such a key aspect of economic struggle in societies whose elites must really believe that they are the best and institute relational processes that ensure the progressive incorporation of the effects of inequalities so as to ensure the condemnation of some via the crystallisation of such differences in the CV which is merely the reified effect of a system of public differences which manifest the public significance of institutional processes that, recognising the sense of such forms, inscribe them in the fabric of reality and being itself. When institutional processes are not globally universal, with only the real global elite accessing the grounds of "records" that "demonstrate excellence in teaching and an interest in pursuing an academic career", then how can the poor compete? Such criteria relate to exclusive forms that are, institutionally, instituted to be exclusive,
that is, their form is interpersonally constituted to ensure a continuously manifest
difference between the elite and the also-rans, so that institutional processes
function as mediums of disclosure that constitute different modalities arising from
different ways of being-there. This is why person-hood is a key stake in such
processes. Those of different statuses are realised in different ways so that their
intentional life manifests such differences. Where some are projectively realised in
relation to possibilities whose actualisation constitute a rich cognitive terrain rooted
in co-presence and visibility, the poor face the annihilation of an unrealisation that
manifests the barren nature of the terrain from which their intentional lives arise.
Moreover, if one experienced being recognised so that one was invited to participate
one would experience the realisation of forms whose physiognomic materialisation
constitute sources of the sense of properties so that, experiencing being so
objectivised, one could accredit to oneself the sense of aspects that inhere in such
relational processes. The conditions of attribution of such properties are exclusive
and this is why the educational experience of the poor is a-social, atomised and
anonymous. In the face of such criteria, given the nature of the education available
to the poor, the only thing it makes sense to do is exclude oneself which is merely a
rationalisation of life-long conditions that call the poor to an order inscribed in an
order of objectivity that they face in every aspect of public culture. Another example
is the following, "Lecturer Teaching Focused—International Development
Department", the criteria specify, "training and experience in an area relevant to the
teaching and research of the department", if you use ideas to represent appropriate
phenomena on a generic postgraduate degree, purchasing the anonymous
experience required to materialise the appearance of your 'education', this wouldn't
count, the identity conditions of this competence will relate to private access to
public relational processes and to rare forms that distinguish the elite from the
masses. Using ideas derived from development economics, for example, to
represent the lives of people in the north of England would never count. So, what
are the identity conditions for the establishment of this competence? What will
determine its perception and what are the institutional-relational grounds
constitutive of such an objectivity? The identity of the competence is established via
the public relational forms that satisfy its conditions of possibility so that the labour
market operates with a shrewd practical awareness of what the education of the
poor rarely provides because it is a means of extorting the sense of processes that
benefit employees whilst reproducing distinctions whose materialisation
disempower and divest the poor of any means to develop. Selection criteria
manifest the real significances that subtend educational space. So, one gets
selection criteria like the following:

You will ideally have (or be about to obtain) a PhD, with an excellent record of published
research, and an international profile. Industry experience will also be taken into consideration
where relevant. The post is open to individuals with a proven track record of either teaching,
research or industry excellence and have exciting plans for developing their teaching and/or
research profile into the future.

When the extent of institutional contact reduced to infrequent meetings with a
supervisor who is one's sole point of contact with any aspect of the public world,
how would one develop "an international profile" or ever manifest any of these
aspects? When lower class people come off of PhDs and return to benefits, unable
to even get interviews in the fields that have been their only hope of salvation, how
would they access any of the interpersonal, or institutional, grounds of such
objectivities? When your education saddles you with the problem of financing a
process of certification rooted in nothing beyond your own ingenuity, private
resources and capacity to labour, without access to any disclosive horizon, how
would you project so as to be able to represent yourself as subject to such aspects?
When PhDs are themselves worthless, facing the reduction to idleness that is an
effect of the worthlessness of credentials devalued, more devastatingly, by your own
devaluation and by the absence which constitutes your sense of the absurdity of
your efforts to project intellectually, how would you project via anything remotely
resembling "exciting plans for developing...teaching and/or research profile into the
future" when your experience of the future was of a reduction to a temporal
immanentism born of a devaluation that makes such possibilities impossible, how
could you satisfy such criteria? Sociology reproduces and transfigures a distinction
between the employed and the unemployed within itself: the employed access the
interpersonal grounds of modalities which constitute capacities for representation
whose identity inhere in such relational possibilities and the unemployed,
reclassified via an effort to finance access to processes that transmute their
objectivity, find themselves reduced and possessed of no capacities to align
themselves with associations whose public, institutional conditions of attribution
inhere in relational states they cannot access. Clearly, the attribution of competence
and its identification inhere in institutional embedding and the education that many
of the devalued undergo lacks contact, involvement, disclosure, embedding and is
characterised by a contactless anonymity mirroring the primal experiences of the
devalued everywhere who face their insignificance via inabilities to elicit recognition,
to matter, and solicit contact leaving them bereft of access to capacities to affect an
incapacity that is born of such conditions of existence. Undergoing a process devoid
of anything beyond the self-generation of documentary forms that can be used
narcissistically via abstracted administrative relationships in order to materialise the
appearance of 'educational' processes, many never access a terrain of existence that
would allow them ever to contest such positions. The problem is that the absurdity
of the dislocation many endure makes even imagining being able to do a job
inconceivable. Without access to the interpersonal, institutional, conditions which
constitute forms whose physiognomic materialisation disclose the sense
appropriated via experiencing being subject to such modalities, the devalued cannot
imagine themselves capable because the relational basis of intentional forms that
presume contextualisation are absent. Individuals cannot tacitly summon capacities
out of the ether, individuals cannot spontaneously intuit appropriate forms without
access to a disclosive medium that constitutes such possibilities as actual aspects of
one's person, and these are completely lacking for the devalued who find themselves
reclassified via mediations that merely mirror, directly, the processes that constitute
their objectivity in relation to other labour markets, all educational reclassification
does is take the excluded and turn them into people who are unemployed in relation
to a particular field that was financed via their reclassification. The grounds of
differences of objectivity are precisely rearticulated because the recognition of forms
physiognomically regenerates such aspects so that differences are sedimented and
entrenched via differences in trajectory that manifest valences of capital that become transfigured into differences of significance in relation to differences of involvement that constitute different ways of being-there, different forms of contextualisation in relation to differences of realisation that constitute the sense of differences whose circumscription disclose possibilities for some and destructure the lives of others. If individuals accede to credentials outside of access to the institutional conditions that, either, validate them or disclose a horizon via immersive actualisation that physiognomically materialises forms whose sense constitute circumstantial aspects via which individuals become subjects, become able, to intuit appropriate forms because they experience the materialisation of a medium that constitutes such possibilities, then, are they qualified in anything? If individuals accede to certificates outside of any conditions that establish the identity of competencies identified via forms of embedding that are unavailable to the majority, then are they certified? Are the certificates real? Given such circumstances, what is the difference between someone who fakes credentials and someone who holds worthless credentials? If you undergo an educational process in which the academics involved have no authority, whatsoever, in relation to the forms you produce in order to materialise the appearance of their competence via the abstracted bureaucratic relationships that materialise the appearance of your 'education', then in what way is this any different to self-certification and to vain projection, to lying? This is why so many who undergo such processes feel fake, a fraud, their feelings are effects of the extortion of the sense of a process where none exists and of the narcissistic extortion of the sense of competencies that have no reality beyond the administrative procedures that produce the artefacts that constitute the symbolic forms that function as sources of value in bankrupt societies whose cultural institutions are corrupt. If you hold degrees in 'disciplines' whose fragmentation relate to closures via which institutional agents generate forms of value relating to the identification of competencies relating to barriers whose practice ensure the unavailability of anything via the 'education' available to you, then are you actually educated or qualified? If competence is identified via the inscribed traces of access to relational forms that are aggregative and exclusive, then, do those who access a generic, anonymous, abstracted, administrative, process access anything or is their experience of the absurdity of the process they undergo a valid experience of an invalidation relating to a delegitimation that is merely the obverse of the refraction of the appearance of competence via institutional-relational grounds that constitute such experiential forms? What is the experience that the poor can purchase? The purchase of credentials in social and political science, for example, has no real identity because of the way criteria like, "training and experience in an area relevant to the teaching and research of the department" are constituted. Another university advertises a post using the following criteria:

MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS: ABD or PhD in Sociology or related field is required.

PREFERRED QUALIFICATIONS: Evidence of accomplished undergraduate teaching.

HOW TO APPLY & DEADLINE: A complete application must include: an application letter, specifically addressing the position description and qualifications
Notice that the credentials, which, for some, are almost impossible to finance and involve nothing beyond the administration of the products of their own dislocated labour, are merely the minimum, in other words, they have become so conditional in value upon other aspects of a person’s public identity that they are constituted via a logic of negation, they are insignificant, they will only allow you to apply, you will not be able to elicit recognition or solicit the kinds of contact that would constitute the required forms and this is characteristic of the type of process the poor undergo, institutionally, for the same reasons, this is what happens when a state system is usurped by the private interests of those who use public institutions to operationalise value-instituting closures that constitute the significance of forms and ways of being-there that objectivise some so that they accede to capacities born of subjection to the meaning of being different whilst others endure a continuation of an underlying condition that economic institutions reproduce: the insignificance of the poor and the destructuring of their lives so that they are unable to represent themselves as subject to possibilities. As there is an effaced group, institutionally, so, too the sense of the criteria tacitly refer to the distinction being institutionally perceived, recognised, and practiced and the personal forms this distinction is materialised via relate to forms of presence, ways of being situated, the valued access connection, co-presence and the relational aspects constitutive of capacities for reference that inhere in experiences of being subject to such circumstantial aspects, and the devalued face the absence of mediation, the lack of any contextualising aspects, they experience nothing via being-there, their experience of university consists of nothing and their CVs manifest the marks of the contemporary poor, credentials embedded in nothing relationally manifesting the difference being publicly instituted. The real criteria are referred to as "preferred qualifications" in a revealing conceptual slippage that manifests that the real criteria are experiences that arise from differences of status that arise from different ways of being involved, situated, contextualised and realised that presume recognitions which disclose the forms that constitute the circumscriptions that realise some in relation to ways of being-there that constitute capacities to represent oneself appropriately because one experiences accession to representational forms of intentionality that inhere in experiences of being subject to such possibilities. Without involvement in such relational aspects that disclose forms of involvement that constitute ways of being situated, individuals will be unable to represent themselves, nor be perceived to manifest, appropriate characteristics because the sense of such properties inheres in relational modalities that arise from closures that the educational experience of the poor manifests as a constitutive aspect of the absence of mediation that characterises the dislocation typical of their educational experience. The point is that the significances arising from such differences, and the dispositions that inhere in being realised in relation to different spatial ways of being-there, different ways of being situated, contextualised and actualised, cannot be countermanded: when you are struggling, outside of access to anything, to satisfy bureaucratic criteria relating to an 'educational' process whose appearance consists of abstracted administrative processes that refract the appearance of a process without co-presence, you have no power over what is available to you and the inscription of the sense of an absence arising from experiences of being positioned in such ways, reproduced via labour
market criteria that recognise the experience of those perceived so as to elicit recognition and solicit the contact that bequeaths access to such forms, and modalities, merely publicly institutes a distinction between the employed and the reclassified unemployed, the valued and the devalued, that becomes transfigured via such mechanisms into differences of capacity that inhere in experiences of being subject to the physiognomic regeneration of such differences as ways of being-there, forms of existence. The properties required relate to relational states that are exclusive which arise from a boundary institutionally realised between the valued and devalued, those perceived as congruent and involved and those perceived to be discrepant whose neglect is rendered invisible by a visibility inscribed in disclosures which transfigure their insignificance into what appear to be absences of personal qualities. The fact that "preferred qualifications" refers, not to qualifications but, to qualities interpersonally constituted via exclusive forms of involvement requiring recognition of appropriate characteristics rooted in experiences of being realised in relation to forms that constitute congruency alongside spatial realisation, a co-presence that physiognomically regenerates such aspects, is precisely what one would expect in a system commandeered by elite groups who can use the anonymity of institutional processes to obscure the spatial divisions being realised whose effects are differences of access to the grounds of human capacities. The incompetence of the devalued is merely another aspect of their public degradation by experiences of being-perceived via absences that are the transfiguration of an economic condition into a sense relation whose interpersonal constitution transposes such objectivities into what appear to be personal aspects of the individuals subject to the mediations of nothing that characterise the institutional experience of the poor. Where some are involved and embedded, others are ignored, robbed of even the evidence of their exclusion by the nature of its anonymous realisation. Notice the real terrain via which discrimination is realised in the final criteria, applications must be written "specifically addressing the position description": unless you were subject to the involvements which disclose forms that constitute capacities for self-representation that inhere in experiences of being subject to such possibilities, how could you possibly manifest appropriate characteristics? How could you manifest appropriate characteristics without experiences of being involved such that you become capable of representing oneself as, actually, subject to such possibilities as attributed aspects of a public identity rooted in recognitions which are contested and exclusive? How can individuals address the "position description" without being subject to involvements that constitute the type of forms that allow them to represent themselves as capable of satisfying conditions they cannot experience being constituted without involvements that relate to employment? Unless you are subject to involvements that disclose the forms constitutive of the sense of properties that are positional attributes of the public identities of persons who accede to such modalities via recognitions of other forms of value, effaced via the mass administration of the devalued, how could you satisfy such criteria? Moreover, without access to the constitutive grounds of the forms which are perceived to manifest appropriate properties, how could one experience the attribution of such aspects as possibilities of one's being-for-others, how could one even evidence, that one were capable of instantiating forms whose conditions of attribution one did not experience being interpersonally constituted?
More particularly, without such realisations, how could one incarnate the effects of realisations that require immersion in relational networks that sustain complex configurations of forms arising from sustained engagement in nested positions that sediment forms crystallised via the closures which constitute the conditions which satisfy the attribution of such aspects? This is why one sees criteria that require one to provide "Evidence of teaching effectiveness, including testimonials or transcripts". Given that, for many, their education is a solitary, contactless, process whose relational underpinnings reduce to the occasional meetings that materialise the appearance of a process for which academics are accredited, how could one satisfy such criteria? As credentials become more worthless, and as more compete, the interpersonal nature of their acquisition changes, affecting their significance as the relations of involvement constitutive of them shift, making the issue of the institutional production of objectivities a significant terrain. What has changed radically, are the relational forms of embedding that certificates relate to and their significance arises via. As academics retreat into capital-generating networks, the credentials are only selectively validated, with the de-legitimating process many endure leaving them uncertain of what skills they may claim to possess. These problems beset referees and letters of reference manifest the limited nature of contact, with referees unable to lay claim to exhibitions of competence via processes that reduce to the solitary production of literary forms, which are usually the object of descriptions, whose administration materialise the appearance of a process via relationships that extort a sense of the validity of those who judge and access the relational basis of disclosures which constitute capacities that inhere in being subject to such possibilities, whilst students access little beyond the minimal contact required to materialise the appearance of a process where nothing, really exists. This nothing is then transfigured into what appear to be absences of properties, and inabilities to satisfy such criteria, so that the devalued are forced to merely rationalise their failure, realise its inevitability and give up because the real issue, here, is that they have never accessed the interpersonal conditions constitutive of intentional aspects that inhere in relational forms that their presence doesn’t elicit so that they experience the meaning of their being via experiences of an absence arising from an insignificance that physiognomically regenerates an experience of lack that is an effect of a devaluation that they experience being transfigured into aspects of their being-for-others, aspects of publicly mediated identities, that preclude their involvement because these meanings are constituted via anonymous processes that preclude access to the interpersonal grounds of objectivities that arise from co-presence, recognition, valuation. Access to the conditions required to experience the identity of the competence requires access to the relational involvements that disclose the objectivity of such forms as aspects of one’s person, as opposed to the conditional possibilities of forms via which individuals experience their not-being-perceived to be appropriate, and thereby, experience the unavailability of forms of objectivity that are continuously manifest via the forms of a process that discloses such aspects: this is why selection criteria attend to the real grounds of the competence, the real conditions of satisfaction of intentional forms that inhere in being subject to the realisation of such modalities, so that a person’s person is guaranteed by evidence of membership because these forms are constituted via closures, via practices born of recognitions, which disclose such
modalities so that those valued accede to an experience of being-able to bear-the-sense of such aspects because such experiences are constitutive of the capacity: being perceived as significant, and being involved in exclusive relational aspects, constitutes capacities for reference that inhere in instantiations arising from realisations that physiognomically materialise forms of expressivity that arise from experiencing being subject to such possibilities as realised modalities of one's being-for-others, one's status, as publicly distinct, perceived and recognised, constitutes differences of actuality that disclose the reality of differences of possibility that enhance the form of life of some and debilitating others. Without involvement you would share none of the incorporated sense arising from experiencing being situated via such modalities and would never be capable of performing the role, which is precisely why selection criteria are as they are because the conditions constitutive of being competent presume forms of involvement characteristic of employment and education separate from employment cannot address deficits, nor their effects, which is why its form just reproduces them. Individuals are subject to precisely the same forms of treatment, that constitute a public incapacity born of subjection to the public realisation of such differences, as modalities that subtend accession to capacities that inhere in closures arising from statuses, informally perceived, which disclose space via forms that constitute some as able to refer via forms they experience being realised in relation to whilst others access an absence of mediation constituted via barriers whose sense they inscribe as an inability to refer because they experience nothing via being situated via such processes. In these areas, what selection criteria relate to are rare forms that are, generally, unavailable to the mass who purchase credentials whose identity are such that they have no clear attributive conditions: which is why it is difficult to ally oneself with such competencies: their identity conditions are unavailable, which is why so many lower class people face disorientation and confusion in relation to the absence of the embedding of their processes of certification, a problem arising from the private use of public institutions to constitute such processes. What counts arises from involvement in a sphere of relationships that disclose the very capacity to intuit appropriate forms because one experiences their immanence via a circumscription that arises from ways of being-there. It is not merely that the signifying of the competence arises from involvement but accession to the capacity to instantiate it arises from experiences of being-able-to-appropriate forms because one experiences their availability as part of the constitutive fabric of one's way-of-being. The identity of the competence is established via manifestation of its conditions of satisfaction: involvement in a sphere which constitutes its availability so that individuals accede to intentional possibilities via the very same conditions. The problem is these conditions are not satisfied for all individuals. Some are left to materialise the appearance of an educational process via administrative mediations that are so abstracted that they are instantiated without co-presence across distances that are merely transposed into sense relational effects of such conditions so that some cannot possibly satisfy selection criteria and merely face the rearticulation of a valuationary dynamic that invalidates what meagre achievements they can obtain in order to materialise the appearance of the functioning of a system that involves very different ways of being and very different forms of actualisation arising from
valuationary processes that transmute status into competence. Take, for example, the following selection criteria:

Letters of recommendation [if any]-only those from one's superior's will be considered
Course evaluations of previous teaching experiences
A Master's degree in Arts and Social Sciences, Applied Linguistics, ENG Language, ENG Literature or Mass Communications.
Candidates are expected to have at least 3 years teaching experience at a university-details of such experience must be indicated in the resume.

Or the following:

A record of successful grant acquisition
Evidence of collaborative research and scholarly writing activity within and across disciplines
A strong record of thesis/dissertation supervision
Evidence of, and, strong interest in mentoring early-career faculty.

How would someone develop the disposition to, or be able to manifest, "strong interest in mentoring early-career faculty", when the nature of their experience of the only thing available to them was of the following: "The PhD is so shitty. I am now completely isolated, when I meet other research students, it's like once or twice every two months. It's just competition". How would one develop dispositions without the realisation of their relational possibility? Many are not subject to the interpersonal basis that might satisfy such intentional states and, thereby, cannot evidence what they have no possibility of acquiring. Clearly, the necessity of being able to "evidence" such dispositions is part of the closures that constitute the value of those who experience being able to manifest such properties because they are part of statuses constituted via differences inscribed in different ways of being situated, different ways of being-there, that sediment meanings and crystallise differences of objectivity that make legible differences of significance arising from differences in value that institutional-relational-forms practically constitute via modes of operation that bely an underlying logic practically evaded yet nevertheless manifest. The isolation described ensures that the devalued don't even experience the disclosure of a horizon that manifests the criterial form arising from the institutional basis of what they are excluded from so that, lacking recognition, lacking embedding, they do not experience the disclosure of a horizon that manifests what they will require because a key aspect of fake education is ensuring that the excluded cannot manage to constitute their own needs and don't access the evidential basis of their own exclusion. One gets a sense of the absurdity of struggling with the absence of mediation arising from being-negatively-perceived because an institutional agent knows that they can simultaneously neglect you whilst materialising the appearance of their objectivity via relationships whose abstraction reduce many to a circumscription that does not disclose the absence of what is required because this circumscription is strategically realised to ensure ignorance so that divisions sustain inabilities even to understand a condition whose mediation constitutes an inability to act because there is no experience of a 'there', of a constitutive horizon, whose disclosure orients awareness via an absorption born of co-presence. When competition reduces individuals to such conditions how can
they mediate access to the interpersonal grounds of relational states that such criteria manifest as traces of elites whose public mobilisation has a determining efficacy manifest via such criteria? Moreover, because the identification of the property arises from recognition of forms relating to closures arising from a boundary at the heart of the institutions, this means that some, irrespective of certification, will not be-perceived-to-bear the sense of properties whose interpersonal grounds arise from involvements in a sphere disclosed via recognitions which constitute capacities for reference that inhere in the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects, institutionally. This means that the devalued are denied access, not merely to objectivities (that they are attempting to purchase certificates to align themselves with) but to an experience of being-able-to-bear the sense of aspects which inhere in recognitions which disclose such modalities so that their denigration denies access to relations to being that are constitutive of development. In this sense, statuses transpose into capacities and inequalities erode human potentiality and frustrate the public development of human capital. How could one manifest these properties without involvement? The tragedy is that supervisors don’t mediate access to any of the relational conditions that subtend such a subject-position so that individuals can experience the disclosure of a horizon that constitutes such possibilities as aspects of their self-actualisation. Embedding requires time, effort, space and it requires attention to be directed to provide access to exclusive forms, this is why getting paid is so difficult in sociology. When I bought my PhD purchasing the certificates was extremely difficult because I had to secure one of twenty-four national awards but getting paid proved to be even harder because the institution was full of wealthy fee-paying students who took precedence over me. In contemporary societies, studying is inescapable, as one university lecturer put it, "it isn’t about whether you have been to university, some of them will take anyone, mine does, it is really more about which university you go to and what subject you study". The problem then becomes how you will be treated if you go somewhere that the international elite use to objectify themselves. How could someone facing the limits imposed by being from a working population solicit the contact required to accede to the possibility of doing collaborative research? Such modalities inhere in the position of those who are engaged with: employees. As we have seen, the reality that is the limit that many struggle to overcome is that they are ignored within positions which reduce, relationally, to the minimum required to materialise the appearance of institutional functions that have little reality or value. The absence of value is manifest by criteria, like these, which operate with a tacit distinction in relation to the devalued who undergo an anonymous and generic processing required to raise revenue and materialise the appearance of public processes whose form bely the extortion of the sense of processes via which forms of value are constituted that negate the subjects of the process. Given that, for many, the only process available is to fill-in-forms from a domestic sphere they are condemned to by an economic status that inflects the meaning of everything obtained and then self-generate projects and products whose administration materialise the appearance of functions that involve little beyond the minimum contact required to constitute the sense of a goodwill belied by such processes, how could they manifest "collaborative research and scholarly writing activity within and across disciplines" when the credentials they obtain are dependent for their
validation on criteria relating to relational states they are not subject to? These criteria allude to relational forms many never access. This is why individuals never feel competent, the feeling of competence inheres in relations of involvement which constitute such intentional states, some never access their conditions of satisfaction and this is why they never experience the actuality of such possibilities. In the UK system it is impossible to get teaching in a university with a masters degree because the credentials are worthless and devoid of involvement in any spheres of possibility beyond teaching yourself in order to produce the forms that materialise the appearance of your education. There are people who complete PhDs who cannot even secure interviews because of the worthlessness of credentials whose conditions of validation are selectively constituted via processes of recognition which surreptitiously disclose access to the grounds of acquisition of forms that, for many, remain unavailable. When people 'do' PhDs and there contact extends as far as using the phone because there is no context of co-presence relating to a project they have had to develop outside of access to any relationships that involve them in disclosing dynamics that constitute possibilities how can they satisfy any of these criteria? The predominantly electronically mediated nature of communication is a manifestation of the abstracted, and de-realising, nature of a process that consists of nothing beyond the production of the traces of such mediations via the relationships that constitute the sense of a process and the fact that interaction predominantly takes place via the phone, or by the student being using varieties of mailing systems because there is no sphere of day-to-day contact with the institutional agents who materialise the appearance of their labour process via associations which relationally constitute the sense of a competence, is a manifestation of the de-realisation attendant on the extortion of capital via the exclusion that constitutes the necessity of the process and materialises, relationally, valuationary, forms that ensure the viability of employees and the negation of those whose labour lacks significance because it is not the product of embedding in the relational forms that constitute recognised forms of social existence. In other words, the nature of the process is enmired, not merely in divisions, but in the forms via which those divisions are transfigured into value-constituting aspects that materialise the appearance of forms of legitimacy, that appear to be forms of competence, via which some access resources and others experience the perpetuation of an underlying condition and status because of subjection to relational forms that merely reconstitute the sense of such differences. There is a huge difference between being involved in a sphere of practice via which projects arise as part of a sphere of reciprocal actualisation and being on benefits without access to any academic sphere and required to generate a project to obtain finances that will, in turn, finance the administration of that project so as to materialise the appearance of a process via relationships that disclose involving relational processes for others who experience being-in-a-world via such mediations. When the extent of possibilities available to you reduce to the solitary production of forms outside of involvement in anything, when you are merely bidding to accede to some kind of public value and objectivity, it is possible to simultaneously feel like you did absolutely nothing and yet did everything one could because the abstracted and de-realising nature of the process available to you makes it impossible for you to experience 'doing' something and you feel, perpetually, like you are 'doing-nothing' because what is available to you does not involve
involvement. This is because consecratory opportunities require a recognition whose sense becomes effaced once there are too many people struggling to accede to recognised forms of public existence. Moreover, not all individuals have equal access to the means to appear to be a legitimate interlocutor in a world in which positions are colonised by those able to secure recognition by purchasing its institutional forms. The real coup of the elite is to ensure access to machineries of objectification that ensure they access the grounds of competencies via relational forms that constitute modalities born of rare existential forms. For the elite, the world is a deeply personal place in which they access nested spaces, contexts, that realise them because they are socially recognized and access the basis of institutional mediations that constitute opportunities, as one academic described their experience:

They will always select the people they know. These positions to get the promotions aren’t even advertised because the professors select their own people anyway, you can’t get the lower positions without being part of the networks, everyone who is selected is known. The credentials are just people to be rejected, they ask for certain credentials to get a pool which is still a very large pool and, I know this from my time in it, the people selected are always known.

The reason it is like this is because objectification is a function of involvement in exclusive relational processes that establish the real boundary between alterity and identity that manifest processes of mediation that embed some in relational processes, forms of embedding, that constitute objectification, whereas the devalued undergo an anonymous process devoid of contact, or any situating of their labor, so that they undergo different modalities and cannot accede to possibilities that inhere in relational states whose conditions are not satisfied for them which manifests itself via the way they experience being disclosed, via expressivities rooted in the absence of this fundamental medium so that they come to bear the sense of a disdain arising from a failure to accede to purposive states that require involvement, contact, a relating of them to-something, some context, which constitutes capacities for intuition born of the disclosure of such intra-worldly aspects. The physiognomic materialization of such aspects constitutes capacities that inhere in experience of such possibilities. The recognized accede to a purposive relation to being arising from experiences of being-there replete with subject-hood that constitute capacities for reference that inhere in experience of aspects that are disclosed as part of participation in nested fields that situate perception and elicit involvement in forms whose realisation physiognomically materialize capacities to experience sense that inhere in experience of being subject to such modalities. Contact has profound cognitive, and developmental effects, transforming being, by providing experience of reasons that inhere in disclosures that constitute purposive states that inhere in membership that constitute identity-conditions and labor market processes operate with a practical awareness of its significance. It is because of the necessary link between valuation, positively constituted, contact, and experiences of possibility and identity, that the devalued experience anonymous and meaningless, even absurd, institutional processes. They are immobilized by a topos rooted in the fundamental public effects of valuationary processes that mediate accession to economic forms. For the poor, the world is an anonymous, contactless, contextless place because it is so difficult to elicit engagement and solicit contact. Procuring access to any human
context gets harder and harder as educational processes become more anonymous and credentials worthless. When the extent of the cultural possibilities available to you relate to form-filling in order to transfer money between different bureaucracies and when you have little contact even with the individuals who materialise the appearance of their labour-process via associating themselves with the administration of the documentation that constitutes the traces of your 'education' then how can individuals satisfy any of these criteria? Is there any wonder that such people feel as confused about their competence as potential employers do? When people cannot access teaching irrespective of their credentials, how can they validate their credentials? Worse still, how can they even develop the competence? Without access to the function and role, how can they direct their labour and constitute themselves so that they become possessed of forms tacitly summoned by experiences of being-realised in relation to modalities that require actualisation? How can individuals experience the integration of their faculties and accede to a command of them as part of the integrating mediations of realisations that arise from absorptions in forms whose immediacy arise from being-situated, being-there, in a context that elicits capacities constituted via such mediations when they never access involvement apart from in administrative-relationships, usually taking place via electronic mediations, that materialise the appearance of processes that arise over distances that reconstitute valuations and experiences of difference that subtent the acquisition of competence? What we see are the interpersonal conditions required for individuals to be identified as competent and to accede to experiences of being competent and what we can appreciate is that these require the organising effect of recognition and involvement, modalities that are unavailable as the system becomes fragmented by a devaluation that effaces the nature of processes obscured by the surreptitious way differences are instituted by the informal use of institutional space. It is the space of positions that determines the appearance of competence because access to involvement is a disclosive condition of acceding to a capacity to bear the sense of forms constituted via such mediations which is why it appears that institutional agents who do almost-nothing, beyond relate-so-as-to-materialise an appearance whose sense they extort via the abstracted relational forms constitutive of an experience of being significant, appear competent whilst people working outside of such dignifying, and authorising, conditions feel incompetent and feel a fraudulence personalised via their internalisation of a toxicity that is at the heart of differences of value that relate to such conditions. The means to arrive at the possibility and the public perception of the validity of the identity of the form are coterminous: without access to a public sphere of involvements that constitute the conditions that make available such a possibility, the individual has no way to mediate such a possibility, no means to project, no way to establish an intention, and they will undergo a continuous de-realisation characteristic of fake educational processes that reduce to self-financed, self-taught, self-certification that authorise and authenticate, validate, others who institute the charade. People finish credentials that provide access to nothing because they are meaningless. Looking at a post in a local university requiring someone to teach academic English there are now a proliferation of teaching credentials that will all be striated by status, rendering older credentials, like mine, worthless. As one person described:
When I finished the PGCE [postgraduate certification in education] I got nothing. No qualified teaching status and lots teaching in further education had certificates in education done at the local college and those in higher education had nothing nor needed anything. The PGCE I did was a con worth nothing…The qualifications you need they provide at a cost. Complete it and it’s out of date and worthless. You need the next one which they provide at a cost and so it goes on. They were certificates for people who couldn’t do anything, so they were worthless. There’s nothing there. Sign of influence is when you don’t have to look for jobs. Friends you have provide pathways, look at the elite they don’t need to piss around looking on websites. Jobs they get aren’t advertised they are provided for the elite groups. I have a teaching certificate, all they tell me is it’s not “qualified teaching status” so it doesn’t count. So, what is my degree, ‘A’ levels, the lot, worth? Great country.

As someone else puts it:

I am now worse off than I have ever been…now I’ve got cultural capital I realize my disempowerment, nobody is ever going to con me into thinking my degree is worth anything the reason nobody is gonna con me into thinking it’s worth anything is ‘cos I’ve got a PhD and it’s worthless. I’ve spent two years looking for work and not had a fucking Goddam thing.

This is the experience of people who experience the physiognomic materialisation of a status attributed via recognition of differences transmuted into deficits via the very institutional processes supposed to ensure their employability and utility. The absence of recognition is manifest via the absence of contact, the fundamental absence of mediation that mirrors the absence of disclosure of any domain in relation to which sources of actualisation might constitute possibilities appropriated via constitutive interpersonal processes. Instead of accession to possibilities appropriated via engagement, there is the perpetuation of a dislocation characteristic of the way educational institutions reproduce forms of objectivity by merely constituting the grounds of their crystallisation. What is most disturbing about these processes is the absence of contact: the absence of mediation mirroring the absence of access to possibilities, the absence of access to qualities one experiences being actualised via recognitions which disclose a medium arising from involvement that constitutes the sense of properties one experiences being physiognomically materialised via such modalities, so that one remains enmired in an experience of the physiognomic regeneration of a sense of absence, incorporated via subjection to forms that exist via their incorporation so that one undergoes a crystallisation of the sense of a status that, whilst education represses it in order to constitute the appearance of fairness, it merely reproduces via a logic of denial: institutional agents reproduce such forms as if they are not doing so. What you have are junk credentials that are constituted outside of modes of closure that might validate them which are for anyone tragically co-opted into educational spaces whose devaluation ensure that only those whose structural ignorance can be sustained, via the distances constitutive of their objectivity, would endure. The relational processes constitutive of the objectivity have no labour market function other than as emblems of the conditions that the need for them arises from: unemployment. Credentials that are worthless because they are marks of an underlying structural condition: some are forced to do them by a devaluation they arise from and, thereby, emblematisé. In the end, the products of these processes bear the sense of the very relational conditions that structurally constitute their
objectivity, they endure a negritude similar to that which Fanon describes when he says, "When a bachelor of philosophy from the Antilles refuses to apply for certification as a teacher on the ground of his color, I say that philosophy has never saved anyone" (Fanon 1967: 29). When people can look at labour market criteria and know that they lack every defining experience constitutive of the identity of a competence, or the attribution of an ability, they could never appropriate because they lack access to the conditions which satisfy its intentional forms, then what is the difference? The constitutive difference is class as a racially, physiognomically materialised, aspect of the public objectivity of individuals who experience being defined, tacitly and invisibly, via absences of presence, mediations of nothing, that constitute the lack of any developmental possibilities which come to constitute them, publicly, as unable, unworthy and incompetent. Without access to the relational grounds, the conditions which satisfy, intentional states, how can individuals contest a labour market whose transactions take place via abstracted processes of signification that relate to the crystallisations of sense arising from institutional-relational forms that are, very clearly, mutilating, so that individuals face an uglification arising from a way of being arising from how they experience their-being situated, and, in reacting, affirm others' assumptions. Such individuals don't experience a way of being composed via participation, they experience the absence of potentiality because they don't experience substantive forms of actualisation that realise them in relation to a developmental, or transcendent, experience of appropriation via the projection of realisation, they experience the unrealisation of reduction and the impossibility of accession to required forms. All of their experience arises via the reproduction of necessity, the necessity forcing them to endure aimless, pointless, bankrupt, parasitic processes that force them to endure exploitative relationships that disclose, for others, access to the very institutional conditions that they, the supposed beneficiaries of this process, are denied. Without a labour market, what is a credential worth? How can it be rendered meaningful? If a credential relates to no sphere of practice, what significance does it have? If you have to study, in your life, two hours of feminist psycho-analysis, when you know nothing of psycho-analysis and these fragments relate to nothing, so that they cannot be rendered meaningful via involvement in any disclosive medium, not even a training in psycho-analysis, and the students who are forced to endure such classes have no pathway into psychoanalysis, are people being provided with anything? If education is separate from involvement and if it cannot embed ideational forms in any constitutive relational medium, in any human context, then can it address the underlying conditions of deprivation that arise from structural divisions that education itself is embedded in? When the certificates themselves do not actually function as objectifications even of the forms of labour that students are forced to carry out in order to satisfy their administrative procurement, what meaning can their processes have? It is not accidental that elite education is contextualising and realising, nor that elite institutions involve high degrees of co-presence, because these are the conditions of satisfaction of intentional forms rooted in a participation that signifies via an exclusivity that is constituted in relation to the obverse of these conditions: the anonymous, impersonal, dislocation via which most of the poor procure the educational products available to them. It seems that in divided societies incommensurabilities are part of the constitution of social space, affecting
all cultural forms. Without involvement in a labour market, a sphere of exclusive relational forms constituted via closures rooted in the recognition of forms of embodied capital that physiognomically materialise differences of capacity relating to the medium disclosed via such modalities, credentials are worthless and educational tracking can only be rendered meaningful via more educational processes that merely reproduce the underlying conditions whose sense individuals bear so that they endure a protracted and truncated trajectory that, relationally, involves little mediation and no experience of capacity, no experience of being-able-to-do anything. Indeed, were it not for the generation of sectors of the population who exist in relation to a matrix of such conditions, there would not really be anywhere for educated working class people to work because of the very closures that spare the elite from experience of such conditions. The role of necessity and negation in the production of an institutional need that is never satisfied because of the fundamental processes constitutive of value, and recognised forms of competence, is clearly formulated, notice the repetition of categories relating to absence (to the absence of what, precisely?): "When I finished the PGCE [postgraduate certification in education] I got nothing. No qualified teaching status...the qualifications you need they provide at a cost. Complete it and it’s out of date and worthless. You need the next one which they provide at a cost and so it goes on. They were certificates for people who couldn't do anything, so they were worthless. There's nothing there." Notice how the cycle of devaluation arising from the structural conditions that constitute the public significance of the educational process is well described. An educational clientele was generated via institutional-administrative processes that could be forced to consume administered products that, often, involved little beyond association around the bureaucratised production of artefacts surrounding their production that dignified the recipients of the process as little as they were introduced to the conditions constitutive of any actual competence. Human capital is wasted by divisions which preclude access to the developmental conditions required for appropriation of complex cultural forms whose conditions of possibility relate to involvements that are exclusive. When educational institutions are appropriated to empower, ennable and remunerate particular class groups who can elide their interests with the interests of the publics they exploit, then dispropriation is an essential effect, reproducing incompetence. The poor, now, are certified, but their CVs lack the forms required to dignify their credentials, as Bourdieu puts it, they "are thus doomed to exemplify properties that are often simply the lowly underside of a dominant property, whose very absence they evoke" (Bourdieu 1996: 151). This begs the question, are all credentials actually credentials, are all credentials real or are some fake and the institutional process of their acquisition merely fraudulent? For many, their credentials involve access to nothing that establishes the identity of a competence, publicly, and this explains their own sense of confusion, uncertainty and malaise relating to the status of their competence. Without access to the interpersonal grounds constitutive of being able to experience the “social capacity to use this competence adequately in a determinate situation” (Bourdieu 1992: 37), how could an individual experience the identity of their competence via grounds which constitute an identity appropriated via experience of its attribution? This is why most lower class students finish degrees feeling that they learned nothing. Their education is completely bereft of
consecratory mediations and the devaluation of credentials makes it impossible for them to mediate access to the public conditions constitutive of intentional possibilities that remain unavailable. The de-realisation that lower class people experience, via their educational process, and their position in the labour market, appears a significant aspect of the competition that constitutes the reality people experience. The manifestative nature of disclosure and the way in which absorption in contextualising solicitations are a condition of appropriating forms that constitute one’s ability to possess competencies via acts of appropriation that require the clearing disclosed via others who constitute the context, the 'there', our way of being arises in relation to, is acknowledged in the final statement: "In what Ah did, yer can’t du ow’t, yer ‘ave t’ wait, then when yer finish yer then in position ‘r waitin’ an’ applyin’, yer just competin’ blind, yer stuck at ‘ome, yer can’t get aht t’ get into owt". With jobs, the conditions of attribution of the competence, relate to modes of objectivisation that are inaccessible to many of those doing credentials, and this is apparent by the dislocation characteristic of the educational process. Moreover, given that valuations are manifest via perceptions which disclose relational aspects, the absence of involvement transmutes into the inability of students to represent themselves, which itself mirrors, a reduction that precludes accession to representational forms of intentionality, so that they cannot represent themselves adequately because they lack access to the sense of relational forms that constitute such modalities, leaving them both non-objectified, essentially, un-qualified, and incapacitated because they lack access to the relational aspects that function as the resources of sense from which human capacities for reference arise. Valuations are manifest via involvement because involvement, contextualisation and capacities for projection that inhere in such modalities, are the preserve of the valued which have to be surreptitiously reproduced via societies enamoured of the ideal of educational equality. Students who experience an inability to do anything, unsure of where to go or how to ever access anything, a condition arising from structural divisions that constitute a blindness arising from barriers which circumscribe such absences, are subject to the physiognomic regeneration of an experience born of structural circumscriptions which are inscribed via the recognition of a difference, transposed via such modalities, into inabilities to refer to aspects whose grounds remain unavailable. People need an experience of being realised in order to inscribe a capacity to project that is an effect of continuous immersion in conditions that disclose capacities for reference that inhere in belonging to a circumscribed realm of legitimate encounter but this is absent for many, "yer can't get into owt": there is, nothing-there, no contextualisation, no realisation, no actualisation because there is no mediation: "the academics at Cardiff simply don't interface with them as soon they finish their phd...they won't interface with anyone": objectifications are effects of embedding, clearly there is no mediation and no contextualisation which means many are not objectified. The same condition education is supposed to address is being reconstituted because, underlying competence are a range of human issues that concern valuation which have far reaching cognitive effects. Devaluation, arising from the circumscriptions via which forms possessed of determinative efficacy arise, constitutes a negation that leads to an objectivity born of reduction: “yer’ve no skills”. It is clear that those who experience a continuation of a dislocation that is itself an effect of valuationary processes that sustain barriers
transfigured into ways of being situated, via such processes, confront the continuation of an unskilled status, their credentials, having no apparent consequence, or function, becoming objectifications of a real condition, repressed via education, that forces such conditions upon them, they face their devaluation and the absence of any skills as effects of a status they experience being physiognomically regenerated via the public and institutional relationships that constitute such an objectivity. Acquiring credentials outside of relations of involvement that validate them, their credentials are worthless and they face the reality of an objectivity that education has merely perpetuated. An unskilled status is perpetuated as an effect of the logic governing the attribution of competence: it is an effect of social value. Educational processes are enmired in valuationary processes that merely reconstitute objectivities relating to the nature of the institutions that subtend the labour market and reproduce forms of legibility and, via the recognition of the uncodified forms that subtend symbolisations grounded in such processes, ways of being that enmire individuals in conditions that sustain a structural deskilling that is an effect of the excess competition that necessitates the hiding of the reality of the unemployed via their reclassification so as to turn them into an economically functional aspect of an economic system condemning many to lives of insecurity and despair. One sees the extent to which lower class people are “doomed to exemplify properties that are often simply the lowly underside of a dominant property, whose very absence they evoke” (Bourdieu 1996: 151) as well as the extent to which the absence they evoke is constituted via an encounter with being unable to access the social grounds constitutive of classificatory forms that remain beyond their reach because of divisions in social space organised around perception of such differences. One can appreciate why Bourdieu says that a “group’s presence or absence in the official classification depends on its capacity to get itself recognized, to get itself noticed and admitted, and so to win a place in the social order” (Bourdieu 1984: 479) and this is precisely what is so difficult given the mediations of nothing characteristic of the processing of lower class people educationally. The institutional forms the state proposes to tackle the effects of such processes merely become enmired in the meanings arising from a competition in which many will always function as a negative foil because of the use of private capital to instantiate strategies whose determinative efficacy allude to meanings that become coopted to being via the spatial effects that (a rigged) mass competition institutes. The experience of absence arises from the unrealisation of negation so that individuals experience their presence in relation to an absence of possibilities which they durably inscribe via the negation they experience being perceived in relation to others so that they come to comprehend classificatory forms, arising from the efficacy of such evaluations, as practiced significances whose forms they inscribe via conditions of existence disclosed via such processes so that they experience the real absence of possibilities as an objectivity they inscribe via their position as a real inability to do anything so that they face only private ways of using the time that is their only resource. One can appreciate Bourdieu’s description of the state of affairs:

...the future is a void which it would be futile to try to grasp, a nothingness which does not belong to us...The temporal experience that is favoured by the pre-capitalist economy is one of the modalities which experience of temporality can assume, including that of the most "rational"
economic agents in the societies which produce anthropologists. It owes its specificity solely to the fact that instead of presenting itself as one possibility among others, it is imposed as the only possible experience by an economy which is unable to provide the conditions in which it is possible to posit the notion of the possible and, which amounts to the same thing, by an ethos which is nothing other than the internalization of the system of possibilities and impossibilities objectively inscribed in material conditions of existence dominated by insecurity and accident. Everything takes place as if explicit discouragement of all the dispositions demanded and favoured by the capitalist economy -- the spirit of enterprise, concern for productivity and efficiency, etc. -- and denunciation of the spirit of forecasting as devilish ambition...were simply ways of "making a virtue of necessity",...and of adjusting one’s hopes to the objective probabilities. (Bourdieu 1979: 16)

The presence of this void, is felt via the fabric of absence that mutilates intentional forms so that individuals experience possibilities as unavailable and acquire, via their institutional and social experience, not a sense of validity and the actualities of realisations that constitute such modalities, but an assurance of a continued failure to project and, thereby, to access anything, publicly, so that they experience both the public and the personal as a void arising from such conditions. Material conditions of existence are the spirited forms arising from the institutional mediations that constitute ways of being arising from this matrix of forms that the over mediation of access to the space of positions constitutes so that many do not experience reasons for being via spatial mediations rooted in valuations that privilege the incorporated effects of abilities rooted in the use of incomes within networks via which recognition is experienced as a constitutive modality of societies enthral to capital.

**Conclusion**

As a society, can we afford to create spaces that facilitate the emergence of individuals who bear the sense of competences they experience being-realised in relation to or will the austerity of a dysfunctional economy continue to produce incapacity as a by-product of the economic conditions that condemn many to the chronic insecurity characteristic of its essential functioning? As educational institutions are fine-tuned to objectify the international elites who segregate within the nation-states they enter, can we afford to finance localities who lack the means to function as sources of wealth because individuals cannot function as bearers of finances without the state creating financial institutions to lend them the money to pay for education they don’t need because their position precludes their involvement in anything anyway? If the social processes constitutive of economic fields render sections redundant as an effect of meanings incorporated via the constitutive effects of the processes arising from the formation of economic space, can we afford to sustain the conditions of civility that subtend the sustaining of competences rooted in the effaced economic processes of public culture? Mass competition destroys the interpersonal fabric constitutive of human civility, basic recognitions required for realisation in relation to humanising aspects become conditional upon position and the whole of one’s life becomes exposed to stakes one cannot be realised in-relation-to so that the forms judgements are-grounded-in remain unavailable so that one endures conspicuous, tacit, judgement and continuous failure which erodes the basis required for individuals to acquire social
dispositions that can only arise from embedding. The poorest lack access to humanising influences: the stakes that humanity becomes conditional-upon depend upon the inaccessibility-of-these forms and they fall into an unrealisation characteristic of their lack of access to any associational basis for a recognisable form of human competence. Never mind the 'big society', can we afford to sustain the basis for the acquisition of associational forms that might ground the acquisition of social dispositions that render individuals functional? Can we afford the interpersonal conditions constitutive of the sense of belonging to a society? Can we afford to finance the institutional conditions for the poor to emerge into competence that will require the financing of forms of access to associational processes that have become conditional, and exclusive, condemning the poor to compete for restricted flows of capital whose meanings have only further entrenched their exclusion? Can the rampant class apartheid that is an informally constituted, economically reproduced, condition of English society be economically viable if what it does is render sections of the population, particularly among the young, economically inactive for ever longer periods? Excessive divisions lead to negations whose behavioural forms lead to withdrawals from a public sphere that has hidden consequences and costs. Can we afford a society in which membership and competence are non-contested attributes that individuals experience emerging into being via? The effects of such conditions are well described by Fanon:

...the colonised person...in underdeveloped countries, or the disinherit in all parts of the world, perceives life not as a flowering or development of essential productiveness, but as a permanent struggle against an omnipresent death. This ever-menacing death is experienced as endemic famine, underemployment, a high death rate, an inferiority complex, and the absence of any hope for the future. All this gnawing at the existence of the colonised tends to make of life something resembling an incomplete death. (Fanon 1967)

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