Merleau-Ponty: Devaluation and Competence

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Abstract:

This piece begins with a brief introduction to Merleau-Ponty before moving on to attempt to situate his ideas in relation to the lives of different people and trying to make a link between value and competence. As neoliberalism hides the structural condition it presumes: unemployment; it creates conditions that erode individuals access to the basis of competence and thereby attacks the basis of labour power forcing many on to a terrain of malaise, antipathy and crisis.

Keywords:

Merleau-Ponty, spatiality, visibility, legibility, valuation and competence
Too often, philosophically, in Hume, for example, the human subject is treated as possessed of an inactive body which is conceived as merely an object in experience and conceived in this way the connection between moments or points remains inexplicable. It is through recognising the way that comportment involves us in webs of instantiated sense that we can understand the necessary connections between impressions and the way states of affairs appear to social agents. It is through involvement that we become aware of a global space whose aspects, whose significances, whose possibilities, relate to ways of being-there. It is through movement that we produce a spatiotemporal field, whose parts are interdependent because they arise as a whole via our involvement in the world. The subject’s being in the world and the world’s existence arise from something encompassing: something which makes their relation, their complementarity and opposition, possible, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “It is,” he says, “into this in-between [entre-deux] that we must try to advance” (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 166). This in-between is a sphere of the visible of which we are a part, we share the properties of belonging by virtue of being visible and it is by inhering in such an element that we can acquire a sense arising from belonging to such an order. Merleau-Ponty suggests that we comprehend this sphere because we are “of it”. For Merleau-Ponty it is by virtue of our visibility that we inhere in this space of appearances via which meanings arise. It is via the medium of visibility that meanings arise. Legibility requires visibility. In order to cover this idea of the surface forms via which we are encompassed as part of a sphere of sense that orients us he uses the term “flesh”. The flesh is not substance but presence…it is also at the same time what makes there be meaning. So, we have the link between the effects of our being possessed of a surface, of determinate forms that are rooted in presence and meanings that somehow emerge from these elements of our being of a medium that is a property of the way these elements cohere as part of a worldliness that inheres in their inter-relation. For Merleau-Ponty, sensing, involves what Heidegger called, a being-the-there (etre le-la), so that individuals occupy an “anonymouus visibility” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 142) which inhabits the other and myself, such that “he and I are like organs of one single intercorporeality” (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 168). The self and the other are but two dimensions in “primordial being which comprises them all” (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 170). This suggests that it is by virtue of our inscription in spatiality, in the meaning of being forms whose sense arise from this medium, that we belong to a recognisable human realm that is conditional on our visibility and significance and on how we inhabit this medium that inheres in our intercorporeality. In this sense, this medium of presence and meaning, reaches via our intercorporeality, via our capacities for instantiation, for response and recognition, to our subjectivity so that intersubjectivity is located in this medium. This is a similar formulation to Hannah Arendt who spoke of being always caught up in the ‘plurality’, being caught up in the world (amor mundi), and the experience of the ‘between’ which is neither you
nor me, but something to which we both belong. It seems to me that something very important is immanent to this position and that is the nature of contextualisation: how are individuals contextualised via the world and other people?

Sensation is an originating and not yet thematised awareness which Merleau-Ponty uses the term “there is” (il y a) to capture. It seems that “there is” signifies the first apparition of something, its presence, the emergence of a configuration, a meaning. Because we inhabit the world via the sense of forms that we are related to primarily practically, via non-conceptual behavioural routines acquired via absorption in the lives of others, there arises via these mediations forms of intelligibility, aspects, acquired via being-situated amidst such a background, what Merleau-ponty calls “natural light”, via existing in relation to such mediations processes of revelation and illumination occur so that we no longer define sensation in terms of the visible upon itself, a carnal adherence of the sentient in terms of “consciousness” but on the contrary “understand it as the return of the visible upon itself, a carnal adherence of the sentient to the sensed and of the sensed to the sentient. For, as overlapping and fission, identity and difference, it brings to birth a ray of natural light that illuminates all flesh and not only my own” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 142). So, via the sphere of visibility arises forms of intelligibility that manifest aspects relating to the phenomena of the social world.

I think this alludes to the way in which we acquire conceptual beliefs because we live in a pre-conceptual engagement with the world from which understanding arises. In other words, cognitive capacities relate to ways of being-situated that involve non-conceptual aspects from which intelligibility and understanding arise as modalities of behaviour. What occurs can’t be a neutral, disembodied, causal, process because the way we live things in a certain relevance, under certain aspects, and these are not processes “within” agents, they are aspects of the interaction. Understanding arises from interaction, it is an effect of being-there in certain ways, an effect of existing via modalities that are interpersonally constituted and can’t be drawn on outside of the relevant conditions. The idea that it arises as a set of explicit rules that can be detached, primarily, is to construe it on the model of inside/outside or subject/world tradition from Descartes through Locke to contemporary AI-modellers, yet this merely recreates a boundary that isn’t there for the agent in the world and makes comprehending the process whereby perceptual understanding arises unintelligible. One of the key ideas here that I merely want to emphasise is that understanding arises from the interaction; it can't be drawn on outside of this, that is, it doesn’t exist in the absence of the relevant surroundings. What this means is that understanding arises from conditions of existing and from ways of being-in-the-world. That is, if you want people to develop understanding, you must involve them in the world of others via ways that tacitly summon the forms that disclose the understanding which is to say that individuals develop cognitive capacities via appropriating forms via disclosures arising via
absorption in a context that materialises such possibilities so that individuals experience being realised as subject to such modalities. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, develop accounts of conceptual thinking as arising from an ordinary way of being in the world, dealing with things and moving about, coping, with the world which is primarily pre-conceptual. Heidegger says it is comportment that discloses aspects and Merleau-Ponty calls the embodied coping that is directed toward objects but that has no propositional success conditions motor intentionality, we might call it poise. For these thinkers our conceptual capacities arise from these existential modalities that govern our absorbedly coping with the world. Absorbed coping is prior and pervasive and it arises from our involvement with others who address the world and enrich it with the meanings arising from these processes. It is via relations of involvement in human milieu, in human contexts, in how individuals circumscribe particular spheres via forms that disclose such existential possibilities that constitute the background from which capacities for social functionality emerge. The morass of relationships that subtend the involvement that coping emerges from support episodes of conceptual focus that arise from the moments of disclosure that constitute such modalities. Moreover, these conceptual activities cannot be ascribed to nature or else this fundamentally mis-represents the nature of our relation to the world. Coping activity unfolds via a relation in which the world encompasses us and we act from being amidst contexts and conceptual understanding arises from processes that subtend intelligibility and often when unreflective coping fails or is disrupted, it is at this point that ‘objects’ with determinate properties falling under concepts appear to our consciousness such that conceptual capacities become operative via such moments of disclosure.

It is therefore easy to see why Merleau-Ponty, in his earlier work, *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962), spoke of consciousness beginning in what he called the “tacit cogito”, a kind of primitive self-consciousness strictly simultaneous with consciousness of the world arising from practical dealings in it. It’s interesting to contemplate the possible significance of this but he suggests that at the level of the tacit cogito the individual comes to awareness via transactions that elicit such modalities, that is, the individual becomes possessed of capacities because they experience being-in-a-world. In the move from *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962) to *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968) Merleau-Ponty moves from a phenomenology of perception to an ontology of visibility that echoes the earlier notion of “tacit cogito”. Merleau-Ponty criticizes Sartrean ontology because the flesh is not Being-in-itself, it is a potentiality, a medium of sense, significance and possibility, if appropriate conditions are satisfied, and the thinker who inquires into the flesh is not a Nothingness but a carnal being whose awareness and capacities inhere in being “of it”, or of the world. So, this situation, this context, from which our humanity arises, is pre-intentional, and pre-conceptual, the “there is” belongs to Being, to the flesh, and not to the individual. The human essence as sensible consciousness is precisely
to be the “there is” of Being. It is not to the individual that presence, sensible consciousness, belongs; it is presence which possesses man. Or As Heidegger put it:

…in the determination of the humanity of the human being…what is essential is not the human being but being…everything spatial and all time-space occur essentially in the dimensionality that being itself is. (Heidegger 1998: 254)

One can appreciate why Merleau-Ponty argued that we need to return to a “fungierende” [acting or functioning] or latent intentionality or a latent intentionality which operated inside, not of consciousness, but of Being. Husserl’s intentional analysis presupposes a consciousness or ego which constitutes the spectacle which the subject’s regard presents to consciousness. But what are the conditions of possibility of a gaze attuned to the sense of the world? The individual, as subject, is not a pure gaze, but, instead, is part of the spectacle, “is of it”. Neither a philosophy of acts of consciousness nor of things “in themselves”, separate from contact with consciousness cannot be adequate and instead, we must pursue a philosophy which conceives of consciousness itself as Offenheit [openness]” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 198), such that the individual, who is attuned by being themselves sensible, via a medium arising via such a mediation, grasps themselves as part of an expression of the flesh, part of this field of presence. What is necessary, Merleau-Ponty says, is to “leave the philosophy of Erlebnisse [experience] and pass to the philosophy of our Urstiftung [primal establishment]” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 221).

So, where does this lead us, sociologically? Well, one key aspect of this is that we need to escape the priority of consciousness and representation and begin to comprehend the way that individuals face processes of contextualisation that situate them so that they experience their being engaged, primarily, via absorbed coping with aspects arising via forms of presence that sub tend the will. We need a vocabulary that allows us to represent different ways of being-there and the different pre-intentional, corporeal, aspects that constitute different possibilities as aspects of the social world that otherwise cannot be represented. What is the nature of this “of it”, how do we capture the way individuals inhere in spatial forms that are also meanings and what are the effects of such processes within stratified societies in which the relations which sub tend meanings are differentiated? How are individuals related to being-there and how can we find a way to represent such a problem-field?

Merleau-Ponty suggests, “The body is our general medium for having a world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 146) and here “the relation of having” is etymologically related to the word “habit” (habitude) (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 174), so, our habits are a medium of possession of a world, they arise as ways of being in a world. Merleau-Ponty identifies habits as aspects of the reality of embodiment wherein it literally becomes significance (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 142-4). Merleau-
Ponty suggests that the new habit, or the new capacity, must have had “the stamp of movement set upon it…it is the body which ‘catches’ and ‘comprehends’ movement. Notice he alludes to our ‘catching’ whilst simultaneously, ‘comprehending’ movement, as if realisation itself discloses the sense that subtends significance so that the physiognomic materialisation of forms, intercorporeally, renders us able to grasp aspects of the world that arise via such interpersonal processes. The acquisition of a habit is indeed the grasping of a significance, but it is the motor grasping of a motor significance…” I think this alludes to the way habits are acquired behaviourally, their physiognomy is incorporated, mimetically, via incorporations arising from contact so that one appropriates fragments, or uncodifiable details, inchoate forms, dynamically but holistically via involvement in contexts that involve recognition and disclosures so that one experiences moments via realisations that constitute one as possessed of what one appropriates via being subject to such interpersonal processes. Habits are conceived as composing a systematic unity arising from the forms of realisation that constitute a lived presence (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 153). It is via presence, via experiences of being-there that individuals acquire habits such that there is a necessary link between the way significance is born via processes of incorporation that make the body the key sense-bearing aspect of social objectivities that are aggregative phenomena. Many of the aspects we incorporate arise from the pre-personal, the impersonal sense of social identification we experience being publicly realised in relation to as aspects of our being-for-others. When one considers that many of the processes constitutive of the sense our bodies bear arise via processes of incorporation that are primarily mimetic, then we realise that there is a key, analytically repressed, condition of agency: contact. What affects contact? Valuation. In what way does valuation affect contact and is this a constitutive aspect of presence? Does valuation affect the interpersonal and if so in what ways and how?

The habits that constitute one’s physiognomy are conceived dynamically as fragments of an overall manner of existence. Now because these fragments are constituted dynamically, it is difficult for an individual to acquire mastery of them without access to their conditions of realisation which themselves have conditions of satisfaction which relate to the recognition of such forms as latent potentialities of expressive physiognomy. As such, their expressivity is an effect of conditions of actualisation in which individuals acquire capacities for projection born of the incorporation of forms that arise via realisations rooted in their recognition so that individuals can appropriate forms that constitute their capacity to instantiate congruencies which are born of the reciprocal constitution of participants. In this sense, the body functions as an analogue of the social forms characteristic of the spatial processes that subtend what it manifests via the incorporation of a social position manifest as postural manner or expressive physiognomy: aspects of the living actuality of a person that manifest pervasive patterns of social significance.
or forms of objectivisation that function as modes of objectification that affect life-chances and experience. In this sense the agent, or person, is a gestalt, a dynamic constellation of habits in a continuous process of limited reconstruction.

Existential stances constitute alternatives within a global space of existential, or physiognomic, forms, and the instantiation of difference is a claim to worth, and, thereby, an allusion to the relative unworthiness of others such that uncodified behavioural patterns manifest potential unthought evaluations that compose the fabric of social environments. The dynamic comes through clearly in the following:

Ah went aht last ne’eight, wi went in a bar in Sheffield, full’r these gorgeous women and these pricks, an thi wo’ talking rait “rrr” [imitates posh enunciation identified with this sound], it wo’ just full ’r middle class pricks, Ah bet we wo ohnny workin’ class in the’er, thi’ it wo just full r middle class pricks wi’ scarves, yer can’ see thi’ think a lot on thei’ selns ‘cos thi’ dress t’ bi different, Ah ses to mi mate “let’s get aht’r ‘ere”. Ah mean, Ah din’t feel comfortable: yer feel shit, these gorgeous women lookin’ dahn the nose on yer, Ah just wanted to get aht. Ah just wanted to get aht, Ah ses “come on, let’s gu somewhe’er when’er thi’s some w’kin’ class”, yer stick aht, yer know yer’ve no chance ‘r talkin’ t’ any’r birds, so thi’is nowt the’er, if yer arahnd ‘em it’s fckin’ miserable.

What we see is how experience of being-perceived constitutes a sense of the possibilities arising from a horizontal space of circumstantial forms arising via disclosures constituted via our experience of the sense of our being-for-others arising from our experience of being-perceived so that we intuit the absence of possibility arising from the recognition of negative difference, “yer stick aht, yer know yer’ve no chance ‘r talkin’ t’ any’r birds, so thi’is nowt the’er”. Attempts at self-determination are limited by the interpersonal conditions required for us to experience forms of self-hood arising from the satisfaction of our needs for recognition and mutuality that arise from an experience of self-discovery via others who make available modalities that satisfy needs to exist as subjects of representational forms of intentionality that require recognition, or positive valuation. Our needs become satisfied by our experience of their being met and we can, thereby, see why actualisation is a key stake of social existence whose grounds are not equitably distributed. As someone else described the same manifestation of forms which reveal social meanings:

When I go to a party to find a partner, guys ask me about my job at first, they want to know my income, they judge me with my job, age, etc. I’m fed up with those
questions and I’m not going out to see people now. Just tired of the shame. I can’t stand with the prejudice from people when I go outside and talk. Some of them start telling me to find job, get job, and then I will become happy. When people start knowing about me, they don’t understand my situation and start telling their way of thought. I don’t want to explain anymore. I don’t want to hear that from others and I’m not going out. It leads me to hate and fear meeting anyone. I can’t walk outside that much...as I don’t want to meet people. My life is internet life now. I’m depressed, totally lost. I just wanted average family. only that but it doesn’t want to happen. I have a bad fate.

One can well understand why Bourdieu says:

At the opposite extreme in the class of free markets, the market for exchanges between friends...it is in the logic of privation rather than rejection that this discourse is defined in relation to the legitimate discourse. As for the dominant markets, public and formal or private, they pose such difficult problems for those who are the most economically and culturally deprived that, if one limited oneself to that definition of speech forms based on the social characteristics of speakers which is implicitly adopted by the defenders of ‘popular speech’, one would have to say that the most frequent form of this speech is silence. (Bourdieu 1991: 101)

If the form of the speech is silence, the way of being realised in relation to such differences is to avoid the public light constitutive of such disclosures so that individuals can hide the truth from themselves by avoiding those who manifest such aspects so that individuals can escape into a sphere of competence at the price of a limited existence. In other words, degradation leads people to avoid experiences of social failure arising from the meaning-of-being-poor so that, in order to avoid experiencing the disclosures that render individuals silent because they lack the resources of sense that experiences of being actualised constitute, they must avoid association because association only discloses their difference and an incapacity that is a real effect of existing via such terms as they are interpersonally constituted via disclosures of form that materialise such modalities. Without access to such modalities, individuals lapse into a sense of incapacity arising from their real experience of being unable to function so that their executive function is deprived because of what they are cognitively subject to as an effect of the meaning of being forms that preclude social effectiveness because of a negation that robs individuals of experiences of co-presence and dispossesses them of their own initiative. As one person describes:
Ah know Ah could never get through an interview, Ah’d just gu to pieces, Ah wun’t know what t’ du, ahr t’ act, it’s all so alien, thi’ ask yer that question “what ‘ave yer got to offer?” [anguished pause] “well you tell me”.

The final statement, “you tell me”, indicates that this person cannot be expected to exhibit what can only arise from experiences of being publicly, interpersonally, constituted, an experience of practical self-composure that requires a coherence that one accedes to via synchronisations grounded in a world of others that his condition precludes. It cannot be the individual’s responsibility to rescue themselves when possession of the properties presumed by economic functionality can only arise, logically, from being-publicly-situated. “You tell me” is telling because it indicates an incredulity born of practical reduction to a state in which capacities are nullified as an effect of processes of devaluation that lead individuals to be situated outside of any spheres of human contact via which they might mimetically incorporate aspects arising via realisations constitutive of a fabric whose interpersonal disclosure constitute possibilities born of realisation that allow individuals to project so that they can sustain a hold, via the forms they experience being physiognomically materialised, and experience the regeneration of capacities arising via such moments. What is clear is that the socially devalued experience themselves being bereft of the characteristics required to appear as a legitimate interlocutor or functioning social agent. The socially devalued experience themselves as a bare agent, bereft of the incorporated effects of realisations that physiognomically regenerate capacities whose form refer tacitly to what is cognized via being subject to such realisations so that individuals accede to functionality via moments of actualisation that are reactionally constituted via the flow of interaction, via experiences of being present via moments whose form intercorporeally donate capacities arising from being-there, from being subject to such aspects. Without such experiences what can they reflect upon? They are enmired in an elementary form of experience, a bare experience, that is that of bearing a sense that is an effect of being located via the physiognomically materialised effects of the recognition of such aspects so that they experience being bereft of what can only arise relationally. What the devalued experience is an incomplete, pre-objective experience born of the recognition of an absence that reconstitutes the sense of absence as a physiognomically regenerated aspect of their comportment that refers, tacitly and continually, to social meanings whose form they experience being reconstituted via public, institutional, relationships. What the devalued face is a sense of a general horizontal field without any sense of a circumstantial field delimited within it, there is “nowhere to go” and “nothing to do”.
Being contextualised appropriately requires recognition, it is recognition which discloses the intra-worldly aspects that individuals experience being via. What recognition does is allow us to move forward into a spatiotemporal field that is animated via significances we appropriate via absorption in forms that recognition discloses so that we can appropriate circumstantial aspects of the environment arising via the sense we appropriate via being subject to such moments. When we are recognised, we accede to capacities born of a responsiveness which means we are actively engaged in forms which constitute capacities physiognomically materialised via such moments so that we escape the finitude of conspicuousness and, instead of merely spectating, we become absorbed in the meaning of being-there, caught in responding so that we escape awareness of our difference and the clumsiness of the effort to project outside of constitutive moments, and we become possessed of capacities that are effects of the physiognomic materialisation of possibilities whose actuality we experience being via the recognitions which constitute such moments. Once we are recognised and involved then we generally know what we are doing because we exist in responsiveness and our physiological and physiognomic, our cognitive and affective systems, are integrated in the sense of acting, we escape doubt because, in such moments, we generally know what we are doing because we accede to doing it, via others so that we know what we are doing because we experience accession to meaningful forms that are the constitutive condition of our ability to make what we do occur. It is self-evident because we experience the self via such disclosures, our character is manifest via the forms we experience presence via so that we intuit the sense constitutive of our being-for-others and posturally anticipate imminence forms which are realised as a constitutive condition of association in space. In this sense, we can see that the problem of socially devalued people, attuning to the rule structures of particular institutions relies not primarily upon ratiocination, they don’t need teaching rules, but on involvement. Adaptation to intentional structures requires involvement in spheres of disclosure that constitute adaptive responsiveness to structures of constitutive rules but the rules relate to ways of being-there and forms of existence which require physiognomic materialisation, opportunities to accede to public forms via their disclosure. Via responsiveness we progressively appropriate forms via an immersion in the fabric we experience being materialised via the interaction so that we accede to a familiarity born of the incorporation of the forms via their disclosure so that we become capable of fluidly instantiating forms that inhere in this native experience that manifests what it arises from: belonging. Responsiveness arises from involvement, from recognition, which constitutes the possibility of acceding to a capacity to fluidly instantiate forms because one experiences being subject to the meaning of being via such processes which constitute our capacities to respond to the ‘there’ we experience being via. The capacity to fluidly instantiate forms arises from experiences of being realised in relation to moments which disclose such possibilities as
available via being-there for instantiation so that it is these modalities which constitute capacities. In this sense, it is engagement that constitutes us as viable persons who emerge into subjecthood via recognitions which intercorporeally donate the means via which we accede to such modalities. Engagement allows us to fluidly instantiate forms because we experience being realised in relation to their constitution. What recognition does is disclose moments that realise us via the engagement so that we move beyond the passivity of inert poses that we find ourselves instantiating outside of interaction and we transcend the status of a social monad, acceding, not merely, to relational states but cognitive possibilities arising from such modalities so that we experience the substrate of action via the medium of engagement. The thing about the circumspective concern arising from involvement, manifest via a comportment attuned to aspects that constitute it, is that the resultant poise is not something we execute via our will, rather, it is an effect of ways of existing, rather it arises from our knowingly responding to aspects that our presence makes available to us so that poise is an effect of ways of being-there, it is a response to circumstantial aspects that others disclose as the possibilities we appropriate via the actualisation immanent to such processes. In other words, what Merleau-Ponty calls embodied coping, or poise, our responsiveness arising from circumspective involvement is an effect of realisation, that is it is achieved in immediacy via the involvement, it is a form of existence realised via existing in relation to such possibilities: as I am realised, I know what I am doing. It isn’t that I know what I am doing and I instantiate appropriate forms, rather, it’s more the case that I am realised so that, via responsiveness, I accede to possibilities whose materialisation constitute my understanding and my competence arises from existing via such conditions. Indeed, my capacity to instantiate forms arises from my being subject to recognitions which disclose what I mimetically incorporate via such moments. Poise arises from being in touch with one’s circumstances which is to say it arises from contact, those uninvolved lose poise, they appear not to be possessed of the same dignity. To be poised is to be self-possessed because forms of subject-hood inhere in the contact and realisation that materialise characteristics whose sense we incorporate via such processes. Poise arises via conditions in which anticipations are satisfied as fast as they arise, where there is no break between intending and satisfying the anticipation that poise is an instantiated response to, what this means is that poise requires responsiveness, it is a physiognomically materialised effect of co-presence that is part of the mimetic incorporation of postural sets acquired as gestalts via existing in relation to moments that function as modalities. The possibility of appearing poised arises from involvement in interactions which disclose forms appropriated via co-presence so that individuals accede to ways of being circumscribed via forms whose sense arise from the incarnational form arising from being-there, grasped by the sense of immediacies which constitute capacities via absorption in such moments. If there is no involvement then there is no
responsiveness and comportment doesn’t arise from the projection of mediation and poise is lost because there are no possibilities for the individual to appropriate via anticipations that arise on the edge of our response times: there is no interval between the having and the meeting of the anticipation of poise, poise is a response arising from being-there to immediacies that engage the lived body in the circumstantial forms with which it copes. Without recognition and the possibility of absorption in meanings we intuit and appropriate via the poise that instantiates an appropriate response via absorption in forms whose disclosure incite responses as if as an echo mimetically signalling via the communication of the nervous systems of body-subjects, the flow of experience becomes turbulent and we feel disorientated, we find ourselves at a loss because coping requires responsive absorption in forms that constitute the moments that we appropriate being via so that we can sustain forms via projecting via them and sustaining a hold on comportmental forms whose sense we experience being physiognomically materialised via such moments. Hence, if we lose touch, we lose poise, our nonconceptual, embodied coping, requires the disclosures of recognition which anchor us in the possibilities of acceding to representational forms of intentionality that require this interpersonal grounding so that individuals can emerge from indifference and insignificance via engagements that disclose the possibilities they experience being actualised via such processes. We can know what we are doing via cognition as an effect of being subject to materialisations of form that constitute the meaning we discover via being subject to such processes. The point is that the capacity to act appropriately involves forms of actualisation that subtend rationalisation: rationalisation presumes modalities that arise from the way individuals experience being-there and therefore the mobilisation of individuals capacities requires their personal mobilisation via relationships that constitute a context of circumstantial forms via which they accede to capacities to instantiate forms because they experience their physiognomic materialisation as aspects of their being-for-others. Our skills are capacities for response to circumstantial forms whose efficacy imply what they arise from, realisation via practices that actualise individuals who experience possession of their capacities via such modalities. Our experience of our general capacities is an effect of an experience of effective self-movement and of our capacities to function, socially, effectively, via experiences of being able to operate effectively across social fields. This experience of capacity is affected by valuationary processes in that realisation requires recognition and contextualisation. Contextualisation itself presumes recognition because we must access some source, interpersonally, some reason-for-being-there which becomes ever more problematic the more massified and anonymous public fields become. Capacity implies a distinction between a determinate state of actuality and a preceding state of possibility from which that actuality emerges, in other words, capacities presume realisation and a sense of movement arising from the temporalisation of appropriations born of an actualisation that
secures capacities to interknit forms as effects of capacities arising via action, via involvement in an interpersonal fabric which discloses the medium appropriated via being subject to such processes. Because the notion of “capacity” implies a distinction between a determinate state of actuality and an antecedent state of the determinate possibility of that actuality (Todes 2001: 175), it makes sense only if we are involved in some activity via which the possibility can be transformed into the appropriate actuality so that the actuality can be experienced as emerging from that possibility. A sense of capacity requires conditions of possibility that make its realisability sensible so that individuals experience the actualisation of a deployment that is part of its constitution. In this sense the distinction between possibility and actuality constitutive of a capacity really masks another distinction between availability and deployment of the activity whose deployment produced this distinction. The sense of capacity, therefore, presumes involvement in interpersonal spheres of practice that disclose forms appropriated via being subject to such experiences of being and as access to interpersonal spheres of involvement become more contested the availability of conditions that initiate such modalities become more problematic. Capacity implies conditions of possibility which involve movement from an antecedent state of possibility to a definite state of actuality (Todes 2001: 175), but this implies realisation, it implies an activity via which the possibility is transformed into the relevant actuality, such actualisation makes the active self, that is, the agent discovers their capacities via being subject to disclosures which make available these transitions as effects of being-situated so that the individual experiences themselves as capable of satisfying human needs which, otherwise, remain ardent and potent sources of human misery. The misery of the devalued is that they have no means to satisfy their human needs or to access these transforming modalities, they have no way to emerge from indifference and insignificance and become possessed by a sense of worth born of an experience of capacity that is an effect of experiencing modalities whose transitional conditions presume recognition and involvement. A sense of capacity preserves a sense of realisability rooted in an experience of involvement that constitutes actualisation and deployment of the competence and yet the devalued tend to experience unrealisation and, thereby, discover themselves as unable to satisfy their potentialities and human needs. Because our sense of capacity arises in relation to a sense of how we experience being realised circumstantially via forms that actualise us via how our capacities for movement are affected by these mediations, anything that curtails our capacities for self-movement will limit our sense of capacity. The textures we experience being are effects of disclosures that realise us via possibilities that either curtail or enable our actualisation: the possibilities we experience being immanent aspects of reality relate to the forms of significance we experience being realised via how we experience being situated, publicly. The negated experience a curtailment that limits possibilities and thereby precludes an experience of transitioning toward forms which require
experiences of being realised via recognitions which disclose the medium actualised via the recognition. Without access to this medium of sense, the texture of reality is impoverished because the basis of the acquisition of skills and cognitive facility with being itself is absent. When you experience reality via an unrealisation that locks you out of developmental possibilities, what can you do but incorporate the sense of the forms you experience being disclosed publicly? In relation to the groups constituting themselves publicly via disclosures which validate forms arising from recognition of affinities of life-style born of resource-bases that symbolic forms emblematise and reconstitute it is not difficult to understand why one person can say:

i work hard under the week an my mother say when i play pc on weekend im asocial. I have no girlfriend. Im asocial because this. my mother have no interestings for me. She ignores me. i play pc its my hobby and she say im a psycho freak. She hates me. all other things are better than i. I work and work and work and work. Never thanks for this. when i go to play pc than play i pc woman say dont play i say fuck you self my interesting on other people is realy bad ever the same with this idiots…god i hate my life an this guys die and i go forward i dont feeling nothing im how dead and i shit on this im not a realy good human what i feel its cold i can say whats good or bad is but i feel hate. i play pc but i cant say i make it off than i have no handy to go out i talking with guy the guys talking not with me they need smartphones basdards am i asocial simon? i think not im a normal guy on this earth. Other idiots are crank…i hate my life. i dont understand this shit world better all die.I think I’m asocial. I hate the world. Not the world, the humans in it. Not all but eighty per cent.

Because individuals aren’t constituted, interpersonally, via mediums of disclosure which realise them so that they are absorbed in possibilities they experience being actualised via, they have no real interest in a world that they have no connection to. Lacking access to any constitutive relationships via the world, they have no real interest in it. Lacking access to intersubjective donations of significance arising from engagements which disclose the sense of capacities appropriated via materialisations of form that are intercorporeally constituted via transitivities of sense arising via such processes, devalued individuals feel their lack of significance as their own incapacity to engage, as their own lack of sensitivity because they lack access to a medium which discloses capacities for affect and cognition that requires disclosure and realisation. That is, because the medium constitutive of human sensibilities, capacities for compassion and fellow-feeling, are lacking because of the conditions constitutive of the public space within
which individuals appear, because they don’t encounter engagement or relationships born of solicitude, they feeling themselves unable to feel appropriately, they feel themselves alienated, themselves unable-to-feel as an effect of how they encounter being-there. As this person describes, “i dont feeling nothing im how dead and i shit on this im not a realy good human what i feel its cold i can say whats good or bad is but i feel hate”. The lack of engagement, the lack of access to an interpersonal sphere of recognitions which disclose possibilities realised via such processes, denudes individuals of a sense of possibilities, others are no longer sources of actualisation who physiognomically regenerate capacities born of forms materialised which constitute us interpersonally as able to appropriate such modalities as part of the sense of being-there, and individuals feel themselves to be cold, callous, uncaring, because they are unable to be to themselves what others won’t perceive them to be so that, lacking access to any interpersonal sphere which discloses characteristics, sensitivities, and possibilities, they feel denuded of human aspects, and, existing asocially, feel there is something wrong with them: “my mother say when i play pc on weekend im asocial”.

The negated can’t project because they lack access to the constitutive grounds of human competence and their own sense of themselves is affected by the unrealisation that renders their experience of being problematic in that they endure the stress of de-realisation that causes an excess of stress hormones that haunt their physiology affecting their experience of their body as an affective environment so that the absence of sense they endure affects the psychocorporeal or affective terrain they exist on, leading to a chronic malaise described in the following:

S: Du you find that it affects yer not workin’?
X: Well, it’s two y’r nahr since Ah w’ked. Ah feel anxious, Ah dun’t know ahr to cope anymore wi’ ‘avin’ t’ bi rahnd people, like Ah dun’t know ahr t’ gu in t’ a w’k situation in rait way, Ah’m not sure what t’ du, what t’ se’.
S: Ahr dus it mek yer feel?
X: Ah feel like numb, kind’r afraid in mi body, Ah dun’t know ahr to gu into a situation in rait way an’ Ah’m allous thinkin’ “if Ah gu the’er, what can Ah se’? Ahr can Ah cope?”
S: Ye’ it’s when yer’ve no shared life wi’ people in it?
X: Ye’, yer dun’t ‘ave a life so yer unsure, yer’ve now’t t’ se’, thi’s now’t the’er fo’ yer, so what can yer talk abaht? What ‘ave you done?” “now’t!” It’s shit, meks yer feel like shit.
There being nothing-there affects ways of being-there that constitute the sense of an objectivity that the individual becomes aware of bearing as an effect of existing in relation to such conditions of existence. As another person reflects:

I feel like there's no point in anything anymore - I can’t motivate myself enough, the thought of going back to work fills me with dread. Ah’ve lost ma confidence, Ah’m scared t’ look fo’ work nahr, every job, it’s just stuff Ah’ve never done, even jobs in Chemistry, Ah dread an interview, nahr, Ah’ll be up against people who are already in work, they can answer easily, what can Ah se’? All Ah can do is try and read stuff ova net an’ watch Youtube videos, what can Ah se’ if Ah get an interview? Ah feel lost, aht’r control, yet all Ah do is sit in a bedroom at mi sister’s.

What is interesting is how the absence of mediation is experienced via anxiety and yet loss of control: the absence of possibilities erodes the capacity to project so the individual experiences an absence of the grounds constitutive of purposive forms as they undergo the de-realisation of the absence of mediations that constitute the banal magic of being-able to act appropriately because one intuits possibilities, relationally, via experiences of being contextualised that constitute what arises from experiences of being-there disclosed via such mediations, so that actualisation constitutes an experience of being-able that is an effect of recognition and the involvement of disclosures that physiognomically materialise what is appropriated via being-subject to such possibilities. Without mediation, there is nothing experienced via being-there and the person experiences the void of indeterminate forms of social existence. Clearly, this individual experiences a decomposition of his humanity as he experiences being circumscribed via experiences that denude him of any capacity to project. Obviously, what the anxiety, antipathy and malaise manifest is that human being is a founded phenomena that has interpersonal grounds, as Moran describes “Foundation, modification and modalization are all structural features of our experiences, and their operations can produce new and more complex forms of consciousness. Modalized forms of consciousness are modifications of an unmodalized…” (Moran 2005: 150) practical form of existence. Subtending our capacities to intuit forms and constitute ourselves appropriately are conditions of realisation that allow us to durably inscribe, via a process of insensible incorporation, the physiognomically materialised basis of forms that have the cognitive effect of constituting us appropriately so that we experience ourselves via being-subject to such intercorporeal processes and accede to recognised forms of social existence, to meaningful forms of experience and to capacities for functionality that inhere in the relational processes constitutive of such modalities. Without involvement in the conditions that might satisfy intentional states, the individual experiences
themselves as devoid of intentions, “I feel like there’s no point in anything anymore - I can’t motivate myself enough”, without involvement in a sphere that discloses forms that the individual can appropriate and project via, the individual experiences themselves as devoid of possibility: negation involves unrealisation so that they experience an absence of possibility, a negative actuality: the individual experiences themselves as will-less, fearful and neurotic as they are subject to the effects of spatial divides arising via the physiognomic regeneration of the sense of forms arising via the recognition of such differences which essentialise capacities so that individuals feel denuded of actuality, like bare agents, dispossessed of their own initiative. What we see is that social withdrawal is an effect of the dissolution of will arising from a failure to exist consequentially so that individuals feel the absence of the grounds which found mediated cognitive states rooted in realisation, they find themselves unable to project, they experience a will-lessness, rooted in devaluation. Without recognitions that disclose forms whose physiognomic materialisation realise individuals responsively in actualising moments that constitute meanings appropriated via the reciprocal constitution of this interpersonal fabric, the negated exist in a condition in which they experience being the absence of possibility whose sense they bear as an effect of such conditions. We don’t appropriate forms stagnantly, via the unrealisation of negation. Meanings, as public forms, are founded modalities, that are responsively appropriated via experiences of being-situated in relation to involvements that physiognomically materialise their actuality as experienced aspects of being subject to their possibility. If you experience the actualisation of negative significances via the passive unrealisation of negation, why would you have any confidence? From where would you tacitly summon capacities to instantiate forms when you experience being locked out of the fabric of being tying individuals to forms and meanings? As one person described:

I know rich people look down on me because I’m not educated but I don’t care I never ask them to help I am working to feed my self and my family. They look down on me, make me feel small. I don’t like it. I feel not good. I just be quiet and think of my kids. I have to be strong for them. Have to take it. Have to take being small so they can have a better future.

One can appreciate how the inability to establish goals leaves the individual unrealised and erodes their capacity to project: without realisation, fatalism arises from the sense of a way of being informed by the purposelessness of a devaluation physiognomically regenerated via such conditions so that individuals have nothing to say for themselves because there isn’t much for their selves to be concerned with, they don’t access a sphere of involvements that constitute them purposively. As one person describes:
Sometimes I feel like I lose self confidence and rejection about general things and half of the time I feel like what is the point of applying for jobs when the reply will be a rejection. When I lose self confidence I feel uncomfortable for example yesterday there was a fit bird at the gym and I felt like asking her out but I felt like what if I wasn’t good enough lookin ect so I didn’t bother. Thought what would I talk about?

What we see is the extent to which devaluation in relation to social markets constitutes awareness that poisons the individual’s sense of their being-for-others, so that their presence is affected by their inability to project because of the absence of the mediations that constitute valued objectivities: working and being a functional person. What we see is how this person’s awareness is inflected by a sense of his objectivity in relation to someone he perceives as possessed of value: “a fit bird”. What we can appreciate is how devaluation is an immanent aspect of the experience of the devalued who experience their presence via the schema they will likely be perceived via so that they are inhibited because they can’t project via possession of the appropriate form. Without the sense of being able to satisfy the conditions for reciprocity, the individual feels unable to establish any contact because they grasp the practical infrastructure of references that subtend successful communication. We see how awareness of the absence of the mediations that materialise the worldly horizons of most constitutes a sense of absence lived via an experience of having nothing-to-offer manifest in the problem of having nothing to say: “what would I talk about?” Without a sense of value, “what if I wasn’t good enough lookin”, the individual’s projection is infected with a sense of their presence that leaves them with little to project via. If you are unworthy and devalued then you do not accede to such modalities. The poor have poor experiences; the negated have negative experiences because of the sense arising from the grounds of differences which relate to valences of capital. If you are treated anonymously because you lack the means necessary to accede to recognised forms of existence, then your experience is impersonal and you feel the absurdity of a devaluation that haunts your objectivity so that you are condemned to impoverished experiences of being-there. This came through powerfully when I asked one man, “Did you ever have a broken heart?” and he replied, “Ye’ every day. Women don’t like me”. The individual understands their objectivity because it constitutes their being-in-the-world and it determines the very qualities they experience being. The reason our value is such a significant existential issue is because it constitutes the very fabric via which we experience being: the very qualities we experience, the possibilities, our intimate sense of what we are is an effect of our being-for-others and of our position. Without value, one doesn’t experience a developmental, or integrative, terrain and this affects one’s experience of how one inhabits the world which effects how we experience being,
our intimate sense of possibilities relating to our body as a vehicle and expression of our worth are effected by such conditions because our value affects our access to the medium constitutive of our capacities so that one feels anguish in the face of the limits of one’s existence arising from the recognition of one’s negation. Without recognitions that disclose the circumstantial forms that anchor projection in a medium of mutual realisation, the devalued labour to appropriate being, to constitute themselves because there is a constitutive medium absent that haunts their presence so that they exist will-less, unable to project or act, minimal aspects of sociality become enmired in the difficulties arising from the absence of shared forms. What one can appreciate is the extent to which the individual’s sense of capacity is affected by awareness of their objectivity. It isn’t that being-good-looking-enough leads one to be good at conversation, rather the condition of being good-at-conversation is being-highly-valued: if you are highly valued then people will accept whatever you say and treat you with respect and you will undergo recognitions and disclosures which constitute a fabric appropriated via being-subject to such possibilities as aspects of your presence: you will be “good at” sociality as an effect of the recognition arising from being valued because being recognised discloses the fabric appropriated via being subject to such forms so that one can function conversationally. When you are valued, people want to interact with you so they disclose possibilities in order to realise you because they want you to experience viability because they want to experience the reciprocal constitution of such forms as conditions of recognition and mutual validation. In this way, individuals incorporate forms via moments which allow them to project so that their presence manifests an awareness inscribed via such processes that render them able to press via social mediations into functional forms, whereas the devalued struggle under the weight of their objectivity until they implode into the mass of their social weightlessness. Devaluation equates with social death because one’s flesh becomes haunted by the immanences one experiences being realised in relation to via others responses so that one lacks the animation of a projection born of recognition. The valued inhabit space via capacities for projection that are effects of experiences of being-recognised that disclose the forms appropriated via belonging to a fabric interpersonally constituted via such mediations. The devalued experience the absence of this medium so that they come to grasp their objectivity via the absence of recognitions which arise from being negatively-perceived. What the socially devalued are robbed of, is access to a developmental medium and so they remain impoverished in what their comportment manifests about their way of being such that they bear the sense of an incapacity that is a socially realised objectivity that they experience being trapped in. Without access to this interpersonally disclosed medium, the devalued experience themselves as unable to develop because they experience being unable to appropriate forms so that they experience themselves as unable to instantiate possibilities because they lack access to experiences of actualisation
and this is why they acquire a sense of learned inability that is an effect of negation: experiencing being circumscribed via attributions that constitute the absence of the forms required to accede to possibilities they experience a real incapacity that feels essential because its grounds cannot be countermanded. The developmental medium is access to the flesh of forms others disclose that constitute forms appropriated via recognition and involvement, and negation, constitutes an inability born of experiencing being cut-off that comes through in the following:

I am just totally cut off from everything. I don’t know what to do to get back into work. Without work I am completely cut off. (S: How does it affect you? Do you feel anxious?) Ye’, since I finished I’ve just noticed I start to feel more anxious, and as time goes on I get worse. (S: You get more afraid?) Ye’, I find myself getting afraid to go out, afraid to go anywhere, afraid that I’ll even get an interview and how I’ll cope, how I’ll come across. (S: Ye’, that’s the worst part of being excluded.) How can you compete with people in jobs? Even though I have twenty years experience, now I’ve been out for a year, my confidence is gone, I feel unsure, I feel like stuttering. (S: Ye’ I know how it feels. You get neurotic, I know.) Ye’, you start noticing things about yourself, you get obsessed, ashamed. Like everyone will laugh at you. I feel humiliated before I start applying now.

One gets a sense of the sensuous and cognitive implosion that public processes of devaluation involve for those without the means to contest public space, elicit recognition and accede to interpersonally realising ways of being. One gets a sense of how the absence of recognition constitutes an unrealisation born of an experience of the absence of access to a constitutive medium so that the physiognomic materialisation experienced by being negated constitutes a temporal immanentism born of reduction to a formless condition in which projection becomes impossible, “I feel like stuttering”, the physiognomic is affected, and this experience of being affects the sympathetic nervous system which is attuned via a meaningless experience of being to a fear based on experiencing being negatively perceived, manifest by the development of fear of being-perceived: “afraid that I’ll even get an interview and how I’ll cope, how I’ll come across”. The feeling of stuttering is an effect of the physiognomic regeneration of an inability to project incorporated via the unrealisation arising from the physiognomic materialisation of negation as one finds oneself locked outside of opportunities for realisation without access to mediations which disclose forms constitutive of capacities for projection that are effects of being-there: without access to any interpersonally realising sphere, individuals become possessed of a sense whose materialisation haunts their expressivity as they manifest the
effects of sensing feelings rooted in primal objectivities that labour market mediations merely reproduce. Without access to determinate spheres whose forms not merely carry significance but realise individuals, what can individuals do? They have no sphere of public existence and no access to address this lack of access whose recognition merely leads to the reconstitution of the sense of the absence recognised via its physiognomic regeneration. As this person goes on, "I'm dwindling here. Slowly dying. I feel like I have a mountain to climb alone. I feel finished. There's definitely a glass ceiling". The flesh becomes possessed by the forms of its realisation and individuals incarnate forms whose significance mean they have little to offer because of a negation they endure because of bearing the sense of differences that are effects of positionings that disclose such objectivities. Subject to negation individuals cannot accede to forms whose experience constitute ways of being that circumscribe capacities born of subjection to such forms. Fears concerning his being-for-others are effects of subjection to forms that materialise an objectivity that functions negatively. Enmired in this experience, how can individuals contest labour market positions which value the effects of exposure to forms whose grounds remain unavailable? The modalities of capacities, access to interpersonal forms of realisation, are absent, so this person is right to obsess over his being-for-others, how he will be perceived, and this shows us that how we are perceived depends on the sense we can incarnate which is not something we can constitute alone. Our expressive physiognomy is not something we tacitly summon out of the ether, it is an effect of experiences of being positioned and of existing in a location constituted via significances whose form constitute capacities to bear the sense of the forms you experience being realised in relation to as effects of the interpersonal processes constitutive of such objectivities. Without access to contexts of actualisation, there is little individuals can do to constitute themselves. Without access to a sphere of involvement, what do you have to refer to? There is no medium to project via, no constitutive horizon, one experiences merely the absence of anything and this affects the sense one bears as an effect of being trapped in such conditions. If the subject makes themselves determinate via their active involvement in perceptions arising from their motility, from their involvement in a world whose forms are interpersonally constituted, then it is clear that we discover ourselves via our circumscription and via the involvements constitutive of a particular position. If we become aware of our capacities via experiences of being realised that do not merely employ the forms that constitute our determinacy as subject but develop them as part of an unfolding modalisation arising from the way comportment discloses aspects whose sense we incorporate performatively, then we can appreciate why the circumscriptions of devaluation constitute such a powerful sense of incapacity and force the devalued into an unhealthy condition that decimates their experience of being. The prominence of fears concerning capacities whose conditions require the support of sustaining relational forms manifests the way
the individual’s awareness of the environment of their own body is affected by the constitutive conditions of human sociality: the fears themselves are effects of the conditional nature of cognitive forms: without access to the grounds of the forms, the individual endures awareness of a meaningfulness that is an effect of the contested nature of labour markets. The destructuring of existence is clear, the individual’s way of being implodes into a neurotic experience of being subject to a way of being whose conditions trap them in the effects of how they are triggered and constituted via divisions whose sense are imbibed from the interpersonal conditions constitutive of the sense-relational processes constitutive of human functionality, or, simply, membership, the way awareness of self is affected is clear when the person says, “you start noticing things about yourself, you get obsessed, ashamed”, the devalued become absorbed by their difference, aware of inabilities that are effects of the sense of objectivities that such conditions reproduce. Clearly, physiology, the environment of the body as a place one inhabits, is affected by the meanings individuals experience being so that how they experience being realised in relation to forms which constitute such meanings affects the affective states arising from this process. Without involvement, disclosure, mediation and realisation, individuals cannot elaborate and extend their corporeal schema, they can’t be subject to a progressive assimilation of forms whose meaning they experience being via the modalities arising via their disclosure, and, instead, they experience the chaotic anxiety characteristic of the devalued. Once individuals are subject to experiences of being triggered via such conditions, how can they project successfully? How can they compete with those whose presence is an effect of the progressive assimilation and incorporation of forms born of experiences of being publicly constituted in relation to intersubjective donations of significance materialised as barriers which tacitly refer to those who are made to bear the sense of their difference as a possession of their identity that is continuously physiognomically regenerated via the very mediations constitutive of individuals as economic agents. Lacking objectivity, lacking any means to contest employment and condemned to a purely privatised experience of dislocation that is born of recognition of differences whose sense they inscribe via flesh attuned via the disclosing effects of experiences of being-perceived, publicly, as deficient, as lacking, such that they face the physiognomic regeneration of the sense of an absence as an effect of such mediations, their cognition collapses into a sensuousness arising from a passivity born of negation. Inscribing boundaries via experiencing being realised via their interpersonal disclosure one incorporates a sense via such forms that constitute one’s life, and one comes to experience one’s flesh as haunted by an alienation that is an effect of the relationships that disclose the sense one incorporates via subjection to such interpersonal forms. Ideality makes its entrance with activity, and we see how passivity infects individuals with the effects of a devaluation whose physiognomic materialisation constitute subjective states born of ways of being-in-the-world that constitute modalities which
affect cognition because they rob individuals of access to the developmental medium of others: smiles, kindnesses, recognitions, involvement in an interpersonal fabric that founds meaning. Without access to the public contextualisation of actualisation, individuals find themselves experiencing the chaos of abortive projection as they face the frustration of unrealisation, unable to extend their corporeal schema and accede to a fuller experience of being more self-composed because we experience our flesh being imbued with the sense of interactional forms that intersubjectively donate capacities whose sense we grasp via being subject to such modalities as possible aspects of our being-for-others. Facing an existence imploding via the private hell of public distinctions whose grounds remain unavailable, haunting subjectivities born of such objectivities, individuals feel their hold on being dissipating and experience impairments of executive function because the substrate of projection, comportment, is lacking access to the medium constitutive of being: access to the world. Negation implodes the transcendental field, and individuals face a space of possibilities constituted via the impossibility of them ever competing, ever contesting access to the performative grounds of ways of being constituted exclusively via barriers inscribed in the flesh via ways of being publicly and privately located that are effects of the significances of structural divisions. When you are negated then you face a struggle with nothingness because nothing is forthcoming and one faces a struggle against the absence of anything and an inability born of the inability to signify oneself appropriately as an effect of the constitutive effects of repeated exposure to the absence of mediations that constitute involvement so that your presence becomes haunted by the sense of inability arising from the unavailability of anything.

The decomposition of unrealisation, characteristic of the poorest, inflects the voice, subjectivity appears to drain from them as an effect of a lack of cogency that mirrors their decontextualisation: the absence of the sense of belonging to relationships which disclose the ability to appropriate forms and accede to a self-composure born of finding ourselves via the realisations of others’ disclosures is manifest via a presence that slips away from its own grounds as an effect of the interpersonal fabric constitutive of being. Lacking access to the relations of involvement which disclose forms appropriated via experiences which physiognomically regenerate a facility rooted in being, individuals endure “the subterranean complicity” of “a body slipping away from the directives of consciousness and will” and experience the implied “violence of the censures inherent in the social structures” (Bourdieu 1999: 170). Relational forms imply valuations that have an objectivity that operates via the incorporation of responses rooted in the interpersonal practice of these forms of hierarchy and economic distances are reproduced as forms governing labour market access. This is why one unemployed person can say, “Ah avoid people, yer know, Ah dun’t like guin’ aht, if yer walkin’ people look at yer like yer a loser, so Ah find Ah dun’t like people very much, so Ah keep miseln’
to miseln’". When you lack realisation in relation to anything you can’t act: you don’t have access to the social fabric constitutive of the tapestry of patterns that are utilised interactionally. Because you don’t access realisation in relation to a realm of existence which consists of shared forms whose disclosure are part of the enaction of possibilities relating to recognitions which materialise the possibilities experienced via being-situated via such processes, you lack the resources of sense required to enact sociality. Keeping the self to itself is a natural by-product of finding one’s inhabitation of the world restricted by the significance one experiences being via forms of unrealisation that incapacitate one by situating one via a negation one incorporates via the public nature of the sense of absence one bears as an effect of such elemental forces. The way forms arise via the sense of the way personhood arises against this background emerges in the following:

If yer tell women truth thi can’t stand thought yer an’t got a job an’ thi fuck off. Ah lie to ‘em fo’ a few dates an’ then when thi’ figure aht Ah’m lyin’ thi’ fuck off. Wi’y’aht a job, wiyaht money, what’s tha’ got, what can tha’ do? Thi’ lookin’ fo’ blokes who can offer someaht, tha’ no use to ‘em so tha’ gets now’t. (S: Ye’, thi’ want a lifestyle that you are required to be able so share. What can you do? To do ow’t yer’d need to get a job to get money, what can yer do to do that?) What can Ah do? Mi CV’s just a blank piece’r paper: that’s me, that’s mi CV, now’t to put on it ‘cos Ah’ve done now’t in life. Ah’ve not been anywhere, not done owt, not been aht’r ouse, Ah’m agoraphobic, Ah do less an’ less. Ah an’t bin aht fo’ twelve month. (S: Ahr du yer get food then?) Ah gu to Asda at twelve o’clock, can’t stand crowds, owt to avoid people so Ah dun’t ‘ave t’ talk, sometimes mi’ mum an’ dad do it fo’ mi if Ah can’t face it.

As someone else narrates:

I must keep going out after summer otherwise I become too shy or embarrassed to move among people. Happened the last time I was hunting for a job, I was so embarrassed that I mostly stayed at home until I end up where I never want to go out anymore since I’ve lost the confidence to be with people. You know, I just have nothing to say to them so I stop going out.

What is interesting is that this person describes losing the confidence “to be with” people as an effect of a change in status that affects the nature of how she experiences existing. What is manifest, here, is that being arises from a fabric that functions as a medium of disclosure that
enables access to meanings via the forms constitutive of the moment via which individuals accede to capacities via appropriating their form, it has promiscuous and contagious moments as individuals undergo an introjection arising from disclosures which enable the appropriation of forms which constitute transitivities of sense that are materialised effects of such intercrossings that establish the basis of provisional identities that emerge from reciprocal encroachment based on recognitions of forms that constitute a viability arising from such processes. Without access to the fabric of shared ways of being, individuals lose their capacity to instantiate forms which require the tacit summoning of a mimesis born of being-with others. The light of the public sphere is necessary to our appropriation of our humanity because we are creatures behold of meaning. We are capable of being what we are subject to meaningfully being constituted as and the case of economic divisions show how vulnerable our humanity is to the economic. Without access to spheres of actualisation, individuals experience a loss of their capacities because their capacities require the interpersonal ground of the public sphere. Talking to this person more fully, when asked to elaborate on why they didn’t want to go out when job hunting, the following emerged:

I don’t want to go out when I am job-hunting (S: Why?) maybe because I think somehow people can tell it by looking at me. If I am traveling during work day, I feel that people will think ”why is she not at work at this hour?” and it is also because of the feeling of guilt…I feel guilt for “failing“ to keep my job even though I do know that it is the lack of projects that was the cause. but since most of the others got to stay, I feel singled out as the “bad“ worker. Soon as I say I don’t work you can see people change and it is always embarrassing to have to tell people that you are unemployed. For me, it feels like a personal failure. I mean…with me it is now almost a physical pain in my stomach…cannot eat much feels like a big fist was twisting my innards anxiety, most probably. And it is weird because I am so ashamed at the moment. I feel ashamed of going to work, even, because everybody there knows and they look at me with pity. The mental atmosphere is very stifling, and has been getting worse and worse. The whole country is toxic now it seems, people are even less tolerant of others with different circumstances in life, because everybody is frantically trying to keep their position, some people kill themselves over losing their jobs…horrible. It is this damn recession... less projects since companies have to save money so, yeah, am not going to hand in my notice but going to hope that they will call me back in autumn but...might get the sack later, they have about 5 months of time to consider, the law gives them that right even so, cannot hand in my notice now, or I will lose my benefits for months I can
get rid of them only by finding a new job, then they would have to let me resign… the system is so fucked. It’s like this for people yet more and more come here to join the rat race… the weird part is that I would be quite happy not working, if we could afford it but at the same time, I would have to defend myself to others by having at least some kind of activity, like freelancing or having a small company of my own those would be seen as acceptable options but not working at all is seen as a very bad thing over here. Here stay-at-home moms are not appreciated much either… the work ethic has been so far pretty strict: everybody, female or male, must have a job of some kind, or they are seen as loungers. I dislike it a lot, because autistic people, shy people, sensitive people... all of them get classed as “parasites”. So, once I work out my notice, I’ll become one of those.

As someone else put it, “I get criticised a lot when I say I don’t work, people look down on me, I know that”. As someone else describes, “Ah’m isolated, when Ah try an’ talk wi’ other pakis, like Ah gu to a lot’r Asian weddin’s an’ the first thing people ask is “what yer doin’?” soon as yer se’ “nothin’” yer can see the change, thi’ want to get away from yer, yer see them start slidin’ away”. What is manifest via the experience of the devalued is that the ego cannot found itself without access to a constitutive interpersonal medium that founds the physiognomically regenerated fabric of meanings that people experience being via so that they become possessed of capacities for functionality as an effect of experiencing being realised via processes that constitute the public grounds of functionality. This is manifest by the fact that those whose insignificance mean they cannot access this public fabric experience a reduction to an inability that is an effect of a status whose physiognomic materialisation constitutes an experience of incapacity born of a sense of absence that is an effect of experiences of being realised in relation to public recognitions of a difference that constitutes their negation so that the experience of being negatively perceived constitutes the grounds of an inability that leads people to dread sociality because being socially encountered merely reproduces an experience of insignificance experienced as incapacity. Experience of insignificance is an effect of devaluation that constitutes the basis of the forms experienced so that individuals become dispossessed of the means to function. If you lack value, then you lack access to a constitutive interpersonal terrain and you lack access to the disclosures which constitute the medium appropriated via being valued. As valuation constitutes viability, so, too devaluation constitutes invalidity. This is why one person can say, “I hate social interaction, I fucking hate dealing with social settings, I shy away from it as much as I can”. The experience of inability is an effect of experiences of being unable to project successfully because one’s form of life doesn’t realise one so that one can physiognomically materialise forms appropriate to contexts so that one
experiences an inability to constitute the other successfully so that one experiences both failed projection and a personal failure to be able to function appropriately, interactionally so that one experiences unworthiness because valuationary processes constitute capacities: the valued inscribe themselves in forms whose display disclose forms that physiognomically regenerate their capacity for functionality and these processes operate tacitly in reference to those whose unworthiness is constituted as invisibility so that the unworthy experience the social as a contactless, impersonal space of non-possibility experienced via the unrealisation arising from their negation. Inability is a really experienced aspect of divided societies. Experiences of capacity and experiences of visibility are part of our experiences of being forms whose interpersonal constitution relate to the recognition of differences as part of the disclosure of physiognomically regenerated forms relating to statuses that transmute forms into functionality: if you are subject to disclosures of form then you can accede to being capable of bearing the sense of meanings constituted, interpersonally, via such processes. If you are negatively perceived then that constitutes a sense via a form whose physiognomic materialisation constitutes that objectivity as a sensible property of your being-for-others. Abjection begets inability and insignificance takes the form of a formlessness that affects cognition: when you experience limited possibilities you lack access to the medium constitutive of development and this absence is at the heart of psychological disorders and the dispossession of the poorest. The relation between the sense of being and way of being and how this relates to forms of perceptibility relating to the materiality of significances in a commodified order appropriated via inscriptions that relate to uses subtended by income which inflects the meaning of being, emerges in the following:

When yer’ve money, yer can gu aht, yer can bi confident, yer not scrimpin’ an’ savin’, yer not worried abaht every penny, yer not worried abaht movin’ abaat cos it’s expensive, yer know yer’ve got rait clobber on, nice phone, yer know people look at yer ‘cos th’ looks rait, if th’a’s no money, it’s not like that, yer know when people look, yer dun’t ‘ave what’s thi’ lookin’ of’ t’ bi interested, yer know, yer feel bad abaht yer self.

What is described, here, is a capacity to project born of an assurance in how-you-will-be-perceived that is an effect of inscribed uses of commodities and of a way of being born of security that transforms your ability to exist fluidly, without the restriction of shame that convolutes projection, breaking up the flow of projection because one feels the need to hide one’s poverty, one’s difference, via masking behaviours based on avoidance so that presence lacks fullness, lacks the definiteness of being sure you can satisfy the schema constitutive of
others perceptions of value, as this person says, “yer know when people look, yer dun’t ‘ave what’s thi’ lookin’ of’ t’ bi interested, yer know, yer feel bad abaat yer self”, when you have income you can inscribe traces of forms which validate you, publicly, so that you can be sure you satisfy the schema constitutive of the sense of being a legitimate interlocutor and attractive person and when you lack income you can’t inscribe these traces and your way-of-being is haunted by a sense of absence that affects projection and identity becomes shame-based, “yer feel bad abaat yerself”. What is described is the way in which being is affected by capacities for projection that relate to the meanings being appropriated via uses of the body as a purveyor of sense that require a level of income that relates to assurances that are subtended by the way economic institutions are themselves informed via recognition of such forms as constitutive interpersonal aspects of reality. Without income, it is not merely that one cannot purchase appropriate forms, one cannot project, one’s way of existing is affected so that one can’t incarnate particular forms, the meaning of being is affected by a substrate which affects modalities and restricts cognition and capacity. Being subject to such conditions precludes capacities: intentionality is affected by such processes and when economic institutions are themselves inflected by such processes one can see how the provision of the interpersonal conditions for accession to human forms so that individuals can develop, belong and contribute, is a key issue of public life. It is because of the communal nature of the self and its effusion via inter-relational forms that constitute capacities for cognitions that inhere in the recognition of differences which disclose moments which constitute individuals as capable of responding because they experience being the bearer of sense physiognomically materialised via such processes that individuals experience devaluation as constituting an internal defeat born of an insignificance whose disclosure leaves them unable to project effectively because the interpersonal grounds constitutive of an experience of being able are missing. We are inscribed in the visibility arising from the forms we incorporate via the disclosive grounds of an existence arising from valuations whose mediations circumscribe our way of being-there. Flesh is a medium imbuing sense from its vulnerability to meanings it has the power to express via incorporations that render us subject to possibilities that can diminish and damage as much as enhance and ennoble.

Economic relationships affect forms of life that become sensible aspects incarnated via ways of being-there that arise from the cultures affected by the malaise arising via such forms. As individuals cope with their physiology as a stress-ridden terrain, they are reduced to treating their body in a particular way, to coping with the continuous stress-induced misery of experiences of reduction that lead their bodies to be invaded by excessive stress hormones that demand address via the chemical systems that characterise the sympathetic nervous system. Without realisation, without engagement, without value, individuals have no access to
experiences born of forms which realise them as potentialities and they experience their negation as a complete reduction, "It’s shit, meks yer feel like shit". It’s not difficult to perceive that the internal defeat lower class people face is an effect of the meaning of being forms arising from distinctions whose grounds are constituted via closures that mean, for many, there is an absence of mediation relating to forms of presence that arise from being publicly situated so that possibilities for action relating to interpersonally constituted representational forms of intentionality remain unavailable and the individual finds it difficult, if not impossible, to talk about an existence arising from ways of being that arise from stigmatisation. As one person describes, “Ah feel awkward when thi’ ask mi "what experience ‘ave yer got?" What can yer se’? It in’t like works easy come by t’ get owt anyway so when thi’ ask yer, ahr’d yer answer?" Feeling awkward is an effect of the unrealisation arising from being possessed by the absence of the grounds required to function so that one doesn’t experience disclosures which constitute forms arising from ways of being-there based on recognition and reciprocally determining possibilities. The possibilities actualised spatially constitute an experience of being positioned so that individuals feel the sense of references disclosed via the constitution of space via interpersonal processes that synchronise and facilitate the actualisation of some who can anticipate the dynamics of a type of interaction because they are privy to its constitutive forms, those who lack the means to access such processes feel incapacity as an effect of a felt positioning whose physiognomic materialisation is an aspect of the contestation of public fields, so that, being outside such spheres, they feel awkward because they lack access to the means to anticipate the dynamics of interactions whose forms remain exclusive. Without access to the interpersonal grounds of forms that function as both references and capacities that inhere in the forms of realization relating to ways of being-there that physiognomically materialize capacities born of the actualization of the realization of being-part of public fields, individuals feel unable to project because they lack access to the medium constitutive of human capacities and feel unable to project, they feel “awkward”. The absurdity of entrapment not merely in a devalued objectivity but in a condition that forces the sense of those forms on one, emerges in the following:

Everythin’s just bullshit. Look at jobs, need this, need that, can’t get it, no point applyin’, everythin’s just bullshit.

S: If yer got an interview what’d ye’ se’?

Ah know, "What’ve yer done?" "Why’ve yer not w’ked fo’ eighteen months?" ‘Cos cunts ask mi stupid questions at interviews abaht why Ah’ve not w’ked, what du yer se’?

S: Does it get t’ yer?
Ahr it does, yer learn what stuff means an' just think, "what's fuckin' point?" Ah feel pissed off, like all time.
S: Thi's no point doin' owt, education is same.
That's why Ah never bothered wi uni, it'll just bi more bullshit when thi's now't the' er anyway.

It’s impossible to represent it all in its brutal enormity, the silent anonymous absence of anything that constitutes lives wasted because of the absence of possibility, the absence of mediation, the constitution of degraded objectivities, passively, without even people’s will being active, reduced to states of inert insignificance that constitute the very appearance of absences that corrode the will and embroil individuals in the mortification of an otherness that assaults the intimate terrain of their existence. How do you struggle against these processes? How do you struggle against absence? You are like a creature writhing without apparent cause. Yet it’s part of the very fabric of public difference that the middle classes use economic power to materialise and, thereby, realise themselves as different, as worthy, as perceivable because recognizable by the grounds of a rarity whose sense they bear as an effect of such conditions of existence. For the poor it consigns them to anonymity, insignificance and failure. As the grounds for the incorporation of forms remain unavailable, so does any capacity to instantiate responses that arise from any relevant contextualization. The insignificant are unrecognized and they exist outside of a medium constitutive of human capacities, they have little to say that isn’t negative because they exist via unrealisations that de-realise them so that they are possessed of no cogent commitment to anything they have a stake in, their beliefs are as nihilistic as their lives are barren. What is ‘there’, for humans, relates to ways of being-there that relate to status differences that constitute different forms of reference relating to different ways of being-there so that, for the poor, dispossession takes the personalised form of incapacity, they can’t answer to much socially beyond an existence devoid of possibility, which is why absence constitutes the pervasive sense of their existence and why they find answering to the form of their life, awkward. The potential individuals imbibe via involvements in recognitions which disclose the forms constitutive of appropriating the potentialities of a certain world (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 106) so that they undergo the physiognomic regeneration of capacities incorporated via realisations in relation to the forms constitutive of such actualities, depends upon experiences of being-in a shared world, that is, upon being-there with others, that is, the ‘there’ that humans experience depends upon aspects of the perception of forms relating to what is incorporated via being-present, being subject, to particular ways of being-there and what economic divisions do is affect the mediations that relate humans to others. The mediations constitutive of being-in discrete worlds enable some while dispossessing others and
while some experience mediations that constitute potentialities realised via the actualisation of recognitions that disclose possibilities appropriated via a practiced affinity rooted in experiences of being interpersonally constituted via shared mediations that circumscribe a world via involvement in shared forms that constitute the meanings appropriated via being-there, others feel unable to appropriate forms, unable to constitute themselves via possibilities because they are not subject to the ways of being that are part of the emergence of a subject whose practical self-composure emerges via such modalities. The absence of any prior experience with the possibilities of determinate spheres means that individuals cannot function as a conduit for the realisation of others, they lack the capacity to function as the reciprocal completion of the way of being of others because they lack capacities that are the incorporated effects of temporal durations that relate to a natal experience of intimacies that require a trajectory and involvement. Unable to appropriate such forms, unable to constitute themselves socially, they cannot bring to fruition possibilities relating to the needs of others to function socially so that they are capable of eliciting from others the reactions constitutive of the forms shared via the common incorporation of such capacities arising from the mimetic possession of a shared form of life, physiognomically regenerated via the materialisation of forms disclosed via being-part of a shared context. The experience of awkwardness is a materialised effect of differences that elicit manifestation of an objectivity arising from discrepancies that are physiognomically materialised via the recognition that manifests the efficacy of the difference so that such a disclosure precludes the appropriation of forms rooted in recognitions which involve the individual in the possibilities of representational forms of intentionality. Lacking access to the medium constitutive of development, unrealised, the individual, unable to project, experiences not the fluidity of realisation, but their way of being via a form of being-there that constitutes their objectivity negatively and they experience themselves as ‘awkward’, their way of being is disclosed such that it’s a problem for them, they experience the disclosure of a way of being that precludes functionality so that their human capacities, instead of being aspects of fruition, become a source of frustration and a sense of inability is what is experienced via the stigma of necessary references that are physiognomically regenerated via excessive competition. Because of the relation between the enaction of form, meaning and cognition, it is, sadly, possible for the essential human relation to meaning to be inflected via negation so that individuals experience being unable to function not because their cognitive functions lack the necessary facility but because of the way those capacities are constituted via forms which constitute the meanings they experience being materialized via the necessary reference of differences rooted in divisions. The forms via which they experience being, preclude adaptation because of the way they experience being-there, that is, because of the disclosures constitutive of an objectivity whose consequential nature eternalizes such differences: as this individual suggested, “Ah feel
awkward when thi’ ask mi “what experience ’ave yer got?” and this problem of absence will continue whilst ever it mediates his presence via valuations that are rooted in recognition of the essential relation between disclosure, realisation and competence. Our self-creation relies on capacities to discover ourselves capable via experiences of being subject to possibilities in the course of experiencing being realised in the world. Dispositions emerge from grounds which make possible the actuality emerging from the possibility of the context. Those contextualised experience the materialisation of forms which constitute their actuality, whereas the devalued don’t even experience the conditions of possibility of acceding to any sense of actuality which is why anxiety, fear and neuroses are effects of the de-realisation of devaluation. We retroactively experience ourselves as capable after we have discovered ourselves able to instantiate forms by experiencing being-realised in relation to the contextualisation that elicits them as aspects of ourselves that we experience being constituted via the disclosures which constitute our experience of being-there. Needs and capacities to satisfy them are retroactively determined by our experience of being constitutively able to satisfy or perform appropriately to constitute them, that is they become determinate by being performatively satisfied. Our attempted self-determinations, our attempts to create our self, are limited by the conditions required to enable us to discover ourselves subject to possibilities via experiencing being-there, amidst others who disclose the medium constitutive of our discovery of ourselves via disclosures which constitute forms which physiognomically materialise meanings we intuit via experience of being realised in relation to such processes. We cannot deliver ourselves to competence and, from outside of involvement in anything publicly, we cannot experience ourselves as able. The sense of inability and of fear emerges in the words of one person discussing an interview he attended:

I almost didn’t go when they asked to give a presentation on scale, because I’ve never worked on scale before, I’ve always worked on a small scale, it’s all a different set of parameters I’ve never dealt with and I don’t know how to do it, and so I almost gave up, I made myself go.

What we see is how this person’s experience of being-there determines his capacity for projection: without some kind of mediation, the individual cannot project, cannot believe themselves able to transition and giving-up emerges as the only possibility emerging from the actuality he experiences being. Nevertheless, when the inevitable failure was visited on him, as others judge an actuality bereft of possibility, he faces the physiognomic regeneration of the actuality arising from the sense of a position he bears as an effect of the reproduction of such objectivities:
I didn’t get it - I’m glad in a way it not really my area of expertise. I don’t think I could do it. Yes they said I had good skills but were looking for experience in scale-up and manufacturing. How can I get the skills without a chance? I was saying that to the JSA person I see - they all want experience. How can I get the experience without a chance?

What is interesting is how the individual experiences their inability, not possibility, “I’m glad in a way it not really my area of expertise. I don’t think I could do it”. What is manifest is the way in which his self-determination is limited by the conditions that would have to be satisfied for him to discover himself via an experience of being in the midst of circumstances that would disclose the basis of the responses that would constitute forms via which he discovered himself able to function because of an experience of being able to appropriate forms via the constitutive experience of being-there. Without being situated, without being able to experience the realisation of contextualisation he cannot experience a transition between an antecedent state of possibility to that of a determinate state of actuality (Todes 2001: 175), via a modalisation born of such conditions of existence and instead of discovering himself able to satisfy needs he was unaware of without contextualisation the physiognomic regeneration of his way of being-there, bereft of context, reconstitutes a discovery of himself as unable because we discover ourselves capable retroactively via experiences of being realised via forms that render determinate our capacities via our experience of being able to satisfy their performative conditions, that is, via experiences of being-there born of disclosures that contextualise us via the forms constitutive of experience of being humanly capable of development because we experience recognition, involvement, disclosure, realisation and validation, forms of personhood rooted in valuation. The problem is that a sense of being-able to satisfy the exigencies of particular contexts is retroactively determined, the sense of being able to satisfy the criteria that would govern success is not posited as a goal because the individual cannot envisage what can only emerge from a condition they must experience being-realised in relation to: absorbed coping amidst the constitutive disclosures of form that physiognomically materialise capacities that become determinate via such processes. Through exposure to the grounds constitutive of such modalities, individuals accede to cognitive modalities that are effects of experiences of being mobilised via disclosures whose form constitute them, actively, so that they discover aspects of themselves via the ways of being that materialise such possibilities as actual aspects of their being-for-others. In this sense our attempted self-determination is limited by the conditions that must be satisfied for us to perceive ourselves, objectively, as capable of bearing the sense of forms that disclose the very capacities we experience being via discovering ourselves via such mediations. In this sense we can appreciate why Bourdieu suggests that the
“space of positions may be characterised through their properties” (Bourdieu 1984: 21) because it is the relational forms constitutive of the space of positions that determine the sense individuals bear of differences that transmute distances into what appear to be different properties so that individuals are subject to effects of structural aspects that determine not merely life-chances but the very qualities they experience being. Without involvement in a sphere via which individuals experience the physiognomic materialisation of capacities that inhere in the aspects whose sense individuals experience being via such moments, how can individuals believe in themselves? How can they plan when they are unsure of the meaning of their being, locked in inabilities that are effects of attributions that are constituted outside of acts of will? How can an individual access any kind of constitutive fabric via which they might direct themselves such that they might ever be able to satisfy criteria that refer to conditions of existence that remain unavailable to them? What happens is the same as what happens to the reclassified unemployed in university departments, the individual cannot direct themselves in order to render themselves skilled and, it is not surprising that they remain negatively signified and subject to the same processes of de-realisation characteristic of others whose humanity doesn’t count for anything. The problem is that realisations constitute forms incorporated via recognitions which physiognomically materialise the sense incorporated via experiencing being subject to such moments so that one can’t elicit engagement and cannot solicit contact, so that one incorporates the sense of an absence that is a really materialised effect of the forms of presence one experiences being. Perception of a lack of value discloses an absence whose sense the degraded bear as effects of such processes. The sense of insignificance arising from experiences of lacking the required experiences, that is, of lacking access to interpersonal disclosures which constitute moments via which forms are appropriated, entails an inability to project via the forms required to reciprocally constitute one’s interlocutors because one lacks access to forms of reference that arise as ways of being-there, so that it appears that one is awkward and inflexible as an effect of deficits of sense that arise from the significance of the negation being publicly constituted by those able to use public space to constitute such modalities and avoid such finitude. The reason employers ask questions about experience is because they practically grasp the conditions of satisfaction which subtend the possibility of being subject to intentional states and they want to discern whether an individual has accessed the medium constitutive of the required capacities. It is because experience arises from positional forms that are constitutive of differences in human cognition that such questions function as means of selection across a variety of markets. Because competencies are effects of being publicly situated, the public situating of the forms constitutive of the competence function as emblems of a difference essentialised via the way such criteria are constituted via closures that allow some to monopolise employment and condemn others to a perpetuation of
an experiential absence functioning as an emblem of what it arises from, negation. The intimacy of such processes, the fact they arise via a terrain of meaning arising from the ways of being rooted in forms of life, mean the poor face a world determined via an absence they face being physiognomically regenerated via a position which constitutes the significance of their life’s worth, many, devoid of access to any capacity to be productive, and enter appreciative and worthwhile relationships even with themselves.

The way these negations arising from disclosures which constitute barriers affect individuals behaviourally is manifest here:

Uni’ definitely made me unhappy and border line depressed. Yeah I remember when I was dating a girl who had dropped out. We got really we both slagged uni off but when she found out that I didn’t drop out and got my degree that ended very quickly to say the least. Not talked since. I got my hopes up to go and when I was there, I didn’t gel with anyone, just didn’t like going in or being around the uni’ so I just stayed out much as I could.

As someone else put it, “If yer gu t’ a red brick uni, it’s just stress, yer end up on tablets, it’s inherent, yer thinkin’ Ah dun’t belong ‘ere, yer looked dahn on, is it worth it if yer duin’ someaht that dun’t involve ow’t?” As someone else described, “…university alienates you even more actually. being educated without social Standing separates you from even more People i find until one is no longer part of anything. I was more talked into going to University you know actually. They don’t tell you the truth till you are stuck facing it”. Here we have the usual conditions: blind ill-informed educational tracking, misinformation and then isolation. Education that cannot situate your labour nor contextualise you isolates because it is purely atomistic. As this person went on:

X: I withdrew socially when I went to university, without a doubt. It just isolated me really. Just spent most of my time in my room, had nowhere to go. I got my first anxiety attacks at uni.
S: How long were you there before you had your first attack?
X: It was a year. I got badly pissed one night and put my fist into a glass window so you know that didn’t help and I threatened one of my flat mates the same night.
S: Out of frustration?
X: Yeah I was sick of it and the whole fake atmosphere still am cause it’s spread into wider society now. This house i live in now they are having an advents Party tonight. i was there at the start but it’s the same fucking People as at uni man even
here. this modern polite Techno society. Frustrated and bored. University connects to nothing. It connects us only with instability. It’s just an unofficial dole office. It amazed me after School how many People I later saw in the Rotherham dole Office and then again later at RCAT and then later again in the dole office, only you Show up on the statistics as in education. Modern apprenticeships was the same scam work for nowt and fuck off.

How does this embedding of education in unemployment affect its meaning and the individuals who experience its meaninglessness via such mediations? The repressed status constitutive of the experience is articulated, “It's just an unofficial dole office", as individuals experience their own objectivity being physiognomically regenerated via conditions of existence that denude them of acceding to an absorption in forms arising from immediacies whose disclosure constitute them viably so that the realization they experience leads them to incorporate the sense of forms they bear as effects of being-subject to such modalities, they intuit the real sense of an objectivity the educational process fails to repress because it is itself constituted by spatial and valuationary forms that subtend economic organization. If the education connects to nothing beyond varieties of doing-nothing, how can individuals project? Via what? What frame of reference arises from such conditions, what horizon will constitute the reality they experience the education via? How can individuals, whose education consists largely of little contextualization or contact, appear to be legitimate interlocutors and appropriate candidates when their education consists of this? A key aspect of access to employment is coming across well or being perceived to incarnate appropriate dispositions, if individuals know their social experience degrades them, publicly, and if all they can access is a variation of this experience, how can they project? How can they interface with institutional agents? Without access to some sphere of practice that is constitutive how can individuals access the schema constitutive of capacities for appropriate response? How can they avoid coming across as discrepant, cynical and disillusioned? Wherever there are divisions there are differences in what appear to be competence which are actually differences of status. The poor’s education becomes associated with unemployment and, moreover, the objectivity they assume because of the way they appear as an effect of forms incorporated because of this close association, only entrenches this further. They are processed in such a way that the condition education is used to repress really constitutes them and they face the rearticulation of the sense of this reference in relation to a different form of valuationary struggle. What is worse is that, without involvement in anything validating, the poor exist on a personal terrain that is essentially the same so that they incorporate a sense of hopelessness that is an effect of a contestation in which they have few capacities to determine how they will be perceived because the processes available to
them provide few opportunities for them to exhibit required characteristics because the interpersonal processes constitutive of these experiential forms are unavailable so that they don’t access themselves via such disclosures and, thereby, experience the physiognomic regeneration of an experience of being incapable that is an effect of the same valuationary dynamics that constitute their unemployment in the spaces they exist in because of such iterable, referential, public processes. Simply the same valuationary dynamics operate in educational fields as other public fields so the underlying logic that individuals are subject to locates them in the same ways. The social embedding of the education of the poorest as a process associated with claiming benefits stigmatises their CVs because there is a necessary reference, implied, in the details of achievements that will forever be modest because of the way public institutions are used to generate distinguishing forms that validate the credentials of the rich. How are those who experience their education via such mediations to relate to their education when it is just endlessly experienced as part of an underlying condition whose sense reproduces a devaluation that consumes every aspect of their existence? Where is the mediation? Where is the connection? If there is no mediation and no connection there is no realisation, if there is no realisation, there is no actualisation and students experience only the physiognomic materialisation of a difference born of distances that their education merely reproduces. It’s clear that as those who institute the appearance of educational processes retreat into the networks they use to materialise the appearance of their concern and value the generic processes that students undergo become distant from any opportunities for contextualisation or realisation and they experience devaluation as disconnection: “University connects to nothing”. Without connection, without mediation, how can students render meaningful their own attempt to constitute themselves? How can individuals project? When the references are constituted via forms whose disclosure physiognomically regenerate a sense of inability born of an incapacity to project, through any interpersonally constitutive moments, into a future rendered meaningful via absorption in immediacies that sustain forms you experience being via their physiognomic materialisation as part of a contextualisation that assures one of one’s being-for-others, then one might ask what this type of education does for the poor? If they are just acceding to the same objectivity via another mediation then they can be processed en-masse as part of a charade that remunerates and affirms others. The problem comes when the sense of the charade is oppositional, with academics securing the sense of a validity that leads them to question the sense that lower class students incarnate. The root of the problem is a lack of shared contextualisation that is an effect of the divisions constitutive of the viability of the education. When there is no shared context there is no involvement and when there is no involvement there is no realisation and so, individuals remain insecure, because the physiognomic materialisation of the forms associated with the educational context, that arise via
association via the educational context, are absent, and forms feel alien because individuals do not experience being realised in relation to them. Differences of status are tacitly reproduced via forms that allow for the denial of what is occurring. Moreover, what does occur, arises as the instituted denial of the very conditions being reproduced and academics experience the moments via which they realise others as constituting something, even though all that occurs is a mirroring of the forms that students disclose, so that they experience themselves as making something available and, themselves, undergo the physiognomic regeneration of experiences of being competent whose institution validates them so that they don’t experience the vacuity of a process that is essentially bankrupt because it cannot situate students in any way in relationship to anything beyond a charade that narcissistically realises agents who materialise the appearance of a labour process via associational forms that make forms that function as valuationary forms available to them via interpersonal modalities whose disclosure constitute their experience of being able to be what they experience being able to instantiate because they experience existing via disclosures which constitute such forms. The ability of individuals to constitute themselves is hindered by such processes. Individuals cannot project successfully in relation to academic forms because the grounds of their disclosure and realisation are absent and they experience their attempts as frustrating, abortive and annihilating. Issues of value are at the heart of issues of competence because without value individuals cannot connect themselves to the interpersonal processes constitutive of experiences of being competent and, hence, they don’t feel competent. Feelings of fraudulence are effects of the pervasive invalidation characteristic of generic, abstracted, administrative processes that connect individuals with no real experiences of being competent. Without contextualisation, individuals don’t experience being situated so that their lives run parallel with them experiencing being decontextualized in relation to what they have turned to study to be contextualised in relation to so that they are subject to constitutive processes that affect expressive physiognomy without them being part of anything because they are the source of the derivation of forms without themselves being subject to validating contextualisations that objectify them. It is telling that students production is circulated privately as part of abstracted processes that don’t involve students in any situated functions. As a student one is merely required to secure finances and then submit work to a secretary and one deals, largely, indirectly, with institutional agents via the phone, rarely in person as an effect of the distances that are conditions and effects of the relationships which produce the appearances space is used to constitute. If individuals aren’t contextualised via involvements that disclose forms they appropriate via being situated via such processes then how can they exhibit relevant characteristics? Indeed, many of the difficulties that students face interfacing with institutional agents are effects of the absence of any real context of co-presence. Academics appear to understand little of the exigencies students face
because they have little to do with them. In reality, students’ education is embedded in divisions and relational forms that are part of the extortion of the sense of value which does nothing but reproduce the problems that the educational charade is supposed to address. What is clear is that instead of education being a mechanism of mediation, connecting this individual with the conditions required to accede to ways of being constituted via recognition, disclosure and realisation, it is merely another mediation of public non-existence, condemning him to a privatised existence. It is not accidental that such conditions initiate a collapse into anxiety since ostracism triggers the parts of the brain that process pain. Because our experience of capacities arises from our experience of being-realised in relation to interpersonal forms that constitute physiognomically materialised aspects whose sense we appropriate via being subject to such processes, healthy forms of cognition relating to experiences of being-realised require recognition and actualisation and competition annuls such possibilities so that individuals experience their own annihilation, their own public insignificance, via an inability to show up in fields dominated by the effects of capital. Distinction has to be purchased in order for recognition to become a viable modality. Those on generic trajectories can only collapse into a state of anonymity that arises from the absence of significance of the only forms available to them. When the forms available to the poor become merely generic, then the poor cannot compete because nothing they can acquire counts in fields in which income is transacted in order to acquire the rare. When there aren’t informal mediations of involvement, fear becomes a key aspect of existence. When nothing is mediated, one exists in a state of confused uncertainty as to the immediate present and what one is doing becomes senseless because it is not anchored in solicitations that disclose a reason-for-being-there, one feels one’s purposive life slipping needlessly in a malaise arising from a non-recognition that arises from the perception of the real interpersonal forms that determine presence and significance in fields dominated by those who embody the effects of an ability to use private capital. It is clear that there is an absence of mediation and if there is an absence of mediation then there is no realisation, no objectivisation and, finally, no objectification. What we see is how the repressed context constitutive of the meaning of the process is forever constitutive of its reality, “It’s just an unofficial dole office. It amazed me after School how many People I later saw in the Rotherham dole Office and then again later at RCAT and then later again in the dole office”: the spatial movements that individuals are subject to mirror the way the meanings they experience being physiognomically regenerated relate to a trajectory itself arising via the way they experience being subject to spatial processes that constitute their objectivity, a recognisable physiognomy that constitutes the public reality whose actuality they experience being materialised, interpersonally, via the processes that force such possibilities upon them as aspects of a nascent objectivity, always repressed but experienced via such constitutive processes. What we
see is how the education of the working class is embedded in a context that determines its value via an experience of an objectivity that is interpersonally constituted via recognition of such mediations. One might ask how experiencing an educational process that is embedded in claiming benefits affects the attitude of lower class students to an educational process which is little more than another aspect of an objectivity that is clearly manifest via such constitutive experiences. It is also striking how this person’s dislike of the “fake atmosphere” arises in relation to an experience of a reality that experience calls him back to, as if reality realises him so that he faces impugning injunctions that remind him of his reality so he cannot absorb himself in forms whose fakeness arises from the interpersonal constitution of such objectivities. We also see the onset of mental health issues, “I got my first anxiety attacks at uni” and their constitutive conditions “I withdrew socially when I went to university, without a doubt. It just isolated me really. Just spent most of my time in my room, had nowhere to go”. What is clear is that connecting with others is difficult when you are devalued. Devaluation is sensed via the relational forms, others manifest a lack of engagement born of an absence of significance which is manifest in qualities that attention discloses so that the poor are impoverished because the medium of their being is impoverished. As this person described:

I think it’s related to that direct competition culture. Most of them are afraid of making connections unless it’s directly advantages to promoting their ‘personal brand’ anything else is just a threat and a lot of them have some illusionary high self esteem to defend and since it’s often based on nothing they have to put in a lot of effort to defend it. You can spot them a mile off and they can spot you. They are on the prowl mate, looking for people who can help them out, on the look out of the next sneaky advantage worming their way in politely of course as if they aren’t doing what they are unless they get directly threatened and then they have a hissy fit or hire a lawyer.

What is described here is not merely a mode of operation but a form of self-presentation whose interpersonal conditions disclose forms of self-hood via ways of being there that are stakes of sociality, one based on the manipulation of others via careful presentation of self. This person is aware of how narcissistic such valuationary transactions are and how they involve impugning, invalidating, injunctions. As this person goes on, “It’s an ill society but mostly they are validated. Certain kinds of people are validated and I feel ill”. Social efficacy depends upon being valued, only if you are socially valued do you experience the mediations constitutive of competence via experiences of being that arise from recognition. In this sense realisation and actualisation; or conversely de-realisation and invalidation are significant aspects of the personal experiences.
that constitute reality. Without recognition, disclosure and realisation, individuals don’t experience the security of actualisation, they don’t experience validation in relation to the conditions constitutive of experiences of mattering, to others, and thereby, for oneself, they experience the same destructuring that the unemployed undergo, the same world constituted via the same way of being, arising from negation and devaluation. It is hardly surprising this person concludes: “There’s no way out of Rotherham is there. It follows you”. The same stigmatising ways of being are reconstituted via a different configuration of mediations that constitute an expressivity born of the hopelessness of facing an existence devoid of real connection in which lower class students are encouraged to project without the means to ever be realised. As this person went on:

It’s hard for any of us to really belong to the working class now. My parents and grandparents never understood what I was doing and neither did I. What can you tell them about when you don’t get chance to do anything but study stuff you’ll likely never use? My grandparents wondered why we didn’t get Jobs in factories in the Long term but there were none left. I worked in some but the boss told me in the interview that it was a useless job. As soon as I hit 21 they sacked me because the Minimum wage went up at 21 and they wanted someone younger.

What is most chilling is the statement, “My parents and grandparents never understood what I was doing and neither did I”, one senses the malaise and chronic insecurity arising from not-being-socially-located-nor-realised in any way that make evident, to oneself or others, forms of existence anchored in mediations that constitute the grounds of the sense appropriated via experiences of being-there that validate and objectivise so that one intuits, at any given moment, meanings because one experiences reality via being-them via experiences of being-there born of actualisation. It’s worth asking why would a person not be able to understand what they were doing? Why, and how, would a person not know what they were doing? How can the statement: “My parents and grandparents never understood what I was doing and neither did I”, have sense? What are the conditions that make this statement sensible? If someone was doing something worthwhile, then it would be apparent to them because they would experience being realised in relation to interpersonal forms that disclosed the sense constitutive of characteristics that they experienced being possessed of via the intersubjective donations of significance that they experienced via doing what they were doing. The reason there is such a sense of malaise and caesura is because there is no real experience of doing anything because access to the grounds of the practices becomes ever more unavailable as contestation forces ever more attenuated pathways onto individuals who experience being
temporally and spatially displaced via the mediations constitutive of the appearance of processes that become distant from any forms of actualisation as those involved reconstitute themselves privately via networks that validate them. How is it possible for an individual to not understand what they are doing? When individuals can access nothing that situates their labour so that they experience a reason for what they are doing born of intersubjective donations of significance that constitute meanings experienced via experiences of forms being physiognomically materialised via disclosures that realise them in relation to such forms, then they feel lost, they feel they are wasting their time, they feel a sense of malaise, antipathy, absurdity. If the experience of study is so impoverished that it merely dislocates individuals from ways of being anchored in coping with exigencies whose form realise individuals so that they experience an efficacy as limited as the curtailment constitutive of the form, then shouldn’t we ask serious questions about the ability of educational processes to address deficits arising from impoverishment? In reality, the confusion itself is part of a displacement born of valuationary and economic processes: as credential inflation erodes the value of first-degrees, those who can’t buy their way out of the mire remain trapped in exactly what they turned to education to escape. Because opportunities for realisation require a recognition that becomes harder to attain the more massified the process becomes, individuals experience the conditional nature of the grounds of actualities via the absence of their interpersonal grounds and they experience the chronic malaise arising from the absence of possibility so that they feel insecurity and confusion as an essential aspect of their form of life. Rather than education being a relief from the insecurity of unemployment, it becomes merely another form of experiencing its real interpersonal grounds: valuation. What is described is the decomposition arising from the sociality of negation. Because the education consists of the uninvolvement characteristic of negation, as you incorporate the sense of this negation via the unrealisation characteristic of your processing, you lose any will to attempt to participate, not merely because such possibilities are unavailable ensuring it doesn’t occur to you to ever try because there isn’t anything you might do in order to do so, but because you are subject to a continuous sense of non-possibility which makes it painful to see the forms of actualisation others access without such possibilities being available to you so that the field of the social becomes constituted via disclosures which situate you via an experience of being-there rooted in the unrealisation of an insignificance whose form the education perpetuates. As one person described, “As soon as Ah started uni’ Ah thought “this is a waste of my life”, it was just demoralisin’ an’ that’s what them kind’r degrees do, thi’ just rob kids ’r any confidence”. As someone else described, “When you’re younger you think you get by somehow but when you go through it you realise and you get exhausted”. As someone else described:
The only mates I had at uni were not students, it was some older blokes in the local pub. I got bad stress problems at University actually. I was getting weird symptoms anyway, most of it seemed to be like fatigue, feeling ill all the time, depressed, tired, no motivation, no energy. I’m surprised I even completed that degree. I think I only went so as not to go back on the dole. I didn’t turn up to the graduation ceremony out of principle. My parents were disappointed and they wouldn’t really believe it when I told them I found the place to be a disgrace. I think it’s partly what changed me too but I didn’t realise it.

What we see is how lower class students face a violating de-realisation that changes them, as trauma does, as they are subject to the continuous triggering of exclusions that are interpersonally constituted as forms whose significance they incorporate via subjection to such processes, they endure the pain of the sense of forms whose objectivity will reproduce the grounds of the experience so that their future will, more than likely, consist of more of the same as they face the rearticulation of a logic whose sense they bear as an effect of a structural logic arising from the practical sense of the mediation of such forms as constitutive processes. We see the usual parameters, of loss of energy as de-realisation eats into souls attuned via incapacities born of experiences of being subject to such processes. Without an experience of being realised in relation to forms which constitute possibilities appropriated via realisations whose materialisation engage us via the moments of our actualisation we feel the world empty of significance because we experience it as devoid of possibilities for actualisation and fatigue sets in. Lack of possibility is inscribed via unrealisation as the individuals comes to bear the sense of a dispossession that is a public facet of their actuality. Without absorption in disclosures individuals face being annihilated and retreat to self-medication to address a frustration born of the de-realisation of the meaningfulness of devaluation. In this sense devaluation is inseparable from meaningfulness and inability to act is an effect of repeated exposure to the absence of possibilities characteristic of the poor. As individuals experience their potentiality via experiences of being realised in relation to actualities that preclude the successful projection via appropriation of forms whose disclosure assure them of the meaning of their being arising via such physiognomically materialised processes, they experience being denuded of energy, dispossessed of their own initiative, they lose motivation, they feel themselves fragmenting into the will-less state that the devalued experience being via the moments constitutive of an objectivity that haunts them.

Lower class students bear the sense of an absence that, in the cases of those who commit to education, is transformed via the vacuity of their educational processing into resentment at their inability to constitute themselves in relation to developmental opportunities, while for many
others the absence of cultural realisation is born via an expressive physiognomy little different to others of their group because education merely reproduces the forms of spatial relationships that are constitutive of such objectivities. The sense of absence and of veiled economic differences that become transposed via institutional processes into different objectivities emerges in the following:

It was more like a course on how to market yourself for getting famous in a cultural void I gave up halfway through because I realised I was just buying a degree all you had to do was fulfill the shite criteria eventually I had no fear of failing something what was worth nothing anyway the whole last years have been mostly boring there are no real opportunities. There is nothing interesting in being educated, mostly, I don’t think. I didn’t even earn my degree because after a certain point I didn’t even try and I knew it was pointless. It was meaningless to me. Anyone could do it. You couldn’t fail. What was the point? I lost interest in it. I realised it was a piss take. They need money, they need bums on seats. Nobody cared. They knew it was all controlled. It was all worthless to me. All competence now is just built on status. It invalidates those with real competence too. You can’t prove yourself. Some of the lecturers gave us tips. Warned us. They warned me that it was mostly orientated on the higher paying international students and pretty much that I had to pass anyway for the sake of the university. There were also some ‘qualifications’ we had to pay extra for which belonged to companies, it was a kind of franchise. The richer students buy membership. They bought the extra things so their CVs look better. I had no chance so gave up trying. These People are nothing new though but they have less and less Need to fight for their positions. In the old days they would have at least to have fought openly for it now they just have to be sneaky. Sneaky is the new wise. I’m Kind of ok doing what i’m doing though. I don’t really aspire to anything else now. What can you do anyway with that kind of education you are stuck? I have student debt for what? I live alone but there is no way to establish an identity or any real self respect it’s just endurance really.

S: Did all that affect your relationships with students?
X: Yes because I used to think what’s the point in talking with them, our future’s are not the same.
S: So, it affects how you are able to to articulate yourself?
X: Yes definitely because you know everything you say is going to be looked down on so you think ‘best to shut the fuck up.
When people are written off, we can see that they no longer face the absence of an educational process because educational processes are used to obscure the absence of anything to them because of belonging to a social category which is highly diffuse and, now, atomised, so that the individuals face the individualised physiognomic materialisation of forms that constitute them publicly so that they face an absence of mediation, an absence of opportunity whose disclosure constitutes them so that they bear the sense of the forms they experience being physiognomically regenerated via the process available to them. When someone can say, “Some of the lecturers gave us tips. Warned us. They warned me that it was mostly orientated on the higher paying international students and pretty much that I had to pass anyway for the sake of the university”, then what sense are they introduced to? Facing the futility of a process that merely extorts income without mediating access to anything objectivising or objectifying, isn’t this just another way of living a fate born of a negation whose public mediations constitute the sense of forms that determine their experience? Isn’t there, underlying these different markets, a unified valuationary process that constitutes individuals objectively via differences that affect how they experience being-there, situated spatially via forms that constitute their experience? What is clear is that this person’s experience consists of the absence of anything born of existing negatively via valuationary forms that constitute them publicly, “the whole last years have been mostly boring there are no real opportunities”. People experience being written-off by educational processes that cannot validate them in relation to the doing-of-anything or in relation to participation-in-anything in which they can experience activity and, thereby, discover aspects of themselves that arise from experiences of being realised so that they experience the physiognomic materialisation of capacities whose sense inhere in an experience of being realised via interpersonal forms that constitute the transition from an experience of being a person of determinate needs satisfied via the movement from an antecedent state of possibility to one that satisfied the needs constituted via this actualisation. That is, they experience themselves unable as an effect of the absence of any constitutive possibilities. It cannot be surprising, therefore, that when the author approached one academic who had associated his name with the administration of the author’s labour so as to materialise the appearance of his labour-process, the truth of the position the administrative charade represses, was articulated, “I actually couldn’t write you a reference because there isn’t anything I could honestly say I believed you were fit to do”. The unemployed from distant regions are processed via abstracted, de-realising, administrative relational processes that extort the sense of processes for the southern-elites who dominate UK educational institutions and what is reproduced is the sense of primal, elemental, objectivities. The notion of capacity doesn’t make sense without some sphere of activity in relation to which the education can be used and, as more people are corralled, any relation between the education and being publicly
validated via experiences of recognition that involve one in its use, becomes ever more conditional with the result that it just becomes experienced as wasted time, “the whole last years have been mostly boring there are no real opportunities”. Abilities born of appropriating forms whose disclosure constitute the moments via which we project via the forms we experience being-realised in relation to, facilitate a transition from an antecedent state of possibility to a determinate state of actuality (Todes 2001: 175) so that the individual discovers themselves capable via experiencing being the meaning of the forms they experience being physiognomically regenerated via such processes. Capacities for transition arise from actualisation and presume mediation. When you look at this person’s experience, where is the mediation? In what way is this person connected to anything? What forms of realisation does this man experience such that he can derive sustaining sources of significance via the process? In what way is anything mediated? Without mediation there is no realization and hence the individual experiences their presence via this absence so that they experience exactly what is described, a “cultural void”, his experience of being-there is of the absence of any opportunities to appropriate forms via moments which sustain a hold on forms he experiences being realized in relation to so that he experiences being absorbed and possessed of forms which render him meaningfully able to manifest characteristics he experiences being physiognomically materialized via such moments. The disclosure of forms via temporalized sequences that constitute one meaningfully are the basis of forms of realisation that constitute us, as able, as effects of involvement in a fabric arising via such processes. Instead of education being part of an experience of being consecrated, validated in relation to publicly consequential distinctions, it becomes the means for the derivation of such forms for those who retreat into private institutional networks in order to refract the appearance of a function they don’t perform and the student experiences the absence of any meaningful forms of actualization. As this person says, there “is nothing interesting in being educated”. Education without involvement is not merely boring, it involves misery because individuals are attempting, alone, to develop personal needs, whose conditions of satisfaction they cannot accede to, so that they are projecting in a void and facing the annihilation of the very dispositions they are attempting to incorporate without access to the grounds of their physiognomic materialisation so that their education is characterised by frustration, loneliness and a sense of inability born of projecting in a void: students cannot mediate access to personal conditions in which they use what they learn because the process they undergo is fraudulent: those involved in the field are materialising the appearance of a function without the process connecting students with anything beyond the bureaucratic processes that materialise the appearance of a process and those instituting the process are retreating into private networks to generate sources of value and experience forms of public validation that students don’t experience. The student faces an instituted inability that mutilates
their relation to their own practice, their inability to project or experience realisation profoundly affects their attitude to education. Clearly, the problems of caesura, antipathy and malaise are effects of the structural disconnection of individuals from any context whose necessity, interpersonally, constitutes them meaningfully via disclosures whose form tacitly summon capacities that are the physiognomically materialised effect of being situated so that some forms become inherently meaningful by being aspects of ones appropriation of being, one’s form of existing via ways of being-there that inhere in involvement. What is interesting is how the vacuity of the experience, that is, the experience of the absence of possibilities for realisation, reduces to perception of the grounds of the phenomena constitutive of the possibility available via the study, as the individual appears to pursue a reductive discursive strategy, “They need money, they need bums on seats. Nobody cared. They knew it was all controlled. It was all worthless to me”. When someone speaks in this way, is it that their minds are simple? Do such formulations reveal people whose minds are determined to fix on the basic economic reality or are their minds like this because of the way this reality is disclosed, interpersonally so that they sense their devaluation via an insignificance whose form is constituted via the absence of possibilities for realisation, objectivisation and objectification? Is the aggressive repetition of self-evident banalities not an aspect of a reduction that denudes individuals of any means to believe in forms they don’t experience being realised in relation to? Because lower class students are not indulged, they never develop the vanities characteristic of those who have the means to show-up as worthy interlocutors and, as an effect, they see the interpersonal reality of the economic roots of beliefs that concern the status of the individual. They have a less unreal experience of reality because they are not subject to intersubjective donations of significance which constitute them in relation to realities they experience themselves being invested in. Because their vanities are not indulged, they experience a de-realisation that affects their experience of reality itself. When competence arises from divisions whose sense relate to institutional distinctions, those consecrated are invested in the significances arising from the differences they experience being meaningfully constituted via forms of actualisation that are part of the physiognomic materialisation of referential capacities whose possibility are disclosed via the recognition, instantiation and practice of such differences. The devalued, perceiving the reality being sense-relationally constituted for what it is, just intuit a destiny immanent to the distinctions being physiognomically materialised, “I had no chance so gave up trying”. Without direct mediation, however hopeless the individual is, trying makes no sense because there is no medium of actualisation, no medium of projection that the individual can use as the basis for appropriating forms so that they can experience realisation and know how to carry on, they have no way to respond, they have no experience of a state of determinate possibility from which a determinate state of actuality can emerge, there is no sphere of activity by which possibilities can transform
them into a relevant actuality and the individual experiences themselves as unable to satisfy their needs, they experience themselves as being unable to function effectively, publicly. The individual experiences themselves as having “no chance” and the only reasonable response to the absence of mediation is to give up. A defeat visited on them, every day, throughout educations devoid of mediation. What is key to this absence of mediation is that transitions are not constituted, the individual does not experience being realised in relation to forms that facilitate the emergence of a definite actuality from a state of possibility, they don’t experience themselves as creatures of capacities able to satisfy needs arising from these capacities via forms of activity born of disclosure that constitute them as subjects of particular properties appropriated via experiencing being realised in relation to such modalities and, instead, they experience the implosion of their being born of the obliteration of negation, “I had no chance so gave up trying”. Trying becomes embroiled in experiences of the futility of a meaninglessness that is itself a physiognomically materialised effect of valuationary processes. This is manifest by a sense of humiliation arising from an awareness of an objectivity arising from such mediations and the way they constitute a destiny whose sense arises from the forms constitutive of an objectivity internalised via the incorporation of the forms of an absence rooted in such processes, “you know everything you say is going to be looked down on so you think ‘best to shut the fuck up’”. The pain of having nothing to say but needing to speak, whilst knowing that whatever you say the poverty of your capacity to constitute yourself will be manifest, is hard to express. When you know that everything you say will merely manifest your inability to escape the determining effects of necessity such that your poverty is manifest in an impoverished relation to an expressive medium arising from the physiognomic regeneration of forms rooted in the absence of negation, then your very projection, your very relation to attempts to constitute yourself as a worthy interlocutor are decimated by the absence constitutive of your experience of being. If you access nothing, socially, beyond the curtailment of isolation, then how do you share a frame of reference? The intraworldly aspects arising from being-there are uncommon, alien, you lack access to capacities physiognomically regenerated via forms that disclose aspects of a shared medium constituted via recognition, disclosure and involvement via the physiognomic materialisation of such aspects of human being. When stigma merely rearticulates itself via the reverberations and echoes manifest in the sense of everything one bears as an effect of the negative determination of the absence of any means of escape from forms that locate one essentially, then you cannot help but appear as you are perceived to be because the sense of the forms you constitute yourself via are relational. Giving up is just enlightened self-interest arising from an encounter with being that inflects and infects one’s intimate experience of the sense of the grounds constitutive of your being-for-others. It’s important to notice that the individual discovers themselves unable to function as an effect of
forms that preclude action or realisation. They discover, educationally, not their capacities but their incapacity as an effect of processes of valuation that physiognomically materialise such objectivities as effects of materialisations of form whose disclosure constitute awareness of such modalities such that they bear the sense of their own inability as an essential reference of the forms they experience being. If the individual discovers themselves via such mediations, how can they not bear the sense of such modalities when this is the entry to being, the form of life, they experience being physiognomically regenerated via key social locations? Valuation and meaning are aspects of constitutive interpersonal processes. The valued accede to meaning via the forms they experience being disclosed that constitute them interpersonally so that disclosures born of recognition constitute capacities arising from experiences of being-realised via such moments. It is via experiences of being subject to such disclosures that they experience themselves being-able to appropriate forms because they experience there being instituted as constitutive aspects of there being-there, as part of the fabric of ‘the there’ they experience being disclosed. Being there, involves experience of a distinct there, a characteristic way of being arising from how you are perceived and it is this medium, and the modalities discovered via it, that is the constitutive terrain. What is clear is the way in which this person discovers themselves is via differences whose form curtail and confuse. The individual discovers their inability against a background of differences which constitute a fundamental lack of opportunity that is an effect of the objectivity of differences whose sense inhere in the differences that constitute ways of being-there against a background of such distinctions. What is experienced is non-possibility, individuals intuit the futility of trying via the meaninglessness of the way they experience being-there. Transitions are not managed so that individuals face a de-realisation that is a problem of non-actualisation so that the sense individuals incorporate enmires them in a condition they experience being physiognomically regenerated via the experience of absence characteristic of the process available to them. For the poor, education is just a continuation of the same form of life. Transitioning would involve the mediation of realisations via forms whose disclosure constitute capacities derived from experiences of being subject to such possibilities and clearly this is absent. Because individuals cannot be situated they experience a de-realisation that is just part of the same destructuring of existence that characterises the lives of the unemployed because the experience of studenthood emerges from the same public processes of valuation. This type of education doesn’t help anyone, it just entrenches the problems arising from being devalued. Instead of being connected via mediations to interpersonally disclosed possibilities that allow individuals to accede to different ways of being, individuals merely discover themselves as subject to differences whose consequences are the meanings they experience being so that they experience their devaluation via a meaninglessness that precludes accession to possibilities and the absence of
interpersonally mediated possibilities is manifest via the barren nature of the interpersonal, they find it difficult to elicit recognition or establish relationships because their lives are constituted via barriers whose sense they inscribe via subjection to the grounds of such forms. Those who exist outside of the institutionalised circles of misrecognition whose privatised relational forms constitute abilities to believe in assessment functions bereft of any embedding in anything: manifest by the absence of contact with students which itself exhibits how little use students can make of what they learn, face a demystifying reality they face through de-realisation, non-actualisation and negation. The social nature of competence in an economy awash with credentials, is clearly manifest: “All competence now is just built on status. You can’t prove yourself”. As access becomes more contested via devaluationary processes, access to the grounds of competences become more problematic, making viable educational processes that do nothing beyond add to the problem. One gets a sense of the utter soulless vacuity of education for members of class groups who don’t exist culturally via relationships that involve them in anything. The categories used to render this experience are interesting: “cultural void” and how this void is rendered via valuationary processes that spontaneously relate to forms of meaning manifest the relation between value and meaning, between existing in-distinction, positively, and acceding to meaningful forms whose functionality arise from processes of physiognomic regeneration that intersubjectively donate capacities via forms experienced as meaningful via being subject to such moments. This individual recognises that his negative difference renders the education worthless, he manifests awareness that he’s been taken for a ride by institutional agents who offer nothing because of a competition that favours those with private wealth. He can perceive that competence reduces to status, or income, and that credential inflation has empowered those who can affect the rate of exchange on forms that relate to private institutional processes that constitute fundamental sources of value that are not affected by the massification of a process that can be used to procure more resources for those who command such valuationary processes to secure such resources. We perceive the lucidity of the dominated that condemns the ill-educated poor to lives even worse than their forebears, utterly lost, culturally, bereft of coordinates, alone and lacking sources that ground capacities arising from being meaningfully realised or acceding to sources of self born of meaningful distinctions, as this person describes, he has “no way to establish an identity or any real self respect it’s just endurance really”, that is, he is dispossessed of the means to exist meaningfully in a world based on capital, deceit and the conscienceless behavior of groups who command such institutional bases to ensure their reproduction via ever more effective means now that the clear superiority of their forms are manifest by a mass system offering them greater rewards. We perceive ourselves via an experience of being realised, via a practical self-composure that is an effect of experiences of being interpersonally constituted via forms that allow us to knit
together past and future, sustaining our hold on forms that, via the success of projection, allow us to experience being meaningfully there, existing, for-others, via forms that validate us because they are rooted in recognitions that allow us to perceive ourselves and experience being composed via experiences of being realised in relation to and absorption in forms that requires mediation, disclosure and the validation arising therefrom. Realisation constitutes the self, it is by being retroactively determined, through practice, that we discover ourselves as capable of manifesting forms whose sense we experience being physiognomically regenerated via recognitions which disclose such possibilities as actual aspects of our being-for-others. Because the self emerges via representational forms of intentionality whose interpersonal grounds must be satisfied, it is possible for the socially devalued to experience being unable to experience viable forms of personhood. The negated experience being as a barren terrain, bereft of possibilities because they are weakly related to the constitutive fabric of human existence. People like this are effectively socially buried by the complete absence of institutional mediation until, via the time-wasted on meaningless credentials, their negation has been so entrenched that they are no longer socially or economically viable and they remain trapped, without possibilities. Without mediation, realisation, disclosure, involvement, in what way do those displaced by devaluation experience contextualisation? What is the context they experience via the ways of being-there that they experience? What does their studenthood arise from? Without these modalities they are essentially being constituted as unemployed, via ways of being-there devoid of subject-hood, as this person says, “there is no way to establish an identity or any real self respect”, there is no way to accede to representational forms of intentionality and he exists minimally, never requiring access to capacities for heightened states of awareness that are not, anyway, interpersonally available to him. The extent of his reduction is manifest when he says “it’s just endurance really”, he is reduced to “an ethos which is nothing other than the internalization of the system of possibilities and impossibilities objectively inscribed in material conditions of existence dominated by insecurity and accident” (Bourdieu 1979: 16). Education merely deepens the personal problems of facing such conditions of existence because the worthlessness of this man’s credentials mean that he is in a worse position than he ever would have been if he’d not wasted what meagre resources he might have accessed on abortive projects that encouraged him to identify his worth with a capacity to aspire that the process itself could never validate. Being encouraged to fuse his sense of worth in a pathway that proved illusory, there is little wonder that his sense of self is mutilated by an education that displaces individuals from any means of association and adaptation via shared exigencies and only deepens humiliation and shame for publicly materialising differences in objectivity that become all the more pernicious for being individualised so that the individual carries a deep sense of inadequacy arising from the personal betrayal they undergo via
processes that are loaded against them. The cultural void is constituted via the absence of any way to situate oneself so that one can render meaningful what one is doing in relation to interpersonal forms that disclose capacities born of recognitions which constitute capacities that inhere in such moments of actualization so that the dispiriting meaninglessness that is a real effect of the perception of differences that constitute an absence whose recognition ensures individuals are dispropriated of the physiognomically materialized substrate of meaningful experiences mean individuals find their education bereft of mobilising opportunities that embed the education in something beyond solitary labour and struggle to pay for something that doesn’t exist because individuals are subject to public non-existence because of the way private relationships are used to constitute public forms so that public forms of existence and accession to meaningful sources of personhood are absent for those who experience only the perception of a difference that education perpetuates. There is an absence of access to forms which realise individuals so that they become capable of intuiting possibilities appropriated via experiencing being realised in relation to experiences so that the sense of absence is sustained, just as the education merely sustains an inability to fill-in-application forms because people’s labour is not situated and the absence of any grounding transmutes into an absence of objectivisation so that students experience the lack of meaning of their process and the absence of their ability to transpose any situating into public events that constitute meaningful forms that they underwent so that they have nothing to write on application forms and their unemployed status is sustained. There is an absence of objectivisation relating to spaces that function as objectifications and a restricted access to objectifications that mirrors the mutilated nature of the recognitions possible via practices that involve very little beyond assessment. Because we perceive ourselves via experiences of being situated that presume recognition, an absence of recognition is manifest by a lack of situating of the individual who experiences an anonymity born of the meaninglessness of what they are doing and, thereby, has difficulty seeing themselves as academic because they don’t experience being a worthy interlocutor. Without access to a sphere of effective self-involvement a sense of capacity doesn’t become constituted because the individual doesn’t experience realisation so that they experience themselves as subject to capacities that they experience emerging via forms of realisation that arise from the situating of themselves via recognitions which constitute transitions from a state of possibility to an actuality arising from the grounds of such processes. The conditional nature of attributions of competence is manifest via the anonymous uninvolvement characteristic of the administrative processing of many who experience the grounds of such attributions via an uninvolvement that manifests the way space is used to consecrate some and not others. Constant fear is an effect of an experience of the absence of access to any of the interpersonal grounds constitutive of a practical self-composure born of a
capacity for effective response arising from being-realised in relation to forms whose disclosure constitute such capacities. We perceive ourselves via experiences of being-realised via a background of mediations that involve us in reality in determinate ways. Without recognition there is an absence of any mediations that constitute capacities to satisfy conditions whose grounds one doesn’t access. Those on elite trajectories never have to feel fear because they experience being realised in relation to forms whose sense they bear as capacities for response to a sphere of action they experience being constituted via. Because they undergo the physiognomic regeneration of the sense of such forms as aspects of public identities they experience being physiognomically materialised, they have only to appear to bear a sense arising from recognitions which constitute them viably so that they experience being validated via interpersonal processes that use space to constitute appearances whose divisions are sense-relationally constituted. A sense of being-able is an effect of accession to a self-composure born of discovering aspects of ourselves via engagement with others so that we experience ourselves via intersubjective donations of significance that arise from an experience of an efficacy that emerges via a possession that is an effect of realisations that facilitate transitions that are physiognomically materialised effects of associational processes that constitute transitions from antecedent states of possibility to determinate states of social actuality. Because our capacities are particular skills for effective response to circumstantial forms, those who are recognised and involved have an opportunity to discover themselves via experiences of being subject to a disclosive medium whose sense they bear as capacities arising from experiences of being realised via such mediations. Those involved accede to an experience of being capable that is an effect of there being publicly mobilised via forms that constitute an experience of being-there that ensures that they have only to appear in order to appear appropriate. Those who aren’t recognised, aren’t involved and they experience an absence of access to forms which means they bear the sense of this absence as an inability to respond appropriately. Because sense is an incorporated effect of realisations which physiognomically materialise objectivities born of experiences of being circumscribed via such processes, without recognition and disclosure, without contextualisation via forms which constitute capacities for response that are the physiognomically materialised effect of being-situated via involvement in spatial forms whose boundaries are discretely materialised via such processes, the negated bare the sense of incapacity as an effect of the valuationary processes constitutive of their objectivity. The meaning of their being is disabling and the form of their life incapacitates them. Without involvement the individual has no way to experience a social efficacy that could only arise from realisation. An experience of possessing skills requires access to a sphere of relationships via which we experience our efficacy via moments which realise us so that we accede to an experience of being actually capable of instantiating appropriate forms
because we experience the disclosure of such forms as part of interactions which transition us from an antecedent state of possibility to one of determinate public actuality. Our experience of being-capable only makes sense via opportunities for using that capacity and the more anonymous educational processes, that reduce to impersonal, de-realising, abstracted administrative processes become, the less opportunities there are to experience any reason for studying or, indeed, knowing anything. Being possessed of a sense of capacity means being subject to its physiognomic materialisation, it presumes experiences of being realised in relation to disclosures which constitute its effective deployment. This is why the sense of capacities inheres in capacities for response to particular contexts, it is part of our general sense of activity and, indeed, the person discovers themselves actively via such moments. This is what is devastating about negation and devaluation because individuals, via the form of their life, discover themselves unable, they experience being possessed of an absence of a capacity to respond that is an effect of dislocation that erodes the very basis of their sense of capacity because they discover, via negation, that they cannot be situated, and the disclosures constitutive of their presence manifest an absence that physiognomically materialises an experience of being unable. In this sense, devaluation is incapacitating.
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