Prof. Dr. Falk Ostermann, who currently represents the Chair of International Relations at the KU, was heard as an expert for foreign politics. His areas of interest in particular include European and NATO foreign and security policy. His research associate Dr. Andreas Ludwig focuses on foreign, security and EU politics with a particular relation to Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom. Prof. Dr. Leonid Luks, holder of the Chair of Central and Eastern European History for many years, shared his expertise on the history and politics of the Eastern European states.
“Putin is just a part of Russia”: Historical and political perspectives on the war in Ukraine
In his introductory statement, Luks named the democratic revolution and dissolution of the USSR as main motives for President Vladimir Putin’s actions. Since his election, he has been trying to reverse the consequences of these events. “Putin himself once referred to the dissolution of the USSR as being the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”, said Luks. In the middle of the 1990s still, the Russian civilian population had considerable influence – structures that were since continually undermined by Putin. In this process, two events that happed shortly after one another played in his hands: the erosion of the communist and the democratic system in Russia. The dissolution of the Soviet Union that was experienced as traumatic as well as the consequences of the ensuing economic shock therapy initially cut the standard of living in half. This had led to harsh discrediting of the democratic idea in Russia. “Putin then thrust into this ideological vacuum with his law-and-order principle and a modest increase of the living standard for the population”, continued Luks. At the same time, the ruling groups in this system escaped social control – a fact proven by the Ukraine war. “Despite their successes, the defenders of the prevailing system do not feel as omnipotent winners. The overarching motive for their actions seems to be fear for what they achieved.” Thus, the democratic upheaval in neighboring Ukraine was the worst-case scenario for Putin and his supporters. It was not NATO’s tanks that evoked panic attacks at the Kremlin fearing the takeover of Russia, but rather the democratic ideas that rooted in Ukraine.
Both historian Luks and political scientist Falk Ostermann emphasized that Putin had acted based on false premises in his attack on Ukraine. He doubted NATO’s and EU’s ability to act. “But quite the contrary happened: a new sense of community grew between the European Union and NATO. Although these players do not directly intervene in combat operations, they renewed their focus on defending the alliance”, described Ostermann. This strategy currently largely eliminates the risk for a new world war; however, fundamental changes in the political relations lie ahead and will lead us into times of high political instability. Ostermann pointed out: “Putin currently violates virtually all contracts Russia has signed, including, for example, the promise of protection issued towards Ukraine, for which Ukraine in turn waived its nuclear weapons status.” This was a clear and open violation of international law on the part of Russia. The goal was nothing less than the containment of democratic states as independent political players and the return to a world order in which great powers ruled over other states.
Dr. Andreas Ludwig recalled the fundamental paradigm shift that had taken place in German foreign and security policy within a few days with the planned build-up and equipping of the German military, deliveries of weapons to a war zone or harsh economic sanctions. "Many would not have thought Germany capable of this, as it is often rightly perceived as hesitant." Even Austria and Switzerland were considering making their neutral position more defensive, while Sweden and Finland were discussing joining NATO. These developments will also have consequences for the European order, as the neutral states always served as a bridge between the blocs even during the Cold War. Further, the integration of Russia had to date been one of the main objectives of the European Council and OSCE, that took a heavy blow with the war. “Despite all justified outrage about this war of aggression that violates international law, we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. We have to keep the door open, especially for Russia’s civil society so that there will be brighter times in Europe again”, said Ludwig.
Along these lines, Professor Luks argued in the following online discussion panel with the audience that while pro-European Russians might have been defeated they did not vanish. Regarding the orientation towards the West, Russia had been a divided nation for generations: Already Peter the Great was an admirer of the West. In Germany as well, this dispute was only put to rest with the ties to the West that were established after 1945. “Maybe this war could also be a turning point towards a more European orientation of Russia. Putin is not Russia – the country has more faces. Maybe one of them is even able to push through in the foreseeable future”, said Luks.
Falk Ostermann adds that as long as Russia sticks to its maximum demands towards Ukraine, the chances for a de-escalation in the short term are bleak. “It is not our place to decide whether Ukraine will – as the demands go – become neutral. It is entitled, like every other state in the world, to decide on its domestic and foreign policy orientation sovereignly. That is what the UN Charta says!”
As regards the distribution of roles in security policy matters between Europe and the USA, it could not lie in the interest of the European Union to withdraw from the close alliance with the United States in NATO, said political scientist Dr. Andreas Ludwig. Although continental Europe must make a stronger contribution, it was illusory to think of a shift away. One question from the audience placed particular focus on the German military asking whether an upgrade was necessary. Professor Ostermann described the planned measures as catching up with defense spending: “The Bundeswehr is currently not meeting the minimum criteria that it should. Thus, I think ramping up defense spending is due.” In the medium and long term, Ludwig emphasized, it was important to maintain international support, even if the consequences of sanctions imposed will not only be felt by Russia. “Security and stability can only prevail if we are aware of and recognize the fact that it will only work with and not against Russia – however hard this may sound given the current situation.”