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at the Professorship for General Psychology II

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Moral foundations and vaccination against Covid-19

Principal investigator: Michael Zehetleitner
Project duration: 2022
funded by: Leibnitz-Institut for Psychology (ZPID). Pre.registration, open material and data on PsyArchives.

Vaccine hesitancy, the decision to reject or delay accepting vaccines despite the availability of vaccine services is an urgent problem in combating the Covid-19 pandemic because vaccine uptake is slowing down in countries where vaccines are widely available. Coming closer to herd immunity will be a prerequisite of reducing non-pharmaceutical interventions such as social distancing, school closures, or mask wearing. The moral dimensions of liberty, purity, authority, and possibly harm have been found to correlate with vaccination hesitancy measured as parents’ and caregivers’ attitudes and intentions towards vaccination against child’s diseases. First, from the perspective of applied research, vaccination programs need to be informed about psychological factors beyond beliefs in safety and efficacy of vaccines in order to tailor messaging directed at vaccine hesitant subpopulations. The objective of the project is to identify subpopulations in vaccine hesitant persons and their moral signatures. Second, from the perspective of basic research, the project investigates the relationship between vaccine beliefs, vaccination decisions, and moral values. The current pandemic situation allows to differentiate vaccine attitudes and mere intentions from the factual decision to become vaccinated or not. This allows to answer the research question: Do moral values predict the decision to vaccinate against Covid-19 over and above vaccination beliefs and attitudes? Third, the project aims at a direct replication of a previously unpublished finding of the relationship between moral foundations and the decision to vaccinate against Covid-19.

Psychological science is currently facing a crisis of credibility because researchers have realized that numerous influential psychological studies cannot be replicated. A potential explanation for replication failures is that psychological theories are often underspecified. As a countermeasure against weak theories, it has bees been recommended that psychological studies should make more wide-spread use of formal cognitive modelling to generate more precise predictions. However, it has never been empirically investigated if cognitive modelling analysis is in fact beneficial for replicability. Given the large number of arbitrary analysis decisions required for cognitive modelling analyses, there is the possibility that cognitive modelling is in fact counterproductive for replicability of psychological findings. In our project, we aim to investigate the replicability of cognitive models based on Bayesian Brain Theory in three exemplary studies. First, we will investigate the reproducibility of the analyses conducted by the authors of the original studies using the original data sets. Second, we will examine the robustness of cognitive modelling analyses by systematically assessing the impact of a variety of theoretically equivalent analysis decisions onto the results. Finally, we will test if we obtain equivalent results as reported in the original studies when we perform exact replication studies of the original experiments.

Sure or unsure: How is confidence in perceptual decisions generated?

Principal investigators: Michael Zehetleitner and Manuel Rausch
Project staff: Sebastian Hellmann,
Project duration: 2019 – 2023
funded by: German Research Foundation

Human observers are frequently faced with the need to respond to external objects although perception of these objects is incomplete or distorted. In these cases, it is necessary to use the percept of the object to make a decision which of several possible objects is present at the moment. In general terms, these decisions are characterized by three properties: First, humans can make a correct or an incorrect decision which of the objects is present. Second, it may take varying periods of time until a decision is accomplished. Finally, humans may feel a greater or lesser degree of confidence about having made the correct decision about the object. However, the existing mathematical theories of decision-making are not able to provide a satisfactory explanation for accuracy, decision time, and confidence at the same time. The goal of the present project is to provide and test a mathematical theory of choice, confidence, and decision time. For this purpose, we aim to extend the weighed evidence and visibility model, a recently proposed theory of choice and confidence, to include decision time as well.

Modeling confidence and reaction times in perceptual decisions

Principal investigator: Manuel Rausch
Project duration: 2017 - 2018
funded by the KU-specific research funding proFOR+

Human beings often face situations with the need to react to external objects although perception of these objects is incomplete or distorted. These situations force humans to make so-called perceptual decisions, i.e., they need to select an action depending on what is the most likely state of the world. Perceptual decisions are characterized by three aspects. First, a perceptual decision can be correct or incorrect. Second, when making a perceptual decision, humans experience a specific degree of confidence that a decision is correct. This means they can be sure that their choice is correct, or they can think that a correct decision is unlikely. Finally, it may take a shorter or a longer period of time until people have settled on a decision. An adequate theory of perceptual decision making should be able to account for errors, confidence, as well as decision times. The goal of the project is to develop a mathematical model that is able to explain errors, confidence and decision times at the same time.