Professor Stüwe, is democracy as a system of government really experiencing a fundamental crisis or is it simply being put to the test?
In the sense of its Greek root, the term ‘crisis’ means a decisive turning point. The subsequent developments can be good or bad. Considering the dramatic shifts that have taken place in terms of the political constellations in some established democracies, it is clear that democracy as a form of political order has reached such a turning point on an international scale. The Brexit vote in the UK, the election of Donald Trump in the USA, the success of right-wing populist parties in countries such as the Netherlands, France, Austria, and Switzerland, but also in Germany, demonstrate that today elections and referendums can lead to results that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. In this respect, liberal democracy is indeed experiencing a crisis. But what will the consequences of these changes be? It is too early to answer this question yet. We cannot rule out that democracy will suffer damage if the current trend continues. The polarization between parties could become even more extreme, it could become more difficult for coalitions to form, and populist majorities could put the liberal dimension of democratic states at risk. But this scenario does not necessarily have to become a reality. Bearing in mind the increasing voter turnouts and increasing interest in politics among the population that we are seeing, the crisis could have positive effects on democracy. Furthermore, surveys show that many voters who vote for populist parties do not hold strong radical views, but instead feel insecure and want to protest.
Is it overly simplistic to attribute the success of parties such as the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) and similar right-wing groups in other countries to ‘populism’?
The success of populist parities that we are currently seeing has a great deal to do with a feeling of insecurity. The R+V study Die Ängste der Deutschen 2016 (The fears of the German people 2016) recently came to the conclusion that fears had increased more quickly in the space of this year than in any of its previous surveys. Many people in Germany and other democracies feel insecure because they are scared of terrorism and crime, social decline and the loss of their cultural identity. We are seeing similar developments in other countries. It seems to me that in recent times, when it comes to safety, a considerable discrepancy has developed between the views of political elites and those of a large section of the electorate. While the established parties and the majority of the media repeatedly emphasize that our safety is not at risk and that concerns are not grounded in facts, many people perceive problems. Let us take crime as an example: Overall, the number of crimes has barely increased over the past few years. In this sense, Germany is still as safe a country as it was before. However, incidences of domestic burglary – a crime that citizens register particularly strongly – have increased significantly in recent years. It is fair to say that both sides are right and that is the paradox of the current situation. However, the consequences of these differences of perception are dramatic: Much trust has been lost. Voters trust in the politicians who are in office has been damaged considerably. According to recent surveys, two thirds of Germans do not believe that politicians are up to their jobs. Populists take advantage of this situation by focusing on the negative news to increase fears or even using lies.
How can the democratic system regain the trust that has been lost?
Citizens have not lost trust in the democratic system itself. On the contrary, surveys show that a clear majority of Germans (77 percent) still consider democracy the best form of government. On the other hand, they have lost trust in politicians. The fact that the AfD has attracted votes from across the political spectrum – from former SPD and CDU voters but also from people who previously voted for the left – shows that all of the established parties have lost trust. And this loss of trust is by no means only among AfD voters; it can be found throughout the electorate. In a survey by the Allensbach Institute after the regional elections for the Landtag in Baden-Württemberg, 46 percent of citizens stated that they were pleased with the AfD’s performance because the established parties needed to be taught a lesson. This should be a warning signal. When lots of people feel that their concerns and needs are being ignored by politicians, they will seek alternatives. This makes it easy for populists. Politicians must therefore work to ensure that no one feels neglected. Furthermore, political decisions must be justified and support must be sought for them. We have to ask whether the established parties have always succeeded in this in recent years. But as citizens we all bear a responsibility. Criticizing politicians seems to have become a kind of national sport in many cases. Politicians make mistakes, but not all of the accusations made against them are justified. Unfortunately many citizens assess the political process on the basis of standards that have little to do with the functional logic of parliamentary democracy or do not take into account the complexity of political issues. For this reason, we as citizens must promote political education. Those with a capacity for political judgment will not be tempted by populism.
Prof. Dr. Klaus Stüwe is Chair of Comparative Politics and Vice President for International Affairs and Profile Development at the KU.
Professor Schieren, did the British electorate risk more than they intended to in an attempt to teach the established politicians a lesson, or does the vote for Brexit really reflect a fundamental stance?
Many voters may indeed have risked more than they intended to. But this does not mean that there has been a change in the general political mood. Polls suggest that a new referendum would produce the same 52:48 result in favor of leaving the EU. This alone shows that this important referendum was about much more than teaching the government a lesson. Without a doubt, there is great mistrust in the so-called establishment – the slogan ‘taking back control’ was crucial. I believe that the desire to be able to go back to making decisions without the ‘interference’ of the EU was a decisive factor.
Now that some time has passed since the vote, how severe do you think the consequences will be for Europe and for the UK once the exit has taken place?
The economic consequences will be considerable for both parties. The EU will lose its strongest member in terms of foreign and defense policy. In light of the current state of the world, this can only lead to increased military spending. But maybe Brexit will prove to be the warning signal that was needed for the EU to move away from its path towards further integration and react to the problems and needs of the member states with more flexibility, leave more room for diversity, and become less dogmatic and more pragmatic. EU politics is based on principles, but real life is different and takes place elsewhere.
Back in the summer there were fears that Brexit could lead to a domino effect. Will they continue in the coming years – is the EU staring to dissolve?
This will depend greatly on whether there is a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ Brexit. In this regard, both the UK and the EU are facing a dilemma. A ‘soft’ Brexit that keeps Britain close to the EU, similarly to Norway, would be sensible. But this could lead to other states wanting to follow Britain’s example and seeing leaving the EU as an advantage. Fear of a domino effect is currently widespread in Brussels. For this reason, a ‘hard’ Brexit looks more likely. But this will not guarantee the stability of the EU. I do not think that we can rule out dissolution. But that does not have to be the end. I think it is likely that the dissolution of the EU would not be a disorderly process. Instead, clubs of different states with similar interests would join together and find the solution that suits them best. This changed Europe would be a Europe in which developments take place at different speeds. This issue will ultimately be decided by the euro.
Prof. Dr. Stefan Schieren is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Work, of which he is the dean.
Professor Luks, critics of democracy in Russia associate the end of the Soviet Union with, above all, a loss of power. Putin draws on this and underlines his country’s hegemonic claims in his politics. What foundations can democracy build on in Russia?
Russia has always been a divided country. There have been people on one side who primarily admired the country’s imperial greatness, while on the other side were people who value freedom above all else. The advocates of freedom in Russia have developed a reputation as the eternal losers. Even in the periods where they governed the country, such as in 1917 or in the early 1990s, they never remained in power for long. They were quickly replaced by their opponents – the supporters of the imperial power vertical. But these developments were by no means inevitable. Other solutions to the various crises that happened in Russia would have been conceivable. Both the ‘first’ Russian democracy established in 1917 and the ‘second’ democracy that emerged after the August Coup in 1991 had a political potential that they did not harness, for whatever reason, and this benefited their opponents (the Bolsheviks and the advocates of Putin’s ‘guided democracy’ respectively). This potential still exists today. The rulers in the Kremlin are well aware of the opportunities that democrats would have for advancement if guided democracy were to experience a crisis. This is one of the reasons why they try to chase democratic groups off the political stage completely. The question of whether they will succeed remains unanswered.
Several years ago hundreds of thousands of people in Russia protested against the government and accused them of committing fraud during the legislative elections. Three months later Putin won the presidential election for the third time. How do these events fit together?
Although the protests against massive manipulations in the Duma elections of December 2011 were a complete surprise for the public, both in the West and in Russia, the Russian opposition was still not in a position to mobilize a wider range of social groups within the population. A ‘colorful’ revolution, like those in Georgia or Ukraine (2003, 2004, 2013/14), did not take place in Russia. In 2011 and 2012, Putin’s people benefited from continued widespread discrediting of democratic ideas that had been observed in Russia since the beginning of the 1990s. The economic ‘shock therapy’, which had reduced the standard of living by almost half, and the break-up of the Soviet Union, which was also a shock for many Russians, contributed considerably to this discrediting. Vladimir Putin benefited from the erosion of both the communist and democratic models of society that followed one another in quick succession. In was in the resulting ideological vacuum that the Putinist system broke through, emphasizing the principle of law and order and bringing about a modest improvement in living standards thanks to the temporarily high price of fossil fuels. For all these reasons, the system of guided democracy that developed under Putin was initially very popular. But one thing that was often left unconsidered was that in a guided democracy the ruling groups take control away from the people, which can have dangerous consequences for the country.
Against this background, what chances does a democracy have in Russia?
Today, many analysts, both Western and Russian, are of the opinion that Russia is not suited to a traditional democracy. However, the proponents of this theory do not take into account the fact that the Russian population has made a ‘democratic choice’ several times over the course of the last century. For example, in the Constituent Assembly elections in November 1917, around 70 percent of the electorate voted for parties that wanted to establish a system of freedom in Russia, while the anti-freedom Bolsheviks only received 24 percent of the vote. That the Bolsheviks brutally disregarded the voters’ decision and dissolved the Constituent Assembly is another story. However, they paid a high price for this, as in doing so they deprived their rule of all democratic legitimacy. When a human rights movement that campaigned for transparency (Glasnost) and freedom of expression emerged in Russia in the 1960s, many observers thought the efforts of this small group of nonconformists was pure quixotism. The human rights advocates themselves thought the same thing. Their often-quoted toast was ‘let's drink to the success of our hopeless endeavor’. However, on June 12, 1991, the supporters of the democratic ideals that were apparently so hopeless in Russia received 57 percent of the vote in the first free presidential elections in Russian history.
On the subject of the failure of the ‘second’ Russian democracy: History has shown that breaking out of a totalitarian dead-end is incredibly difficult. It is very difficult to achieve without a great deal of external support. The fact that Germany was able to build stable democratic structures relatively quickly after the collapse of civilization from 1933 to 1945 was closely linked to the Marshall Plan and the other assistance provided by the states of the free world. Similar conclusions can be drawn about some Central and Eastern European states that became candidates for joining the EU after the dissolution of the Eastern Block. Without considerable external assistance, this time from the EU, the relatively quick establishment of democratic structures in these countries would hardly have been imaginable. The pro-Western groups in post-Soviet Russia who still dominated its political class in the 1990s also sought a close relationship with the West. However, this only happened to a limited extent. An opportunity was missed, and Russia had to make the difficult transition from a closed to an open society largely alone. This also made the transformation processes in the country more difficult and eventually led to the discrediting of the democratic ideals mentioned above.
When you consider that Putin’s popularity is at an incredibly high level right now, the idea that the country might turn its back on the current imperial nationalist trend is difficult to imagine. On the other hand, we should not forget that Russia has surprised the world on more than one occasion over the past few decades. For example, almost no one expected that on June 12, 1991, after 73 years of communist indoctrination, the Russian people would elect as its president, of all people, Boris Jelzin, the symbol of Russian democracy at the time, with 57 percent of the vote. The current trend, which is going in the other direction this time, could turn around one day too.
Prof. Dr. Leonid Luks was Chair of Central and Eastern European History and director of the Center for Central and Eastern European Studies at the KU until his retirement in the winter semester 2012/13.